Capital, labour and economic performance in the engineering construction industry: 1960-1990 by Korczynski, Marek
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2470
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
CAPITAL, LABOUR, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE ENGINEERING 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 1960-1990. 
Marek Dariusz Korczynski, B. A. (Hons. ), M. A. (Distinction). 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph. D. in Industrial and 
Business Studies, at the University of Warwick. 
Research undertaken in the Department of Industrial Relations and 
Organisational Behaviour. 
Submitted: May, 1993. 
ABSTRACT 
This study engages with the debates on industrial relations and 
economic performance at the micro-level. Primarily; this issue 
has been addressed through the production function approach which 
seeks to correlate a variable for unionisation with an economic 
performance measure. Criticisms are put forward which stress the 
technical limitations of existing studies, the limitations of 
statistical studies in examining social processes, and 
theoretical problems with the production function approach. The 
literature recognises the need for a detailed, processual case 
study. The thesis is such a case study, examining the 
Engineering Construction Industry, i. e. the building of large 
power stations and process plants, from 196-0- to 1 990 _ The 
principal research methods were archive work and interviewing. 
The industry was chosen because it constituted a 'crucial' case 
for the argument that labour militancy underlay the UK's poor 
economic performance in the 1960s and 1970s. The industry was 
characterised by widespread militancy and large project overruns, 
the assumption (tested within the thesis) being that the former 
caused the latter. 
The key finding is that the chronic project delays were at root 
due to the opportunistic practices of contractors who 
deliberately and covertly delayed construction in order to force 
the client into offering extra payments. A key profit focus of 
contractors lay in exploiting opportunities to generate 
additional payments. The widespread militancy of the 1960s and 
1970s exacerbated overruns, but the key significance of militancy 
was that it was used as a tool. by contractors'in reproducing 
beneficial commercial relations with clients. The improvement 
in performance in the 1980s was at root due to the rise of 
managing contractors who curbed opportunism. Unconstrained by 
high levels of labour militancy, managing contractors adopted a 
low trust route to improve project performance, implying that the 
basis for longer term development has not been laid. 
A 'crucial' case study of the British worker argument has 
rejected the thesis that militancy underlay poor performance. 
The relationship between opportunism, militancy and poor 
performance uncovered within the study potentially has relevance 
for other important sectors of the UK economy. 
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Glossary of Contract Terms 
Types of Contract 
There are two main dimensions to a contract - basis of payment, 
and scope of work. Distinctions within both dimensions need to 
be made. 
1. Basis of Pa_vrnent 
a. Fixed Price/Lump Sum 
Here a contractor bids, a. price for a defined piece of work. When 
a bid is accepted by the client the price quoted by the 
contractor becomes the 'fixed' amount of money that the 
contractor will receive, 
ký 
, 
Schedule of Rates 
Here a contractor bids a price for a less well defined piece of 
work on a p_ro rata basis. P. -a. 
for a leb said to involve 
approximately 4,000 metres of Piping, the contract will involve 
a price Der metre of Dining which will be Paid for each metre 
above this amount- 
c. Reimbursable 
In its simplest form a cost reimbursable contract provides for 
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the reimbursement of the contractor's actual on-site costs, and 
for the payment of a fee which will include overheads and 
profits, 
Scope of Work 
a. Design/Engineering 
The client gives information to the contractor concerning the 
Process required of the finished plant (or a particular part of 
the plant) and from this the contractor designs/engineers 
appropriate drawings. 
h. Prociiremen t 
This area involves taking responsibility for the manufacture 
and/or arrival on site of pieces of plant which will he assembled 
in the construction of the plant, 
c. Construct 
Here the contractor is responsible for assembling on site the 
plant items in line with the design drawings. 
Types of contractor 
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1. Managing Contractor 
A managing contractor is an external organisation appointed by 
the client to manage and co-ordinate the design and construction 
phases of a project. 
ý_ Turnkey Contractor 
Effectively a sub-set of management contracting, here detailed 
design, construction and management are undertaken by one 
contractor. This contract is paid on a lump sum basis, 
Direct Contractor 
A direct contractor is one who does not undertake managing 
contracting functions, is concerned with construction, and has 
a direct contract with the client, 
4. Sub-contractor 
A sub-contractor has no direct contract with the client, but is 
appointed by another contractor to undertake a piece of work. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FROM INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
Industrial relations in the UK, both as a field of study and as 
a practice, is in crisis. Apparently stable institutions and 
assumptions are being put into question. Whilst departments of 
industrial relations in Universities in the country are 
increasingly subsumed into business studies or are redefined as 
departments of human resource management, levels of unionisation 
continue to decline, management at greenfield sites seek single 
union 'no strike' agreements, and the latest survey of workplace 
industrial relations concludes that it is now no longer possible 
to speak of a single system of industrial relations in the UK 
(Millward et al., 1992). 
This chapter argues that the root of this crisis is the break-up 
of the Keynesian management of the macro-economy, the break-up 
of markets, and changing nature of international competition. 
The crisis in industrial relations as a field of study stems from 
the disintegration of the concept of industrial relations as a 
distinct and separate social area, and suggests two alternative 
forms of development -a transformation into the study of human 
resource management within the increasingly unitarist study of 
businesses and management, or a transformation into the study of 
the political economy of production which allows for an 
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understanding of social relationships as power relationships. 
This thesis, by examining the relationship between industrial 
relations and economic performance, using the engineering 
construction industry as a case study, seeks to contribute 
towards the development of the study of the political economy of 
production. 
The first substantive section of the chapter highlights the 
crisis in industrial relations and articulates the consequent 
importance of studying the links between industrial relations and 
economic performance. The final section outlines the structure 
of the thesis, and the central points addressed in each chapter. 
1.2. Crisis in Industrial Relations 
As Hyman (1989: 120) has noted, 'the very term 'industrial 
relations' is indicative of the character of the subject which 
it denotes. It forms an area of study with no coherent 
theoretical or disciplinary rationale, but deriving from a 
directly practical concern with a range of 'problems' '. And yet 
given that the study of industrial relations did flourish this 
indicates that there was a perception of industrial relations as 
a distinct social area. The seminal statement of this perception 
was Dunlop's 1959 book, Industrial Relations Systems, which 
gained widespread currency in the UK and the USA. Dunlop argued 
that a distinct industrial relations system could be identified 
3 
as existing, bounded by, but largely separate from, the realm of 
technology, the market, and the nature of power in the larger 
society. 
Prevalent at the same time was the thesis of convergence of the 
characteristics of advanced industrial societies proposed by Kerr 
et al. (1960). While the main thrust of the convergence thesis 
concerned the nature of wider social stratification the argument 
also applied to the characteristics of industrial relations - as 
Goldthorpe (1984: 322) notes, 'their expectation clearly was that 
as labour unions 'matured'.... and concentrated their efforts on 
pragmatic collective bargaining and pressure-group activities, 
they would come to form a quite integral part of pluralistic 
industrialism'. 
These concepts of a semi-autonomous industrial relations system 
and of a convergence of industrial relations' characteristics are 
related. Underlying each was the particular material context of 
the form of political economy established in the leading 
capitalist countries in the post-war period. 
The important elements in this post-war political economy were 
Keynesianism, mass production and primarily economistic trade 
unions. The conditions of full employment (central to 
Keynesianism), pattern wage bargaining (see Piore and Sabel, 
1984: 80-84), and unsaturated mass markets in effect set a context 
which both allowed observers to argue that industrial relations 
were separate from the economic sphere, and further that there 
4 
were increasing similarities in the advanced capitalist countries 
in the institutions of industrial relations. Yet, what appeared 
as a form of autonomy was in fact a particular, temporally 
specific, type of relationship between industrial relations and 
the economy, and what appeared as a trend towards convergence was 
in fact a configuration specific to the post-war period and 
strongly influenced by the strong role of the USA politically in 
the immediate post-war period. 
As divergence in economic performance of the competing advanced 
countries became manifest, and as divergences in the nature of 
their industrial relations became manifest, so the thesis that 
industrial relations existed as a distinct and separate social 
area was increasingly put into question. 
The form of the political economy of the post-war settlement can 
be broadly characterised as one of 'pluralistic industrialism' 
(Goldthorpe, 1984: 322), in which trade unions were accepted as 
legitimate actors, full employment was guaranteed, and labour 
movements turned their attention away from political goals 
towards regulating wages. These were the key characteristics 
that emerged from the New Deal settlement in the USA. The USA 
played an important sponsoring role in creating this form of 
political economy, in a sense equalising the social costs that 
underlay international competition. Keohane (1984: 16) notes 'how 
conditions in the world political economy and American policy 
during the 1950s and early 1960s facilitated European economic 
growth and reduced the severity of dilemmas facing European 
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governments seeking to combine capitalism, increased openness 
with respect to the world economy, and social welfare'. The AFL- 
CIO and the USA government objected to the entry of Spain into 
the international system of free trade unless free trade unions 
were established in the country. General McArthur deposed the 
socialist government in Japan in 1947. The AFL-CIO objected, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to the establishment of co-determination 
in West Germany. 
There were a number of contradictions and tensions within this 
form of post-war political economy. Keynesianism was primarily 
based upon a model of a closed economy. With the 
internationalisation of markets the level of penetration of 
imports into domestic economies increased and the option of 
reflating the domestic economy became increasingly unavailable 
(the clearest manifestation of this being Mitterand's failed 
attempt to reflate the French economy to full employment in the 
1early 1980s). The existence of 
full employment allowed trade 
unions to increase their demands in both economic and political 
terms - there emerged 'a new 'maximising' militancy in collective 
bargaining, encouraged.... by the weakening of traditional 
legitimations of class inequalities.... as well as by the rising 
confidence of trade unionists in the bases of their organised 
power', in the words of Goldthorpe (1984: 322), or in the words 
of Skidelsky, there was a 'breakdown of the market and social 
disciplines that previously restrained wage demands' (1979: 69). 
Therefore, the state in many advanced capitalist countries sought 
to bargain with trade union leaders in a form of neo-corporatism. 
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Another important consideration was that whilst social costs were 
() I 
broadly equalised at the level of competing countries, the 
ýýý 
incentive existed for individual firms within countries to seek 
to move from production entailing adversarial economistic trade 
unions. The actions of individual firms were able to transform 
the systems of industrial relations within countries. Within the 
USA, the sponsor of the form of pluralistic industrialism, firms 
sought to exclude trade unions. This led to substantial falls 
in the level of union density in the USA. In Japan, firms were 
increasingly able to mould trade unions away from adversarial 
economism towards a form of incorporated enterprise union. In 
instances this entailed the deliberate policy of firms in 
breaking socialist trade unions and creating company unions. The 
case of West Germany is more difficult to characterise, but it 
is clear that the system of co-determination led to a form of 
industrial relations very different from a pluralistic 
industrialism. 
In short, the equalising of social costs in the post-war 
political economy broke down. As divergences in the nature of 
industrial relations emerged so did divergences in the economic 
performance of the competing advanced capitalist economies. The 
Japanese economy grew rapidly, the West German economy performed 
well on a number of indicators, France performed less well, 
whilst the economic performance of the UK was poor relative to 
the other advanced capitalist economies. 
This increasing divergence in both industrial relations and 
7 
economic performance between countries has led to a re-awakening 
at a number of levels in the examination of the links between 
industrial relations and economic performance. Increasingly, 
Dunlop's concept of an semi-autonomous industrial relations 
7 system became untenable. The intimate and complex connections 
between politics, the market and technology and industrial 
relations became more difficult to ignore. 
The consequent academic re-examination of the relationship 
between industrial relations and the economy has taken two main 
forms. The first form is the redefinition of the study of 
industrial relations as the study of human resource management. 
Implicit in human resource management is the concept that the 
nature of employee relations is a key determinant of economic 
performance, such that long term strategies towards employees, 
fostering loyalty and cooperation, should form an important part 
of the wider business strategies of firms. Just as the practice 
of human resource management in production is the attempt to 
create such an integration of strategies so the study of HRM has 
increasingly focused on integrating market and personnel 
strategies and on the methods of creating cooperation and 
loyalty. Hyman is clear on the consequences of such a 
redefinition :- 'one response is to redefine industrial relations 
in terms of the management of the employment relationship.... the 
job description of the industrial relations scholar-consultant 
is then unambiguously to aid, advise and reinforce management in 
exerting unilateral control over the workforce' (1989: 12-13). 
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There are a number of problems with a redefinition of industrial 
relations as HRM. As Hyman implies, there is a strong 
managerialist, and hence unitari st, core to HRM. It does not 
allow for a conception of the employment relationship as a 
misbalanced power relationship in which management seeks to exert 
control in translating the labour power purchased at the point 
of contract into actual labour within the production process. 
Moreover, such a redefinition falls prey to a similar fault that 
underlay Dunlop's project - that of conceptualising A particular 
form of the relationship between industrial relations and 
economic performance as THE form. It is no coincidence that the 
stress upon creating loyalty and cooperation amongst employees 
has arisen alongside a shift in the form of competition away from 
price-based mass markets towards quality-based niche markets. 
But to characterise the whole of the UK economy as being subject 
to such a fundamental shift in the form of competition is clearly 
mis-placed (see Nolan and O'Donnell, 1991). In accepting such 
a redefinition of the field of study, academic institutions are 
allowing the agenda to be set by so-called 'leading edge' firms . 
The evidence from the latest workplace industrial relations 
survey shows that the large and growing non-union sector in the 
UK economy, rather than being characterised by sophisticated HRM 
policies, is characterised by low wages, poor levels of training, 
more accidents, greater unilateral management authority, and 
greater insecurity of employment (Millward et al., 1992). To 
accept a redefinition of industrial relations as a study of HRM 
is to ignore the realities of the contemporary nature of 
production relations in the UK. 
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An alternative analytical response to the re-examination of the 
relationship between industrial relations and the economy is to 
reconceptualise the issue as one of political economy. 
The apparent dichotomy between examining power relations, or 
politics, within production, and examining the economics of 
production would not have been recognised by writers before the 
neo-classical introduction of marginalist concepts. Adam Smith 
and Karl Marx both wrote as political economists, understanding 
the connections between politics and economics such that it was 
not useful or possible to analyse them separately. The neo- 
classicists sought to de-politicise the study of political 
economy, introducing concepts which denied the relevance of 
concepts such as power. The establishment of strict barriers 
between the academic study of politics and economics can be seen 
as mirroring the covert nature of exploitation within capitalism. 
JG. 
U 
However, it is now appropriate with events in recent decades 
bringing into sharp relief the connections between politics and 
economics to reassert the relevance of the study of political 
economy. This leads to the question of how far it is legitimate 
to define the political economy of production as a useful focus 
of study. Hyman has argued that it is more useful to redefine 
the subject of study as 'the political economy of industrial 
relations' (1989: 133). 
Hyman implicitly argues that 'industrial relations' remains a 
useful term in focusing attention upon the institutions that 
10 
mediate the capital-labour relationship :- 
'the state of industrial relations.... cannot be 
simply 'read off' from a generalised characterisation 
of the economic and political conjuncture.... what is 
at issue is the specificity of institutions and 
processes of mediation which are in some respects 
distinctive.... [and] it is .... correct to insist 
that this is a level of social relations which 
partially follow their own (contradictory) laws of 
development, and which accordingly require serious 
analysis in their own right. But.... it is fallacious 
to exaggerate the autonomy of the processes of 
institutional mediation of the capital-labour 
antagonism' (1989: 135). 
But this raises the question of whether this is referring to the 
institutional mediation of the capital-labour antagonism in all 
of its manifestations. Such a reference is more applicable to 
the more general field of political economy and does little to 
aid useful sub-divisions of the field of political economy. 
Early in his article, Hyman, himself, in a criticism of 
conventional industrial relations writers provides an important 
criterion in creating such a sub-division :- 
, it is ironical that conventional writers on 
industrial relations have developed often 
sophisticated discussions of 'job regulation' and 
'systems of rules' without any apparent recognition 
that the elaborate procedural and institutional 
superstructure on which they focus has its foundation 
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in the sphere of PRODUCTION' (1989: 129). 
It is useful to examine the political economy of production 
because the process of production is an analytically distinct 
social process. Hyman's implicit focus is upon the institutions 
and processes of mediation of the capital-labour antagonism 
within the process of production. Earlier, Hyman had argued that 
the notion of 'industrial relations' as a field of study had 
emerged on a pragmatic basis in response to perceived problems. 
Such a pragmatic basis is not adequate in delineating useful 
areas of focus within the wider field of political economy. 
An important manifestation of the increasing awareness of the 
relationship between industrial relations and economics is the 
debate in the USA and the UK on the effect of trade unions upon 
economic performance. This debate has coincided with the fall 
in Keynesianism referred to earlier. Within Keynesian theory 
unions played an important role in the macro economy as 
institutions which served to act against downward pressure on 
wages, thereby serving to prevent a deflationary spiral. As 
Keynesianism at the domestic level became increasingly untenable 
(at least in the countries where neo-corporatism was not firmly 
embedded) so the perceived usefulness of unions in terms of 
macro-economic regulation increasingly fell away. This was an 
important material context underlying the focus upon the micro- 
economic effects of trade unions. In a sense, unions became 
institutions which needed economic justification, or 
alternatively became subject to attack for economic reasons. In 
the mid-1970s Freeman and Medoff sought to create such a 
(, 
c 
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justification in the USA by comparing the performance of 
unionised firms with the performance of non-unionised firms, and 
finding that under certain conditions unions had a positive 
impact upon productivity but a negative one upon profits. In the 
UK, research using similar methods has been undertaken and has 
been used by the Conservative government in a White Paper to 
justify legislation aimed at weakening trade unions :- 
'recent research shows that trade unions have used 
their powers in ways which adversely affected labour 
costs, productivity and jobs. Managements who 
recognised and negotiated with trade unions were more 
likely to suffer job losses than managements which did 
not. In general, trade unions tended to push up 
earnings of people they represented while blocking 
improvements in productivity which are needed to pay 
for these higher earnings' (Employment for the 1990s: 
15). 
This thesis seeks to engage with this debate, and thereby 
contribute towards a better understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between politics and economics surrounding 
production, or, in other words, to contribute towards a more 
adequate understanding of the political economy of production. 
1.3. The Study 
This study engages with the debate on the effects of unions upon 
economic performance at the micro-level, with a primary focus on 
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the UK literature. It contributes to the debate by examining the 
', extant literature, by putting forward the findings of original 
`research undertaken, and by relating these findings to the 
literature. 
Chapter 2 examines the literature. It spells out the arguments 
of the two main schools of thought in the area - the neo- 
classicists and the Harvard school. Whilst there are important 
theoretical differences between the schools they share a common 
research method - the production function approach. A review 
of the UK evidence, defined within the terms set by the two 
schools, suggests apparent, fragmentary support for the argument, 
put forward by Prof. Metcalf (1989), that powerful unions in the 
1960s and 1970s impeded productivity levels. However, through 
putting forward important criticisms of the existing research a 
counter-argument is constructed which stresses the importance of 
examining the social organisation of production, rather than of 
adopting a one-sided focus on unions. Recognising the 
limitations of statistical models in examining social processes 
it argues the need for case study research. N\ 
G( 
Chapter 3 elucidates why the engineering construction industry 
(ECI), 1960-90, was chosen as the site for a case study. The ECI 
involves the design and construction of large power stations and 
petro-chemical plants. The industry was subject in the 1960s and 
1970s to both extensive delays against construction schedule, and 
a high level of labour militancy. In the 1980s the performance 
of the industry improved substantially, whilst militancy fell. 
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As such, the industry constituted a 'crucial case' (Mitchell, 
1983) for the argument that labour militancy underlay poor 
performance in the wider UK economy. It is further argued that 
the ECI is a useful site for a case study because its 
organisation of production, with firms coming together on a 
project basis and with firms flexibly reconstituting themselves, 
can be seen as prototypical for wider sectors of the UK economy. 
Moreover, examining the capital relations of the ECI allows an 
analysis of the usefulness of the Williamson (1975,1985) 
approach to the evolution of economic institutions of capitalism. 
The third chapter also details the research methods undertaken, 
highlighting the interview and archive research undertaken. 
Chapter 4 presents the data on economic performance in the 
industry. The measure utilised is performance against 
construction schedule. This is an extensive measure of 
performance relevant to clients in the industry. This measure 
has the advantage of addressing issues of non-price 
competitiveness which are ignored in the extant literature. The 
chapter shows the checks for bias in the data that were 
undertaken. The screened data show that overruns existed in the 
1960s and 1970s, and that a major improvement occurred in the 
1980s. The task of the following 4 chapters is to explain this 
change. 
Chapter 5 examines capital relations and economic performance in 
the 1960s and 1970s and argues that opportunistic practices of 
contractors were at the root of the long delays of the period. 
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This argument is based both on an examination of secondary 
sources and on interview research with contractors at 4 large 
sites. The primary evidence on contractors' opportunism is laid 
out in relation to terms which have common currency within the 
industry - 'extras/on day rates', 'underbidding', 'sitting on the 
job', and 'commercial bias scenario/withholding information'. 
Chapter 6 argues that the improvement in the 1980s was at root 
due to the emergence of managing contractors who were able to 
curb the opportunistic practices of contractors. In principle, 
managing contractors can adopt two routes to improving economic 
performance - the high trust route and the low trust route. The 
high trust route involves an integration of design and 
construction, a sharing of information and costs and managing 
contractors undertaking direct construction themselves. The low 
trust route involves a rigidification of design, the separation 
of design and construction, and managing contractors pursuing a 
strategy of passing on risk. The low trust route implies more 
of a 'step' improvement in performance than a foundation for 
longer term economic development. Managing contractors in the 
UK in the 1980s adopted the low trust route. It is also argued 
that whilst the Williamson framework provides a basis for 
understanding the rise of managing contractors, the assumption 
of opportunism as a fundamental behavioural characteristic makes 
the approach less useful in examining the distinction between low 
trust and high trust routes. 
The seventh chapter turns to examine the role of labour relations 
16 
in performance outcomes in the 1960s and 1970s. Evidence, in the 
form of archive and secondary materials, shows that high levels 
of site autonomy and militancy existed in the decades. The 
militancy exacerbated the schedule overruns. However, its 
central importance was that contractors were able to use 
militancy to reproduce the form of commercial relations which 
underlay the chronic overruns. Occasionally, contractors would 
even foment strikes to further their commercial objectives. The 
militancy was to an important degree a reaction not to any 
intensification of work but rather to the uncertainties and 
inefficiencies created by contractors' focus on profit outwith 
production. 
Chapter 8 details the fall in the level of militancy in the 
1980s, and reversal in the flow of authority in trade unions to 
a position of the primacy of national official power. It is 
argued that the slump in demand, the curbing of opportunism, and 
the introduction of a comprehensive national agreement all 
underlay these changes. The fall in militancy facilitated the 
strategy of managing contractors in curbing opportunism. 
Further, the NAECI had important direct effects on the commercial 
arena, also facilitating this strategy. 
The final chapter recapitulates the argument and relates it to 
the points developed in chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, it is 
argued that a number of points concerning research methods are 
borne out by the findings which emerge from a case study 
approach. The point that managing contractors, unconstrained by 
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labour militancy, adopted the low trust route suggests that 
arguments that management unconstrained will make optimum 
decisions are misconceived. The central conclusion is that the 
validity of the British worker question must be put into serious 
doubt. It is argued that the specific form of relationship 
between opportunism, militancy and poor performance in the ECI 
in the 1960s and 1970s could have wider resonance in important 
industries in the period - shipbuilding, docks, construction, 
aerospace and wider engineering. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE - THE EXTANT 
LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will critically review the academic literature which 
addresses the relationship between industrial relations and 
economic performance. The main form that this literature has 
taken is one of a production function statistical study between 
unionisation and economic performance measures. Three key 
criticisms will be advanced. Firstly, technical limitations in 
existing studies will be highlighted. Secondly, limitations in 
statistical studies in examining social process will be shown. 
Finally, it will be argued that there are theoretical problems 
with the production function approach. In the process of making 
these criticisms relating to method, substantive points will be 
made concerning the role of unions in affecting economic 
performance, primarily in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The existing academic literature can be divided into two school's 
of thought - the neo-classicists and the advocates of the Harvard 
approach. These schools were first outlined in the USA and the 
categorisation of the leading UK protagonists in terms of the two 
schools is less straightforward but still useful. While there 
are theoretical differences between the two schools the 
production function method of correlating a unionisation variable 
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with economic performance variables is common to both. 
2.2. The Neo-Classical and Harvard Schools 
It is worth considering why the debate has focused on the role 
of trade unions in affecting economic performance. The previous 
chapter noted that the demise of Keynesianism meant that unions 
were left without a macro-economic role. At the same time, rates 
of unionisation in the USA fell substantially. As such, the 
debate in the USA has sought to influence public policy, with the 
Harvard school being broadly pro-union, and the neo-classicists 
being anti-union. Similarly, the political nature of the debate 
in the UK is underlined by the statement from the Government 
White Paper quoted in the previous chapter. 
The Neo-Classical School 
The conventional neo-classical approach is centrally informed by 
the conceptualisation of unions as a monopoly force which 
distorts the operation of market forces and causes a mis- 
allocation of resources. By creating a monopoly in the labour 
market unions force up the price of labour. This causes 
unionised firms to substitute physical capital for labour. The 
employees who were laid off are re-engaged by non-union firms at 
lower wages in less productive, more labour-intensive industries. 
Note that it is assumed that the productivity in the union sector 
will be higher because of the greater capital-intensity of that 
sector. However, the overall effect of unionisation is presumed 
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to be harmful in that it is assumed that the allocation of 
resources prior to unionisation was optimum. Unions as a 
monopoly force lead to a mis-allocation of resources. The stress 
here is on the sphere of exchange. Indeed, the neo-classical 
approach effectively ignores the sphere of production. It 
assumes that the production outcomes flow automatically from the 
technical combination of particular inputs of labour. 
The implication for the method of social enquiry of this approach 
is that a statistical comparison of union and non-union firms 
and their performance outcomes, while statistically controlling 
for other relevant variables, most importantly the capital-labour 
ratio, is the most appropriate method of examining the union 
effect. Controlling for the capital-labour ratio is central to 
the production function approach. The production function 
approach 'traditionally makes output per worker depend on capital 
per worker [i. e. capital-labour ratio], other inputs used per 
worker, and indicators of the quality of the workers.... To 
determine the effect of unionism on productivity, one adds to the 
traditional variables a variable giving the fraction of the 
workforce that is unionized. In statistical analyses the 
estimated effect of the fraction unionized reflects what unions 
do to productivity above and beyond changes in the amount of 
physical inputs used per worker' (Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 165) 
(see Note 1). Further, within this theoretical approach there 
is no need for a case study examining the processes of the causal 
mechanisms involved. The causal mechanisms are specified a 
priori. 
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In relation to the neo-classicists ignoring the sphere of 
production, Leibenstein (1976) noted that the basic assumption 
of the neo-classical model, that every firm utilises all of its 
inputs 'efficiently', was invalid, and introduced the concept of 
'X-efficiency' in elaborating how the relationship between inputs 
and outputs was not a determinate one. The concept of 'X- 
efficiency', however, is effectively little more than a residual 
label highlighting a major inadequacy in the neo-classical 
approach, and it has little analytical utility. The inability 
of the neo-classical school to deal with issues relating to the 
production process means that writers are forced into ad-hoc 
arguments concerning the possible negative union effect on 
efficiency in production. For instance, Hirsch and Barnett point 
out that 'it has been argued that union restrictive/protective 
practices are potentially a much greater source of output loss 
than their relative wage effects' (1986: 184), but this is merely 
asserted and there is no attempt to ground it in the neo- 
classical theory of perfect competition, nor indeed within any 
other theoretical construct. 
In so far as neo-classical writers do adopt arguments concerning 
the union effect within the sphere of production (and they do- 
see Hirsch and Barnett above, and Metcalf , 1989) it is no longer 
the case that causal processes are specified a priori. This 
suggests that the method of enquiry should also be concerned with 
investigating the social processes involved. 
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The Harvard School 
The Harvard approach was primarily defined by Freeman and Medoff 
in a book and a series of articles in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The Harvard approach effectively constitutes an 
institutionalist revision to the neo-classical approach, seeking 
to embrace issues concerning the sphere of production as well as 
the sphere of exchange. They put forward a theoretical approach 
in which unions could be expected to have a positive effect on 
economic performance. They argue that there are two faces of 
trade union behaviour. The first face is the monopoly face 
associated with the union's 'monopolistic powers to raise wages', 
and the second is the 'collective voice/institutional response 
face, associated with their representation of organised workers 
within enterprises' (1984: 6). 
The concept of the monopoly face of unions exactly follows the 
neo-classical line of reasoning. Unions constitute a monopoly 
which raises wages, leading to a substitution of capital for 
labour in unionised firms. Productivity is higher in unionised 
firms but this is socially harmful. To control for this 
substitution effect it is necessary to control for the capital- 
labour ratio through the production function method. 
They argue that also associated with the monopoly face of unions 
are 'restrictive work rules' (1984: 163). This facet which lowers 
productivity is unlikely to be of long-term significance, however 
- 'while under some circumstances unions may use their monopoly 
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power to lower productivity through restrictive work practices, 
competition in product markets is unlikely to permit such 
practices for very long except in markets sheltered from 
competition' (1984: 164). Nevertheless, this element of the 
monopoly face, acting within production, suggests the utility of 
research methods which are able to examine social processes. 
Freeman and Medoff argue that the 'collective voice/institutional 
response' face of trade unions will tend to raise productivity, 
and in a way which is socially beneficial. They follow Hirschman 
(1970) by arguing that there are two basic mechanisms for dealing 
with social or economic problems - the classic market mechanism 
of exit and entry, and the political mechanism of voice. To the 
extent that employees do choose the voice option, the expression 
of the voice will necessarily be collective rather than 
individual in nature because of both the existence of public 
goods within the workplace and the existence of the authority 
relationship within employment, such that individual workers may 
fear reprisals if they express dis-satisfaction to the employer. 
They continue by arguing that the union fulfils the function of 
a collective voice. Unions as political organisations will tend 
to sum individual preferences such that they will tend to express 
the preference of the average worker. Under the exit option it 
is the preferences of the marginal worker which are expressed to 
the employer. However, because the marginal worker, i. e. the 
worker who uses the exit option, is 'generally young and 
marketable', the firm tends to ignore the preferences of the 
typically older, less marketable workers. Freeman and Medoff 
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argue that because unions sum the preferences of all the workers 
the ensuing union contract 'can be economically more efficient 
than the contract that would result in the absence of unions' 
(1984: 10). They give the example of reduced turnover as an 
economic benefit of the collective voice which unions represent 
.- 'for example, reductions in turnover due to unionism raise 
productivity by lowering costs of training and recruitment. In 
industries like construction, productivity gains result from 
unionized apprenticeship programs that produce better workers' 
(1984: 164). 
A further element in the second face of unionism is the concept 
of institutional response or shock effect. Here, unions may have 
a positive impact upon management, whereby 'because of incomplete 
information, lack of coordination in an enterprise, and 
organisational slack, management can respond to unionism in more 
creative ways, which can be socially beneficial' (1984: 11). 
They state that in the examination of the effect of unions on 
productivity it is important to recognise that what is being 
examined is not unions in isolation, but unions in a relationship 
with management. This institutional response element of the 
Harvard argument is a serious attempt to advance understanding 
in that it not only stresses the importance of union-management 
interaction, but also because it lends itself more easily to a 
dynamic analysis of capitalist development, as opposed to the 
essentially static approach inherent in the neo-classical concept 
of the market equilibrium (see Nolan and Marginson, 1988). 
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The argument that 'unionism per se is neither a plus nor a minus 
to productivity. What matters is how unions and management 
interact at the workplace' (1984: 179) is important. It suggests 
that a method involving statistical comparison of union and non- 
union outcomes cannot tell us about the causal mechanisms 
involved in the association of a unionisation variable with a 
particular performance outcome variable unless there is also an 
attempt to operationalise the concept of union-management 
interaction in the form of a variable in the production function 
equation. 
In the UK Nolan and Marginson (1988) have been the leading 
critics of the neo-classical approach, and in their critique of 
the neo-classical school they stress the strengths of the Harvard 
approach :- 'it is possible to identify a rich and enduring 
tradition of dissent.... which has maintained a different 
perspective on unionism.... most recently this tradition has 
found expression in the empirical studies of unionism in the 
United States by economists at Harvard.... in our view the best 
examples.... are extremely impressive and cannot be dismissed' 
(1988: 2-3). They stress the virtues of the Harvard approach in 
introducing a dynamic focus into the debate though the concept 
of the 'shock effect' in which management is forced into adopting 
'the most productive techniques' by unions. 
////,, 
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They differ from the Harvard approach by putting an understanding 
of the power relationship inherent in the employment relationship 
at the core of their approach :- 
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'The [neo-classical] theory is premised on the idea 
that the employment relationship would be 
characterised by shared interests, harmony and 
cooperation in the absence of unions. Yet such a view 
is at odds with the findings of.... writers who have 
shown that output restrictions and conflicts in the 
workplace predated unionisation and are a continuing 
feature of non-unionised settings. The roots of these 
practices are to be found.... in the character of the 
employment relationship' (1988: 2). 
It will be recalled that Freeman and Medoff note the existence 
of the authority relationship in employment when discussing the 
need for a collective rather than an individual voice. They 
locate the origins of the authority relationship in the 
uncertainties which are peculiar to the employment contract and 
which distinguish it form other types of contract. Whilst they 
claim to be following Marx in stating that the 'essence of the 
employment relationship under capitalism.... is the payment of 
money by the employer to the employee in return for the 
employer's control over a certain amount of the worker's time' 
(1984: 10), they fail to develop this analysis into an awareness 
of the differentiation between labour and labour power, and the' 
inherent conflict of the employment relationship in capitalist 
production. Thus, whilst Freeman and Medoff acknowledge the 
existence of a power relationship they fail to examine the nature 
and consequences of the relationship. 
This review of the two schools has shown that there are important 
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theoretical differences between the two schools. There are, 
however, important commonalities. In particular, the Harvard 
school's concept of the monopoly face of unionism exactly 
parallels the neo-classical understanding of unions as 
constituting a monopoly which distorts market forces. This 
common thread allows the schools to share a common research 
method - that of production function analysis. When Freeman and 
Medoff write that the 'empirical question is whether 
productivity-augmenting or productivity-reducing behaviour 
dominates ' (1984: 165) they write with the assumption that 
examining the 'empirical question' can be done by an uncontested 
method. 
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2.3. The Evidence Reviewed 
This section reviews evidence for the UK. For reasons of space 
and because comprehensive discussions exist elsewhere (see Nolan 
and Marginson, 1988; Metcalf, 1990; Brown and Wadhwani, 1990) the 
aim is not to provide a comprehensive overall examination of the 
evidence. Rather the aim is to focus on the stronger studies 
(see Note 2) which have been interpreted by Metcalf (1989,1990) 
as supporting his arguments. As such, the focus is primarily 
upon Machin (1987), Nickell et al. (1989), and Machin and 
Wadhwani (1989). These studies analysed company and plant level 
data. None of the studies can claim to be statistically 
generalisable to a wider population. 
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In examining Metcalf's claim that evidence supports his 
arguments, it is important to see that the core of his argument 
does not rest on a view that unions will always impede 
performance. Therefore, Nolan's observation that the Nickell et 
al. (1989) study 'casts further doubt on Metcalf's claim that 
unions lower productivity' (1992,: 12) seems to rest on a 
misinterpretation of Metcalf's argument. 
Metcalf has sought to refine the a priori neo-classical argument 
that unions will always harm economic performance. Rather, the 
suggestion is that unions will harm performance primarily in 
circumstances which grant them excessive power (although note 
that Metcalf's understanding of the nature of this power is 
highly problematic - see Note 3). This is essentially the 
concept underlying Metcalf's discussion of why the political and 
economic context of the 1970s which granted unions power 
undermined the Donovan proposed reforms which were meant to allow 
for a form of bargaining which would alter the negative impact 
of unions on performance (Metcalf, 1989: 5-10). Collective labour 
organisation per se is not identified as the impeding agent, but 
rather collective labour organisation with excessive power. This 
leads to the argument expressed by Metcalf that the context of 
the 1980s, with its industrial relations legislation aimed at 
regulating and weakening trade unions, with its severe and 
prolonged recession, and with its heightened competitive 
environment, led to important industrial relations changes which 
underlay the 'productivity miracle' of the 1980s. Implicit 
within this is the expectation that unionised workplaces should 
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experience superior economic performance in the 1980s following 
their inferior performance in the 1970s, a period when collective 
labour organisation, according to Metcalf, was powerful. 
Therefore, the evidence from the Nickell et al. (1989) study that 
unionised establishments experienced superior productivity growth 
in the 1980s, and inferior growth in the 1970s can be used to 
support the Metcalf argument. Machin's (1987) study of 52 
engineering firms is more ambiguous in relation to the Metcalf 
argument. Machin's sample of 52 engineering firms contained only 
one non-union firm, and he found positive associations between 
union density and productivity levels in seven firms, and a 
negative one in eleven firms. Within this small sample the, 
negative union association is confined to larger firms. ýºfa 
Further support for the Metcalf argument is apparently provided 
by Machin and Wadhwani's (1989) study, based on a sub-sample of 
firms from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. 
Wadhwani argues that this study examines productivity change :- 
'the measures of productivity change.... in WIRS.... is obtained 
as an answer to a question' (1990: 375). However, this is 
misleading. The Machin and Wadhwani (1989) study does not 
measure productivity change, rather it examines how far 
unionisation affected whether an establishment experienced 
organisational change. Whether organisational change led to 
productivity change is an open question, and the study does not 
address it. The key finding of the study is that union 
recognition was associated with greater organisational change in 
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the 1980s but only if the relevant sector also became less 
concentrated. Organisational change is defined in the WIRS 
questionnaire as 'substantial changes in work organisation or 
work practices not involving new plant, machinery or equipment'. 
The authors interpret organisational change 'as denoting the 
removal of some restrictive practices' (Wadhwani, 1990: 374). 
Metcalf can seek to use this study to support his argument 
because it apparently both provides evidence on the route by 
which unions adversely affect performance, and provides evidence 
that collective labour organisation has a particular effect where 
it is powerful (power here deriving from product market 
conditions). It was noted that neo-classical writers have 
resorted to ad-hoc arguments concerning the union imposition of 
'restrictive practices'. The Machin and Wadhwani study 
apparently provides evidence that unions did create 'restrictive 
practices'. 
At present the counter-arguments to Metcalf's thesis lie at too 
high a level of abstraction. Nolan (1989) on productivity 
improvements in the 1980s, argues that the improvements arise 
from a one-off rise in the intensification of labour and from 
changes in the organisation of work, and makes the point that 
such improvements do not necessarily constitute improvements in 
efficiency (understood in the technical sense). However, he is 
unable to provide evidence to support this point. Further, Nolan 
does not centrally addresses the question of the poor 
productivity record of the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, although 
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he does discuss 'the sources of productivity weakness in the 
past' (1989: 110). Here he states that, 
'the social agencies and pressures which might have 
led to the establishment of a high-wage, high 
productivity industrial system have been weak, and 
ambiguous in their effects. The key social agencies 
in question are the state, the trade unions and 
industrial capital. 
In stressing the effects of particular social agencies 
in Britain, the aim is not to reproduce the argument 
that productivity growth has been obstructed by 
powerful institutional 'rigidities'. The argument, 
rather, is that the agencies which might have 
generated the pressure for change have been too WEAK' 
(1989: 111). 
This is a potentially interesting and persuasive argument but as 
it stands is at too high a level of abstraction to aid an 
understanding of the particular question of the UK's poor 
productivity record in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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This section has stressed the fragmentary and ostensible nature' 
of evidence which Metcalf has used to support his position. An 
examination of the problems with Metcalf's interpretation of the 
evidence needs to be grounded in an understanding of the nature 
of the research methods. The following section, therefore, puts 
forward criticisms of the research methods underlying the debate, 
and also constructs a more detailed counter-argument to the 
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Metcalf thesis, with the primary focus on the 1960s and 1970s. 
2.4. Criticisms of Research Metho 
Three main forms of criticism are put forward - technical 
limitations with existing studies, the limitations of statistical 
studies in examining process, and theoretical problems with the 
production function approach. 
A. Technical Limitations with Existing Studies 
Failure to Model for Management 
If production is seen as a social process in which workers, 
unions and management take part it is clear that to seek to 
ascribe causal significance to unions it is necessary to include 
a variable operationalising management behaviour. Yet none of 
the UK studies includes a measure for management behaviour 
Freeman and Medoff state 'unionism per se is neither a plus nor 
a minus to productivity. What matters is how unions and 
management interact at the workplace' (1984: 179). Further, 'if 
management uses the collective bargaining process to learn about 
and improve the operation of the workplace and the production 
process, unionism can be a significant plus to enterprise 
efficiency. On the other hand, if management responds negatively 
to collective bargaining.... unionism can significantly harm the 
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performance of the firm' (1984: 12). Even Hirsch and Barnett 
recognise the need to examine management. They criticise studies 
which do not adequately report or measure nonunion labour inputs, 
such as managerial supervision. Without these measures 'one 
cannot disentangle the direct effect of unionism per se from its 
indirect effects via management response' (1986: 194). Nolan and 
Marginson apply this point of criticism with reference to 
Machin's 1987 study : - 
'no attempt is made to control for variations in 
management performance. Thus it remains possible that 
the lower productivity levels in large plants were as 
much to do with the behaviour of management as with 
unions.... without additional information on 
management it is impossible to ascertain whether or 
not unions had a direct CAUSAL effect on performance' 
(1988: 4-5). 
This argument also clearly means that when Metcalf uses the 
extant evidence to support arguments concerning the causal effect 
of unions (and he does - see Note 4), his approach is 
misconceived. 
One study in the USA attempted to model for management. Clark 
(1980b) undertook a longitudinal study of the effects of 
unionisation on cement plants. He used the variable of the ratio 
of supervisory to direct production manhours in order 'to 
disentangle the direct effect of unionism from its indirect 
effects via management response' (Hirsch and Barnett, 1986: 199). 
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In principle it is possible to model for management behaviour 
However, it is problematic because management response to unions 
is a complex and multi-dimensional concept. Management can seek 
to bargain at the multi-employer, industry, corporate or plant 
level; they can seek to limit the scope of bargaining to wage 
issues or they can consult with unions on new technology or 
investment; they can seek to deal with the union through direct 
opposition, proposing a unitarist framework, through a form of 
pluralist-adversarialism, or through an attempt to incorporate 
unions into sharing concerns over profitability; they can seek 
to bolster the official structure of the union by only dealing 
with FTOs and refusing to recognise shop steward committees, or 
they can encourage lay representation; they can undertake a 
strategy of relative autonomy or of direct control (see Friedman, 
1977) in the workplace; they can seek to offer workers guarantees 
of employment, or they can contract-out work and introduce a form 
of casualisation. 
Arguably, Clark's operationalisation of management response 
attempts to probe the issue of the strategy of relative autonomy 
or direct control. Even at this level problems remain. As 
Friedman (1977) makes clear, management can simultaneously pursue 
a strategy of relative autonomy on some issues and of direct 
control on others. Therefore, to simply point out a change in 
the ratio of supervisory to direct production hours is by no 
means to point out that there has been an overall change in 
managerial strategy between relative autonomy and direct control. 
It is a concept which can be best examined through detailed, 
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qualitative research. 
Endoqeneit 
The issue of endogeneity was first raised by Addison and Barnett 
(1982), leading neo-classicists in the USA. It is necessary to 
place their criticism in the context of the USA in which the 
early studies reported by Freeman and Medoff (1984) tended to 
find unions positively correlated with productivity outcomes 
(though negatively with profits). They state 'our suggestion is 
that unionism is an endogenous variable, not determining 
productivity in those cases where a significantly positive effect 
of unionism is obtained but, rather, being jointly determined 
with productivity' (1982: 145). Their argument is that the 
benefits Freeman and Medoff ascribe to the union's collective 
voice are very similar to the benefits which Williamson ascribes 
to the development of the internal labour market, i. e. both 
'perform functions to attenuate these hazards of unconstrained 
trading' (p. 149) in circumstances of idiosyncratic jobs. 'The 
upshot of this is that if unions do have the beneficial 
productivity characteristics ascribed to them by Harvard analysts 
they will presumably be jointly determined with idiosyncratic job 
markets' (p. 150). 
This is an argument that unions and idiosyncratic job markets are 
jointly determined. In order that this may result in a 
systematic bias in the union correlation it is necessary to then 
argue that idiosyncratic job markets exist in firms which are 
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more productive. However, they do not seek to make this point. 
This is a major gap in the argument. The continuation of their 
argument relies on the point that the Harvard studies have not 
'clearly established that the firms in question are competing in 
the same markets' (p. 151). The tenuous implication here is that 
idiosyncratic jobs will exist for certain product markets, that 
firms in these markets will be more productive, and that these 
firms will tend to be unionised. 
Freeman and Medoff acknowledge the possible importance of 
endogeneity :- 
'individuals or firms with similar measured 
characteristics are unlikely to be unionized on a 
random basis. If individual or firm X gets organized 
and individual or firm Y does not, there is probably 
some difference between them that explains their 
different unionization history. This uncaptured 'pre- 
union difference' may explain part of the outcome 
difference that we attribute to unionism' (1984: 23). 
The key point is made by Brown and Medoff (1978) - endogeneity 
may exist but there is no sound basis on which to assume that 
unionisation is jointly created with more efficient or profitable 
firms. In relation to their own study they argue that for the 
endogeneity bias argument, 'one must assert that within a given 
region, in a given two-digit industry, focusing on firms of a 
given size, unions organize the most productive firms. While 
such a conjecture seems plausible, previous studies of the 
determinants of unionization do not support this view' 
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(1978: 374). 
It is noteworthy that the issue of endogeneity has only been 
raised by neo-classical writers in terms of unions being jointly 
created with highly productive firms, but it has never been 
raised to explain studies which find unions negatively associated 
with productivity. 
There is another way in which the issue of endogeneity is worth 
considering in relation to the UK, however. The issue here does 
not concern the origins of unionisation but rather the origins 
of militancy, where militancy is defined as encompassing both 
strike action and a high level of job controls. 
It will be recalled that a number of studies operationalise 
collective labour organisation through measures of strike 
activity. Further, in the USA Ichniowski (1983) sought to 
examine the effect of the number and complexity of union rules 
on productivity (with work rules proxied by the number of pages 
in collective bargaining agreements). Therefore, the endogeneity 
of militancy is of relevance to the debate. 
Although unionisation and strike activity are strongly correlated 
this does not mean that studies using strike-activity measures 
examine the union effect. Rather, these studies compare the 
economic performance of firms/industries experiencing militancy 
against those firms/industries which do not experience militancy. 
It is true that the firms/industries which experience militancy 
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are highly likely to be unionised, but it is crucial to see that 
the firms/industries which do not experience militancy encompass 
both unionised and non-unionised elements (see Note 5). 
With this in mind consider Batstone's argument (see Note 6) :- 
'basic failures of production organisation may lead to lower 
productivity not only directly, but also indirectly through their 
effects upon union organisation and industrial relations' (1986: 
41). This is in effect an argument that both poor productivity 
and antagonistic industrial relations are jointly created by 
'basic failures of production organisation' (which he earlier 
attributes to lack of management sophistication) and further that 
antagonistic industrial relations will exacerbate low 
productivity. Turnbull, discussing the Harvard approach, makes 
the same point by inviting the reader to 'consider ... the case 
where inefficient management leads to conflictual labour 
relations, restrictive work practices and low productivity' 
(1989: 12). 
Batstone suggests specific ways in which this process could be 
manifest :- 
'First, stoppages of production due, for example, to 
shortages of components may lead to a host of 
industrial relations issues concerning the 
reallocation of labour and associated problems of pay, 
seniority etc. Second, where problems of production 
organisation lead to the need to lay workers off, an 
economically rational management often has an 
39 
incentive to foster strike action... Third, poor 
organisation and design often mean that production 
depends upon workers breaking the rules.... This 
provides a powerful base for fractional bargaining and 
serves, therefore, to encourage parochial, 
unsophisticated steward organisation. Fourth, 
management failures to rectify technical - and related 
labour - problems mean that strikes may occur over the 
same issue on numerous occasions ( .... see for example 
Batstone et al., 1978; Beynon, 1973). Problems 
associated with a lack of management sophistication 
are likely to be particularly evident in large plants' 
(1986: 41). 
Nor are these arguments without other empirical support. For 
instance, in Lupton's study of Jay's, an electrical components 
factory, it was found that a large number of delays in production 
were caused by flaws in the production planning by management 
(1963: 158). These delays, creating instability in earnings, were 
an important element leading to the workers undertaking 'fiddles' 
of booked time. Further, there is evidence that lack of 
management sophistication, labour militancy and poor performance 
co-existed in important sectors of the UK economy in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Pratten and Atkinson (1976) summarised results of 
studies of 'inefficient labour utilisation' in industries in 
which poor performance was perceived. Of the five sectors in 
which 'labour restrictive practices' existed all five were 
subject to 'management failures'. Of the two sectors in which 
importance was ascribed to strikes, both were subject to 
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'management failures'. 
The purpose of this discussion is not to subscribe to the 
simplistic argument which ascribes poor performance simply to 
management inefficiency. As Nichols notes, 'the hypothesis that 
poor management causes low productivity is essentially 
unsatisfying' (1986: 101). The point is that strong grounds exist 
for believing that where poor performance and high militancy were 
correlated in the 1960s and 1970s in many cases both can be said 
to have been 'created' by poor management. This is not claimed 
as a complete statement of the relationship between industrial 
relations and economic performance. 
It does, however, have important implications for studies which 
seek to construct arguments, linking strike activity causally to 
negative performance outcomes (Metcalf, 1990: Davies and Caves, 
1987; Caves, 1980; Wragg and Robertson, 1978). If militancy can 
be seen as endogenous in the sense described here, then such 
arguments may be spurious. Further, note that problems of 
endogeneity will be stronger for industry level data. The four 
studies referenced immediately above all focus at the industry 
level. 
Performance Measures 
The operationalisation of performance outcomes is not an 
unproblematic process. Also, the particular measures chosen have 
political implications. 
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Nolan (1989) has provided an incisive account of two key measures 
utilised - labour productivity, and total factor productivity. 
Labour productivity is a measure of output per employee (or 
employee hour). As Nolan points out, it 'is often presented as 
a rough and ready index of labour efficiency' (p. 102). Total 
factor productivity is defined as the rate of output growth minus 
the weighted sum of growth of the inputs, the weights being 
determined by each input's share of total income. Nolan makes 
the point that total factor productivity is dependent on a number 
of highly limiting assumptions. He goes on to argue that a rise 
in productivity is not synonymous with a rise in productive 
efficiency, where productive efficiency is defined in technical 
terms :- 
'the concept of production efficiency specifies a 
relationship between input and output. If output is 
increased without a corresponding rise in input then 
it is accurate to speak of an efficiency gain. If, in 
contrast, the gains in output are secured by 
increasing input then the situation is not clear-cut. 
Productivity increases may be consistent with no 
change, or even a loss of efficiency' (1989: 118). 
A rise in productivity through an intensification of labour may ' 
appear as a rise in efficiency. However, this is only if the 
measurement of labour is an extensive one. The measures of 
labour input utilised in the debate are extensive ones. 
Another problem with performance measures concerns the conflation 
of price and quantity effects. Hirsch and Barnett argue that 
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these studies which posit value-added as the dependent variable 
'confound price and quantity effects, that is, part of the 
measured union productivity differential may in fact result from 
higher product prices in the unionized sector' (1986: 194), i. e. 
unions, rather than raise productivity simply raise costs which 
are passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. 
Nolan and Marginson note that this is a common criticism and that 
'the best way of overcoming the difficulty is to use a physical 
measure of productivity' (1988: 5). In the USA, Clark (1980a, 
1980b) utilised the physical measure of tons of cement per unit 
of labour time and therefore avoided the -problem. In the UK 
Machin (1987) measured output in value-added terms but deflated 
this by an appropriate index of industry prices. Within the 
terms of the debate between the Harvard and neo-classical schools 
the problem of conflating price and quantity effects is an 
important one which has only rarely been addressed in substantive 
research. The importance of the terms of the debate in defining 
the nature of the problem is discussed later in the chapter. 
The final issue concerning measurement of performance outcomes 
relates to the lack of acknowledgement of the increasing salience 
of quality and delivery measures as measures of economic 
performance. 
The literature has examined the effect of unions on economic 
performance by focusing on a number of measure of performance - 
labour productivity, total factor productivity, productivity 
growth, profits and investment. These measures do not address 
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the concept of non-price competition; but there is evidence that 
non-price competition is becoming increasingly important to 
capitalist development in advanced countries. 
Jones notes that 'objectives such as quality in short runs of 
components and the completion of final assembly operations to 
specific times may (perhaps increasingly in the advanced 
economies) reduce the importance of price considerations' 
(1985: 249). Piore and Sabel relate the salience of price 
competition to the system of mass production :- 'the victory of 
mass production meant the redefinition of tastes (through 
advertising) and merchandising that emphasized price, not 
quality' (emphasis added) (1984: 190). They go on to argue that 
with the break-up of mass markets and mass production, 
competition is increasingly related to issues of quality and 
schedule completion. Similarly, Streeck strongly argues for the 
increasing salience in the 1970s and 1980s of quality- 
competition. This is reflected in his characterisation of the 
emerging form of production as 'diversified quality production' 
(1991). In considering the export competitiveness of UK 
manufacturing industry, Williams et al. (1983) note not only the 
importance of non-price-competitiveness but also the inability 
of traditional measures of economic performance to address this 
importance. They argue that the poor UK exports record up to the 
end of the 1970s cannot be explained by 'out-of-control labour 
costs', a measure based on traditional productivity and earnings 
measures. The explanation for the poor performance therefore 
lies elsewhere than in simple price-competitiveness :- 
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'Quasi-official NEDO studies.... have argued that the problem is 
the non-price competitiveness of British manufacturers - inferior 
design, poor performance, bad marketing, late delivery and 
inadequate after-sales service' (1983: 14). 
That none of the performance measures in the debate over unions 
and economic performance seek to operationalise the concept of 
non-price-competitiveness must be considered an important gap in 
the literature. 
B. The Limitations of Statistical Studies in Examining Social 
Processes 
'The social scientist's 'factors' or 'variables' are 
no more than summary measures of what are of ten highly 
complex social processes, and it is an in-built 
deficiency of the method of comparative statistics-D 
that it is ill-suited to the analysis of quality 
rather than quantity and to the exploration of social 
process' (Nichols, 1986: 97). 
The argument that statistical studies have significant 
limitations in the examination of social processes is of 
particular relevance for the debate on unions and economic 
performance. It will be recalled that for the Harvard school 
social process is important in that they recognise production as 
a social process in which unions and management interact. How 
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they interact is important to Freeman and Medoff :- 'in what ways 
does trade unionism raise productivity? How important are lower 
turnover of the workforce, changes in managerial techniques and 
the other routes.... These are extremely difficult questions to 
answer, for they require knowledge not only of differences in the 
characteristics of organized and unorganized plants but also of 
the actual ways in which the plants operate' (1984: 174). 
For the neo-classical school the main (monopoly) route of unions 
affecting performance is specified a priori; however, when 
adopting ad-hoc arguments concerning union activities within 
production their approach similarly implies the need to examine 
process. 
There is a disjuncture between these concerns with social process 
and the research method of statistical modelling which has 
underlain the debate. This is acknowledged by Metcalf when he 
states that 'statistical analyses must be complemented by case 
studies' (emphasis added) (1988: 2). 
An important manifestation of the limitations of statistical 
studies in understanding social processes is provided by Machin- 
and Wadhwani's influential study (1989) which appears to support 
the Metcalf argument. As noted in the section on the UK 
evidence, Machin and Wadhwani analysed WIRS data to find that 
organisational changes 1981-84 were more likely to occur in 
unionised establishments, but only if there had been an 
intensification of competition in the product market. This is 
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interpreted by the authors as evidence concerning the removal of 
'restrictive practices'. In particular, it is asserted that 
'establishments with recognized unions are more likely to have 
restrictive work practices compared with non-union establishments 
- so although non-union establishments are not exempt from the 
existence of restrictive practice, the commonplace image of 
unions securing reductions in effort appears to be confirmed' 
(Wadhwani, 1990: 376). This draws a conclusion concerning social 
processes from a statistical model. How far is the 
interpretation legitimate? 
Firstly, it is necessary to clarify the measures being used. 
There are two relevant questions from the 1984 WIRS questionnaire 
which the authors use. The first question focused on 
'organisational change', on whether 'substantial changes in work 
organisation or work practices not involving new plant, machinery 
or equipment' had occurred in the establishment in the previous 
three years. The second question (asked of a smaller sub-sample) 
concerned whether or not management felt constrained in their 
organisation of work. 
To examine how the authors move from the questions concerning 
organisational change and managerial perceptions of constraints 
to conclusions concerning 'restrictive practices' it is necessary 
to probe the concept of 'restrictive practices' . The concept is 
a contested one. The authors appear to be following an approach 
similar to that adopted by Ulman (1968) in which restrictive 
practices concern the practices of labour which inhibit the 
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efficient utilisation of labour. This approach is most explicit 
when Machin and Wadhwani define 'limits', i. e. constraints, as 
being where E< Emax, where E is effort, and Emax is 'some upper 
bound level of effort which management chooses' (1989: 5). There 
is therefore a hypothetical maximum against which to measure 
actual effort. 
There are a number of problems here. Firstly , effort is a 
difficult concept to measure (see Baldamus, 1961: 29-30); Edwards 
and Whitston, 1991). Secondly, the concept of 'restrictive 
practices' should not be seen as a neutral measure; rather it is 
politically defined. The concept as used by Machin and Wadhwani 
involves the definition of the upper level of effort as held by 
management. As Lupton argues, this makes it a definition with 
strong political assumptions :- 'to speak of restrictions of 
output in such circumstances is merely to express an opinion that 
workers ought to do more' (1963: 182). Beyond this, even 
accepting a managerial definition of restrictive practices there 
remain real problems in interpreting the WIRS data in terms of 
restrictive practices. 
The argument that management itself had an upper band level of 
effort which it had chosen contradicts much of the knowledge 
available of British manufacturing management in the 1960s and 
1970s. Lupton's comments on the concept of 'restrictions of 
output' are relevant :- 
'I was not able to ascertain accurately whether the 
'fiddle' did, in fact, result in restriction of 
48 
output. This was because management made no estimate 
of the daily or weekly output of the shop against 
which I could measure actual output. So there was no 
hypothetical maximum against which to measure actual 
roduction' (emphasis added) (1963: 181-182). 
Other case study examinations of UK manufacturing in the 1960s 
and 1970s suggest that this picture would not have been untypical 
of large sectors of the manufacturing economy. For instance, it 
is apparent that in the plant studied by Belanger and Evans 
(1988), management had no hypothetical upper level of effort in 
mind. Whilst extensive shopfloor job controls existed such that 
workers were able to 'get the day in' and then take 1-3 hours of 
leisure, it is apparent that these job controls could not be 
defined as restrictions on output or restrictive practices where 
these terms are managerially defined. A managerial preference 
for an upper band level of effort would be predicated either upon 
an active marketing strategy which would seek to increase the 
market share of the firm's products, or upon an active cost- 
reduction strategy. The former strategy would have necessitated 
higher output, but the management in the plant did not work under 
such a long-term strategy, their policies were 'reactive' and 
'incoherent'. In the short term, and they were primarily 
concerned with the short term, management were satisfied with the 
levels of effort and output (see Note 7). With this connection 
between the form of shopfloor relations and a reactive marketing 
strategy it is relevant to note Williams et al's (1983) 
characterisation of British management as being particularly 
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deficient in marketing. Their argument is backed by strong 
evidence. 
Furthermore, Machin and Wadhwani implicitly argue that the 
origins of 'restrictive practices' lie solely in actions of 
collective labour - the practices are imposed by labour and their 
removal is sought by management. This is an inadequate 
understanding of the social origins and meanings of these 
practices; it lies in contradiction to the research findings of 
industrial sociologists. Edwards and Terry note that 'the 
contradictory nature of job controls is now well-established. 
Not only are they ways for workers to challenge managerial 
authority, but also they are often modes of accommodation with 
that authority, and they can actively assist the production 
process' (1988: 216). For instance, Friedman describes the gang 
system at Standard Motors in which labour had a wide area of 
autonomy on the shopfloor :- 'the gang system represented a 
solution to top managers' need for an extremely flexible and 
'responsible' labour force.... The gang system also increased 
workers' direct control over productive activity' (1977: 213). 
It is not useful to describe such practices as restrictive 
practices, they are part of a particular social organisation of 
production, an outcome of labour-management interaction, not 
simply of an imposition by labour. This was a form of social 
organisation of production which matched the form of product 
market to the extent that profitability in the short-term was 
secured, and it was primarily the short-term with which 
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management were concerned. 
Lewchuk (1986) makes precisely these points in his analysis of 
the motor vehicle industry. He states that whilst productivity 
was low in the industry, it was not until the 1970s that profit 
levels were not high. He stresses that the job controls that 
existed should not be seen as a form of labour imposition of 
restrictive practices, and the job controls have to be understood 
in relation to the low levels of management production skill :- 
'Faced with an organised workplace and managers who 
were unable to co-ordinate factory production, Martin 
attempted to create a factory system in which the 
workforce, paid by the piece, would itself fulfil a 
number of managerial tasks such as parts delivery, 
machine maintenance, and quality control' (1986: 140). 
Job controls existed as part of a social organisation of 
production which allowed profitability to be maintained in the 
short-term with the given product market conditions. 
As the nature of product markets began to change substantially 
in the 1960s and 1970s (e. g. see Williams et al. (1983: 7-8) for 
the dramatic rise in import penetration ratio for products of ' 
manufacturing industry in the UK) a disjuncture began to appear 
between this social organisation of production and even short- 
term profitability, prompting management into attempts at reform 
which culminated in the 'organisational change' identified in the 
WIRS data. Piece-meal and ill-conceived attempts at reform in 
the 1960s and 1970s encountered resistance, with unions acting 
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as institutions which rigidified the social organisation of 
production. Lewchuk notes for the car industry that 'there is 
evidence to suggest that the difficulties associated with the 
British move towards Fordism and direct control after 1950 had 
as much to do with the lack of professionalism within management, 
as it did with the resistance by the trade unions' (1986: 151). 
This is a significantly different scenario from the simplistic 
one painted by Machin and Wadhwani in which management is at last 
allowed to remove labour-imposed restrictive practices due to the 
drop in union power arising form either product market changes 
or the union legislation of the 1980s. Aside from the importance 
of this substantive argument this discussion has highlighted the 
limitations of statistical modelling in understanding social 
processes. 
C. Theoretical Problems with the Production Function Approach 
Two assumptions underlying the production function approach are 
problematic. Firstly, the approach assumes that the switch to 
capital by management in response to higher union wages has a net 
negative effect on allocative economic effiqiency and the 
substitution of capital for labour is controlled for within the 
terms of the model. However, within another school of thought 
such a substitution, rather than having to be controlled for, 
lies at the heart of the impact of unions on economic 
performance. Central to Marx's analysis of capitalism was that 
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economic development was driven forward not only by the forces 
of inter-capitalist competition but also by class struggle 
between labour and capital. He wrote (1977: 562-3) that 
'[machinery] is the most powerful weapon for suppressing strikes, 
those periodic revolts of the working-class against the autocracy 
of capital.... It would be possible to write quite a history of 
the innovations made since the 1830s for the sole purpose of 
supplying capital with weapons against working class revolt'. 
The concept of the introduction of new technology for control 
purposes is an alien one to the neo-classical approach which is 
blind to the power relationship in employment. The Harvard 
school acknowledged the issue of power in employment but failed 
to integrate this concept within the core of their analysis. The 
control aspect is only part of Marx's argument; he accepted that 
technology could be introduced because labour had become too 
expensive. 
Whilst Marx's concept of capitalism being driven forward by both 
competition and class struggle has strengths, Marx's own writings 
concerning the nature of class struggle in this context are not 
without problems. Marx assumed that the capitalist's control of 
technology would make for the complete subordination of labour 
within the labour process. Nowhere in his account of the move 
from the formal to real subordination of labour is there a part 
for the self-activity of workers in resisting and adapting 
technological: change; the subordination of labour is seen as the 
inevitable outcome of the processes of technological development. 
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Hobsbawm's (1968) account of unionisation in the nineteenth 
century gasworks industry puts empirical flesh on to this 
theoretical point. Hobsbawm shows that in the 1870s and 1880s 
the gas industry was stagnating; technological change was slow 
and there was a tendency for productivity per worker to fall. 
There were a number of technical innovations available in the 
1870s, but given the cheapness of labour they were not 
implemented in the industry. Unionisation occurred in 1889 and 
union demands were met. This both substantially increased the 
wage bill and reduced the intensity of work. The effect of 
unionisation was such that management immediately embarked upon 
a programme of technological change, a major desire being to 
'eliminate skilled labour' (p. 167) implying both cost and control 
objectives. Whilst the new technology had the effect of greatly 
increasing productivity it did not succeed in eliminating the 
bargaining power of the workers, 'despite counter-attacks from 
management' (p. 169). Hobsbawm argues that the union's strength 
was not undermined because they were able 'to maintain their 
relative indispensability during the crucial transition 
period.... [and] 'capture' the new devices for recognised 
unionism' (p. 170). 
A second wider problem with the mainstream debate is that it 
cannot examine the relationship between the sphere of exchange 
and sphere of production. Implicit in the production function 
approach is the assumption that the product market of the firm 
is given and determining. Streeck (1991) argues that 'in the 
world of standard economics, product markets are seen as 
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DETERMINING.... the choice of product ranges. These, in turn, 
determine product technology, which then determines work 
organisation, which determines skill requirements, from which , 
finally, flow wage levels and wage structures' (p. 74). However, 
there is a growing and important literature on the pro-active 
role that firms can have in creating and/or choosing markets. 
The implications of this is that firms increasingly face the 
choice of continuing to produce in the mass, low quality, price- 
competitive markets or moving into niche, quality-competitive 
markets. 
One implication of the firm having a choice is that unions may 
be able to influence the choice, either in terms of pushing the 
firm up-market or serving to consolidate constraints of low trust 
relations which militate in favour of remaining in the mass 
market. For instance, Streeck (1986) argues that the constraints 
on management action set by unions and works councils in Germany 
are such that they push firms in the motor industry into locating 
their high value-added, high quality production in that country. 
Advocates of the production function approach acknowledge the 
legitimacy of criticisms concerning the conflation of price and 
quantity effect through output being measured in terms of price 
of sales. The Harvard and neo-classical analysis have common 
praise for those studies which are able to have output measured 
in terms of quantity instead of price. However, the shared 
criticism concerning the conflation of price and quantity misses 
the point that a key mediation in the relationship between unions 
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and economic performance is the potential role of unions in 
pushing firms 'up-market' . This is especially so since the 1970s 
and the increasing fragmentation of markets. Because both the 
Harvard and neo-classical schools have models in which the sphere 
of exchange is given they are unable to investigate the 
relationship between the spheres of exchange and production and 
its implications for economic performance :- 
'differences in commercial success depend not only on 
the different degree to which managements are 
permitted to implement their.... strategies, but also, 
and probably at least as much on differences in 
strategies themselves' (1986: 9). 
Industrial relations can have a role not just in constraining the 
implementation of management strategy but also in influencing the 
type of strategy itself. 
Nolan (1992) argues that the concept of the union shock effect 
has close affinities with Streeck's analysis of 'the dynamic 
consequences of institutional 'rigidities', including union 
organisations, in (West) Germany' (p. 9). Is Nolan's argument 
valid? It must be noted that the concept of a shock effect has 
not been well articulated. The term 'shock effect' has been 
primarily used to denote a dynamic whereby a form of worker 
action, be it unionisation (Clark, 1980b), the prevention of 
labour intensification (Nolan and Marginson, 1988), or, 
potentially, a form of militancy, leads to a form of reaction by 
management, be it either 'the adoption of best practices' (Nolan 
and Marginson, 1988), or 'extensive changes in management 
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personnel and procedures' (Clark, 1980b). The reaction by 
management then impacts positively on economic performance. 
There is an important difference between this shock effect 
argument and Streeck's approach. Whilst Streeck's approach 
hinges on the interconnections between production and exchange, 
the concept of a shock effect is apparently centred on issues of 
(in)efficiency within production. Indeed, it is not clear how 
far the concept of the shock effect differs from issues central 
to Leibenstein's concept of 'X-efficiency', a concept whose sole 
focus is upon the sphere of production. This point is recognised 
by Addison who notes that 'since the.... [Harvard] argument links 
improvement in productivity in part to shock effects, there is 
also an allusion to notions of X-inefficiency (Leibenstein)' 
(1985: 130). 
Consider Metcalf's approach against the insights drawn from 
Streeck. The Metcalf argument is centrally focused on unions 
constraining the effectiveness of management strategy in the 
1960s and 1970s, and fails to consider the possibility of unions 
affecting the form of strategy itself. The argument regarding 
unions constraining the effectiveness of management strategy has 
already been discussed above where it was argued that 
'restrictive practices' was an inappropriate conceptualisation 
of the social organisation of production in the 1960s and 1970s. 
But what of the effect of unions on the form of the strategy 
itself? 
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Firstly, the obvious point is that firms were not pushed 'up- 
market'. Nolan (1989: 112) argues that by the 1960s the UK was 
becoming a centre for relatively cheap, disposable labour, and 
that the following decades saw the consolidation of the UK 
economy as one based on low value-added production. Secondly, 
it is debatable how appropriate it is to apply the term 
'strategy' to the practices of UK management in this period, 
given that the term implies a degree of medium to long term 
planning, and given that UK management was primarily reactive, 
acting on short-term horizons, and low in production skills. The 
question arises - did unions act in any way to reinforce this 
approach? 
They did in the sense that the nature of job controls reflected 
and reinforced the lack of management production skills. This 
is another way of looking at the dual nature of job controls. 
Given their own lack of production and planning skills, 
managements were grateful to abrogate areas of responsibility for 
the organisation of production. The increased strike rates in 
the 1960s and 1970s in part reflected labour's increasing 
unwillingness to bear the costs of the inefficiency deriving from 
the lack of managerial production skills, but this was not 
sufficient to prompt anything more than piecemeal attempts at 
reform of the social organisation of production. 
The discussions of constraints and of the nature of strategy, 
taken together, provide a coherent explanation of the poor 
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performance of the UK manufacturing economy in the 1960s and 
1970s which matches the available evidence on performance and the 
nature of industrial relations more satisfactorily than does the 
Metcalf argument. In these terms, any short-term union 
'constraints' on the effectiveness of managerial 'strategy' were 
far less relevant to understanding the poor performance of UK 
manufacturing than the fact that shopf loor relations did not push 
management into altering the nature of its short-term approach, 
but rather served to consolidate it. This is an argument which 
goes beyond the terms of the debate defined through the use of 
the production function approach. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This review of the literature has made both methodological and 
substantive points in criticising the Metcalf argument that the 
existence of powerful unions in the 1960s and 1970s underlay the 
poor performance of the UK manufacturing economy in the those 
decades, and in putting forward the counter-argument concerning 
the nature of the social organisation of production in the 
period. Indeed, the methodological and substantive points 
informed each other, particularly on the points that the 
examination of management must be central to the analysis and 
that there are limitations in the examination of social processes 
by statistical studies. 
A feature of the debate which has also been stressed is that 
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there exists only fragmentary evidence. More research is 
required. This thesis seeks to provide further research. 
Recognising the limitations of statistical models in examining 
social process, the research is based upon a case study approach. 
Further, recognising the compelling arguments for a focus on the 
social nature of production, the thesis places the nature of 
union-management interaction at the centre of its focus. 
The question then arises as to how this relationship is most 
usefully examined in a case study. The classic condition to look 
for in examining a relationship between two variables is 
variation in both variables. In this instance, therefore, it is 
useful to look for a situation where there is variation in both 
economic performance and industrial relations. Moreover, the 
force of seeking variation in the variables matches the need for 
a dynamic focus to the study. Further, a case will be preferred 
which allows scope for generalisation both in theoretical terms 
and in terms of substantive empirical findings. The following 
chapter will elucidate how these concerns guided the choice of 
the engineering construction industry as an appropriate case to 
study. 
Finally, there is another level at which the question of how best 
to examine the relationship must be addressed. Should the study 
simply concentrate on the changes in industrial relations and 
attempt to work through these effects upon performance, or should 
the study address the wider question of what caused the change 
in performance, and examine the role of industrial relations 
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within this? The latter is more appropriate for two reasons. 
Firstly, the former approach, by an exclusive focus on industrial 
relations may overstate the importance of the effect of 
industrial relations. Secondly, the former approach will fail 
to address the relationship between industrial relations and 
capital relations. Potentially, such a relationship could be an 
important mediating link between industrial relations and 
economic performance. 
Notes 
1. This quotation assumes that union density is the measure used 
to operationalise collective labour organisation. Other measures 
- union recognition, collective agreement coverage, frequency of 
strikes, days lost to strikes, workers involved in strikes, and 
'bellicosity' - have been used, however. 
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2. Metcalf himself states that 'I surmise that industry data are 
inferior to work-place or firm data to establish the connections' 
(1990: 251). The studies examined are based on workplace/firm 
level data. 
3. Metcalf's argument has intellectual antecedents in the neo- 
classical school. He directs attention not just to unions but 
to the origins of union power. Freeman and Medoff note a similar 
line of argument in the neo-classical tradition :- 
'The fact that union monopoly power is likely to be 
important only when unionised firms either completely 
dominate a market or operate in a non-competitive 
market has created an interesting intellectual 
anomaly. Some economists of a strong free-enterprise 
bent, who one might expect to be strongly opposed to 
unions, are in fact rather indifferent. They believe 
that markets are competitive enough to give unions 
little or no power to extract monopoly wage gains' 
(1984: 7). 
Metcalf differs from this precise line of thought in that he 
implicitly sees the origins of union power as lying in other 
spheres beside that of the product market. However, he is never 
explicit on the origins and nature of such power. Inherent 
problems in the approach are highlighted by Nolan and Marginson 
'Power structures and forces are totally alien to the 
neoclassical analysis of production, yet they occupy 
a central position in Metcalf's assessment of recent 
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changes in British economic performance.... On the one 
hand.... Metcalf falls back on a corpus of economic 
theory which denies the existence of power structures. 
On the other hand, he brings forward empirical 
arguments which emphasize their salience' (1988: 7). 
4. A clear causal argument is present when Metcalf states that 
'it is now possible to tell an entirely consistent story - based 
on hard facts - about what unions do' (1988: 1). 
5. Knight (1987), for instance, makes the error of claiming that 
his study of the association between strike activity and 
productivity levels examines the union effect :- 'these results 
from the majority of industries actually confirm the 
'alternative' face of unionism favoured by Freeman and Medoff' 
(p. 369) (emphasis added). Similarly, Metcalf (1990: 251) 
reproduces this error by stating that 'different dimensions of 
strike activity had different effects.... This again shows that 
'unionization' does not have a unique effect' (emphasis added). 
6. Whilst Metcalf makes extensive reference to this Batstone 
article he fails to address the arguments examined here. 
7. Note that the plant described by Belanger and Evans 
constitutes, prima facie, an archetypal example of a firm subject 
to very strong restrictive practices. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CASE STUDY - THE ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, AND 
RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that in order to examine issues of 
process and causation in the relationship between industrial 
relations and economic performance it is useful to undertake case 
study research. This chapter seeks to argue that the engineering 
construction industry (ECI) is an appropriate industry in which 
to base such a case study. It then outlines relevant 
characteristics of the ECI. The final section of the chapter 
details the research methods of the study. 
3.2. A Case Study - Why the ECI? 
Variabilit 
The previous chapter argued that, following the classical 
conditions of looking for variation in relevant variables, a case 
study should seek to examine an arena where both industrial 
relations and economic performance vary. The ECI from 1960 to 
1990 fulfils these conditions. The 1988 NEDO/NJC report, The 
Project Record, argued that the industry in the 1960s and 1970s 
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was subject to considerable delays against construction schedule, 
whilst in the 1980s project performance was substantially 
improved. The report characterised the industrial relations of 
the 1960s and 1970s as dominated by site-level labour militancy, 
particularly manifest in leapfrogging wage bargaining. In 1981 
a comprehensive national agreement was introduced which, the 
report argues, had the effect of centralising negotiations and 
creating order and stability on sites. 
Clearly it can be pointed out that a number of industries could 
have been chosen which exhibited variation in both relevant 
variables in a similar time period, so there is a need to look 
for further reasons why the ECI was deemed a suitable industry 
to study. A number of supplementary reasons can be put forward. 
A Crucial Case for the British Worker Question 
Firstly, it can be seen as a crucial case study of the thesis 
that labour militancy lay at the root of the poor performance of 
the UK economy in the 1960s and 1970s. The term 'crucial case' 
study here follows Mitchell's (1983) discussion of the differing 
uses of case study research. He describes the crucial case 
studies as offering 
'the circumstances which enable the analyst to reject 
some theoretical proposition.... the selection of the 
case is clearly difficult . the assumption is that 
enough will be known about the phenomenon a priori to 
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enable the analyst to recognise the particular 
significance for the way in which the proposition has 
been formulated. A detailed study of the case will 
then enable the analyst to relate events to the 
theoretical proposition. ' (p. 197). 
The thesis that labour militancy lay at the root of the poor 
performance of UK industry in the 1960s and 1970s gained common 
currency in the 1980s within discourse in the mass media, within 
academic work, and within the political arena. Perhaps the 
clearest political statement of this thesis came in a pamphlet 
written by leading Conservative M. P., Keith Joseph in 1979 
entitled, Solving The Union Problem Is The Key to Britain's 
Recovery. 
Nichols (1986) characterised this thesis as that of 'the British 
worker question'. In his examination of the comparative 
international research which apparently supported this 
perception, Nichols convincingly showed that the methods of the 
research were deficient primarily in terms of inadequately 
controlling for other relevant variables and in terms of relying 
too heavily upon managerial perceptions, information and 
definitions -a reliance which is likely to lead to problems of 
bias. 
Nichols' work is important in subjecting the comparative academic 
research to suitable tests of rigour. What the book does not do, 
nor claim to do, is to disprove the British worker thesis. His 
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work merely shows that the case remains unproven; he has not 
dismissed the thesis. Arguably, it is still a common perception 
within the discourse of the mass media, and, moreover, it has 
been resurrected, albeit in a more subtle and refined manner, in 
recent academic work. As argued in chapter 2, Metcalf has argued 
that changes in industrial relations in the 1980s were the key 
elements in the apparent substantial improvement in the labour 
productivity record of UK manufacturing in the decade (1989). 
The corollary of this is that the unreformed labour relations 
problems of the 1960s and 1970s lay at the root of the poor 
performance in labour productivity in the 1960s and 1970s. As 
such, the British worker question thesis continues within the 
academic discourse. 
The ECI can be seen as a crucial case for the British worker 
thesis because of the high level of labour militancy in the 
industry, and the ostensible link of this militancy with poor 
performance against construction schedule. The 1970 NEDO report 
into the industry quoted the Department of Employment and 
Productivity's conclusion from three ad-hoc surveys of large 
construction sites in the 1960s :- 
'while we lack a precise measure of days lost per 
thousand workers, it appears that in this period large 
industrial construction sites were one of the most 
strike-prone sectors of the economy, exceeded only 
perhaps by the docks and the motor industry, and the 
situation has deteriorated even over this short 
period' (NEDO, 1970: 104). 
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'This strike record, though indicating a worrying loss 
of production, tells only part of the story. It does 
not show the extent of 'go-slows', refusals to work 
overtime, or the debilitating hostilities between 
management and men' (1970: 42). 
That the National Economic Development Council believed that 
there was a clear causal link between labour militancy and poor 
performance is made clear from the terms of reference given to 
the working party which produced the 1970 report :- 
'to inquire into the problems of organisation of large 
industrial construction sites with particular 
reference to labour relations, to investigate the 
causes and 'effects on cost of commissioning and 
operating plants, and to make recommendations' 
(1970: 7) (emphasis added). 
Governments of the 1970s continued to be concerned with the high 
level of labour militancy in the industry, and the impact of this 
on performance. In November 1970 the Commission on Industrial 
Relations was asked to investigate industrial relations at the 
Alcan smelter site, Northumberland. The report describes the 
background to this request as follows :- 
'the completion of the Alcan construction site at 
Lynemouth is, at the time of publication, at least a 
ear behind schedule and a significant part of this 
delay is the result of industrial unrest.... It was 
with these points in mind and the fact that there were 
a number of serious labour problems on site, and 
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following discussions between Alcan and the Department 
of Employment, that the reference was made to the 
Commission on Industrial Relations' (1972: 1). 
A decade later, the 1981 Report of the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Energy stated that 'during May, 1980 an industrial 
dispute involving the Thermal Insulation Engineers.... at the 
Isle of Grain was drawn to the attention of the Committee' 
(1981: 44), and the Committee, therefore, included a consideration 
of the dispute within their wider report which concerned the 
general economic performance of the CEGB. 
The dispute at the Isle of Grain gained widespread media 
coverage, and there were other instances of media coverage of the 
industry in the 1970s. The prevalent thesis of this coverage was 
that militancy was widespread and that this led to poor 
performance against construction schedule. The Sunday Times 
began a major feature article on the Isle of GraiTl power station 
as follows :- 
'[four years ago] Europe's biggest and most advanced 
power station was already two years behind schedule. 
Matters have since got steadily worse. Strikes and 
inter-union squabbles have increased and work is now 
four years behind schedule' (January 27,1980). 
The clear implication here is that militancy directly led to the 
delays. An earlier article in the same paper concerning the same 
project had a similar slant :- 
'the bonus rows have been exacerbated by the failure 
of the workers to achieve even modest productivity 
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targets' (October 1,1978) (emphasis added). 
The paper assumes that low productivity is primarily due to the 
recalcitrant labour force. 
From the above it can be seen that the ECI in the 1960s and 1970s 
constituted an archetype for the argument that labour militancy 
lay at the root of poor economic performance. This thesis 
represents a crucial case study in that if this argument cannot 
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in the 1960s and 1970s then its more 
general validity must be put into serious doubt. 
The ECI as a Prototype for Capital Relations and Organisation of 
Production 
The aim of the case study is to examine why economic performance 
changed from the 1960s/1970s to the 1980s. This entails not only 
studying labour relations but also capital structure and 
relations in the industry. There is a strong, though more 
speculative, argument that the organisation of production within 
the ECI can be seen as prototypical for the organisation of 
production within wider sectors of the UK economy. 
At first sight it would appear that the organisation of 
production in the ECI is atypical. The most common form of 
production occurs within a stable physical area, often a factory. 
Production is permanently located. In the ECI production is 
permanently dislocated, firms come onto site to undertake certain 
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agreed construction and some months or years later they relocate 
to another site. Not only is the ECI apparently unusual for the 
physical dislocation of production but also because of its 
capital structure. In the ECI different sequences of the 
construction of a plant, the levelling of the ground, the laying 
of the foundations, the erection of steel frames, the laying of 
the pipework, the instalment of the mechanical machinery, the 
laying of the electrical cables, and the insulation of the plant, 
will be undertaken by different firms or contractors. 
Streeck (1991), however, has suggested in passing that the 
organisation of production in construction can in an important 
sense be seen as prototypical. Streeck, discussing the 
institutional conditions necessary for diversified quality 
production, a form of production seen as succeeding Fordist mass 
production, states that, 
'high product diversity and quality sometimes seem to 
go together with an attenuation of the distinction 
between firms and their competitors, as well as a 
blurring of the boundaries between firms and their 
suppliers.... To the extent that diversified quality 
production is enhanced by a fluid, quasi-consortial 
pattern of industrial organisation - with joint 
ventures being set up like building sites, for special 
projects, to be dismantled after their completion - 
firms in a given industry are at the same time 
competitors and potential allies' (p. 34) (emphasis 
added). 
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The relevant point here is that Streeck suggests that production 
will be increasingly characterised by its lack of permanence, by 
its dislocation, by the flexibility of firms in redefining and 
reconstituting themselves, and that a prototype for such 
flexibility and reconstitution is the contracting firm in 
construction. He is suggesting that in the same way as 
contracting firms come together on construction projects, so 
increasingly manufacturers' production will be organised on a 
quasi-project basis with firms coming together, albeit not 
necessarily in a physical sense. 
Whilst the term 'diversified quality production' is peculiar to 
the writing of -Streeck, its conceptual basis has important 
commonalities with Piore and Sabel's concept of 'flexible 
specialisation', and with Kern and Schuman's (1987) concept of 
'new production concepts'. All stress the increasing importance 
of uncertainty and flexibility in shaping the nature of the 
organisation of production, and that increasingly successful 
production systems will be based on cooperative relations between 
firms as much as on competitive relations. 
Indeed, Stinchcombe and Heimer (1985), writing prior to (or at 
least without reference to) the emerging conceptualisations of 
the new form of production, argued that a high degree of 
uncertainty in terms of design inputs and production outcomes was 
a characteristic of a number of major sectors of the economy. 
Sabel eloquently puts the case that this uncertainty and 
flexibility is becoming more pervasive :- 
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'as markets become more volatile and fragmented, 
technological change more rapid, and product life 
cycles correspondingly shorter, it is too costly and 
time-consuming to perfect the design of new products 
and translate those designs into simply executed 
steps. Those formerly charged with the execution of 
plans - technicians, blue collar workers, outside 
suppliers - must now elaborate indicative 
instructions, transferring the final design in the 
very act of executing it' (1992: 215). 
Streeck argues that the changing nature of product markets is 
such that purely competitive relations between larger and larger 
firms are no longer congruent with the demands being placed upon 
production :- 
'under a competitive market logic, the prosperity of 
one firm is based on the elimination of other, 
competing firms; under a hierarchical organisation 
logic, it entails the inclusion of different levels of 
the production chain in one corporation and their 
subjection to centralised managerial control. Neither 
of these seem fully functional for diversified quality 
production where shorter (sub-) batches enveloped in 
long (sets of) batches, as well as higher quality 
standards, appear to put a premium on strategic 
alliances and joint ventures between firms at the same 
level of the product chain, and on close, privileged 
and trust-based cooperation between assemblers and 
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suppliers at different levels' (1991: 33-34). 
In so far as the construction site can be seen as a prototype for 
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the future organisation of production and in so far as the nature 
of capital relations can be seen as a key determinant of economic 
performance then the choice of the ECI as the site for a case 
study can be seen as particularly appropriate. Central to the 
study is an examination of the nature of capital relations in the 
ECI. If these relations are found to be of a low-trust, 
conflictual nature, or of a high-trust, cooperative nature then 
the precise nature of the implications for economic performance 
can be spelled out. This greater understanding of the nature of 
the relationship between capital relations and economic 
performance will have resonance for the manufacturing economy 
given the argument concerning the construction site as a 
prototype. 
A Crucial Case for Williamson's Framework 
An important consequence of choosing the ECI as a case study is 
that it constitutes a crucial case for the Williamson transaction 
costs framework. Williamson is a leading proponent of the 
institutional economics revision of the neo-classical approach. 
The point of departure from the neo-classical approach is that 
transaction costs 'regards the business firm as a governance 
structure rather than a production function' (Williamson, 
1985: 18). Williamson, however, does not depart from the rational 
economic individual as the basis for his social theory. Indeed, 
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his concept of opportunism as a fundamental trait of human 
behaviour in a sense strengthens this assumption :- 'opportunism 
is an effort to realise individual gains through a lack of 
candour or honesty in transactions. It is a somewhat deeper 
variety of self-interest seeking assumption than is ordinarily 
employed in economics; opportunism is self-interest seeking with 
guile' (Williamson, Wachter and Harris, 1975: 258). He also 
modifies the assumption of perfect information with the concept 
of 'bounded rationality', the essence of which is that there are 
computational limits to human capabilities in processing 
information. One effect of this is to provide enhanced scope for 
opportunistic behaviour in comparison with that existing under 
the neo-classical assumption of global rationality. 
The central tenet of the Williamson approach is that the 
coordination of economic activity through administrative units 
(firms) rather than markets can be explained in terms of the 
costs incurred in transacting in markets. If institutions reduce 
transaction costs below those arising in the market then they are 
considered to be efficient. Economic organisation can be 
understood as a process in which actors economise 'on bounded 
rationality while simultaneously safeguarding transactions 
against the hazards of opportunism' (Williamson, 1985: xiii). 
This means that with the operation of the competitive process 
more efficient modes of contracting emerge over time. Francis 
et al. characterise Williamson's (with Ouchi) approach thus :- 
'they believe that in the long run, say ten years or so, 
competition both in the factor and product markets will ensure 
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that efficiency considerations dominate' (1983: 7). Only longer- 
term 'buffers' against competition can prevent this :- 'natural 
selection forces do not always operate quickly.... Firms that are 
buffered against product market rivalry... can postpone the 
reckoning' (Williamson, 1985: 129-130). 
Williamson has argued that 'the full range of organisational 
innovations that mark the development of the economic 
institutions of capitalism over the past 150 years warrant 
reassessment in transaction cost terms' (1985: 17). His analysis 
of the changing nature of economic organisation in capitalism has 
covered a wide time period, with particular stress on 
understanding the levels of vertical integration amongst USA 
firms. In the analysis, vertical integration is to be understood 
as economising on transaction costs rather than forming a 
monopoly. He is not, however, solely concerned with issues of 
vertical integration, and the approach is not dependent on 
simplistic models of discrete transactions contrasted with 
vertical integration :- 'suppose that transactions were to be 
arrayed in terms of the degree to which parties to the trade 
maintained autonomy. Discrete transactions would thus be located 
at the one extreme, highly centralized, hierarchical transactions 
would be at the other, and hybrid transactions (franchising, 
joint ventures, other forms of nonstandard contracting) would be 
located in between.... I am now persuaded that transactions in 
the middle range are much more common' (1985: 83). 
The ECI constitutes an ideal case where the transaction costs 
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approach should be able to explain the form of economic 
organisation. Williamson has stated that 'any issue that either 
arises as or can be recast as a problem of contracting is 
usefully examined in transaction cost terms' (1985: xii). The 
economic organisation in the ECI is very plainly a 'problem of 
contracting'. It is also argued that the transaction costs 
approach will particularly aid understanding where a condition 
of large numbers competition obtains at the outset but where a 
condition of bilateral treaty evolves thereafter. This process, 
termed 'the fundamental transformation' (Williamson, 1985: 12), 
has clear parallels with the tender process, within the ECI, 
evolving into the execution of a contract by one contractor for 
one client. 
If the Williamson framework is unable to aid understanding of the 
economic institutions of the ECI, 1960-90, then the more general 
validity of the approach must be put into serious doubt. 
The ECI - Unstudied but Important to the UK Economy 
Another important, though subsidiary, reason to choose the ECI 
as a site for a case study is that its social relations remain 
largely unstudied by the academic community despite the fact that 
the industry's effective performance is a necessary condition for 
the development of the manufacturing sector in the UK. 
The academic literature concerning the SCI's social relations and 
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economic performance is sparse. Eldridge (1968) devoted a 
chapter to a discussion of a dispute in the ECI in 1954-55 within 
his book which examines the sociology of industrial disputes. 
The study primarily concerned itself with the role of the 
national institutions in the dispute. Lumley (1980) published 
an article which examined the influence of security of employment 
on industrial disputes for which the fieldwork was undertaken on 
a petro-chemical construction site between 1972 and 1974. Paling 
(1982) submitted a Ph. D. thesis to Brunel University entitled, 
'Industrial Relations in the Building, Civil Engineering and 
Engineering Construction Industry'. The main question which 
Paling addressed was the extent to which legal provisions 
affected industrial relations, and his main research method was 
a series of questionnaire surveys to contracting firms. Both 
Lumley and Paling contributed little either to the more general 
questions which they addressed or to an understanding of the 
social relations of the ECI. 
Morris and Hough (1987) have written on the management of major 
projects and in doing so have included a discussion of the 
construction of Heysham 2 power station. This discussion suffers 
from an acceptance of managerial perceptions and definitions and 
is characterised by a descriptive rather than analytical 
approach. Most recently, Garfit (1989) has described the process 
of negotiating the 1981 national agreement. Again, his is a 
primarily descriptive account, in which the role of the Oil and 
Chemical Plant Constructors' Association (OCPCA) is given 
particular emphasis. This emphasis is understandable given that 
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Garfit was the Director of the OCPCA during the negotiations. 
There is also a small, more explicitly managerialist-prescriptive 
literature on the ECI. Carr and Williamson (1982), Kharbanda and 
Stallworthy (1983), Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1985) and the 1983 
report by the Construction Industry Research and Information 
Association all include discussions of particular projects within 
the ECI. 
The bulk of the extant literature on the ECI is made up of 
research undertaken by public bodies. As argued above, the ECI 
was perceived by governments throughout the 1970s as the 
archetypal case in which labour militancy underlay poor economic 
performance. Reflecting this, a number of studies were 
undertaken by public bodies. These were the 1969 Wilson Report, 
a number of NEDO studies (1970,1976,1986,1988 (with NJC), and 
1990), the 1972 Commission on Industrial Relations report, the 
1981 report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, 
and the 1981 report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
A number of these studies provide important information 
concerning the social relations of the industry, but all can be 
criticised for their lack of critical insight and their 
acceptance of managerial perceptions and definitions. The 
precise arguments and failings of a number of these studies are 
examined within the substantive sections of this thesis, in 
particular in chapters 5 and 6. 
Despite its small size in terms of employment, the ECI plays a 
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pivotal role in the UK economy - as Lumley states, 'large 
industrial construction sites have an economic importance 
disproportionate to the manpower they employ' (1980: 68). Garfit 
(1989: 1) notes 'the total installed costs of plant built in 
Britain in 1986 was around £6 billion, but the numbers actually 
engaged in on-site erection work were only around 25,000'. The 
ECI involves the construction of electricity generating plants, 
oil and chemical process plants, and manufacturing plants. As 
such, important sectors of the UK economy rely upon the effective 
performance of the ECI. A corporation's decision to site a plant 
in the'UK1will be determined not only by running costs and 
efficiency, by its geographical location relative to product and 
supply markets, but also by the length, cost and degree of 
uncertainty associated with the construction of the plant itself. 
The importance of the economics of the construction process 
itself to investment decisions was manifest in the 1980s debates, A 
concerning the possible construction 'of Sizewell B nuclear power Jý 
station. At the public enquiry into the---issue a central line 
adopted by those opposed to the construction of the plant was 
that the projected length and cost of construction would in all 
likelihood be overrun, and that therefore the economic case for 
the station was seriously undermined. Further, the 1970 NEDO 
report quoted a report on investment by the Chemical Industries' 
Association which concluded that 'average building time for new 
plants erected in North West Europe has been shorter than for 
similar plants in the UK. More important, however, is the great 
variation that has taken place in the UK. This has made 
completion dates difficult to predict with confidence. The bad 
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cases have presented a generally unfavourable prospect to 
international observers' (p. 12). 
The importance of the ECI to the UK manufacturing economy demands 
that its social relations and the determinants of its economic 
performance be understood, but the academic literature on these 
very issues is weak. This study serves to correct this 
situation. 
3.3. Features of the Engineering Construction Industr 
Definition 
Garfit gives the following definition : - 
'[the ECI] is the generic title given to the total 
process of designing, ordering materials for and 
constructing manufacturing plants such as power 
stations, oil refineries, and chemical works' 
(1989: 1). 
The ECI effectively constitutes a third sector of the 
construction industry - along with building and civil 
engineering. At the margin it is perhaps difficult to 
differentiate the ECI from civil engineering, 'but there is a 
clear difference between infrastructure work which is civil 
engineering and the building of manufacturing plants, which is 
engineering construction' (Garfit, 1989: 1). 
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Whilst some institutions associated with the industry were in 
existence between the wars (e. g. in 1924 the Constructional 
Engineering Union separated from the Iron and Steel Trades 
Confederation), the major expansion of the industry came in the 
post-war period when the size and complexity of power and process 
plants grew considerably - Garfit notes 'the large petrochemical 
construction sites which were being developed in the post-war 
period' (1989: 2), and the 1970 NEDO report states that 'projects 
undertaken in the 1960s and the late 1950s are larger than ever 
before. In a period of fifteen years power stations have 
increased ten-fold in size' (p. 9). 
Between 1978 and 1988 it is estimated that the numbers employed 
on ECI sites ranged from 12,753 (in 1987) to 22,181 (in 1978) 
(Clifford, 1990: 27). 
Structure of the ECI 
The structure of the capital of the industry can be examined by 
considering three levels of actors - clients, contractors, and 
managing contractors. Clients are the large firms or state 
bodies which request and pay for particular plants to be built. 
They are the owners and the operators of the plant once it is 
built. They employ contractors to undertake the construction of 
the plant. Contractors are often hired though the tender system 
in which the client invites bids to undertake a specified piece 
of work. Sometimes the clients will hire managing contractors 
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to oversee and manage the construction of the plants. On a 
project with a managing contractor the contractor has a direct 
contractual relationship with the managing contractor and not 
with the client. The differing forms of managing contractor, and 
of contract are specified in the glossary of contractual terms. 
There are a number of identifiable stages to the construction of 
a plant. The 1982 NEDO booklet, Guidelines for the Management 
of Major Projects in the Process Industries identifies design, 
civil and structural, equipment, piping, instruments, electrical 
lagging/painting, start-up. The specialisms of contracting firms 
broadly follow these contours, e. g. specialist contracting firms 
seek solely to undertake the lagging of a plant, although some 
contractors offer to undertake work covering a number of stages 
of construction. 
The manual labour on ECI sites can be divided into a number of 
occupational groups. Clifford of the Engineering Industry 
Training Board identifies nine such groups. Table 3.1. lists 
those occupational groups and gives the percentage of the group 
within the total employees on ECI sites in 1989. 
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Table 3.1. Employment on ECI Sites by Occupation in 1989 
Occupation Percentage of employees 
Welders 11.6 
Platers 4.0 
Scaffolders 0.8 
Riggers/Erectors 9.8 
Pipe Fitters 15.0 
Electricians 3.5 
Instrument Fitters 1.6 
Mechanical Fitters 8.5 
Other Manuals 23.4 
Total Manual Occs 78.2 
Managers 2.1 
Supervisors 10.5 
Draughtsmen 0.2 
Other Non-manuals 9.0 
Total 100.0 
Source: Clifford (1990: 18), based on EITB statutory returns. 
Industrial Relations Characteristics 
Employers 
There are 5 employers' associations representing contractors in 
the ECI. The Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors' Association 
(OCPCA) represents companies designing and managing the erection 
of process plants, i. e. managing contractors. It has 
approximately 60 major members (full and affiliate status). It 
was formed in 1967 from contractors previously in membership of 
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the Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors. The 300 or so 
members of the National Engineering Construction Employers' 
Association (NECEA) cover the whole spectrum of engineering 
construction work and employ approximately 75% of employees in 
scope of the National Agreement (NEDO/NJC, 1988). NECEA was 
formed in 1982 from contractors who were previously members of 
the Engineering Employers' Federation's construction site 
section. The Thermal Insulation Contractors' Association (TICA) 
formed in 1957 and has 175 members. It represents thermal 
insulation contractors. Electrical contractors are represented 
by the Electrical Contractors' Association (ECA) and the 
Electrical Contractors' Association of Scotland. 
Trade Unions 
Seven trade unions signed the 1981 National Agreement. The 
Amalgamated Engineering Union - Construction Section (AEU-CS) 
(previously the Constructional Engineering Union) mainly 
represented riggers/erectors, crane drivers, scaffolders, and 
some welders. The Amalgamated Engineering Union - Engineering 
Section (AEU-ES) mainly represented mechanical fitters. The 
Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union 
(EETPU) mainly represented electricians, cable-pullers, and pipe 
fitters. The Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, 
Blacksmiths and Structural Workers (ASBSBSW) represented welders 
and platers. The National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, 
Coppersmiths and Heating and Domestic Engineers (NUSMCHDE) mainly 
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represented sheet metal workers and platers. The Transport and 
General Workers Union (TGWU) represented laggers, semi-skilled, %7$( 
and unskilled workers. The General and Municipal Workers Union 
(GMWU) represented the same constituency. The National 
Engineering Construction Committee (NECC) is a joint body 
comprising the unions in the ECI. Precise figures on union 
density in the industry are not available. The 1972 Commission 
on Industrial Relations report noted that for the Alcan site in 
Nothumberland 'we found that union membership among the craftsmen 
was very high' (p. 14). The interviews in 1991 with site 
participants at 4 sites in 1991 painted a similar picture. 
Further, the archive research covering the period 1960-1990 
provided no evidence that unions have been concerned at falling 
membership on large sites. 
Collective Baraainina Agreements 
In the 1960s and 1970s there were a number of agreements under 
which workers on ECI sites could be working. There were 
agreements at national level, site level, and firm level. 
Relevant national agreements were the Mechanical Construction 
Engineering Agreement between the EEF and unions, and the Thermal 
Insulation National Agreement between TICA and the TGWU and GMWU. 
Both of these agreements gave a great deal of scope for variation 
by firms at site. Relevant site agreements were the BP site 
agreements at Grangemouth, Baglan Bay, Hull and Liandarcy, and 
the Shell site agreement at Stanlow. These agreements attempted 
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to impose uniform conditions of employment throughout particular 
sites. Relevant firm-level agreements were the ones made by 
Redpath-Dorman-Long with the CEU in the late 1960s. 
In 1981 a comprehensive national agreement was signed. The 
national agreement superseded these previous agreements on ECI 
sites. 
3.4. Research Methods 
From the Abstract to the Concrete 
The first section of this chapter put forward reasons why a case 
study of the ECI was a useful concretisation of the more abstract 
aim of studying the links between industrial relations and 
economic performance. The precise focus of this study, however, 
is upon industrial relations and economic performance on large 
sites, 1960-90, in the ECI. Further justification is required 
for these additional elements defining the field of study. 
The concentration is solely upon the large site sector of the ECI 
because adequate data pertaining to economic performance only 
exists for that sector. Moreover, documentary records concerning 
industrial relations in small sites and for repair and 
maintenance in the ECI are much less common than records 
concerning industrial relations on large sites. Further, it is 
the characteristics of the large site sector in particular which 
87 
allow the study to address the British worker thesis and to 
address issues concerning the ECI as a prototypical organisation 
of production. 
I 
The time period, 1960-90, has been chosen because this allows the 
study to embrace a dynamic focus, and because it is these years 
in which issues concerning the British worker question are most 
prevalent. 
Sources 
The first stage in examining the role of industrial relations in 
the changearound in economic performance in the ECI was to 
address the quality of the data on economic performance. This 
process is spelled out in detail in chapter 4 and appendix 1. 
Once this was complete it was necessary to examine why the 
turnaround occurred. Two main research methods concerning 
primary evidence were used - interview and observation, and 
archive work. 
1. Interview and Observation 
Interviewing took place at two levels - with national actors and 
with site-level actors. 
a. National Actors 
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Semi-structured interviews took place with 2 national trade union 
officials, 5 national employer association officials, a former 
Minister of State, a NEDO official, and a corporate-level client 
management official. These interviews were carried out primarily 
for the purposes of examining the political and economic origins 
of the 1981 national agreement. 
b. Site-Level Actors 
A total of 32 working days was spent at 4 large ECI sites in 
spring/summer, 1991. Site-based research was undertaken because 
it was considered that whilst the available documentary evidence 
was useful in examining issues of collective bargaining there 
were a number of issues which it could not address. Most 
important here are the client-contractor and inter-contractor 
relationships. These issues are addressed in a number of the 
published materials referred to earlier in the chapter, but at 
best only receive a parenthetical mention in the primary 
documentary evidence available. It is not accidental that 
documentary evidence concerning capital relations is difficult 
to obtain. These relations are fraught with conflict, with 
frequent claims and counter-claims concerning terms of contracts, 
their specification, and their fulfilment. A key characteristic 
of this conflict is that it is often covert. Little original 
documentation concerning such conflicts is available to the 
researcher. Given that an understanding of capital relations is 
essential to the thesis, this situation necessitated a site-based 
research strategy. Clearly, in addition, such a strategy allowed 
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a more subtle and fuller picture of contractor-worker relations 
to be formed. 
4 sites were chosen because the aim was not to undertake an in- 
depth study of one site, but rather to obtain an overall 
understanding of the nature of capital relations, and industrial 
relations on large ECI sites in 1991. The relevant 
characteristics of the 4 sites are given in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Characteristics of the Sites Studied 
Site Plant Type Contracting Form 
A Process Plants Mixed (1) 
B Process Plant Direct with Client 
C Nuclear Power St. Direct with Client 
D Process Plant Managing 
Contractor 
Note 1. There were a number of different sub-projects at Site 
A. The main plant was constructed with the contractors in a 
direct contractual relationship with the clients, whilst the 
other plants used a managing contracting system. 
Interviews were undertaken with client officials, managing 
contractor officials, contractor officials, union FTOs and shop 
stewards. Interviewing was semi-structured and concentrated on 
gaining information concerning material practices rather than 
attitudes. Preliminary site visits and preliminary examination 
of documents relating to the site held at the offices of the 
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National Joint Council for the industry would often suggest a 
particular incident or area of interest. Questions were then 
asked of interviewees concerning their roles in these areas. On 
several occasions specific interviewees were also asked about 
specific incidents relating to projects in the 1970s and 1980s. 
These individuals were located by their name appearing both in 
historical archive material as well as in documents relating to 
the current projects. 
The brief description above of the conflictual capital relations 
in the industry will suggest to the reader that interviews with 
management officials may have been problematic in terms of 
eliciting reliable information concerning practices in the 
commercial arena. Indeed, this was the case. A substantial 
amount of time in interviews with management officials was spent 
convincing the interviewee of my neutrality, and reassuring the 
interviewee of the conditions of anonymity and confidentiality. 
My 'credibility' in this respect was enhanced in having 
previously secured the acceptance of the National Joint Council 
for my research. I was satisfied that the interviewees talked 
freely and frankly. However, in two instances management 
officials refused to discuss any details of current contractual 
disputes. 
In addition, as the opportunity arose, observation was made of 
meetings. These were :- at site C, a client-contractor meeting; 
at site A, ä Project Joint Council (PJC); at site B, a PJC 
training sub-committee meeting, a multi-contractor meeting, and 
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an internal client meeting; at site D, a workplace induction 
session. 
2. Archive Work 
The primary archive material consulted can be divided into 3 main 
sources. 
a. Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick 
The following files were consulted : 
- OCPCA files (filed under Refractory Users' Federation). 
These are an extensive set of files relating to 1968-81 national 
and site level bargaining at Grangemouth, Baglan Bay, Seal Sands 
and Sullom Voe. 
- EEF files. Minutes of stage 4 (national) meetings 
concerning the ECI from 1966 to 1975 were examined. 
- AEU(CS) files. Minutes of biennial and special national 
conferences, and minutes of executive committee meetings, 1963- 
83, were consulted. 
b. National Joint 
Industr 
For the Enaineerina Construction 
Comprehensive files are held concerning both national and site 
level industrial relations issues since 1981. The national-level 
files were extensively examined, and site-level files relating 
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to seven projects were examined. 
c. Miscellaneous 
The following miscellaneous sources of documentary material were 
also consulted : 
- AEU(CS) executive and conference minutes, 1985-91. 
- EETPU files of a national official relating to the ECI, 
1974-85. 
- NEDO, miscellaneous files and minutes of meetings, 1972- 
85. 
- OCPCA 1967 study of the causes of low productivity. 
- EEF files relating to the negotiation of the 1981 
agreement. 
- CEGB evidence to the Sizewell 'B' Nuclear Power Station 
Public Inquiry, held at the Public Records Office, Kew, Surrey. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has put forward the case that the ECI is a useful 
site for a case study because it can be seen as a crucial case 
for the study of the thesis that labour militancy lay at the root 
of poor economic performance in the UK economy. Further, it is 
a useful site because the form of capital relations and the 
organisation of production can be seen as prototypical for the 
wider manufacturing economy. It is also important to study the 
ECI because it is strategically important to UK economy yet 
remains largely unstudied by the academic community. Finally, 
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the choice of the ECI also provides a crucial case in which to 
examine the transaction costs approach to economic organisation. 
With these points made, the rest of the chapter laid out the 
relevant features of the ECI and the methods of the research that 
underlie the argument of this thesis . Here it was noted that the 
methods of examining the quality of the data on economic 
performance would be outlined in chapter 4. It is to this 
chapter and its wider discussion of the data on economic 
performance in the ECI to which we now turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DATA 
4.1. Introduction 
In this study, economic performance data have two roles. 
Firstly, they are used as indicators of potentially useful areas 
of research, i. e. the thesis aimed to study an industry in which 
changes in industrial relations were ostensibly linked to changes 
in economic performance. This role effectively lies prior to the 
substantive research. Secondly, they are used as an outcome 
measure which must be understood in terms of its expression of 
social relationships. There are two levels on which the concept 
of economic performance data as an expression of a social 
relationship can be understood - one more abstract and one more 
concrete. The abstract level refers to the level at which the 
social meaning of economic performance data can be discussed. 
Section 2 of this chapter engage with issues at this level. The 
second more concrete level refers to an understanding of the 
process of the creation of the data as a social and political 
process. 
Section 3 of the chapter deals with issues concerning the source 
and quality of the data. Section 4 outlines the additional 
screening undertaken for the data on the 1980s. Section 5 
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presents the methods and the results of a statistical analysis 
of the relationship between economic performance and time. 
4.2. Construction Schedule as a Measure of Economic Performance 
Because the ECI does not have its own industry classification for 
the purposes of governmental statistics there are limitations to 
the type of data available relating exclusively to the industry 
(as opposed to relating to the whole construction sector). The 
only type of economic performance data available for the ECI is 
that relating to construction project performance on large sites 
against schedule, measured in units of time, usually months. 
From two measures, schedule and actual construction period, a 
third statistic, schedule delay, can be calculated by expressing 
the overrun (or underrun) of actual construction period against 
schedule as a percentage of the schedule. 
A discussion of the social meaning of construction schedule delay 
should embrace an understanding both of what it does not express 
as well as what it does express. Firstly, it should not be 
regarded as a proxy for labour productivity. It is quite 
possible for labour productivity (output per personhour) to 
increase whilst performance against schedule deteriorates - for 
instance because of a ban on shiftworking which would be 
necessary to catch up a delay previously caused by a late 
material delivery. 
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Secondly, performance against schedule is not a measure of 
efficiency where efficiency is technically defined as increasing 
if a given output is produced with fewer inputs. Performance 
against schedule is an extensive measure of economic performance. 
It conveys nothing about the amount of inputs taken to complete 
a construction project in a certain time, e. g. a project built 
in 24 rather than 30 months can use up more inputs, perhaps 
through use of an additional shift. Therefore, in the same way 
an improvement in labour productivity need not imply an increase 
in production efficiency (in that an increase in labour 
intensity, an increase in input, may have caused the 
improvement), so an improvement in performance against schedule 
need not imply an increase in production efficiency. This 
distinction between an improvement in performance against 
schedule and an increase in productive efficiency is an important 
one to bear in mind for the arguments of the thesis. 
Thirdly, performance against schedule is not a measure of 
economic performance of central concern to contractors. Clients' 
and contractors' interests differ such that a project may be 
built over schedule and over budget to the client's dis- 
satisfaction, whilst the contractors can still generate 
substantial profits (the changing mechanisms of this are 
discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6). 
Performance against schedule is, however, a measure of economic 
performance utilised by clients in judging project performance. 
This statement is based on interview-based and document-based 
97 
research. In interviews with senior client management at the 
four sites visited, the unanimous response to an open-ended 
question on the subject was that performance against original 
schedule was the key criterion for clients of economic 
performance of projects. Documentary support comes from an 
internal B. P. document concerning the costs of implementing their 
key 1968 site agreement at Grangemouth in Scotland. This 
document stresses the importance of projects hitting schedule and 
lays out in detail the considerable costs associated with 
schedule delay. Such costs include not only extra interest 
charges on the capital released for the project, but often more 
crucially the opportunity cost of lost revenues from unrealised 
sales (of chemical products in this case) for the period of the 
delay. The 1970 NEDO report also puts forward similar concerns 
(p. 12) :- 'the costs of delays in other sectors are harder to 
obtain but there is no doubt they are considerable. Thus the 
loss of gross profit resulting from a (not uncommon) eight month 
delay in the completion of a £15 million refinery project might 
amount to about £2.5 million. The delays in a chemical plant's 
completion is recorded as costing £7 million in terms of the 
additional imports required'. Further, the 1970 NEDO report 
quoted a report on investment by the Chemical Industries' 
Association which stated that the uncertainty in relation to 
construction to schedule was a vital factor in deterring client 
investment :- 'more important.... is the great variation that has 
taken place in the UK. This has made completion dates difficult 
to predict with confidence'(p. 12). As such, the meaning of 
schedule delay has significance beyond Morris and Hough's 
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characterisation (1987: 14) :- 'overruns are at minimum at least 
indicative of problems'. That other observers recognise the 
value of overrun measures is demonstrated by the fact that Morris 
and Hough can list 33 other studies which use the criteria of 
time and budget overruns as key measures of economic performance. 
A strength of utilising performance against schedule as a measure 
of economic performance is that this measure relates to non-price 
competition. In chapter 2 it was argued that an important gap 
in the extant literature was that the measures of performance 
which were utilised ignored the increasing salience of non-price 
competitive factors, such as quality and performance against 
project schedules (with production increasingly organised on 
quasi-project bases), in capitalist development. 
In addition schedule delay can be usefully characterised as being 
indicative of the relations of production. It is essentially a 
measure of how successful the client is in making the contractors 
build in a given period of time, which is itself partly a 
function of how successful the contractors are in securing the 
productivity of labour. As such, to adequately grasp the full 
meaning of schedule delay data a study of those very relations 
are necessary. Implicit in this approach is an examination of 
how sustainable are the improvements in economic performance for 
the future. 
A consideration of economic performance data in the ECI cannot 
be complete without asking why only data relating to schedule 
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delay are available. Here it should be recalled that schedule 
is a measure utilised by clients, not contractors, and pertains 
to client, not contractor, criteria. The point is that there are 
no data which relate directly to the economic performance of 
contractors and their workforces. The lack of such data is both 
a weakness and a strength for this thesis. It is a weakness in 
that such data could have proven highly instructive in comparing 
and contrasting movements in measures of economic performance 
relevant to both clients and contractors. It is a strength in 
that it offers a considerable insight into the nature of client- 
contractor and inter-contractor relations, and in that it 
highlights the status of data on economic outcome not as 
objective truth but as the outcome of a political process. These 
points warrant amplification. 
Contractors have sought to withhold data on productivity from 
clients. The first example of contractors refusing to divulge 
productivity information to clients came in 1978 at the BP site 
in Grangemouth. The client, aware that the site agreement was 
often being ignored by contractors, instigated an audit system, 
part of which entailed contractors detailing weekly productivity 
targets and outcomes. The contractors refused to supply such 
figures. This was echoed at the national level in the 1980s. 
Since 1983, as part of the national agreement, contractors on 
nominated sites are obliged to return certain ipformation to a 
project auditor, an outside firm independent of contractors and 
clients. The auditor collates the information, reports to the 
Project Joint Council, and this report is then fprwarded to the 
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NJC in London. The information returned by contractors to the 
auditors covers items such as workforce numbers, grades, 
payments, hours, time lost for disputes. A sub-committee of the 
NJC proposed that additional information should be returned 
concerning productivity, specifically relating to target time (in 
person-hours) for a piece of work against the actual time. The 
advocates of this were primarily the trade union officials and 
the NJC full-time staff. This proposal was blocked by the 
resistance of contractors. This resistance was justified in 
terms of the commercial sensitivity of such information. In 
effect the contractors were unprepared to divulge information 
which could be obtained by clients in a dispute over contract 
terms. This indicates the continued existence of conflictual, 
low trust relations between clients and contractors, and shows 
the limited forms of direct control that clients have over 
contractors. 
It was the intention of the union officials and NJC staff that 
such data could have been collated and analysed at national 
level, and used as a benchmark against which to measure the 
economic performance of the industry, with the aim being to 
improve that performance. Therefore, the contractors can be said 
to have frustrated both the process of the creation of the data 
concerning economic efficiency and attempts to improve 
efficiency. This a prescient observation which will develop into 
a recurring motif throughout this thesis. Within the current 
structure of relationships, not only do contractor interests 
counter those of economic efficiency, but, importantly, 
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contractors are in a position in which they are able to act on 
those interests. 
4.3. Source and Quality of the Data 
Data for construction performance against schedule comes from 
three main sources the 1970 and 1976 NEDO reports, and the 
1988 joint NEDO/NJC report, The Project Record. It is the aim 
of this section to examine the quality of this data, with 
particular emphasis on examining for bias which may have the 
effect of overstating the improvement in performance in the 
1980s. 
Within this aim it is useful to conceptualise data creation as 
comprising four stages in each of which bias can exist - internal 
recording by clients, clients reporting to an agency, agency 
recording, and agency reporting. With this categorisation in 
mind a number of questions will be addressed. 
The first question is whether any systematic bias exists in the 
internal recording/measuring process by clients. The argument 
here is that if schedule delays, as measured internally by 
clients, were high in the 1970s and low in the 1980s this may be 
a function of the client coming to anticipate schedule delays and 
precluding such delays by lengthening the original schedule. 
Given that very few projects are identical replicas of previous 
projects it is difficult to give a definitive answer to this. 
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The balance of the evidence suggests that this has not occurred. 
The one clear instance in which a schedule for a similar project 
has been lengthened is Heysham 2 nuclear power station built for 
the CEGB. Here, Morris and Hough note that '50% more programme 
time was allowed for Heysham 2 than for Hinkley Point B, 
resulting in a 78 months programme for the first unit' 
(1987: 123). However, further evidence and analysis suggests that 
this is not true for the rest of the industry. In interviews 
(see note 1), senior client management argued strongly against 
any such increasing occurrence of contingency being built into 
schedules within their own corporations. Indeed, on site A it 
was stated (and documents confirmed) that the proposed 
construction schedule had been unilaterally cut by two months by 
the Board member responsible for construction. Documentation at 
the NJC offices provided evidence of a wider scope than that 
covered by the four clients whose sites were visited. This 
showed that according to pre-project discussions between the 
client and the NJC 3 projects had been set to be shorter than 
previous similar projects in the UK. None of the discussions 
showed a lengthening of schedules. 
Moreover, analytically, the argument that clients would tend to 
lengthen their schedules to anticipate delays can be shown to be 
ill-founded. The point here is that, after the North Sea-related 
boom of engineering construction in the 1970s capital investment 
decisions for the clients in the 1980s became increasingly 
marginal, both in terms of whether it was built at all, and in 
terms of whether it was to be built in the UK (rather than 
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elsewhere in Europe). If these decisions were increasingly 
marginal it is implausible that clients would react by 
lengthening schedules in anticipation of delay, rather they would 
not build at all, or they would build elsewhere in Europe. 
Indeed, this far stronger argument implies that any bias would 
likely to be in the opposite direction. 
The second question concerns potential bias in the stages of 
agency (i. e. NEDO) recording and reporting. To assess relevant 
issues here, a member of the statistical working party for the 
1970 report, and the NEDO official who was the central author of 
the 1976 and 1988 reports were interviewed, and the documentation 
concerning the data recording and reporting for the 1988 report 
was examined. Documentation pertaining to the compilation of the 
earlier reports could not be located. 
This research indicates that while the framing of the questions 
and reporting of the answers in the 1970 and 1976 reports 
appeared to be free from systematic bias, clear evidence exists 
of bias in these areas for the 1988 report. Importantly, this 
differentiation in bias was openly stated by the NEDO official. 
He stated that the 1976 study was 'objective' and that 'it would 
have been difficult to portray the situation worse than it 
actually was'. He also stated that the 1988 report was 
'basically a PR exercise', seeking to attract new investment by 
casting a picture of success for the industry. By contrast, the 
findings of the 1976 report were deemed to be so damning that 
NEDO had decided not to publish the report, and were ultimately 
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prompted into publishing it only by a leak of some of its 
findings to the press. The decision not to publish hardly 
conforms with a pre-set agenda of deliberately creating data 
reflecting poor performance. The lack of such a pre-set agenda 
is also indicated by the fact of the two UK power stations chosen 
for case study, one was chosen as a relatively poor performer, 
whilst one was chosen as a relatively good performer. 
The bias in the framing of the questions in the 1988 report is 
evident in the following extracts taken from letters to clients 
requesting information :- 'it is appropriate to state that 
clients for whom projects have been completed in this period are 
satisfied with the contribution made by the NJC towards 
improvements in industrial relations', [NEDO and the NJC are] 
'now concerned with developing promotional material about 
projects which have been successfully completed under the NAECI' . 
Bias in the reporting stage also existed for the 1988 report. 
Whilst the report purports to outline performance against 
schedule of all nominated projects since 1981, for a number of 
projects the phrase 'to client's satisfaction' appears in the 
performance column. The phrase was used when it was not easy to 
elicit information from clients. Bias existed in that the 
authors of the report did not pursue the issue if they believed 
schedule delay existed in the particular case. 
The third question concerns potential bias in the reporting by 
the client. The issue here is whether the motivation to report 
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accurately their project's performance differed systematically 
between the NEDO reports. There are a number of possible 
arguments here. Firstly, it could be argued that clients were 
motivated to over-state the extent of schedule delays in the 1970 
and 1976 reports by a desire to create a climate in which 
pressure for the negotiation of a national agreement could be 
achieved. This already tenuous argument is undermined by the 
observation, outlined in chapter 8, that any motivation amongst 
clients to achieve a national agreement was not strong at the 
time. Secondly, it could be argued that motivation to respond 
accurately varied between reports because of differing conditions 
of anonymity - anonymity existed for project and client in the 
1970 and 1976 reports, but not in the 1988 report. As such, it 
can be plausibly argued that clients were motivated to over-state 
the success of their projects in the 1988 report compared to 
previous reports. This argument concerning bias clearly works 
in the same direction as the bias that was said to be created 
through the recording and reporting of the agency, i. e. it would 
overstate the improvements in performance. 
The final question on the quality of the data to be addressed 
concerns issues of representativeness for the period and for the 
industrial sector. For the period from the mid-60s until the 
introduction in 1981 of the national agreement, the 1970 and 1976 
reports give data for 58 projects. Two issues must be discussed 
here - the significance 
'that 
these projects do not constitute the 
I\ 
whole population of large projects for the period from the mid- 
60s to 1976, and the significance of the gap for 1976-81 for 
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which no data exist. 
Whilst the sample contained in the 1970 and 1976 reports cannot 
be said to be random, nonetheless there are no reasons to believe 
that it is systematically biased in a manner which would 
strengthen the expected relationship. 
It is possible to judge the 1970 NEDO statistics on power station 
delays against statistics contained in the 1969 Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into Delays in Commissioning CEGB Power 
Stations (Wilson Report). The Wilson Report supplies data on 
power station delays in the 1960s in a different form from that 
in the NEDO reports, putting the number of power station units 
subject to 0-6 month delay, 7-12 month delay, and over 12 month 
delay. Table 4.1. shows the 1969 Wilson report data on the 70 
units released for construction by the CEGB between 1959 and 
1967. The Wilson Report provides data for the total population 
of power stations in this period. 
TABLE 4.1. Wilson Report - Power Station Delay Data 
Delays in Months 
0-6 7-12 Over 12 
No. of units Definite 10 8 10 
Forecast 16 6 20 
Total 26 14 30 
The 1970 NEDO data on power station delays, covering 48 units, 
can be similarly broken down into these categories and a 
107 
comparison can be made. This is shown in table 4.2.. 
TABLE 4.2. Comparison of Wilson Report and 1970 NEDO Data on 
Power Station Delay 
Delays in Months 
0-6 7-12 Over 12 
Percentage of units Wilson 37.1% 20.0% 42.9% 
NEDO 45.8% 16.7% 37.5% 
The close comparison of percentages in each category indicates 
that the 1970 NEDO data appears not to be an unrepresentative 
indication of power station project performance in the 1960s. 
It should also be noted t at the 1970 data show a slightly 
superior performance tn that in the Wilson report. This will 
serve to attenuate rather than strengthen the expected 
relationship between time and performance. 
Moreover, it can be legitimately argued that the manner of 
sampling from non-power station large sites for data for the 1970 
report contained a bias likely to weaken the expected 
relationship. This is because the data for the 1970 report is 
'based on information submitted by most of the major clients in 
the industry' (1970: 125) (emphasis added). The point here is 
that it was the major (i. e. regular) clients who contributed 
information. It is very likely that project performance for 
major clients would be superior to that for occasional clients. 
This is because occasional clients are more likely to neglect 
pre-planning and organisation, in favour of the incentive of 
bonus payments. This point is elaborated in subsequent chapters. 
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The argument that the 1976 report is free from systematic bias 
is supported by evidence at the Sizewell B public inquiry. When 
a CEGB witness at the Sizewell B enquiry attempted to discredit 
the 1976 NEDO report by arguing that it sought to deliberately 
show an inferior UK performance in the case studies chosen he 
ultimately had to concede that the postal survey section of the 
report largely undermined criticisms of selectivity bias :- 
'Q: you made the point about selection and bias in 
relation to the selection of the projects, and when I 
was looking at page 8, you made the point about the 
selection of the project.. . . Of course NEDO did 
endeavour to check that, didn't they, and we see on 
page 23, that they carried out certain postal surveys, 
because they were well aware of the bias of 
selectivity.... they were perfectly well aware of the 
set of reservations you had in mind?.... 
A: I accept that sir. ' (Sizewell: day 80, page 38). 
The complete gap for 1976-81 is a considerable weakness in the 
available data but not seriously damaging in terms of its use in 
the thesis' overall argument. If (as is indeed the case) the 
data show a clear improvement in performance after 1981 compared 
to the 1960s and 1970s it could be argued that this improvement 
started to occur in the 1976-81 period for reasons unrelated to 
the 1981 national agreement. Two points can be made in reply to 
this. Firstly, there are no indications that such an improvement 
occurred in this period - indeed a minute from a NEDO meeting in 
109 
1980 states that 'no major project has come in anywhere near 
schedule recently'. Also, the 1979 Price Commission report noted 
the continuing delays in power station construction .- 'many 
large capital construction projects, power stations in 
particular, have experienced delays in completion in recent 
years. CEGB conventional coal and oil-fired stations which have 
been ordered for commissioning in the last 15 years have suffered 
delays ranging from 4 months to 4 years on a completion time of 
6 years' (1979: 21). Further, the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission report on the CEGB, published in 1981 and therefore 
also relevant to the missing period, states that 'the 5 
conventional stations currently under construction are expected 
to be delayed on average by 2.3 years'. Secondly, there are no 
adequate explanations of why such an improvement should occur in 
the period. There are competing explanations of the turnaround 
in economic performance which are discussed throughout this 
thesis, but the important point is that they all construct an 
argument from occurrences in the 1980s. 
There are fewer issues of concern relating to the 
representativeness of the sample for the 1980s. The 1988 
NEDO/NJC report lists all the nominated projects under the NAECI, 
plus three non-nominated projects. This approximates very 
closely to the whole population of large projects in the ECI. 
Nomination is effectively defined to encompass all large ECI 
projects. The inclusion in the 1988 report of the data on 5 non- 
nominated projects can be seen to be a function of the systematic 
bias in the NEDO/NJC reporting process in that they were all 
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completed successfully against schedule. Therefore, these 5 
projects have been excluded from the analysis undertaken in this 
thesis. 
Summing up this discussion of the quality of the data, some bias 
may exist in the internal client measurement process, and more 
seriously in the reporting/recording and response stages. The 
client measurement bias will serve to mollify a correlation 
between an improvement in economic performance and the 1980s, 
whilst the other form of bias would serve to strengthen the 
relationship. Given that the existence of this relationship is 
an important starting point of this thesis the sources of bias 
identified in the 1988 study were addressed by undertaking an in- 
depth screening of the data for the 1980s. 
The screening process sought to obtain data for project 
performance against schedule which corresponded as closely as 
possible to the clients' internal measurement. Firstly, a survey 
was circulated direct to clients asking for information on 
performance against schedule. Although this questionnaire was 
extremely short and guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity only 
one client replied. Secondly, a systematic check on files 
relating to all projects held in the NJC offices was undertaken. 
The minutes of Project Joint Council meetings for nominated 
projects include reports by the client or the managing contractor 
of progress against schedule in percentage terms, e. g. it is 
reported that the project is 25% complete against a target of 
28%. If these reports consistently indicated that the project 
111 
was on or ahead of schedule, and if this corresponded with the 
information in the files on the 1988 report, this was taken to 
be sufficient evidence concerning project success. If there was 
no explicit information on the length of schedules the length of 
the project was taken to be the time in months between the first 
and the last PJC meeting. Whilst this will not correspond 
exactly with the project lengths there are no reasons to believe 
that it is not an adequate proxy. 
However, if the PJC progress reports did not consistently 
indicate that the project was on or ahead of schedule, it was 
decided to rely on more than these reports. This was because bf 
a project runs behind schedule there is a tendency among managing 
contractors to redefine the schedule, i. e. lengthen it, thereby 
putting the project back on schedule. Because this redefinition 
is often part of a process of renegotiating terms of the contract 
the PJC reports often do not carry details of this redefinition. 
Note that the process of lengthening the schedule during the 
project is a distinctly different one from that of lengthening 
it prior to the project. The latter process was discussed 
earlier in relation to potential bias. Given that a lengthening 
of the schedule during construction must be interpreted as a 
constituting a de facto overrun, further investigation was 
required. To ascertain the original schedule length and the 
actual schedule overrun other documents, including the minutes 
of the pre-project client-NJC meeting, and post-project 
correspondence between the client and the NJC were examined. In 
this way the systematic bias in the data for the 1980s was 
112 
satisfactorily reduced such that the data can now be said to 
correspond closely to the clients' internal measurement. 
4.4. Methods and Results 
To test for a relationship between economic performance and time 
the following were undertaken :- 
a. Mean construction delay statistics (i. e. overrun divided 
by original construction schedule, expressed as a percentage) 
were calculated for a number of time periods (the 1960s, the 
1970s, the 1960s and 1970s combined, and the 1980s) and compared. 
b. A statistic for the percentage of projects subject to 
construction schedule delay was calculated for each of the above 
periods and compared. 
c. The above calculations were undertaken for all projects, 
all projects excluding power stations, where possible, and for 
power stations alone, where possible (see appendix 1). This was 
done in order to test for the possibility that power station 
projects' performance may differ systematically from that of 
other projects. If there is such a difference an over- 
representation of power stations on one of the time periods may 
invalidate any attempt to generalise for the whole of the large- 
site sector. 
The results are given in tables 4.3. and 4.4.. 
Table 4.3. shows the mean schedule delay and the percentage of 
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projects subject to delay for the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s 
separately. 
TABLE 4.3. Schedule Delay and Projects Subject to Delay - 1960sß 
1970s, and 1980s 
Period No. of 
Projects 
Mean Schedule 
Delay (%) 
Projects 
Subject to 
Delay (%) 
1960s 35 20.6% 
_ 
82.9% (2) 
1970s 23 39.0% - (1) 
1980s 26 7.4% 15.4% (2) 
Notes. 1. It was not possible to calculate this statistic from 
the 1976 NEDO report. 
2. This is a cumulative figure based on subtracting the 
projects which underran from those which overran. 
Table 4.4. shows the mean schedule delay and percentage of 
projects subject to delay for the 1960s and 1970s combined and 
the 1980s. 
TABLE 4.4. Schedule Delay and Projects Subject to Delay - 1960s 
and 1970s Combined, and the 1980s 
Period No. of Mean Schedule Projects 
Projects Delay (%) Subject to 
Delay (%) 
1960s/70s 58 27.9% - (1) 
1980s 26 7.4% 15.4 
Notes. 1. It was not possible to calculate this statistic from 
the 1976 NEDO report. 
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The above tables refer to all projects without separating out 
power stations. Table 4.5. gives the same statistics, this time 
separating out power stations for the 1960s. 
TABLE 4.5. Schedule Delay and Projects Subject to Delay - 1960s 
for Power Stations and Others 
Project Type No. of 
Projects 
Mean 
Schedule 
Delay (%) 
Projects 
Subject to 
Delay (%) 
Power Stations 13 17.0% 100.0% 
Others 22 22.7% 72.7% 
All 35 20.6% 82.9% 
Table 4.6. gives the same statistics, this time separating out 
power stations for the 1980s. 
TABLE 4.6. Schedule Delay and Projects Subject to Delay - 1980s 
for Power Stations and Others 
Project Type No. of 
Projects 
Mean 
Schedule 
Delay (%) 
Projets 
Subject to 
Delay (%) 
Power Stations 2 - (1) - (1) 
Others 24 8.0% 20.8% 
All 26 7.4% 15.4% 
Notes. 1. It was not considered useful to calculate statistics 
for the 2 power station projects. 
It was not possible to separate out power station projects from 
other projects in the 1976 NEDO report data. 
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4.5. Analysis of Results on Economic Performance 
A clear, strong relationship between economic performance and 
time exists given that the mean construction schedule figures 
fell considerably both between the 1970s and the 1980s (from 
39.0% to 7.4%) and between the 1960s and 1970s together and the 
1980s (from 27.9% to 7.4%). There was also a large fall in the 
percentage of schedules subject to delay. In the 1960s 82.9% of 
projects were subject to construction schedule delay, whilst in 
the 1980s 15.4% were. Another important finding is that despite 
the relative improvement a not insubstantial proportion of 
projects continued to overrun construction schedule in the 1980s. 
From the statistics available for the 1960s, power stations, 
rather than performing significantly worse than other projects, 
performed slightly better than other projects in terms of mean 
schedule delay (17.0% against 22.7%). This serves to allay fears 
that an over-representation of power stations in one of the 
periods could endanger any attempt to generalise for the whole 
of the large site sector. 
Given the finding of a strong relationship between schedule delay 
and time, what conclusions can be drawn? A simple causal 
relationship between time and economic performance is not being 
suggested. Such a causal link was suggested by one management 
official who argued that the ECI could be defined as a young 
industry which was naturally learning and improving over time. 
Such a view is inadequate, however. It proposes no concrete link 
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between the two variables, and it is profoundly asocial and 
apolitical. Even if the metaphor of learning is taken as useful 
it must be recognised that learning itself is a social, 
political, and not automatic, process - as Deutsch argued, power 
is 'the ability to afford not to learn' (1963: 111). 
Rather than indicating a simple causal relationship between the 
two variables the statistical relationship leads the observer to 
ask what occurred in the 1980s to cause such an improvement in 
construction performance against schedule. The statistical 
relationship in effect begs the questions which this thesis seeks 
to address as part of the wider aim of analysing the links 
between industrial relations and economic performance. The 
question also remains concerning the persistent and not 
insignificant schedule delays in the 1980s. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the meaning and nature of economic 
performance data in the ECI with particular stress on its social 
meaning and on its quality. Results have been presented which 
show a clear relationship between economic performance and time, 
with a substantial improvement occurring in the 1980s. The 
causes of this improvement cannot be simply deduced from the data 
but must be addressed by examining the changing social relations 
of production. Within this general aim the following chapter 
will focus on the relationship between capital and economic 
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performance in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Notes 
1. In interviews with senior client management the issue was not 
probed through a blatant questioning of whether they had 
lengthened the schedule in anticipation of delays, because such 
a form of question would very likely elicit an automatic, 
defensive, negative reaction. Rather, the matter was raised in 
a deliberately more subtle, almost parenthetical, manner by, in 
asking about schedule lengths, enquiring whether any buffer time 
period existed in the schedule. 
k 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 1960s AND 1970s 
5.1. Introduction 
'Ensuring continuity of attendance and consistency of 
performance by subcontractors now poses as great a 
constraint over management planning of production as 
any union influence over output and work organisation' 
(Evans, 1990: 248). 
'The primacy of the merchanting role is an inevitable 
outcome of the historical development of the 
contracting system in Britain. One result is a 
weakening of the coercive pressures of accumulation in 
revolutionising the productive methods of the industry 
and forcing producers towards the known limits of 
productive efficiency' (Ball, 1988: 96). 
Both Evans and Ball, in their respective pieces, argue that the 
structure of capital and the relations between units of capital 
are key determinants of economic performance in the wider 
construction industry, such that peculiarities of the contracting 
system, as it has developed in the UK, serve to hinder longer 
term gains in economic efficiency. The thrust of the analysis 
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of the ECI in this thesis concurs with this approach. 
However, two important extensions within my approach as compared 
with that of Evans and Ball must be highlighted. The first point 
is that this chapter will attempt a far deeper integration of 
empirical evidence with analysis than achieved by either of the 
above authors. Although Evans writes that his article is based 
upon 'some 150 interviews with managers, sub-contractors, 
employers' organisation and trade union representatives, workers, 
and public authority clients at sector, firm and site level 
involving fifteen sites in two major local labour market areas' 
(p. 249) the reader is left unsure in what way, and how far, 
evidence informs analysis. Evans makes important suggestions :- 
'under the contracting system difficulties predicting tender 
prices generate pressures to realise profits by maximizing extra 
claims against clients. Improving efficiency is subordinated to 
the aim of avoiding risk and maintaining flexibility of financial 
assets for investment wherever is most profitable, inside or 
outside construction' (p. 245). However, empirical evidence to 
substantiate these points is not provided. 
The second important extension is that this thesis will attempt 
to extend their analysis of the structure and relations of 
capital and the impact of these on economic performance. This 
is clearly related to the first point in that it is only possible 
to move beyond the level of the generality with the aid of 
analysis grounded in empirical evidence. 
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The following two chapters seek to integrate evidence and 
analysis in a nuanced account of changing capital structure and 
relations and their impact on economic performance, primarily 
measured in terms of performance against construction schedule. 
The two chapters will address two separate but logically 
connected questions : 
-what caused the delays in the 1960s and 1970s? 
-why has there been an improvement in the 1980s? 
This chapter deals with the role of capital in relation to the 
first question, and chapter 6 examines this in relation to the 
second question. 
The chapter addresses the issues by, firstly, examining evidence 
relating to attitudes, and, secondly, examining evidence relating 
to practices. Much of the evidence relating to practices is 
derived from original on-site research. An additional section 
of the chapter considers how far it is legitimate to infer from 
this evidence across time. 
5.2. Capital in the ECI - an Introduction 
It is useful to break down the concept of capital into a number 
of sub-categories along two dimensions. Firstly, capital 
structure should be differentiated from capital relations. 
Capital structure refers primarily to the size, the number, and 
the specialisation of firms engaged in the industry. The concept 
of capital relations refers to the manner in which these firms 
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interact. The two are not unrelated but can be seen to be 
conceptually distinct, and it is important to have an 
understanding of both elements in order to formulate an adequate 
analysis. 
The second dimension relates to the different structural 
positions of sectors of capital in the ECI - namely the 
differentiation between client capital and contractor capital. 
An important element here is the precise form of the contractual 
relationship that exists between the client and the contractor. 
Such contractual relationships can take a number of forms, 
ranging from a fixed-fee construction-only contract to a fully 
reimbursable design-and-build contract (see glossary for a list 
and brief explanation of different contractual forms). It will 
be noted that the issue of design has been included in the 
analysis. This requires some explanation in that this thesis is 
primarily concerned with economic performance in the construction 
phase of the project schedule whilst design is essentially a pre- 
construction phase. There are, however, strong analytical 
reasons and empirical evidence to suggest that economic 
performance in the construction phase is intimately linked to the 
issue of design. 
A discussion of client-contractor relations must do more than 
simply examine the precise forms of contractual relationships, 
important as these are - rather the nature of their relationships 
must be understood, with relationships here having a wider 
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meaning than the narrow one implied by the term 'contractual 
relationship'. Relevant concepts in delineating the nature of 
this relationship are those of power, of control, of conflict, 
of co-operation, and of trust. 
Inter-contractor relations will also receive attention within 
this chapter. The point made above concerning the need to 
examine both the technical form of the contractual relationship, 
as well as the nature of the relationship is also relevant here. 
An important element which should be covered in a discussion of 
contractor relations is the issue of late delivery of plant and 
materials to the site. Whilst in a narrow sense this can be 
regarded as a pre-construction phase the argument for including 
it in this analysis is just as compelling as the arguments made 
above concerning the inclusion of design issues. The 1970 NEDO 
report deliberately omitted consideration of delivery problems 
:- 'to have pursued delivery problems to their source - through 
suppliers to their suppliers to the availability of raw materials 
- would have involved following a trail through a large segment 
of the economy, and grappling with general commercial and fiscal 
questions for which we were not specially equipped' (p. 14). This 
approach stresses the technical nature of the problems. A more 
adequate approach is to examine delivery of materials and plant 
to the site as a political and economic process intimately linked 
to issues of inter-contractor relations. 
5.3. Evidence on Attitudes 
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Evidence on attitudes of contractors themselves and public bodies 
concerning the relationship between capital and economic 
performance in the 1960s and 1970s can be found in a number of 
sources - the 1970 NEDO report, the 1967 unpublished internal 
report by the Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors' Association, 
the 1969 Wilson Report, and the 1981 Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission report. Each of these will be examined in turn. 
The strongest, most direct, and most illuminating evidence is 
contained in the 1970 NEDO report. The NEDO group undertook a 
survey of contractors in which 86 head office questionnaires and 
260 site questionnaires were returned. Specific consideration 
is warranted of the contractors' replies to the question which 
asked them to choose the most important reasons for delays from 
a list of possible reasons. 
5.1.. 
The results are reproduced in table 
I 
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Table 5.1.1970 NEDO Survey - Causes of Delay 
Reason for Delay Percentage of Companies 
Ranking as First 
Late Design Changes 27% 
Late Delivery of 
Plant/Materials 
21% 
Unexpectedly Low Labour 
Productivity 
10% 
Other Contractors' Performance 8% 
Labour Disputes 8% 
Delays in Subcontractors 8% 
Access* 7% 
Skilled Labour Shortages 5% 
Clients' Performance* 1% 
Faulty Materials 1% 
Management Problems More 
Difficult than Anticipated 
1% 
Faulty Workmanship 1% 
Total 98% (note 2) 
Notes 1. Contractors were asked to indicate from a pre-set 
list of possible reasons, the ones they regarded as most 
important. A space was also provided for respondents to write 
in non-specified reasons. Those categories marked with an 
asterisk were created from written-in replies. 
2. The report does not specify why the percentages do 
not add up to 100%. The 2% shortfall could, therefore, arise 
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from rounding-off and/or the existence of small unspecified 
categories. 
In examining this table it is useful to group the individual 
reasons for delays under the broader, more analytically based 
headings: - 1) Labour-related, 2) Pertaining tp capital relations. 
Table 5.2. gives a breakdown of table 1 into the two categories, 
by first choice. 
2. 
Table 5.2. - Categorisation of 1970 Survey ýf 
Reason for Delay Companies Ranking as First 
Labour-related 24% 
Pertaining to Capital 
Relations 
74% 
Total 98% (note 2) 
Notes 1. 'Labour-related' category comprises 'low labour 
productivity', 'labour disputes', 'skilled labour shortages', 
'faulty workmanship'. 'Pertaining to capital relations' 
comprises all other categories. 
2. See note 2 for table 5.1. above. 
An analysis of the survey results must start from an 
understanding of the basic question - what information is being 
reported? The simple answer is that managerial staff of 
contractors in the ECI replied to a NEDO group survey question 
concerning the causes of delay in the construction of large 
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sites. There are a number of implications of this. One is that 
it is a subjective assessment. The tables contain information 
concerning attitudes about practices rather than about the 
practices themselves. That the question on the survey refers to 
the general phenomenon of delays on large construction sites 
rather than focusing on the reasons for delays in particular 
instances serves to militate against the results as an effective 
proxy for practices. Against this is the fact that the 
respondents are the very people who have experienced delays, and 
who have witnessed the practices that cause delays. 
Whether the attitudes reported can be taken as an effective proxy 
for actual practices will also depend upon the possibility of 
bias existing. Bias can exist in a number of areas. The size 
of the survey is relevant - can 86 head off ice level replies and 
260 site level replies be assumed to be a representative sample 
of contractor management attitudes? The NEDO report states that 
'data were received on 43 of the NEDO list of large sites' 
(p. 71). This NEDO list of large sites is given on page 11 of the 
report, and contains 51 projects under construction. Therefore, 
43 out of 51 projects have been covered by the survey. This wide 
coverage of the survey suggests that unless there are compelling 
reasons to the contrary the results should be taken as strongly 
indicative of contractors' attitudes. No such compelling reasons 
exist. 
The next question to consider is whether contractors' reported 
subjective attitudes towards practices will differ systematically 
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from the actual practices. Bias is likely to exist because they 
reported their attitudes for publication to a NEDO group. The 
NEDO group had been set up under the terms of reference "to 
inquire into the problems of organisation of large industrial 
construction sites with particular reference to labour relations, 
to investigate their causes and their effects on the cost of 
commissioning and operating plants, and to make recommendations'. 
The NEDO group was established, therefore, with clear public 
policy implications with particular reference to labour problems. 
Given this,, contractors can be seen to be less likely to blame 
themselves (as a group as well as individually). Moreover, it 
is clear from the form of question asked by the NEDO group to the 
contractors (and indeed by the general tenor of the survey 
itself) that the NEDO group, following its terms of reference, 
particularly focused on labour-related issues. This is evident 
in that of the ten pre-selected possible causes for delay in the 
question five pertained to labour-related issues. An opportunity 
was given for contractors to choose non-pre-selected reasons. 
All of the categories created from this related to capital rather 
than labour - 'access', and 'client performance'. 
In sum, the findings reported in table 5.2. are biased to the 
extent that contractors are more likely to blame labour for 
delays, and that problems exist in that the table reports 
attitudes rather than practices, with the former a not wholly 
adequate proxy for the latter. 
Despite the bias, the total score for labour-related items is 
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only 24%, whilst the percentage for the combined categories 
pertaining to capital is 74%. These are extraordinary 
statistics. In a questionnaire whose structure is likely to 
produce responses biased against labour, contractors, a section 
of capital in the industry, apportioned three times as much blame 
to issues connected with capital relations than to issues 
connected with labour. These findings indicate that issues 
within capital relations may well be the key determinants of the 
record of poor project performance against schedule in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
The second piece of evidence on attitudes concerns a report by 
a committee of the Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors' 
Association appointed to 'enquire into the whole aspect of low 
productivity on the mechanical construction side and to make 
recommendations on how productivity can be improved. The terms 
of reference were to study ways and means of achieving greater 
productivity in oil refinery and chemical plant construction work 
and to make recommendations in a report to the panel'. This 
committee was comprised solely of management staff of the 
individual member companies. Its report remains an unpublished 
internal document. Not untypically the report indulges in the 
troublemaker theory of labour causing delays ('troublemakers form 
a very small proportion of the total labour force, generally less 
than 2%. Although their proportion is small it is estimated that 
they cause at least 80% of all work stoppages. Their motives are 
either political, social crusades, career forwarding agitation 
or psychological'). In this context of an anti-labour slant the 
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report ends with a striking conclusion :- 'the most important 
item which causes disruption of site operatives is the late 
arrival on site of materials or delivery in an incorrect 
sequence'. Therefore, an internal management contractor 
appraisal of economic inefficiency in the 1960s chose an issue 
which can be legitimately subsumed under the category of capital 
relations as the prime reason for low productivity. 
Whilst the above two sources represent the most direct evidence 
on attitudes, public body examinations of the industry should 
also be examined. Two such studies of the industry focus 
exclusively on the power station sector - the 1969 Wilson Report 
and the 1981 Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) Report. The 
Wilson committee comprised contractor management, civil servants 
and trade union officials. Their level of analysis is indicated 
by their own description of their approach :- 'to start off on 
the assumption that the CEGB and the contractors had by now 
evolved reasonably satisfactory remedial measures, and for us to 
try to see whether these measures were in fact being applied, and 
to form an opinion on the extent of their success' (p. 1). The 
report which is ambiguous and inconsistent begins by arguing that 
the main overt cause of delays had been 1) adverse site 
conditions, 2) manufacturing difficulties, 3) an unusually high 
incidence of design faults, and 4) labour disputes on sites and 
the low productivity of site labour. It ends by saying 'the 
primary cause of the difficulties in constructing power stations 
efficiently has been a failure in long-term planning' (p. 35). 
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The MMC in its 1981 report on the whole operations of the CEGB 
included a chapter on the construction of power stations. Once 
again the admission of their own approach leads the reader to 
wonder how illuminating the study will be :- 'in view of the 
extensive work carried out by previous inquiries, we have 
restricted our investigation of the construction of power 
stations to an examination of the way in which the CEGB is 
implementing its new policies' (p. 250). As such, for the 
conventional power stations the report merely accepts the 
findings of previous public body reports into the industry. In 
relation to nuclear power stations the commission undertook 
additional research and analysis and argued that the origins of 
delays lay in design and technical problems, in construction 
starting before design was complete, and in the organisation of 
the contractor consortia. 
5.4. Evidence on Practices - Primary Sources 
Having examined the evidence on attitudes and briefly noted the 
findings of public body studies it is now necessary to examine 
evidence directly relating to practices. This form of evidence 
is to be preferred to evidence on attitudes but it is not without 
its own problems. In particular, such evidence will pertain to 
individual projects, and thus questions concerning the ability 
to generalise need to be addressed. Nevertheless, it is hoped 
that evidence from four nominated projects which is integrated 
into an overall analysis of the relationship between capital and 
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economic performance which itself corresponds with the picture 
from other forms of evidence will adequately deal with such 
problems. 
The following section considers evidence from secondary sources 
whilst in this section evidence is examined which is derived from 
original research interviewing contractors and clients at site 
and national level. Given that this research focused on 
practices in the late 1980s/early 1990s whilst the focus of this 
chapter is on the 1960s/1970s some explanation is required. 
There are two relevant points in justifying the inclusion of 
evidence derived- from original research conducted recently 
rather than at the time. Firstly, existing evidence relating to 
practices in the 1960s and 1970s has important inadequacies. 
There are a number of important issues which such evidence failed 
to address. In particular, whilst such evidence acknowledged the 
potential existence of diverging interests between contractor and 
client, it failed to provide the reader with an understanding of 
the nature of the relationship between contractor and client. 
Correspondingly, it also failed to provide an understanding of 
the precise mechanisms through which the diverging interests of 
the client and contractor are played out in such a way as to 
impair performance against schedule. Lazonick's (1990) 
historical research on the cotton industry has shown how an 
understanding of such precise mechanisms can be crucial to an 
understanding 'of the relationship between the social relations 
of production and economic performance. Therefore, an important 
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gap exists in the extant evidence. The second point is that the 
inclusion of contemporary evidence fills this gap and is able to 
be generalised analytically. By presenting evidence on 
contemporary relationships inference can be drawn to apply to 
such relationships in the 1960s and 1970s. In the process of 
applying this inference it will be necessary to take into account 
any relevant changes in the environment surrounding and inter- 
acting with these relationships. As such the inference of such 
evidence across time must be supported by an additional argument. 
This additional argument will be spelled out after the 
presentation of the evidence. 
Before the presentation of the evidence three methodological 
points should be made. 
Most of the evidence is based upon accounts provided by 
individual respondents and unsubstantiated by other respondents. 
This raises the question of the reliability of such evidence. 
Given that a recurring overall picture of material practices 
emerges, and given that there exists no systematic motivation for 
interviewees to mislead in terms of over-stating the existence 
of practices outlined below it can be argued that the problem 
of reliability has been adequately addressed. Moreover, the 
evidence is not based on interviews with one group of people 
alone, but upon interviews with contractor, managing contractor, 
and client, staff. This allows for the detection of possible 
serious divergences between these groups in the general thrust 
of their evidence, if not necessarily in the particularities of 
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the evidence. 
Next, as mentioned in the chapter 3, gaining insights into 
contractor practices which can harm economic performance is not 
an unproblematic process. Given that revealing such practices 
does not place the interviewee in a favourable light, the 
interviewee's ability to communicate freely was largely 
conditional upon how convinced they were of assurances of 
confidentiality, independence, and anonymity. In that such 
conviction varied the precise form of questioning in which I 
attempted to elicit information also varied. As such, the reader 
should bear in mind that the evidence below is not based on 
replies to uniform questions. 
The final point concerning methodology is that if it became 
apparent in the interview that the respondent would not talk 
freely concerning the current project it was often profitable to 
direct questioning towards practices on the (named) project on 
which they had recently worked. Here it was particularly 
important to direct the interviewees to give specific information 
on actual practices rather than allowing them to make broad 
general statements. 
Considering the very real problems of contractors' reluctance to 
divulge information and of gaining contractors' confidence, it 
is striking that seventeen of the twenty three contractor 
management staff gave information on concrete material practices 
which serve to further the contractors' interests of short-term 
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profit whilst harming the clients' interests of schedule 
completion on time. Of the six interviews in which no such 
evidence was forthcoming the following observations are relevant. 
Two interviewees were in the middle of the process of substantial 
claims and counterclaims with the client, an antagonistic process 
in which information is at a premium. These interviewees refused 
point blank to talk about tactics to make profit or the nature 
of their relationship with the client. One interviewee was an 
industrial relations officer who stated that he deliberately 
remained ignorant of contractual matters and he was unable 
(rather than unwilling) to provide relevant evidence. Three 
interviewees stated that their company did not undertake the 
practices outlined below. The sum of these observations is that 
of the twenty three contractors interviewed, seventeen gave 
direct evidence relating to practices outlined below, whilst only 
three stated that their firms did not undertake such practices. 
In addition, all the client managerial staff who were interviewed 
gave direct evidence. 
Rather than presenting what each client and contractor said, one 
by one, it is more useful to look at the evidence in the context 
of examining the meaning and implications of certain important 
terms :- 'extras/on day rates', 'sitting on the job', 
'underbidding', 'commercial scenario/withholding information' - 
terms which have common currency in the industry. 
'Extras/On day rates' 
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These two terms, often although not necessarily, are used in 
tandem. The neo-classical theory of efficiency through 
competition as applied to the ECI suggests that at the stage when 
a contract for a piece of work is put out to tender the 
competitive process between the contractors should lead to 
increasing efficiency in the performance of contracts over time. 
The most efficient firms will be able to bid for a piece of work 
at a lower price and in a shorter time period than less efficient 
firms. These latter firms must be able to lower their bids 
through increasing the efficiency of the qrganisation of 
production or else they will be forced out of business. 
Underbidding may occur occasionally but ultimately those firms 
able to generate a profit will be able to survive. Here there 
is no consideration of the possible effects of diverging 
interests of the contractor and the client }which could be 
damaging to economic performance. 
The whole premise of this argument rests upon the assumption that 
the profit base for the contractor exists within the terms of the 
contract. This central assumption does not hold for large sites 
in the ECI. The site manager of contractor C. a. (see Note 1) put 
it succinctly 'the name of the game is going for all the 
extras you can get, that's what it's all about'. A manager of 
contractor C. i. said that 'getting extras is a key part of our 
strategy. We are always looking for changes [to the contract]'. 
The site industrial relations officer of contractor A. d. put it 
less bluntly .- 
'on this contract there have been lots of 
modifications on day work rates which we're not unhappy with'. 
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The assistant site manager of contractor A. e. noted that the 
contract was on a 'very tight budget', and that they were 
'relying on extras and claims to turn in a profit' . The manager 
at contractor B. a. said 'you always try to get extras and this 
contract is no exception'. The manager at contractor B. c. 
commented that the productivity estimates underlying the bid were 
'deliberately optimistic', because they knew that 'there will be 
changes, and we'll have claims'. 
Here is strong evidence that the basic assumption underlying the 
neo-classical approach is inaccurate; contractors tend to regard 
the terms of the contract established at the stage of their 
tender bid being accepted as 'the bottom line', as the client 
industrial relations officer at project B put it. There are a 
number of ways in which contractors can receive payment in 
addition ('extras') to this bottom line. This will occur if 
there is a simple change in the amount of work ('a scope 
change'), e. g. whist the tender may specify installing 2,000 
metres of pipes, the client may subsequently change this to 2,500 
metres, and the payment will increase pro-rata by 25%. This is 
likely to lead to an increase in profits to the contractor in 
that if the contractor does not increase the overheads at site 
the average cost per metre of piping should fall. 
As such, simple changes to scope will be welcome to contractors, 
but a more lucrative source of extra payment is work 'on day 
rates', where payment is not changed pro-rata with the amount of 
work. As a manager from contractor A. f. stated :- 'about 20% of 
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our site man-hours has been on work orders, which we're delighted 
with'. Rather, the contractor is able to charge the client a 
higher rate, i. e. day rate, in which all the additional labour 
and materials used by the contractor, plus a mark-up percentage 
of the order of 12.5 - 15%, is paid by the client. Whether the 
work is done on day rates depends on the implications and the 
timing of the changes requested by the client. If the work needs 
re-working of already completed work (perhaps because of a design 
fault, or because of poor work in the geographical area by 
another contractor, e. g. if the steel frames to carry piping are 
faulty in some respect) then this work will be on day rates. 
Similarly, if the work needed requires work where there is 
limited access because another contractor's workforce are in that 
area or because the work is in a confined, awkward space, the day 
rates will also apply. 
Crucially, the contractor has an influence on whether extra work 
is paid pro rata or at day rates. It is important to note again 
the elements that determine if a job is paid at day rates - the 
implication and the timing of the changes. Whilst a contracting 
firm is undertaking a piece of work its staff will be aware of 
any inadequacies in the existing design or in the preceding work 
of any contractor but it will be in their interest to complete 
this badly designed work, wait for a client inspection, and then 
be instructed to undertake re-work, to be paid at day rates. 
Here the contractor is paid for the original work at the rate set 
in the tender bid, and then receives additional payment at day 
rates for the additional work. This explains the action of 
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contractor C. a. (as described by the site manager) in their 
contract to line a structure with thick plating. The staff were 
aware that the lining of an adjacent structure completed by 
another contractor was inadequate. A correction immediately upon 
this discovery would not have been costly in terms of money or 
time to the client. However, the contractor staff did not inform 
the client of this fault immediately. As work around the area 
continued a correction no longer constituted a simple matter 
which the client could expect to reimburse pro rata. At the 
stage where re-work would inevitably attract day rates, and when 
re-work was both time-consuming and likely to cause delays in 
access to other contractors, the contractor notified the client 
of the problem and offered to undertake the re-work at a 'times 
and materials rate plus 12.5%' . The client had little option but 
to accept. To attempt to force the original contractor to re-do 
the work would have been problematic, with the process of 
apportioning blame being time-consuming, and with the client 
lacking the ability to tolerate further delays in the area. 
The same process was at play in the example given by the manager 
at contractor C. i.. In the process of completing work on their 
general mechanical engineering contract the contractor staff 
became aware that a significant element in the design was 
inadequate. Rather than informing the client of the problem, the 
approach was that it was 'best to leave things go without 
questioning'; there was a deliberate decision :- 'we'll let it 
run and get the changes when necessary'. At the point of the 
interview taking place the contractor had not yet informed the 
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client of the problem in the design, and so the outcome of the 
process was unknown, but the contractor believed that the re-work 
would be undertaken on day rates .A similar process was outlined 
by the industrial relations officer of contractor A. d.. He 
stated that of the work undertaken on site, which was nearly 
complete, approximately 15% had been done on day rates. Upon 
being asked whether the firm had in effect helped to create some 
of this work for itself, the interviewee replied 'let's put it 
this way, a lot of it might not have existed if we'd been 
completely honest'. 
A clear conclusion from this is that the diverging interests of 
client and contractor manifest themselves in practices which 
directly serve to delay construction, and which therefore 
directly serve to harm performance against construction schedule. 
Therefore, in stark contrast to the neo-classical theory of 
efficiency though competition, it is apparent that it is those 
contractors who are most adept at exploiting the opportunities 
for extras, rather than those who are most efficient in their 
production organisation, who will reap the highest profits. This 
is the context in which the boast of contractor C. i. that 'our 
backroom boys are exploiting every avenue' acquires real meaning 
and relevance. Moreover, often a client will be unaware that a 
contractor has deliberately contributed to the creation of 
extras. This will mean that the tactics of creating extras at 
day rates will not necessarily impair the contractor's chance of 
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being re-hired by the client on a later project. At this level 
it can be seen that under the appropriate circumstances a 
systematic reproduction of inefficient practices will occur, 
leading directly to chronic problems concerning performance 
against schedule. 
'Underbidding' 
Underbidding occurs when the contractor quotes a price for a 
piece of work put out to tender which is lower than one which 
would cover its costs. The rationale is that the firm is 
desperate for work and is willing to gamble on the opportunity 
that once the job is won there will be possibilities to increase 
the payments from the client. 
A rare piece of primary, documentary evidence concerns 
underbidding. The Director of a major contractor wrote to the 
NJC Director in 1988 concerning the 1981 national agreement's 
effect on economic performance. The letter argues that the 1981 
national agreement could only have a limited impact because it 
cannot directly affect capital relations which are the key 
determinants of performance :- 
'On many large projects the nature of the contract 
between client and contractor creates problems which 
are insoluble in terms of the agreement, e. g. lump sum 
contracts which are entered into at cost or below cost 
with the managing contractor happy to recoup losses by 
means of extras, this demands unrealistic bids by 
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subcontractors who quite understandably are not 
prepared to consider any course of action unless it is 
specifically spelled out in the contract. This in 
turn leads to low productivity on site which becomes 
the norm.... this leads quite naturally to overrun on 
the project' (emphasis added). 
Although evidence on underbidding from original research is more 
limited than for evidence concerning extras it is nonetheless 
informative. A senior management official for the client at 
project A stated that on one of the parts of the site where the 
client did not use a managing contractor, and hired contractors 
directly, it became obvious that one -of the contractors had 
underbid. This firm sought to delay their work as long as 
possible in their attempt to look for avenues through which to 
extract more money from the client. In this instance the client 
added client staff as supervisors to the contractor's staff, 
seeking to impose more direct control. A delay was expected on 
the completion of the contract. The site manager of contractor 
C. g. reported that on the previous (named) project on which he 
had been working, the firm had underbid, and had been unable to 
exploit any avenue for significant additional payments. The firm 
ultimately went 'cap in hand' to the client seeking an increase 
in payment. The client conceded 'a small increase'. It is 
appropriate to place contractor B. c. in a discussion of 
underbidding. The site manager commented that the productivity 
levels on their tender had been 'deliberately optimistic' in the 
belief that 'we'll have claims'. This belief, however, had yet 
142 
to be justified. The contract was a fixed price one for 
fabricate and construct. Severe problems had arisen with 
delivery of materials from the contractor's manufacturing base. 
The blame for the delay in construction work could not be 
apportioned to another party, and the contractor felt compelled 
to substantially increase the labour force to increase the 
construction pace even though the marginal productivity of 
additional work was low due to an inadequate supply of materials 
to provide a continuous flow of work. The manager stated that 
if the materials problem had not been so clearly the fault of his 
firm he would have 'sat on the job' and waited for a direct 
instruction from the client to accelerate. A more indirect piece 
of evidence on underbidding was the comment by the client project 
manager at project C that the cancellation of future orders for 
similar plants 'made hitting the project schedule more difficult' 
because a number of contractors had put in very low bids in the 
hope of securing work for future projects. 
This evidence indicates important consequences of the practice 
of underbidding, all of which harm performance against schedule. 
The contractor who underbids will be firmly committed to gain 
extra payments from the client in some manner. The various 
methods of achieving extras were outlined earlier and were shown 
to impair economic performance. Alternatively, the underbidding 
contractor could seek to gain additional payments by forcing the 
client to issue 'instructions to accelerate' through 'sitting on 
the job'. The meaning of these terms and their wider relevance 
will be outlined below, suffice to say here that they harm 
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economic performance. The other potential option for the 
underbidding contractor is to go 'cap in hand', i. e. to ask 
directly for an increase in payment. In this last option the 
contractor is in the weakest position, and because of this it is 
likely that the contractor will attempt the other two options 
before resorting to the third. The third is still a viable 
option often to contractors because they are aware that it would 
be extremely costly and time-consuming for the client to attempt 
to bring in another contractor to replace the original one. 
Whist this last option does not directly impact on economic 
performance it should be seen as occurring at the end of a 
process which does have potentially signifjcant negative 
implications for project performance. 
Another implication of underbidding concerns its likely impact 
on the resourcing and structure of the contractor site management 
team. The point was made above that there is a clear incentive 
for contractors to structure their site management team in terms 
of favouring the jobs which seek to exploit the opportunities for 
extras, rather than those concerning planning and increasing the 
efficient organisation of production. For the contractor who has 
underbid this argument becomes much stronger - such a management 
structure is no longer determined by incentive, but rather by 
necessity. 
A discussion of underbidding and its consequences needs to be 
informed by an understanding of whether it should be seen as an 
occasional aberration, or whether it should be seen as 
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systematically recurring. It is necessary to consider the 
environment which prompts the contractor to consider the option 
of underbidding. Underbidding becomes an option when nationally 
the firm is short of work or has a cashflow problem. If the 
structure of capital in the industry is such that there is a 
relatively high turnover of competing firms then it can be seen 
that underbidding becomes endemic to the industry. There will 
be a high turnover of firms where there is a low threshold of 
capital for entry into the industry, i. e. where the industry is 
characterised by a large number of small firms . The ECI is just 
such an industry. Supporting evidence for this assertion on the 
structure of the industry will be given in the following chapter. 
It is also necessary to consider the environment which relates 
to the likelihood of success of this strategy of underbidding. 
Success depends on the client accepting the bid and the 
contractors being able to extract sufficient additional payments 
from the client to make a profit on the job. Relevant 
considerations here are whether the client has a long term 
projection of investment in the country; whether the client has 
developed long term relationships with contractors; and issues 
concerning the level of control the client has over the 
contractor. 
This discussion has highlighted the negative impact of 
underbidding on project performance and has argued that under 
certain circumstances underbidding can become a significant and 
chronic characteristic of capital relations in the industry. 
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'Sitting on the job' 
The practice of 'sitting on the job' was referred to in the above 
discussion of the consequences of underbidding, but it has a 
wider relevance than that. The term refers to the practice of 
a contractor deliberately working more slowly than the client 
wishes. The point of this is to force the client or managing 
contractor to issue explicit instructions to accelerate the work 
programme, instructions which will subsequently form the basis 
of claims for extra payments. 
Contractor A. b. was a managing contractor on one of the sub- 
projects on the site. The contract with the client was to design 
and construct a plant, with payment by a fixed price -a turnkey 
contract. At the time of the interview the project was 
'considerably behind schedule'. The industrial relations officer 
of the managing contractor stated that the delay was 'largely due 
to problems with design of the plant'. In particular, he argued 
that the root of the problem was the poor definition of the 
process of the plant by the client. The managing contractor 
argued with the client that the contract should have been turned 
into a reimbursable one, but so far the client 'has stood his 
ground'. This same managing contractor had two sub-contractors 
who were 'sitting on the job' . The sub-contractors had bid fixed 
price on the basis of only limited design information. With the 
delay caused in the design stage, the managing contractor 
required an acceleration in the construction phase to compensate 
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for this. However, the sub-contractors had no incentive to 
accelerate their work programme without additional payments, and 
were therefore refusing to commit extra resources, in terms of 
management, labour and plant, to the site without a guarantee of 
extra payment. The problems, however, were such that the 
managing contractor could not afford to offer to make such 
payments. The interviewee characterised this situation as 
'problems compounding themselves' with the original delay which 
lay at the design stage being compounded by the sub-contractors 
sitting on the job. Although the outcome of the situation had 
not yet become clear the interviewee indicated that the - sub- 
contractors' tactics were likely to be at least partially 
successful when he stated that whether a profit was to be made 
on the project depended on 'our claim with (client A) and on how 
much we have to pay the sub-contractors for acceleration'. 
Contractor C. h. had a fixed price contract with the client. 
Their access to the work site had been delayed due to the late 
working of previous contractors, but the client had stated that 
the contractor was still expected to be finished by the original 
date in the contract. The site manger at contractor C. h. stated 
that he had considered adopting the tactic of 'sitting on the 
job' in order to force a specific instruction from the client to 
accelerate, an instruction which would be the basis of a claim 
against the client. Ultimately, the site manager stated that he 
rejected this option because there were likely to be a large 
number of opportunities to claim extras on the contract through 
the processes described above under 'extras/on day rates'. 
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The industrial relations officer of client B gave relevant 
evidence concerning a (named) contractor on a recent (named) 
project. He stated that if a contractor bids for job X but 
ultimately is asked to perform job Y then in the process of this 
the contractor is likely to become a 'problematic contractor'. 
He gave a specific example to substantiate this. He stated that 
the particular contractor had inadequately understood the 
complexities of the job for which they had bid, and found 
themselves unable to make adequate headway with the work with 
their existing site resources. There were some late design 
changes which affected the precise definition of their allocated 
work in a 'not particularly significant' manner. The contractor 
seized this opportunity to attempt to extract extra payments and 
sought to pressurise the client by 'basically sitting on the 
problem for three months' . Ultimately, the client was forced to 
concede some extra payments and the delay contributed materially 
to the overall project overrun. 
The experience of contractor B. c. was outlined in the discussion 
of underbidding. The contract was experiencing considerable 
delay because of problems with supply of materials. The site 
manager stated that had the problems not been so clearly the 
fault of his own firm he would have 'sat on the job' , and waited 
for a direct instruction to accelerate. As it was, he had been 
obliged to bring in extra labour to attempt to compensate for the 
delays. 
The project manager of a scaffolding firm (no code given for 
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reasons of confidentiality) stated that the contract on the 
project was a 'very tight' fixed price one. In the likelihood 
that the profit return would not be adequate based on the 
existing terms he anticipated deliberately 'slowing down the 
work'. He stated that it was unusual for scaffolding to be 
undertaken on a fixed price contract, and that this placed the 
risk on the subcontractor. However, for this to work smoothly 
it required excellent advance planning by the client/managing 
contractor, such that if the contractor was to be able to 
maintain an adequate and stable workforce he required four weeks 
advance notice of the workload required. At the time of the 
interview the project was at an early stage but the manager 
believed that stich a level of planning was unlikely to be 
achieved. The contractor would then be in a position of 
deliberately 'slowing down the work', being able to blame this 
on inadequate planning from the client/managing contractor, and 
then being issued with an instruction to accelerate, which would 
constitute the basis of a claim for additional payments. 
Clearly, the practice of sitting on the job has a direct negative 
impact on performance against schedule. Here it should also be 
borne in mind that it takes time before the client realises that 
the contractor is deliberately sitting on the job - indeed 
contractors will never freely admit to a client that they are 
deliberately delaying a job. The true nature of the situation 
only becomes apparent after a period of time, during which 
progress is held up. Even once the situation has been diagnosed 
by the client or managing contractor further time will elapse 
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before the work is accelerated. 
It is necessary to address the question of how far sitting on the 
job can be regarded as endemic and structural, or as an 
aberration. Given that the practice is often associated with 
underbidding, and given that underbidding was seen as being 
systematically reproduced under the appropriate circumstances, it 
is logical to argue that sitting on the job should be regarded 
in the same way. 
'Commercial Bias scenario/Withholding Information' 
These two practices often go together, but it will be seen that 
withholding information has a wider applicability. The term 
'commercial bias scenario' mainly applies to situations involving 
managing contractors. The precise meaning of the terms is best 
understood through examining the interview evidence. 
The site manager of contractor C. e. gave relevant evidence 
concerning the firm's experience on a recent (named) project. 
He stated that it was important to differentiate a project under 
a client (i. e. project C) from one under a managing contractor. 
At the recent project the managing contractor was experiencing 
problems at the design and procurement stages. The managing 
contractor did not inform the client that problems had occurred, 
problems which were the fault of the managing contractor. 
Rather, the managing contractor sought to mitigate the effects 
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of delays at earlier stages on the overall project schedule by 
seeking an acceleration of the construction phase. The 
interviewee stated that with the managing contractor not 
highlighting the true source of the problem to the client, the 
job developed a 'commercial bias', with relationships becoming 
'very contractual in nature'. The managing contractor, working 
within a fixed price contract, sought to 'minimise on the 
subcontractors'. The managing contractor sought to 'pressurise' 
the interviewee's firm and others into building up the labour 
force in order to accelerate the construction programme. At 
first this pressure was applied informally, but was later 
manifest by the managing contractor claiming that the precise 
form of words within the contractual document which the sub- 
contractor had signed obliged the firm to accede to demands to 
accelerate the programme. The interviewee's firm contested the 
managing contractor's interpretation of the words in the 
contract. This is what is meant by a relationship becoming more 
'contractual in nature'. The interviewee further said that 
whilst this 'contractual squabbling' was going on the managing 
contractor was able to go to the client and argue that any 
problems that were occurring were due to uncooperative 
contractors -a claim which could form the basis for a subsequent 
request for additional payments from the client to the managing 
contractor. Crucially, the terms of the contractual relationship 
between the client and the managing contractor were such that the 
client was unable to directly communicate with the 
subcontractors, and therefore the client remained ignorant of the 
true cause of the initial delays. The outcome of the 
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'contractual squabbling' between the managing contractor and the 
interviewee's firm was that the firm agreed to a 'partial 
acceleration', with a 'slight re-negotiation of terms'. The 
interviewee was unaware if the managing contractor was able to 
extract any additional payment from the client. 
The industrial relations officer at contractor A. a. stated that 
on the present job the development of a 'commercial bias 
scenario' had only been narrowly avoided. The firm A. a was a 
main contractor to a managing contractor on the site who had a 
turnkey contract with the client. There were severe delays in 
the design stage of the project, and the managing contractor 
sought to hide their own problems by pressuring the contractor 
to accelerate. The contractor initially responded by putting 
forward their interpretation of the contract such that additional 
payments would be required if extra resourcing took place. These 
were the preliminary stages of a commercial bias entering into 
the relationship. The full scenario was avoided by a national 
directorial-level meeting between the firms in which it was 
decided to 'split the dividends'. This was possible because the 
contract was 'very lucrative'. The project overran by three 
months but the managing contractor and the main contractor still 
reaped a profit. 
The situation of managing contractor A. b., which was outlined in 
the discussion of sitting on the job, can be legitimately 
conceptualised as involving a commercial bias scenario, although 
the interviewee did not use the precise term. The managing 
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contractor had a turnkey contract with the client. The contract 
was subject to considerable delay due to problems in the design 
stage (the managing contractor was arguing that the problem lay 
in the stage of process definition, the client's responsibility). 
Because of this the managing contractor required an acceleration 
of the construction phase, but had so far been met by two 
contractors sitting on the job. At the time of the interview the 
managing contractor was involved in the process of arguing with 
the obdurate contractors that they were contractually obligated 
to accelerate. 
The project manager of the client at project A stated that real 
drawbacks existed* in the use of managing contractors, and that 
the decision to use them on some sub-projects had been 
necessitated by the very high peak load of construction which the 
client did not have sufficient design and management resources 
to cover. The drawbacks which the projects manager had 
experienced were the problems of 'managing contractors not 
divulging information, and trying to hide their mistakes'. He 
stated that this had occurred with two (named) managing 
contractors - managing contractor A. b. and the managing 
contractor of contractor A. a, both of whom have been referred to 
above. 
The industrial relations officer of the client at site B gave 
relevant evidence concerning his experience at a recent (named) 
project. He stated that at the project the managing contractor 
had been awarded a turnkey contract. There had been severe 
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problems and delays in the design stage, but the managing 
contractor had attempted to shift the blame for the problems onto 
the subcontractors. The client was unable to directly 
communicate with the subcontractors, and the managing contractor 
used this situation to attempt to draw money from the client. 
The key focus of the managing contractor was on seeking to 
extract additional payments rather than on attempting to solve 
the severe design problems. The interviewee stated that 'the 
last thing the managing contractor will say is the truth - that 
we are the cause of the problem'. 
In all of the above the practice of withholding information 
occurs in the context of a commercial bias scenario, but it has 
a wider relevance than this. The site manager of contractor B. c. 
stated the firm had a fixed price fabricate and construct 
contract with the client. The contractor was experiencing 
'horrendous problems' of delivery of items from another 
manufacturing division within the firm. The site manager had 
sought to hide the problems from the client, but the problems had 
become so manifest and were so obviously the fault of the firm 
that upon persistent questioning by the client the contractor 
admitted the nature of the problem. In connection with this, the 
industrial relations officer of the client at project B stated 
that contractor B. c. 's job had been subject to delay, and that 
'we got them to admit' that the problem lay in the supply of 
fabricated items from their manufacturing base. Upon further 
enquiry into the form of this problem the client concluded that 
there was unlikely to be a significant improvement in the 
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delivery of items in the near future, and the client therefore 
forced contractor B. c. to give part of the fabrication element 
of their contract to another firm. 
So far the evidence presented on the commercial bias scenario 
might suggest that it only applies in situations involving 
managing contractors. However, similar, though less extreme, 
processes of withholding information and attempting to pass on 
blame can exist in the context of client/main 
contractor/subcontractor relations, where the main contractor 
could attempt to shift the blame for its own mistakes on to the 
subcontractors. The interview with the manager at contractor 
A. c. provided evidence of a contractor withholding information 
from the client. The official stated that 'we are running about 
six weeks late because of modifications and design changes, and 
also because of some poor working by us'. On being asked how he 
explained the delay to the client, he stated 'I say it's 
completely down to their incompetent design'. Also relevant is 
a rare case of historical documents providing direct information 
on the practices of contractors. The minutes of a meeting in 
1971 at the BP site, Baglan Bay, between BP Chemicals staff and 
a contractor committee set up (at the behest of BP) to examine 
low productivity state that 'BP Chemicals say contractors are far 
too optimistic when giving dates for plant availability and only 
at the last hour will admit failure'. This 'optimism' can be 
legitimately interpreted as a deliberate withholding of 
information concerning directly attributable problems created by 
contractors. 
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It is necessary to clarify why the client is constrained from 
communicating with the subcontractor. In a turnkey contract with 
a managing contractor the client is aware that interference of 
any kind whatsoever within the area specified in the contract to 
be the sole responsibility of the managing contractor will 
constitute a 'legitimate' basis for a claim against the client 
by the managing contractor. As such, the terms of the contract 
between client and managing contractor can be seen to constitute 
a boundary over which the client is not allowed to step without 
penalty. The very strict and defined nature of this boundary is 
manifest in that the mere occurrence of direct communication 
between the client and the contractor in order to exchange 
information would constitute a breach. Where there is no 
managing contractor the nature of the boundary separating the 
client from a main contractor's subcontractor is less defined. 
From the above discussion it is clear that the practices related 
o the commercial bias scenario and to the withholding of 
information have a negative impact on performance against 
schedule. There are a number of differing mechanisms through 
which this impact is transmitted. Firstly, the process of a 
commercial scenario creates an environment in which the 
likelihood of contractors sitting on the job becomes greater 
The development of relationships which are 'contractual in 
nature' leads to a delay in all decision-making in that 
discussions become increasingly based on quasi-legalistic 
interpretations of forms of words. This feeds into another 
aspect of the negative impact on performance - namely that the 
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priority of the management of the managing contractor and the 
contractor becomes not making the organisation of production more 
efficient, even of aiming to complete their work by the agreed 
date, but rather the practices of attempting to assign blame to 
another party, and of seeking interpretations of particular terms 
in documents and contracts which are favourable to them. In 
considering all of these mechanisms it should also be borne in 
mind that the playing out of these tactical practices all takes 
time. The systematic manipulation and withholding of information 
is an intrinsic element in this whole process, and so because the 
process can be said to be furtively created time necessarily 
elapses before the parties are aware of what is occurring, and 
before a possible solution can be reached. 
The question now arises how far practices related to the 
commercial bias scenario and to the withholding of information 
can be seen as systematically recurring. The practice associated 
with the commercial bias scenario occur primarily in situations 
involving a managing contractor. Therefore, any attempt to argue 
that it systematically recurred in a particular time period must 
take into account how widespread managing contractors were. In 
periods where there are managing contractors it is clear that the 
process will keep playing itself out on projects where major 
problems occur in the design stage. Furthermore, in relation to 
the withholding of information it is clear that there 
structural incentives for contractors to attempt to pass on the 
blame to other parties. Here, the words of the client 
interviewee at site B bear repeating : -'the last thing the 
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managing contractor will say is the truth - that we are the cause 
of the problem'. This point has a wider applicability than to 
just managing contractors. 
Evaluation of primary data 
The above sub-sections presented evidence based on contemporary 
original research on a number of common practices which are 
important to understand in examining capital relations and their 
impact on performance against schedule. In each of the 
individual discussions of extras/on day rates, underbidding, 
sitting on the job, and commercial bias scenario/withholding 
information, it was noted that there was convincing evidence that 
such widespread practices had a negative impact on performance 
against schedule. It was also noted that in each case there were 
strong reasons for rejecting the idea that such practices could 
be regarded as aberrant. Rather it was argued that these 
practices could be seen as recurring systematically. In a number 
of instances the important qualifying clause 'in the appropriate 
circumstances' was an integral part of this argument. 
While each of the individual discussions provides valuable 
evidence linking capital relations and economic performance, 
taken together to form a whole the discussions constitute 
stron of systematic evidence__on) the nature of client- 
contractor, and inter-contractor relations, and on the negative 
a 
impact of these relations on performance against schedule. The 
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evidence on the nature of these relations and the practices to 
which they give birth paints a very clear picture of clients and 
contractors meshed in a system of conflictual, short-term, low 
trust relations, a system in which the focus of profit-making 
becomes the ability to exploit opportunities to generate extra 
payments rather than the ability to organise production more 
efficiently. 
5.5. Inference Across Time? 
As noted earlier, the use of research on contemporary events in 
analysing the 19,60s and 1970s needs to be justified. In the 
analysis of contemporary evidence it was argued that the 
practices could be seen as systematically recurring in the 
appropriate circumstances. It is logical, therefore, to argue 
that if the relevant environmental factors in the 1960s and 1970s 
correspond to these 'appropriate circumstances' then the case for 
inference across time has been made. 
As such, the focus of this section is upon these environmental 
factors. Because much that is relevant here pre-figures the 
following chapter's discussion of the role of capital relations 
in the improvement in project performance in the 1980s this 
section will serve only to present outline rather than detailed 
points, leaving greater detail for the following chapter. 
In relation to extras and day rates it was argued that there 
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would be a systematic reproduction of these inefficient 
practices. However, these practices will also vary according to 
the timing and quality of design in particular, in that it is 
often faults in the design which are deliberately ignored by the 
contractor, or late changes in the design, which allow 
contractors the opportunity to claim extras on day rates, thus 
perpetuating the system of profit-making which is not dependent 
on the efficient organisation of production. The important point 
here is that there has been a significant improvement in the 
control of the timing and quality of design in the 1980s. This 
improvement has taken place largely due to the growth of managing 
contracting and its success in better controlling the discipline 
of design, and due to the development of Computer Aided Design 
technology. What is relevant for this discussion is that the 
fact that the timing and quality of design were significantly 
worse in the 1960s and 1970s serves to strengthen the argument 
that it is appropriate to generalise from contemporary evidence 
to the 1960s and 1970s without fear of overstating the existence 
of contractor behaviour harmful to economic performance. 
In relation to underbidding it was argued that this practice 
would systematically recur where there was likelihood of extras, 
where there was a large number of small firms, where there were 
short term relationships between client and contractor, and where 
the level of control over the contractor was low. The above 
paragraph argued that the likelihood of extras was higher in the 
1960s and the 1970s. In terms of the structure of capital in the 
industry, it largely remained in the 1980s what it was in the 
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1960s and the 1970s - namely, an industry of a large number of 
small firms, and a small number of large firms. In relation to 
short term relationships between contractors and clients this has 
been a chronic feature of the industry throughout the thirty 
years covered by this thesis. This is manifest in the manner in 
which the NEDO (1991) report on partnering in the USA points out 
what a radical departure this form of long term relationship 
would be for the UK industry. In relation to the last factor, 
the level of control by the client over the contractor has 
increased markedly in the 1980s compared to the 1960s and 1970s. 
A good proxy for this shift is the move from reimbursable 
contracts in the 1960s and 1970s to fixed price contracts in the 
1980s. The prevalence of reimbursable contracts in the 1970s and 
their significance in terms of control is highlighted by the 
evidence given by John Baldwin, General Secretary of the AEU-CS, 
to the 1981 House of Commons Select Committee on Energy :- 
'I see the reimbursable contract being the main thing 
in this country.... there is evidence that some of the 
major contractors in the United Kingdom now would not 
be interested in bidding for a large contract unless 
it was on a reimbursable basis.... I do not really 
see.... any real evidence that we have control of the 
purse strings so far as reimbursable contracts are 
concerned' (para 1924). 
In sum, consideration of the environmental factors support the 
thesis that it is appropriate to infer across time. 
The earlier discussion of sitting on the job indicated that the 
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factors determining how far it could be said to systematically 
recur were essentially similar to those factors discussed in 
relation to underbidding. As such, the conclusion of the above 
paragraph holds true for sitting on the job as well. 
The discussion of commercial bias scenario and withholding 
information argued that the widespread existence of managing 
contracting would be a sufficient condition for their recurrence. 
Managing contracting began in the early 1970s and became 
widespread in the non-power station sectors by the mid/late- 
1970s. The incentive for contractors to withhold information as 
part of a system of passing on blame to other parties can be seen 
to be present throughout the 30 year period being studied. 
Therefore, with the minor proviso that managing contracting did 
not exist in the 1960s, it is once again appropriate to argue 
that inference can be legitimately made across time. 
In each of the individual discussions it has been found that it 
is legitimate to infer from evidence on contemporary relations 
and practices of capital to relations and practices in the 1960s 
and 1970s. More generally, given that the contemporary evidence 
painted a vivid picture of clients and contractors meshed in a 
system of conflictual, short term, low trust relations, any other 
evidence which points to such a nature of relations will serve 
to strengthen the argument that it is appropriate to infer across 
time. Such secondary evidence that pertains directly to the 
1960s and 1970s is considered in the following section. 
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5.6. Evidence on Practices - Secondary Sources 
In considering evidence from secondary sources it is important 
to be aware of the underlying model of political economy being 
put forward by the authors. In particular, given that it has 
been argued that an understanding of the diverging interests of 
the client and the contractor is a fundamental building block for 
an analysis of capital relations and economic performance it is 
clear that those accounts of practices which do not portray this 
understanding will be of limited value. The secondary sources 
examined are Kharbanda and Stallworthy (1983), an internal 
unpublished NEDO report, a 1986 NEDO report on the BP Sullom Voe 
project, and the 1976 NEDO report. 
The title of Kharbanda and Stallworthy's (1983) book, How To 
Learn From Project Disasters, informs the reader immediately that 
the authors approach the issue entirely from a managerial concern 
to improve project management. Chapter 6 of their book concerns 
the building of an oil refinery, the Conoco refinery, in 
Humberside in 1967-70, a project which was subject to substantial 
schedule and cost overruns. The chapter includes valuable 
information concerning the relationship between the client and 
the managing contractor. Conoco, an American client with no 
experience of the UK ECI, insisted that the refinery be built by 
a managing contractor on a design and build basis, to a fixed- 
price contract. Under the tendering system Davy were appointed 
managing contractors. The authors argue that Davy deliberately 
underbid in order to be able to expand their operations into the 
163 
construction of oil refineries. They explain the occurrence of 
the schedule and cost overruns in terms of two key factors - the 
lack of discipline in not having a frozen design, and the labour 
situation in which there were no established procedures for 
paying for work against effort. They argue that problems 
multiplied through the client demanding numerous design changes, 
and through Davy failing to reveal to the client the escalating 
nature of the problems. 
The point to note is once again the central importance ascribed 
to capital relations. Here is concrete and specific evidence 
connecting capital relations and project overrun. Although the 
chapter adopts a descriptive rather than analytical approach 
there is enough information to give indications of the 
mechanisms though which this connection occurs - evidence of 
underbidding, of the lack of discipline on design, and of the 
deliberate withholding of information by the contractor are all 
present. 
The next piece of evidence on practices to be considered is an 
internal unpublished NEDO report on a named project. The NEDO 
group comprised a trade union official, two client officials, and 
a NEDO staff member. The project was an oil refinery built 
between 1978 and 1982; it had a planned construction schedule of 
28 months, and an actual one of 53 months. The project design 
and build contract was let by the USA client to a managing 
contractor on a reimbursable basis. After providing a detailed 
descriptive account of capital relations and labour relations of 
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the project, the report concludes that there were three key 
reasons for the massive overrun. Firstly, it was considered that 
the original schedule was grossly unrealistic, This meant that 
the whole basis of planning was flawed, contractors were forced 
to start up too early on site, and the inevitable re-negotiation 
of contracts served to sour relations. Although the report does 
not explicitly state that the managing contractor underbid this 
does not appear unlikely given that it was the managing 
contractor's first major project in the UK, and given that their 
tender bid quoted a project length a full 6 months shorter than 
their nearest competitor's. Secondly, the management performance 
by the client was seen as being 'inappropriate', particularly in 
relation to choosing the lowest and shortest bid, and in relation 
to not committing enough resources to monitor and improve the 
work of the managing contractor. Lastly, the report blames the 
managing contractor's inexperience of the UK ECI :- 'much advice 
was ignored about the management of sub-contractors in the U. K., 
about the need to support their planning, about the risks of poor 
supervision, about the sort of field co-ordination the managing 
contractor should provide, about likely supply problems'; the 
managing contractor was 'unaware of the chronic tendency of 
contractors to 'buy the job' and therefore accepted unreasonably 
low bids. The inevitable consequence was that the sub- 
contractors were looking for opportunities to re-negotiate and 
in the meantime were minimising their own risk'. This analysis 
clearly supports of the arguments developed in the discussion of 
the primary evidence. 
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Given the report's unequivocal analysis that the form of capital 
relations lay at the heart of the reason for the large overrun 
it is hardly surprising that it remained an internal document, 
and was not considered for publication. It is, however, the most 
penetrating and insightful of the various NEDO studies, being 
uniquely characterised by an approach which does not in effect 
pre-judge the issue by focusing primarily on labour issues, and 
which also critically examines managerial interpretations and 
definitions. 
The published 1986 NEDO study of the BP oil storage and refinery 9 
facilities project at Sullom Voe, however, cannot be 
from the latter criticism in that it relies heavily on a paper 
written by Carr and Williamson (1982) who were both part of the 
client management team for the project. The project which was 
built between 1975 and 1982 was subject to a construction 
schedule delay of 25 months. Whilst political problems involving 
planning permission from the council caused significant delays, 
both the NEDO report and Carr and Williamson's paper stress that 
an incomplete design lay at the heart of the delay, in particular 
in that it necessitated the placing of reimbursable, rather than 
fixed price, contracts - 'an attempt was made to provide an 
incentive element to these contacts by the award of a fee for 
satisfactory performance against work norms. However, BP have 
stated that this was not successful in inducing greater 
productivity. They believe that better productivity was achieved 
on the fully measured contracts' (NEDO, 1986: 18). Further, the 
early problems 'lead to the usual sequence of hiccups, late 
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design leading to late ordering and deliveries, inappropriate 
start to construction etc. which had become a familiar feature 
in the management of large capital projects' (NEDO, 1986: 31). 
Here once again a study of an individual project subject to 
substantial delays reveals that issues which can be 
conceptualised as pertaining to the relations of capital are seen 
as the central determinants of construction schedule overrun. 
The final piece of secondary evidence on practices to be 
considered is the 1976 NEDO report. The NEDO group consisted on 
2 national union officials, 3 client officials, 4 contractor 
officials and was chaired by the chairman of ACAS. This report 
was quoted by the press at the time, and by subsequent public 
bodies to the effect that the key cause of delays in projects was 
the state of industrial relations. However, it is clear that the 
importance of industrial relations' problems is inferred rather 
than demonstrated within the report. This stress on industrial 
relations can be related to the fact that within the working 
group who authored the report there were a number of individuals 
who were persistent advocates of reform of the collective 
bargaining arrangements. 
Despite the lumping of problems in the residual category of 
industrial relations, the report does contain relevant evidence 
pertaining to capital relations. The report examines 7 UK 
projects, 5 of which overran their schedule substantially. 
Severe design problems are mentioned in relation to 3 of these 
projects. Also, the report notes that design and construction 
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problems may be 'inter-related' (p. 64), but there is no attempt 
to understand the nature of this inter-relation, and whether it 
is systematic in nature. This is inevitable given that the 
report lacks the conceptual tools to develop an analytical 
understanding. 
The evidence on the persistence design problems is very relevant 
in that design problems allow contractors opportunities to claim 
extra payments. At this point it is also possible to begin to 
understand the persistence of the problems in the 1960s and 1970s 
concerning the late delivery of materials and plant to site as 
emphasised in the 1970 NEDO survey of contractors as well as in 
the 1976 report. Such problems can be seen not only as a 
consequence of late design information,,, but also as a 
consequence of the emphasis of contractors upon generating 
additional payments rather than increasing the efficiency of 
production. This point becomes clear if the situation of a 
contractor with a fabricate and construct contract is considered. 
Given that the construction site management know that there is 
a strong likelihood of being able to generate additional payments 
from the client beyond the original tender price, they will be 
less likely to seek to exert pressure on the manufacturing 
division of their firm to ensure correct and timely delivery of 
materials. In the context of spiralling and reinforcing problems 
on large construction sites in the 1960s and 1970s opportunities 
would always exist for the contractor to be able to deflect blame 
for delays on to another party. Similarly, given that the senior 
corporate management of the firm are aware that the construction 
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site management can be relied upon to generate profit through 
reaping additional payments beyond the original tender price, 
they will be less likely to grant priority to manufacturing and 
delivery items to the construction site team. 
Two additional relevant pieces of information are contained in 
the 1976 report. The first is that in the 1970s reimbursable 
contracts were in widespread use. On the ethylene plant the 
client would have preferred a fixed price form of contract but 
'under the circumstances it was not realistic to consider 
anything other than reimbursable contracts. A few subcontractors 
who were employed on a schedule of rate basis found themselves 
governed by the slow tempo of the job and their position 
untenable. As a result these contacts were subsequently replaced 
by reimbursable contracts' (p. 34). On the distillers plant the 
form of contract for the construction contractors was 'total cost 
plus percentage for field labour', which is in effect a variant 
on the reimbursable contract theme. On the first refinery plant 
the construction contracts were reimbursable, although 'the 
client would have preferred a wholly lump sum contract but could 
not find a contractor who was prepared to bid on that basis' 
(p. 59). The second refinery plant's main contract was wholly 
reimbursable, while the main contractor subcontracted sitework 
on a lump sum basis. On the methanol plant the contracts were 
let 'on a schedule of rates basis' (p. 67). The report fails to 
give any information concerning the form of contract on the two 
power stations, but from the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
report (1981) and the House of Commons Select Committee report 
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(1981) it is clear that from 1970 to 1978 the CEGB had a policy 
of letting contracts on a reimbursable basis. 
The point here is that the existence of reimbursable contracts 
in this period further strengthened the nature of the system in 
which the focus of profit-making for contractors was not the 
efficient organisation of production. The report notes that the 
client of the ethylene plant 'claimed that the subcontractors on 
reimbursable arrangements lacked incentive to achieve good 
performance' (p. 34). In addition, the report notes that the 
client of the first refinery would have preferred a lump sum 
contract. Also relevant here is the comment in the 1986 NEDO 
report concerning the 1975-82 Sullom Voe project :- 'BP have 
stated that this [reimbursable contracts] was not successful in 
inducing greater productivity. They believe that better 
productivity was achieved on the fully measured contracts' 
(p. 18). The Monopolies and Mergers Commission noted in relation 
to the CEGB sites that due to reimbursable contracts 'self- 
discipline of contractors in matters of efficiency tended to be 
undermined' (p. 264). This can be seen as supportive of the 
thrust of the argument of this section. 
Therefore, there is logical clarity and strong evidence to 
support the argument that in the 1970s in the context of a system 
of low trust, conflictual, short term capital relations the 
existence of reimbursable contracts served to strengthen the 
mechanisms through which capital relations served to negatively 
impact on performance against schedule. 
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The final relevant piece of information in the 1976 report is the 
observation that delays on projects were rarely made up, and in 
fact tended to compound themselves (p. 10). This was only true 
for the UK projects. The report offers no explanation for this. 
However, the primary evidence gathered in on-site interviews 
makes an understanding of this possible. It will be recalled 
that a common practice of contractors to generate additional 
payments is to sit on the job in order to force an explicit 
instruction to accelerate, an instruction which will form the 
basis of a claim for extra payments. To be undertaken 
successfully, sitting on the job requires that the contractor is 
able to justify their failure to meet the construction schedule 
on the actions of another party. In a situation of already 
existing delays, due to design problems and/or the actions of 
other contractors, the condition for the successful execution of 
sitting on the job is effectively satisfied. Clearly, in this 
context it is likely that a situation will arise in which one 
delay begets another as contractors seize the opportunities to 
generate additional payments though sitting on the job. So the 
cycle of compounding delays is created. This lies at the heart 
of an explanation of the 1976 report observation that delays were 
rarely made up on UK projects and. tended to compound themselves 
on UK projects (see also chapter 7's discussion of shiftwork). 
5.7. Conclusion 
The introduction to this chapter stated that the aim was to 
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integrate evidence and analysis in addressing the question of the 
role of capital relations and structure in the poor performance 
against schedule of the 1960s and 1970s. It has done this by 
firstly examining attitude-based evidence. This was taken from 
both published and unpublished sources, and it strongly suggested 
that capital relations and structure played a key role in poor 
performance against schedule. Next, the chapter examined the 
evidence concerning the material practices, arguing that this 
form of evidence should be preferred. Firstly, primary data were 
considered, and this provided strong evidence directly linking 
contractors' practices with poor project performance through a 
discussion of extras/on day rates, sitting on the job, 
underbidding, and commercial bias scenario/withholding 
information. It was argued that it could be inferred that in the 
environment of the 1960s and 1970s a system existed in which the 
focus of profit-making for contractors was not the efficient 
organisation of production but the ability to exploit the 
opportunities to generate extra payments. This system reproduced 
poor performance against schedule. 
Next, evidence on practices from secondary sources was 
considered. Published and unpublished sources were examined, and 
it was argued that the sources which acknowledged the diverging 
interests of client and contractor should be preferred. A 
consideration of these secondary sources in light of the insights 
gained from the primary data served to strengthen the emerging 
picture of clients and contractors meshed in a system of low 
trust, conflictual, short term relations. 
172 
The reader will note that many of the practices of contractors 
outlined in this chapter accord with the expectations raised by 
Williamson's concepts of 'opportunism' in situations of 
'information impactedness' where a post-tender situation of 
'bilateral monopoly' exists. A fuller discussion of the 
relevance of Williamson's approach is, however, postponed until 
the following chapter. 
With the central role of capital relations in the creation of 
poor project performance in the 1960s and 1970s established, it 
is the task of the following chapter to address the question of 
the role of capital in the improvement in project performance in 
the 1980s. 
Notes 
1. To preserve anonymity the contracting firms are not 
identified by their trading names. Rather, they are identified 
by a code comprising of two letters. The first (capital) letter 
refers to one of the four projects, whilst the second (lower 
case) refers to a particular firm on that project. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 1980s 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 presented evidence on performance which showed a 
significant relative improvement from the 1970s to the 1980s but 
that in a number of projects in the 1980s actual construction 
continued to overrrun construction schedule. This chapter 
therefore seeks to address the role of capital-capital relations 
in this considerably improved, but not unproblematic, performance 
against schedule in the 1980s. 
The primary evidence, used in the previous chapter, taken from 
contemporary on-site interviews, clearly established that 
capital-capital relations in the ECI can continue to be 
legitimately characterised as low trust and conflictual. As 
such, the basic nature of capital relations from the 1960s to the 
1980s remains unchanged. 
The key argument of this chapter is that although these low 
trust, conf lictual relations persist, the op`prtunistic practices, 
outlined in chapter 5, which directly harm performance against 
schedule have been less widespread because of the rise of 
managing contractors and their successful reduction of 
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contractors' opportunistic practices through a strategy of 
passing on risk. 
The improvement in economic performance has not come about 
because of any shift in the fundamental nature of capital 
relations. 
Sections two to four of this chapter address the growth of 
managing contracting and explanations for this growth. Sections 
five to eight examine the implications of this growth for 
economic performance by examining the practice of passing on 
risk, the relationship between design and construction., the rise 
in subcontracting, and the changing form of contract. Section 
nine examines the facilitating contexts for the implementation 
of the managing contractors' approach. Section ten concerns the 
change in capital relations in the power station sector. The 
eleventh secton addresses the question of whether there has been 
any signifiant increase in efficiency in the organisation of 
production in the 1980s. 
Both primary and secondary data are used in this chapter 
6.2. The Growth of Managing Contractors 
The Construction Industry Research and Information Association 
(CIRIA) defines management contracting as follows :- 
'the term 'management contracting' covers the various 
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systems of project administration in which the common 
feature is that a client for a construction project 
enters into a contract with an external management 
organisation which then operates as the project's 
Management Contractor with responsibility for the 
management and co-ordination of the design and 
construction phases of a project' (1983: 6). 
Common to the number of differing forms of managing contracting 
is the organisational form which puts managing contractors in a 
position of monitoring the performance of contractors. 
The key change in the structure and relations of capital in the 
1980s compared to the 1960s has been the dramatic rise of 
managing contracting. Even in the late 1960s it barely existed 
in the UK - its exceptional status is clearly shown by the 1970 
NEDO report in its discussion of the desirable numbers of direct 
contractors :- 'we believe that there is a case for the 
employment of the specialist 'engineer-constructor', i. e. the 
single managing contractor, on large sites. The employment of 
this type of contractor is common on nuclear and conventional 
power station construction abroad as well as on oil refinery and 
chemical projects' (p. 20). The only managing contracting at the 
time were the consortia of large contractors which had been 
formed for nuclear power station construction. 
The growth of managing contracting began in earnest in the 1970s. 
An indication of this growth is that of the five non-power 
1 176 
station projects examined in the 1976 NEDO report three involved 
a managing contractor. Further, Carr and Williamson (management 
staff of the client, BP), discussing the 1975-1982 Sullom Voe 
project, state (1982: 245) :- 'we opted for what in 1975 was the 
fairly conventional approach of using one or more main 
contractors for design, procurement and construction management 
phases' (emphasis added). By the 1980s the rise of managing 
contractors was complete with only the electricity utilities and 
another major client building any major projects without the 
involvement of management contracting. 
Further supporting evidence of the rise of managing contractors 
can be found in' Ball's discussion of the wider construction 
industry in which it is argued that smaller firms seem to have 
changed their role within the industry, from being independent 
medium and small main contractors to being sub-contractors on 
projects run by large firms, and that 'to summarise the shift in 
the role of the building contractor, it is perhaps best to see 
the change as one of [large] contractors no longer being 
concerned with production management, which in its direct form 
is now often the prerogative of the sub-contractor, instead they 
are increasingly project managers' (1988: 211). 
6.3. Explanations for the Growth of Managing Contractors 
Three potential reasons can be advanced for the initial growth 
of managing contractors in the 1970s - the general contracting- 
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out by corporations (i. e. clients) of their non-core activities; 
clients seeking to improve project performance by improving 
industrial relations; clients seeking to improve project 
performance by improving control of contractors. Evidence 
suggests that a combination of the latter two reasons provides 
the most plausible account. 
Research involving both primary and secondary data provides no 
support for the first thesis. Indeed, there is evidence that 
serves to undermine it. In particular, Carr and Williamson 
(1982) in their discussion of the Sullom Voe project detail how 
BP hired two managing contractors, and yet still manned the 
project with the full complement of client managerial staff. 
Moreover, given that the recent contracting-out strategy of 
British capital did not become manifest until the 1980s (see 
Felstead, 1991: 217), it is difficult to sustain, even at a 
logical level, the argument that clients in the mid-1970s sought 
to hire managing contractors in order to concentrate on their 
core activities. 
The situation in the early and mid 1970s was that clients 
managing their own projects found that they were increasingly 
unable to complete projects to time or to budget. Around this 
time multinational contractors began to enter the British market 
offering managing contractor services. A large element of the 
growth of OCPCA membership in this period came through USA 
managing contractors establishing a base in the UK. The 
unpublished internal NEDO report on an oil refinery project begun 
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in 1977/78 notes that the managing contractor involved was 
European-based and that the project was its first job in the UK. 
Further support comes from Kharbanda and Stallworthy's (1983) 
account of the Conoco refinery in the late-1960s in which the 
British managing contractor involved deliberately underbid in 
order to expand its operations into the world market of oil 
refinery construction. 
These multinational contractors offered clients the possibiity 
of improving project performance by both better monitoring of 
contractors and improved industrial relations management. 
Indeed, these two methods were intimately linked. As chapters 
7 and 8 spell out in detail, an adequate control of contractors 
implied the need for control of industrial relations in that 
shopfloor militancy was used by contractors as part of their 
strategy of evading client control and forcing additional 
payments from clients. 
An integral part of the package which managing contractors 
offered clients was a claim to be able to improve industrial 
relations. The Director of the OCPCA, in interview, stated that 
the industrial relations expertise of managing gontractors was 
a 'key selling point' for them. Indeed, the continued existence 
of two separate employers' organisations in the industry can be 
partly explained by this. The last serious merger attempt 
between the OCPCA and NECEA foundered upon the constituent 
members of the OCPCA (i. e. managing contractors) refusing to 
accept the NECEA condition that members should not meet with 
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union officials without an official of NECEA being present. 
Managing contractors objected to this condition because they saw 
it as undermining their individual expertise in large site 
industrial relations, an expertise which they regarded as one of 
their key selling points. Further, the intimacy of the link 
between the better monitoring of contractors and the improved 
industrial relations is the only way to understand the apparent 
contradiction of an employers' association (the OCPCA) 
negotiating terms and conditions of employment for workers none 
of whom they employ. Managing contractors in the 1980s do not, 
as a rule, directly employ labour. 
The rise of managing contractors cannot be interpreted as a 
direct reaction to labour militancy. If schedule delays had been 
primarily caused by militancy and if the key reason that clients 
hired managing contractors had been to improve industrial 
relations, then, and only then, could the rise of managing 
contractors be seen as a reaction to militancy. However, neither 
of these conditions held. Labour did not push capital into the 
changes which were attendant with the rise of managing 
contractors, i. e. a curbing of opportunism. 
The transaction costs approach appears to offer a framework to 
explain the rise of managing contractors. As noted in chapter 
3 the central point of the approach is that economic 
organisations of capitalism can be understood as a process in 
which actors 'economise on bounded rationality while 
simultaneously safeguarding transactions against hazards of 
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opportunism' (Wi lliamson, 1985: xiii). Thi s means that more 
efficient modes of contracting emerge over time. Within this 
framework, the rise of managing contractors can be seen as 
explicable in terms of their role in minimising transaction costs 
by monitoring and curbing the opportunism of contractors which 
was described in chapter 5. At this level the Williamson 
framework is clearly applicable. 
However, serious problems with the Williamson framework emerge 
once the question arises of analysing the form of managing 
contracting that emerged in the 1980s. It will be argued that 
managing contractors and clients faced alernative routes to 
improve performance. These are termed the low and high trust 
routes. In the UK the low trust route was followed. It will 
also be argued that improvements in economic performance in the 
1980s have necessarily been limited because of this adoption of 
the low trust route. 
The point at which Williamson comes closest to directly 
addressing issues of trust is in his discussion of 'atmosphere' 
(1975: 37-9, Ch. 4). It will be argued that the concept of 
atmosphere lies in contradiction to other assumptions in his 
framework. Next, it will be argued that, disabused of the 
concept of atmosphere, the Williamson framework in principle 
allows for the creation of high trust relations between firms but 
that the assumption of innate opportunism impedes analysis. 
Williamson (1975: 37) introduces the concept of 'atmosphere' 
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through a discussion of the study by Titmuss (1971) of blood 
donors. Titmuss compared the British system which relied 
entirely on voluntay donors, with the American system, a mixed 
voluntary-commercial effort, and concluded that the 
commercialisation of blood had had debilitating consequences. 
Williamson defends the Titmuss study against criticism :- 'an 
answer to the effect that the standard economists' model is 
correct and that altruism is unaffected by the creation of 
markets is glib and inaccurate' (emphasis added) (1975: 38). This 
leads Williamson to argue that concern for atmosphere is 
important because 'supplying a satisfying exchange relation 
is.... part of the economic problem, broadly construed' (p. 38). 
Note that in the development of the concept of atmosphere 
Williamson is implicitly accepting the existence of altruism and 
its importance in understanding behaviour. Altruism is defined 
in the Oxford English Dictionary as 'devotion to the welfare of 
others, regard for others, as a principle of action; opposed to 
egoism or selfishness' (emphasis added). Yet within the 
Williamson framework it is an assumption that opportunism is a 
fundamental trait of human behaviour; opportunism is defined as 
'self-interest seeking with guile' (Williamson, Wachter and 
Harris, 1975: 258). There is a clear contradiction. Opportunism, 
as a fundamental trait of human behaviour, and altruism cannot 
co-exist. 
Whilst the concept of atmosphere is 'theoretically poorly 
articulated' (Willman, 1983: 123), it is apparent that the concept 
of atmosphere allows for the possibility of altruism although it 
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does not necessarily denote its existence :- 'preferences for 
atmosphere may induce individuals to forego material gains for. 
nonpecuniary satisfactions' (1975: 39). 'Nonpecuniary 
satisfaction' can embrace altruism and therefore by extension the 
concept of atmosphere lies in contradiction to the assumption of 
opportunism. Reference to the 'nonpecuniary satisfaction' of 
individuals is a clear attempt to move away from assumptions of 
the economic human, and yet the assumption of opportunism posits 
the existence of the hyper-economic human. 
Atmosphere is an artificial and contradictory addition to the 
Williamson framework. Disabused of this confusing notion it 
nevertheless remains possible in principle for actors defined by 
Williamson assumptions to create high trust relations. However, 
the weight of his assumptions make the creation of high trust 
relations almost impossible. Consider the case of the repeated 
P4soners' Dilem a in which participation is voluntary. The 
learning process means that the participants' behaviour will be 
modified in light of the falling participation rate. The 
revision in behaviour of an individual is dependent on the 
realisation that cheating lowers participation, and on the belief 
that the individual's own behaviour materially affects the level 
of cheating and hence the level of participation. This is 
feasible. However, once the assumption is made that not only is 
the individual self-interested, but self-interested with guile, 
then the process of the modification of behaviour becomes more 
problematic. In particular an opportunistic actor will tend to 
want to be the last actor to modify his/her behaviour. If all 
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actors are opportunistic the learning process is drawn out. 
The fragility of, and barriers against, high trust relations 
under the Williamson assumptions are highlighted by Casson's 
argument that :- 
'this kind of trust is no more than enlightened self- 
i interest.... The costs of engineeirng the right 
t 
incentive structure can be very high. The incentives 
have to be foolproof, in the sense that no loopholes 
must be left which the self-interested individual can 
exploit.... To be sure that another self-interested 
individual can be trusted a large amount of 
information'is needed, and a sophisticated model is 
required to predict that individual's most expedient 
strategy' (1991: 16). 
Further, there is evidence that high trust relations between 
firms do exist (e. g. see Sabel (1992), Zeitlin (1992). This 
indicates that the Williamson assumption of innate opportunism 
is misplaced. 
There are parallels between this criticism of Williamson and the 
criticism developed by Lazonick (1991). Lazoni, ck argues that 
Williamson's is a theory of an 'adaptive' rather than an 
'innovative' organisation (p. 197), where the 'innovative strategy 
represents an attempt to confront economic uncertainty, the 
adaptive strategy an attempt to avoid it' (p. 199). There are 
clear parallels between Lazonick's criticism that Williamson's 
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framework cannot address innovative orgainsation and the 
criticism developed here that the framework hinders analysis of 
trust relations. Williamson's framwork can explain actors 
avoiding economic uncertainty, or in the specific case of the 
ECI, actors 'passing on risk', but it cannot address the 
possibilty of confronting economic uncertainty, or in the 
specific case of the ECI, of sharing risk through the sharing of 
information and costs and the integration of design and 
construction. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make clear that when the term 
'opportunism' is used in this thesis to desrcibe the practices 
of contractors outlined in chapter 5 it is not being used in 
Williamson's sense of opportunism as a fundamental behavioural 
characteristic. 
6.4. Managing Contractors - Two Routes to Improved Performance 
There are two basic ways in which managing contractors can 
improve performance against schedule on large construction sites. 
Firstly, they can undertake no direct production themselves, 
monitoring the contractual performance of other contractors, 
seeking to reduce opportunism and passing on risk. Secondly, 
they can undertake direct production themselves, seeking to make 
overall efficiency gains by integrating design and construction, 
and they can seek to enter into cooperative, higher trust 
relations with other specialist contractors. 
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These two routes to improved performance are alternatives. They 
imply a fundamentally different treatment of design, and a 
fundamentally different relationship between firms. In the first 
route the essential charateristic of design is that it must be 
fixed, because a fixed design will reduce the space for the 
opportunistic practices outlined in chapter 5. The relationship 
between firms is essentially low trust - firms expect each other 
to act opportunistically and the strategic emphasis is upon 
preventing the position where contractors bear the costs of other 
firms' opportunism, and upon fostering a position where their own 
firm's opportunism can benefit them. In the second route, the 
design can be fluid, and have 'constructability' (see Tatum et 
al. , 1984) 
issues central to it, i. e. issues of how to build more 
efficiently. Further, there is an exchange of information 
between construction and design in which solutions to problems 
in design are dependent on information which can only be gained 
in the construction process. This concept of the symbiotic 
fluidity of design and construction has been remarked on by a 
number of authors (Abernathy et al, 1983; Streeck, 1991) as 
applying to other sectors of the economy. The common 
characteristic of these sectors is that they are product 
innovative. Competition is as much in terms of product 
innovation as price. Of course, ECI large site work can be 
similarly characterised as product innovative; indeed, many 
plants are unique. Here in this second route the nature of 
information exchange and the belief that material benefits will 
be shared implies the need for high trust, coopertative 
relationships between firms. 
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Whilst these two routes can both improve economic performance 
they have differing implications for longer term economic 
development. The first, fixed design, passing-on-risk, route 
implies a short-term, 'step' gain through the reduction of 
opportunism. The second, fluid design, high trust, route implies 
the potential for longer term gains in performance. It will be 
shown that managing contractors in the UK in the 1980s have 
followed the first, fixed design, passing-on risk, route. 
Indeed UK contractors remain so firmly meshed in this approach 
that an attempt by a client to foster longer term, higher trust 
relationships at a project was undermined. This information is 
based on an interview with a mangement official of contractor 
A. a., and does not relate to project A. The managing contractor 
had recently been chosen by a client as a long term 'partner', 
with a guarantee of work which arises for a number of years in 
order to facilitate cooperative relations between client and 
managing contractor. On the first project, which was concurrent 
with project A, the interviewee stated that the client 'raised 
an eyebrow in surprise' at the decision of the managing 
contractor to subcontract out the civil engineering work, and 
'raised another in dismay' when the decision was taken to 
subcontract out a large section of the mechanincal engineering 
work. Such a strategy of passing on risk, of not undertaking 
direct production, was central to how this managing contractor 
was used to operating in the UK, and indeed is central to how all 
managing contractors operate in the UK. 
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Further evidence is required to substantiate these assertions 
that managing contractors have improved performance against 
schedule through the first, fixed design, passing-on-risk route. 
This evidence is offered in the following sections which examine 
the practice of passing on risk in a context of low trust 
relations, the treatment of design, the rise in subcontractors, 
and the changing form of contract. These sections will also 
address the precise mechanisms by which managing contractors 
improved performance against schedule. 
6.5. The Low Trust Route - Passing on Risk 
The central point to note is that managing contractors have not 
altered the short-term, conflictual, low trust relations which 
characterised the industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, 
their role has primarily been in terms of limiting the 
opportunities for contractors to undertake the opportunistic 
practices outlined in chapter 5. 
The contemporary site-based research reported in the previous 
chapter put into sharp relief the underlying relations between 
units of capital in the industry. Given that two of the four 
sites at which interviews were undertaken had managing 
contractors present it should be seen that managing contractors 
were an integral part of evidence concerning these relations. 
In particular, managing contractors played a central role in the 
discussion of commercial scenario/withholding information. 
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Further evidence that managing contracting has not fundamentally 
altered the low trust relations of the industry is provided by 
the fact that the OCPCA members of the National Joint Council 
(NJC) were as opposed as the NECEA members to the proposal that 
contractors be required to reveal productivity information to the 
NJC. This opposition was discussed in chapter 4. This 
withholding of information must be interpreted as an expression 
of low trust relations. Importantly, managing contractors played 
a full role in this. 
Important indicative evidence of the mechanisms by which managing 
contractors have improved project performance is present in the 
comment made by a management official at contractor B. d. that 
'under a managing contractor there are more commercial battles. 
I'd rather work under a client any day' . The manager 
interviewed 
at contractor C. e. Stated that 'we are much more likely to get 
squeezed [under a managing contractor] . 
it's always easier money 
when you deal direct with the client'. Si mi la_rly; the project 
manager at the managing contractor at site D stated that 
'contractors used to be able to get money fron clients like 
turning on a tan_ Managing contractors have changed that'. 
Contractors prefer working for clients rather than managing 
contractors because under the latter there is greater pressure 
to work according to the terms of the contract, and less 
likelihood of being granted extra payments, Contractors feel 
'squeezed' by managing contractors because an integral element 
of managing contracting a it has 
dP_VPlope in the UK EdT has 
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been the practice of 'passing on risk'. 
In their early years of competing in the UK large project market, 
some managing contractors employed labour directly (e. g. this was 
the case in the two refinery case studies reported by the 1976 
NEDO report, and in one of the two projects covered by the 
unpublished internal 1982 NEDO report). However, increasingly 
the norm became to subcontract out all construction work, thus 
employing no direct labour. Indeed, only one major project since 
1985 has been undertaken by a managing contractor who hired 
labour direct. 
Essentially, managing contractors compete by offering management 
services rather than by offering to improve the efficiency of 
production directly. This was obviously manifest on a sub- 
project at site A. The client put a plant out to tender to be 
built by a managing contractor on a turnkey basis. Contractor 
A. a. bid for the package on this basis. The management official 
of this contractor who was interviewed stated that if their bid 
had been successful they would have subcontracted out all 
construction work, employing no direct labour. However, their 
bid had not been successful. Another managing contractor had won 
the contract. This managing contractor had put out the 
construction work to tender and the contractor A. a. bid 
successfully for part of this, and was therefore employing labour 
directly, and was hired to undertake construction work. The 
strategic decision to subcontract out all construction work if 
their original bid had been successful was justified in terms of 
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'it's all about passing on the risk'. It is also relevant to 
note that the particular contract was not perceived by any of the 
parties to be one of high risk. Indeed, as noted in the previous 
chapter, it was possible to avoid a potential commercial bias 
scenario between the managing contractor and contractor A. a. 
because a directoral-level meeting decided that an amicable share 
of the 'lucrative' contract was possible. 
As they have developed through the 1970s and 1980s, managing 
contractors have become institutions which offer management 
services and which pass on risk, but which do not directly 
control and seek to improve productive efficiency. This has 
important implications for the nature of the association between 
managing contractors and project performance. 
To fully understand these implications the concept of passing on 
risk needs to be examined in more detail. The Second Edition of 
the Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as 'hazard, danger; 
exposure to mischance or peril' and 'the chance or hazard of 
commercial loss'. As such, an institution which passes on risk 
is an institution which is faced with a situation of potential 
loss and which is able to transfer this potential loss on to 
another institution. In the particular case of the ECI the 
potential loss exists in the inability of a contractor to 
undertake the work set out in the contract within the time set 
out in the contract and at a cost less than that set out in the 
contract. Passing on risk can be understood as occurring when 
a contractor perceives a potential overrun of time or budget on 
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construction work and transfers this potential overrun to another 
contractor. 
Therefore, an institution which is characterised by passing on 
risk has a relationship with economic performance that is limited 
in nature; limited in terms that it is defined by its 
transferring potential overrun rather than by its gaining profit 
by directly seeking to improve productive efficiency by cutting 
construction time and costs. Passing on risk implies a 
relationship with economic performance in terms of preventing 
overruns rather than in terms of improving productive efficiency. 
This discussion throws up two more relevant questions - how 
exactly does the passing on of risk by managing contractors tend 
to prevent overruns?; even though managing contractors are not 
directly concerned with improving productive efficiency, does an 
indirect link in a long term framework, perhaps through the 
competitive tendering process, exist? These will be addressed 
in turn. 
The mechanism by which the practice of managing contractors 
passing on risk tends to prevent overruns can be conceptualised 
as follows. At the top of the hierarchy the managing contractor 
bids for a complete project package from the client on a fixed 
sum basis. Let us call the accepted tender bid X pounds. The 
managing contractor then divides the project into a number of 
packages of work and puts out these individual packages to tender 
for a total of Y pounds. These main contractors will undertake 
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part of the construction package directly themselves, at a cost 
of Z1 pounds, and will also subcontract elements of the packages 
for Z2 pounds. The contractors further up the hierarchy ensure 
that X pounds >Y pounds > Zi + Z2 pounds. The key point to note 
is that whilst the tender price is falling as a piece of work is 
transferred down the hierarchy there is no necessary 
corresponding reduction in the time taken to do the work, and as 
such, no necessary increase in productive efficiency as defined 
in non-monetary terms. 
This system inherently implies a hierarchy amongst the 
contracting firms. Two integral elements here are, firstly, that 
large firms are able to find smaller firms who will accept the 
work at a lower price than the one at which the larger firm 
secured the work, and secondly, that the larger firm is able to 
resist claims for extra payments against it from the smaller 
contractor. This is an analysis of the structural conditions 
underlying the feeling among contractors that they are being 
'squeezed' by managing contractors or by main contractors. 
The issue remains of whether there may be an indirect link 
between managing contractors' practice of passing on risk and the 
improvement of productive efficiency. The most obvious 
mechanism for such a link is the neo-classical notion of 
increasing efficiency over the longer term through the 
competitive tendering process. As noted in chapter 5.4., this 
argument rests upon the assumption that the profit base for the 
contractor exists within the terms of the contract. Although 
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managing contractors have made the opportunities for extras less 
frequent the situation still exists in which contractors regard 
their tender bid as the 'bottom line' , in the words of the client 
industrial relations officer at project B (also cited in chapter 
5.4. ). This means that the process remains a flawed mechanism 
for the longer term improvement of productive efficiency. 
Although in the above stylised account of passing on risk down 
a hierarchy of firms it was implied that the tender price is a 
relatively fixed, immutable figure, this was essentially to aid 
clarity of exposition. The original research reported in chapter 
5 highlighted the fact that to a large extent tender price exists 
for contractors as a 'bottom line'. This argument is equally 
true for managing contractors. Thus, in Kharbanda and 
Stallworthy' s (1983) account of the Conoco refinery it is stated 
that the managing contractor deliberately underbid with the aim 
of both breaking into that section of the world market and of 
generating extra payments from the client. 
Supporting evidence of this was also obtained in site level 
research. The managing contractor A. b. was hired under the 
terms of a fixed sum turnkey contract, but at the time of the 
research was deeply involved in prolonged negotiations seeking 
to turn the contract into a reimbursable one on the basis that 
the client had given inadequate design information. The client 
industrial relations officer at project B stated that on a 
(named) previous project with which he was involved the managing 
contractor had been hired on a fixed sum basis but had sought to 
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generate extra payments from the client by 'playing off design 
against construction'. 
Given, therefore, that the competitive tendering process is at 
best a flawed mechanism for improving productive efficiency it 
is clear that the managing contractors' practice of passing on 
risk is associated with improved project performance centrally 
in the sense of cutting overruns. 
6.6. The Low Trust Route - Design and Construction 
Managing contractors play a pivotal role in the relationship 
between design and construction, a relationship which, as was 
argued in chapter 5, is central to the link between capital and 
economic performance. 
A number of authors have advanced arguments to the effect that 
managing contractors, as institutions which unite the previously 
separate functions of design and construction, should constitute 
a major force for innovation, to the long term benefit of the 
economic efficiency of the industry. That the separation of 
design and construction is a block on sources of innovation has 
been put forward on a number of occasions. Winch (1984: 3.44) 
states that the distinctive feature of the UK contracting system 
which has been most important in inhibiting innovation is that 
those responsible for design let the production work to a 
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completely separate organisation. 
Similarly, Ball (1988: 96) argues that 'the fragmentation of the 
building process between different enterprises involved in 
design, surveying, contracting, plant-hire and materials creates 
a minefield of dispute, delay, avoided responsibilities and 
missed opportunities for innovation'. In this context there is 
a potential breakthrough in the growth of managing contractors - 
this is recognised by Massoud (1988: 78) when he argues that 
managing contractors should be seen as providing the opportunity 
to undertake complete work packages and to introduce suitable new 
techniques. 
The existing evidence suggests that the full benefits envisaged 
by Massoud and implied by Ball and Winch have yet to be reaped. 
Also, given the relative lack of evidence on the issue, a more 
searching analysis suggests a cogent explanation for this lack 
of fulfillment. 
The problem with the Massoud argument is that it concentrates on 
the technical aspects of the issue while ignorin1ý considerations 
of the political economy of the industry. Massoud perceives 
design and construction coming together for the first time in a 
physical sense in one institution. From this he concludes that 
it must lead to innovations in the process of undertaking 
projects through the integration of design and construction. 
This, however, ignores considerations of the origins and nature 
of this institution, the managing contractor - considerations 
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which have been at the heart of much of this chapter so far. 
The concept of innovation and increased productive efficiency 
through the integration of design and construction implies a 
symbiotic fluidity in which solutions to problems in design are 
ýýý dependent on information which can only be gained in the 
construction process, and in which a faster construction process 
is dependent on a design concept in which the aim for faster 
construction is a central defining characteristic. 
This form of integration of design and construction implies a 
very different nature of capital relations th n exists or has 
existed in the ECI. For the concept to be fully realised 
managing contractors would have to directly undertake 
construction activity, and if subcontractors were needed there 
would have to be trust-based co-operative relations between the 
firms. These forms of relations would be necessary to allow the 
free exchange of information, and transfer of costs that are 
inherent in the concept of integrated design and construction. 
As has been pointed out throughout chapters 5 and 6, capital 
relations in the industry are low trust, and conflictual in 
nature. Managing contractors have not reformed these relations 
but have grown from them. They have limited opportunistic 
practices, but must ultimately be seen as being part of these 
relations. Moreover, managing contractors do not directly 
undertake construction work. 
This suggests that the key concern of managing contractors in 
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relation to design should be to ensure that it is fixed, not 
subject to late changes, and accurate. These questions will be 
of prime concern to the managing contractor because, as noted 
earlier, they will allow less scope for the construction 
contractors to claim extra payments from them, and therefore will 
allow the managing contractor to successfully pursue a strategy 
of passing on risk. 
Evidence suggests that managing contractors have been pursuing 
a strategy concentrating on securing a fixed design, rather than 
concentrating on reaping the benefits of an integration of design 
and construction. 
The management official from management contractor A. h. stated 
that 'ten years ago extras from design changes were common', but 
now 'managing contractors ensured that design was much tighter'. 
Similarly, the industrial relations officer of the managing 
contractor on site D noted that in the 1970s extras from design 
changes were the key source of profits for contractors but that 
'they are not so common now'. The project manager of contractor 
B. d. noted that 'life's harder these days.... you can't expect 
as many major changes'. Further supporting evidence came from 
the official of a managing contractor who was interviewed at 
national level. He stated that the key reason for the success 
of managing contractors was their 'better control of design' 
(emphasis added- control implying the existence of a hierarchy 
rather than a fluidity of exchange). 
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The non-integration of design and construction by managing 
contractors was also manifest from the interviews given by the 
industrial relations officer and a senior corporate level 
management official for the client at project B. On a recent 
(named) project on which they had been involved, the managing 
contractor was hired with responsibility for both design and 
construction. The design, which was undertaken largely in-house, 
was of an inadequate technical standard. However, rather than 
seeking to ameliorate this core problem the managing contractor 
undertook to shift the blame for lack of progress on to the 
construction contractors. The client was unable to directly 
communicate with the construction contractors and the managing 
contractor used this situation to draw money from the client. 
As the industrial relations officer stated :- 'the last thing the 
managing contractor will say is the truth - that we are the cause 
of the problem. '(also cited in chapter 5.4. ). It can thus be 
seen that a lack of integration of design and construction can 
suit managing contractors and their strategy of passing on risk, 
in that it allows for the possibility of shifting blame on to 
another party for problems created in-house. 
The importance to managing contractors of ensuring a fixed design 
was shown in the experience of managing contractor A. b.. The 
management official of this firm stated that there were serious 
delays on the project largely due to severe design problems (the 
client blamed the managing contractor, whilst the managing 
contractor blamed the client for inadequate process definition). 
Because of these design problems the managing contractor required 
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the construction contractors to compensate for the delay by 
accelerating their work. However, the inadequate design 
information gave the contractors the opportunity to sit on the 
job, blaming the delays on design problems, whilst in fact 
deliberately compounding the delays by tactically slowing the 
work. The contractors were awaiting an explicit instruction to 
accelerate which would form the basis of a claim for additional 
payments. 
Project A gave a stark example of the potential benefits of 
integrating design and construction, and the failure of managing 
contractors in the UK to become institutions which seek to 
innovate in this area. It will be recalled that on this project 
there were a number of sub-projects. On the major sub-project 
the client was in a direct relationship with the construction 
contractors, but on others managing contractors had been hired, 
because the client had insufficient in-house management resources 
to deal with the peak project workload. On these sub-projects 
where there were no managing contractors and where the client 
was undertaking the design work there was a deliberate policy of 
designing the plants with 'constructability', i. e. with 
considerations of efficient construction inherent in the design 
process (see Tatum et al. 1986). This was manifested in the lay- 
out of the piping which was deliberately organised to facilitate 
the efficient use of orbital welding equipment. An orbital 
welding machine replaces the labour of the welder in welding 
piping joints, undertaking this process more quickly and more 
accurately (requiring considerably less re-welds) on a stand- 
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alone basis. The optimum use of an orbital welding machine is 
where it can be set up on a position of easy access on a long run 
of similar welds. Its use is more efficient here because its 
set-up time is reduced. The plants were designed to facilitate 
just such a use, and the client bought a number of orbital 
welding machines and offered these on hire to the contractors. 
Therefore, orbital welding machines were in widespread use in the 
sub-project in which contractors were in a direct relationship 
with the client. 
Such an integration of design and construction did not exist on 
those sub-projects in which contractors were hired by a managing 
contractor. Indeed, the management official of contractor A. a. 
stated that although the company owned its own orbital welding 
machine it had been 'of little benefit because of the lack of 
design and field planning to get clear runs'. Interviewees of 
two other managing contractors on the site stated that their 
company had not considered the option of encouraging the use of 
orbital welding equipment either by designing with its use in 
mind, or by purchasing these machines and offering them for hire 
to contractors on an easy access basis. 
The point now should be obvious - why seek to innovate to make 
the construction process more efficient when your strategy is to 
pass on risk? It is also noteworthy that the client management 
officials who were interviewed at no point argued that managing 
contractors had been appointed with the explicit purpose of 
facilitating the integration of design of construction. 
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It is thus not surprising that the Construction Industry Research 
and Information Association in a document seeking to increase the 
use of managing contracting felt obliged to concede that 'from 
the case studies and possibly as a reaction to some of the more 
extravagant claims and generalisations made for the benefits of 
managing contracting, there are some doubts about its merits' 
(1983: 7). The failure of managing contracting to innovate in the 
integration of design and construction is also made manifest by 
a NEDO Construction Industry Sector Group report on the possible 
introduction of 'partnering', i. e. long term trust-based 
relations, in the UK which argues (1991: 20) that a major 
advantage of partnering would be to improve 'buildability' - 
thereby implicitly conceding that current relations and 
structures militate against this. 
The lack of an integration of design and construction by managing 
contractors must be set beside the fact that technological 
innovations have made such an integration increasingly feasible 
in a technical sense. Just as the growth of integrated Computer 
Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacture (CAD/CAM) systems in 
manufacture in the 1980s have allowed for an increasing 
integration of design and production with a blurring of 
previously distinct functions, so the availability of CAD and 
Project Planning Systems (PPS) technology in construction has 
made such an integration increasingly technically feasible. 
However, the nature of managing contractors in the UK has meant 
that the technology rather than being used for an integration of 
design and construction has been used to rigidify the 
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distinction. CAD is used by managing contractors to make design 
more precise and more intricately specified. There has been no 
attempt to utilise the information feedback loops (Winch, 1991) 
which an integrated technology would allow. This flows from 
managing contractors following the low trust route to improve 
performance. Winch reports evidence that this non-utilisation 
of the integrating technology is also true for the wider 
construction industry. He states :- 
'there have been very few attempts to link design and 
draughting systems with either quantity surveying or 
project mangement software to form a fully fledged 
CAD/CAM type system. Day et al. (1986) found no cases 
of data exchange amongst the case studies' (1991: 156). 
Therefore, analysis and evidence suggest that the growth of 
managing contracting has had an impact on design not through an 
integration of design and construction but rather though an 
emphasis on ensuring the design be fixed and accurate. Whilst 
this implies managing contractors have yet to lay the basis for 
longer term dynamic gains in economic efficiency, they have had 
an important short term effect in cutting project overruns by 
imposing a discipline or rigidity in the design process. 
This discipline was lacking in the 1960s and 1970s before the 
growth of managing contractors. The survey of contractors on the 
1970 NEDO report shows that 27% of companies ranked late design 
changes as the key reason for project overruns, by far the 
largest percentage for any category of explanation. The 
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importance of the lack of discipline in the design process is 
spelled out by the 1976 NEDO report (p. 14) :- 'where the client 
retains considerable control, and particularly where, as in 
reimbursable contracts, the financial incentive to the contractor 
to complete the project within a pre-set contract price is 
absent, the discipline on the client's design changes (and the 
effectiveness of planning and monitoring procedures) has to be 
to that much stronger if the project is to be completed on time' 
The report also showed that in two of the five case study 
projects subject to delay the lack of client discipline on design 
was a central reason for overrun. The extent of client lack of 
discipline is further underlined by the statement of the client 
project manager *at site C that 'the control of the design 
technocrats is absolutely fundamental' to cutting overruns. 
Evidence presented earlier in the chapter that contractors now 
are less able to rely upon late design changes as a source of 
profit adds further to the case. 
It is here that it is possible to understand the jmproved but not 
unproblematic performance of projects against schedule in the 
1980s. The point is that if managing contractors' control on the 
fixedness of design occasionally fails then this greater 
opportunity for opportunistic practices will lead to problems 
compounding themselves and the delay growing. A PJC minute from 
a 1980s nominated project subject to delay is relevant here :- 
'the trade unions were concerned at the possibility that high 
modifications manhours may delay the contract completion and yet 
again, they said, the men would be blamed for lack of production 
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and/or competence. Initially, they suggested that an independent 
survey be made to investigate the reasons for high 
modifications'. The union side here is clearly aware of the 
inevitability (in the context of the existing capital relations) 
of problems in design leading to contrators' opportunism and 
their shifting of blame for poor performance, often onto labour. 
6.7. The Low Trust Route - Increasinq Subcontractin 
If passing on risk is as pervasive a characteristic of the 
industry as has been argued then an increase in subcontracting 
should have occurred. This is because the practice of pushing 
down the hierarchy of firms the responsibility for as much of the 
actual process of construction as possible should necessarily 
lead to an increase in specialist subcontracting. 
In assessing any trend from the 1960s and 1970s to the 1980s it 
is necessary to be aware that subcontracting was already a 
widespread phenomenon in the late 1960s. The 1970 NEDO report 
conducted a survey of contractors, and had 260 questionnaires 
returned by site based firms, covering 16,563 manual employees - 
an average of only 64 manual employees per contractor per site. 
In the same survey 82 companies at head office level reported 
that on average 28% of their total contract value was to be sub- 
contracted. Indeed, much of the report is premised on the 
assumption of the widespread nature of subcontracting, a premise 
which has the status within the report as being self-evidently 
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correct. For instance a report by the Department of Employment 
and Productivity, which constitutes appendix 3, states that the 
'multiplicity of contractors and subcontractors is a major source 
of managerial and industrial relations problems' (1970: 98). 
From this already high level of subcontracting there are 
indications that it has grown still further. In the 1960s and 
1970s scaffolding work was predominantly undertaken directly by 
main contractors, but in the late 1980s this would be extremely 
rare - scaffolding now being undertaken almost exclusively by 
specialist subcontractors. Similarly, in the late 1960s the 
pulling of electric cable was predominantly undertaken directly 
by the main electrical engineering contractor, but in the late 
1980s this would be undertaken by a specialist subcontractor. 
These points were confirmed in interviews with management 
officials from specialsit subcontractors, main contractors and 
clients. 
6.8. The Low Trust Route - The Changing Form of Contract 
Given the preceding arguments that managing contractors are 
concerned with passing on risk down a hierarchy of firms in a 
context of low trust conflictual relations, and have concentrated 
on the fixedness and accuracy of design, it should be the case 
that the frequency of fixed price contracts will have risen. It 
will be recalled that passing on risk relies upon the firm higher 
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up the hierarchy being able to control the costs claimed by the 
sub-contractor - this will be facilitated by the use of the lump 
sum contract. 
The evidence strongly shows that there has been just such a shift 
from reimbursable to lump sum contracts from the 1970s to the 
1980s. 
Chapter 5 has already provided evidence that reimbursable 
contracts were widespread in the 1970s. That contracts in the 
1980s changed to become predominantly fixed price becomes clear 
from examination of the field research. Excluding managing 
contractors from the analysis, of the 21 contractors whose 
management staff were interviewed, 13 had a fixed price contract, 
6 had a fixed price bill of quantities contract with fixed pro 
rata increases, and 2 were on a reimbursable contract. These 
last contractors were both scaffolding contractors who were hired 
directly by the clients, with the clients providing scaffolding 
as a common-user service to other contractors. Similarly, the 
1990 NEDO report on the 1989 Kodak plant noted that 'contracts 
between the managing contractor and the sub-contractor were of 
a 'lump sum' or schedule of rates type' (p. 15). 
The important role of the lump sum contract in helping to impose 
a greater degree of control down the hierarchy of firms than is 
possible with a reimbursable contract was evident in the 
experience of managing contractor A. b.. The managing contractor 
had been awarded a fixed price turnkey contract to construct a 
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plant. The schedule had been subject to considerable slippage, 
which the managing contractor blamed on inadequate design 
information from the client. The managing contractor had 
attempted to use this argument to persuade the client to change 
the contract to a reimbursable one, but at the time of the 
interview 'the client has stood his ground'. Contractors prefer 
reimbursable contracts, because this means that they cannot be 
'squeezed'. 
Whilst, theoretically, reimbursable contracts could imply a more 
trust based, cooperative relationship between firms, in the 
context of the ECI in which low trust, conf lictual relations, and 
profit through generating extras and passing on risk are the 
defining motifs, a reimbursable contract is more a manifestation 
of a disrupted hierarchy. That there has been a dramatic switch 
from the 1970s and reimbursable contracts to the 1980s and lump 
sum contracts is testimony to the assertion of hierarchical 
relations in the 1980s. 
6.9. The Context of the Changes 
There were two important contextual changes which facilitated 
success in the implementation of the managing contractors' 
strategy of passing on risk. The two changes were the fall in 
demand in the industry in the 1980s, and the fall in labour 
militancy in the 1980s (although also note that the fall in 
militancy was partly caused by managing contractors). These will 
208 
be addressed in turn. 
A fall in demand will aid the stategy of passing on risk because 
passing on risk is predicated on a hierarchy of firms in which 
the firms higher up the chain are able to exert control over 
those lower down, and are able to resist attempts by those firms 
to claim extra payments. This form of hierarchical relationship 
will be at its most effective when there is a fall in demand in 
the industry - with the smaller, more vulnerable, firms prepared 
'to be squeezed' so long as their survival is ensured. 
Stallworthy and Kharbanda, using slightly different terminology, 
note the importance of this :- 'there is yet another practice, 
described by the term 'bid shopping', where the main contractor 
presses for ever lower bids in order to increase his own profit 
margin. Sadly, many of the smaller subcontractors, fearful of 
losing work, are prone to retreat under pressure, and reduce 
their prices' (emphasis added) (1985: 107). The clear implication 
is that in a slump in demand smaller subcontractors will be more 
'fearful of losing work', and therefore more susceptible to be 
squeezed. 
Evidence suggests that a slump in demand occurred from the early 
1980s. The most reliable evidence on shifts in demand over the 
period is provided by the Review of the Engineering Construction 
Industry (1990), written by Clifford of the Engineering Industry 
Training Board (EITB). Figure 6.1. reproduces a graph from this 
report which shows the total expenditure on process plant, i. e. 
in the ECI, at constant (1986) prices. The table is based on 
209 
forecasts and measures of investment in process plant compiled 
annually by NEDO. The table indicates a rise in investment from 
the mid-1970s to a peak in 1978-79, with a slump from then until 
1983. Investment remained at this level until 1987 at which 
point the graph indicates a rise. 
Figure 6.1. Total Process Industries Expenditure on Process 
Plant at Constant (1986) Prices 
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Table 6.1. shows the estimated number of employees, both manual 
and non-manual , on on-shore ECI sites from April 1978 to 1989, 
based upon EITB statutory returns. Overall, there was a 46% drop 
in on-shore labour from 1981 to 1989, with the sharpest fall 
occurring between 1985 and 1987. The report notes that 'the 
decline in employment is spread across all major types of on- 
shore projects' (p. 9) and the the 'workforce.... tends to be 
concentrated in a small number of very large operations' (p. 1). 
Table 6.1. Estimated Number of Employees on On-Shore ECI Sites 
1978-1989 
Date Employees on ECI Sites 
1978 22,181 
1979 21,845 
1980 21,613 
1981 21,883 
1982 17,551 
1983 16,251 
1984 16,319 
1985 16,822 
1986 14,330 
1987 9,936 
1988 11,818 
1989 11,854 
Source: Clifford (1990: table A2 - source: EITB statutory 
returns) 
Whilst there are certain inconsistencies between sources about 
the precise nature and timing of the fall in demand, taken as a 
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whole the evidence shows that there was a fall in demand near the 
beginning of the 1980s with a potential recovery becoming evident 
towards the end of the decade. 
The other important 'contextual' change was the fall in labour 
militancy in the 1980s. This is included as a contextual change 
for simplicity of exposition. The drop in militancy was caused 
by a number of factors, amongst which the rise of managing 
contractors is included. Further details are given in chapter 
8. A fall in labour militancy is an important contextual change 
in that labour militancy in the 1960s and 1970s was used by 
contractors to avoid tighter control by clients and managing 
contractors and was used by contractors as part of their strategy 
of profit creation through extras. The details of these uses of 
labour militancy will be spelled out in chapter 7. A fall in 
labour militancy will allow tighter control by managing 
contractors and facilitate a strategy of passing on risk. 
6.10. The Power Station Sector in the 1980s 
It was noted in the discussion of the growth of managing 
contractors that in the power station sector no managing 
contractors were employed in the 1980s, except for small sub- 
sections of nuclear power stations, because it was believed that 
there were no managing contractors in the UK capable of 
undertaking a project as large as a power station. The power 
station sector was therefore excluded from the discussion of the 
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implications of the growth of managing contractors, and the 
subsequent discussions of increasing sub-contracting/passing on 
risk, and the changing form of contracts. 
Although managing contractors are absent in this sector, the 
story of changing capital relations and their impact on economic 
performance in the 1980s mirrors the story of the other sectors, 
with the difference being that contractors have been 'squeezed' 
directly by the client, rather than by managing contractors. 
Improvement in performance against schedule in the power station 
sector has come about through an assertion of hierarchy and 
control amidst the unchanging milieu of low trust conflictual 
relations. 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981), the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Energy (1981) and the Wilson Report 
(1969) all provide a clear picture of a context in the 1960s and 
1970s in which contractors enjoyed 'easy money' in the words of 
the project manager of contractor C. a.. Given an understanding 
of the focus of contractors in generating extra payments, the 
environment of substantial design changes, and reimbursable 
contracts in the 1970s, as described by these reports, can 
clearly be expected to lead to precisely the substantial overruns 
that were witnessed at the end of the decade. 
In the 1970s the CEGB adopted a strategy of letting reimbursable 
contracts and cutting back on the number of direct contractors 
and indirect sub-contractors. This decision was partly 
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influenced by the suggestions put forward by the 1970 NEDO report 
and partly by the ability of contractors to resist lump sum 
contracts (see House of Commons Select Committee, 1981: para 
2176). Whilst the 1970 NEDO report had envisaged a relationship 
of mutuality between client and contractors to underlie a 
reimbursable contractual relationship, what in effect occurred 
was that the contractors took advantage of the conditions which 
'allowed us to increase our profit as we increased the amount of 
hourly labour', in the words of the project manager of contractor 
C. d. who was also a management official for the same firm at 
Littlebrook power station in the late 1970s. 
At the end of the decade, however, the CEGB undertook a number 
of measures which strongly echoed the developments in the other 
sectors of the industry. For the Drax coal-fired power station 
and the Heysham 2 nuclear plant which both began at the start of 
the 1980s, 'it is now the CEGB's policy generally to avoid the 
use of reimbursable contracts and to place lump sum contracts 
coupled with incentives and a 'key-date' procedure.... The 
essence of the key date procedure is that at the beginning of a 
contract, targets are set for the amount of work to be completed 
in each 6-month period. If any part of the work is not finished 
by the agreed time, the contract payment due at that date can be 
withheld until the delayed part is complete' (Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, 1981: 260). 
Similarly, the CEGB policy emphasised the necessity of the 
fixedness of design, rather than seeking to integrate design and 
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construction. This is amply demonstrated in the following 
passage from the MMC report :- 
'In order to overcome the delays caused by design 
changes during construction, the CEGB's policy is now 
to have all substantial design work completed by 
contractors before manufacturing of hardware 
begins.... This policy has been implemented for the 
advanced gas cooled reactor (AGR) at Heysham 2 for 
which a separate design contract has been let, rather 
than as often in the past, a combined design and build 
contract' (1981: 259) (emphasis added). 
The client project manager at site C reiterated this policy when 
he stated that 'the control of the design technocrats is 
absolutely fundamental' to the successful completion of a project 
(also cited in section 6). Further, the Chief Engineer of a 
power station client's construction division wrote to NEDO 
concerning the publicity attempts on improvement in performance 
in the followong terms :- 'a major factor has been that we are 
building an established rather than a protoype design as was the 
case for all previous UK nuclear power sations. The importance 
of the design being sufficiently complete before site contruction 
starts is of course well known but it is so important that it 
cannot be given enough emphasis'. 
The assertion of hierarchical relations, its consequent squeeze 
on contractors, and their consequent reaction of passing on risk, 
is eloquently demonstrated in the words of the project manager 
of contractor C. b. :- 'since Drax the CEGB has been very keen on 
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controlling costs. . . major changes used to 
be common, but not 
now.... we are using a cable-pulling subcontractor, it's better 
for someone else to shoulder the blame, and we get a mark-up'. 
Assisting this assertion of control based on hierarchical 
relations has been a severe cutback in orders for power stations, 
i. e. a slump in demand in the sector. Figure 6.2. (from 
Clifford, 1990: 7) shows the level of investment in electricity 
industry process plants at constant (1986) prices. This shows 
a peak demand in the early 1980s, with a sharp fall from around 
1983. An assertion of control and hierarchical relations by the 
CEGB in the early 1980s occurring simultaneously with a peak 
demand appears somewhat contradictory. This can be explained by 
noting that the peak investment of the early 1980s was due, not 
to substantial new orders but to the completion of a number of 
severely delayed projects. As such, the CEGB's actions took 
place in a period of low orders - only five new power stations 
were ordered in the 1980s (Drax, Heysham 2, Torness, Kilroot, and 
Sizewell B), whilst at the time of its publication in May 1981 
the MMC report could note that eight stations were under 
construction. 
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Figure 6.2. Electricity Industry: Expenditure on Process Plant 
at Constant (1986) Prices 
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6.11. The 1980s - Stagnancv in the Efficiency of Construction 
The preceding sections of this chapter have argued that an 
assertion of hierarchical relations, the practice of passing on 
risk, and increasing rigidity in design have led directly to the 
fall in project overruns witnessed in the 1980s. A corollary of 
this argument, and a sub-theme throughout this chapter, has been 
that whilst these changes in capital relations have impacted 
directly on performance against project schedule, their impact 
on the efficient organisation of production has been much less 
significant. This section seeks to put forward more evidence 
pertaining to this corollary argument. 
Two types of evidence will be examined - indirect evidence which 
is analytically supportive of the overall argument, and direct 
evidence on the continued existence of widespread inefficiency 
in the industry. The direct evidence will be examined first of 
all. 
In the on-site research, of the twenty one contractor management 
officials (excluding managing contractors) interviewed, ten 
stated that they had knowledge of productivity assumptions 
underlying their firms' estimates over the previous decade. 
Three stated that there had been a 'slight' increase over the 
decade, whilst seven stated that there had been 'no change' in 
productivity assumptions over the decade. No contractor official 
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stated that there had been a 'substantial' increase over the 
decade. Such findings suggest support for the corollary 
argument, especially bearing in mind that contractor officials 
could be expected to over-report productivity increases, rather 
than under-report. 
Another indicative piece of direct evidence was provided by 
activity samples that had recently been undertaken at site A and 
site C. These activity samples were organised by the client, and 
consisted of taking a large number of observations of people in 
their working environment; their activity is recorded and 
classified into pre-defined categories of construction work, 
movement, miscellaneous, and not on plot. Reasons of 
confidentiality prevent me from reproducing these figures. 
However, the key point is that they produced figures within the 
range of figures provided by activity samples of 6 UK sites for 
the 1976 NEDO report,. On the 6 sites there was an average of 
26% of the paid period spent on construction activity. 
The 1976 NEDO report interpreted their findings as demonstrating 
a highly inefficient organisation of production. Given that the 
two activity samples from 1991 gave comparable results, this 
indicates that this high level of inefficiency may well have 
remained largely unchanged. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 
it was the clients, rather than the individual contractors, who 
undertook the activity sampling. 
The next indicative piece of direct evidence is based on 
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interviews with the client industrial relations official on 
project B. On the previous (named) project on which he had 
worked he had initiated a productivity improvement pilot scheme 
in which supervisors of a number of selected contractors filled 
in daily reports of length of periods of inactivity and their 
reasons. This scheme found that substantial periods of 
inactivity occurred, with the primary reason being lack of 
materials and lack of planning. Documents, including supervisor 
returns, pertaining to this scheme were examined, and confirmed 
the points made in the interview. The official had suggested 
that this scheme be widened to cover all of the contractors on 
the project, but the project manager had vetoed this, arguing 'I 
don't want to be told how bloody inefficient my contractors are, 
I already know'. 
The final piece of direct evidence suggests that contractors 
continue to put little emphasis on productive efficiency. In 
this case it is manifest through an example of a contractor not 
measuring the work undertaken. An internal NEDO note from 1989 
details a joint client/NEDO exercise to measure productivity on 
a particular site. Part of the exercise entailed a 'weekly 
comparison of work completed and man-hours expended against the 
NEDO norms. For this it was necessary to be provided with 
accurate measurements by the contractor of work completed on 
specific items of work, e. g. individual pipelines etc. in each 
week and the actual man-hour allocation to this work'. However, 
this turned out not to be possible .- 'despite promises, 
regarding the information that could be made available.... the 
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contractors were not measuring work completed in any accurate 
sense'. The contractor involved was a major contractor. 
Issues concerning the quality of supervisors in the industry 
provide analytically supportive evidence of the thesis of 
stagnant construction efficiency in the 1980s. Given the 
necessary dislocation on large sites between the place of 
production, the work face, and the place of material storage, the 
supervisor plays a key role on planning the materials' 
requirement to ensure a steady flow of work. Further, the 
supervisor must play an important role in planning for potential 
access problems. In short, the quality of supervisors will 
clearly impact decisively on production efficiency. The 1970 
(p. 29) and 1976 (p. 6) NEDO reports and the 1981 House of Commons 
Select Committee report suggested that the ECI was plagued by the 
poor quality of supervision. 
In a memo to the House of Commons Select Committee, Babcocks, a 
leading contractor, stated that the quality of supervision was 
poor and ascribed this to the shortage of able candidates. The 
joint trade union body, the National Engineering Construction 
Confederation, in their evidence also stressed the poor quality 
of supervision and management (1981: 644). Rather than accept 
Babcock's bland explanation of the poor quality of supervision, 
the reader should be able to see that poor supervision connects 
very directly with the analysis of capital relations that was put 
forward in chapter 5. Given that contractors sought to gain 
profit through generating extra payments rather than improving 
the efficiency of production, it follows that improving the 
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quality of supervisors who are only tangential to the practice 
of claiming extras will not play a central role in contractors' 
strategy. 
If the analysis of capital relations presented in this chapter 
is correct and if the corollary argument of stagnating efficiency 
is correct it can be expected that the poor quality of 
supervision will have remained a chronic problem. This appears 
to be the case given that the Engineering Construction Industry 
Training Board and the NJC in 1989 began discussions in 
attempting to instigate a supervision training scheme. In these 
discussions emphasis was laid on the contunuing low quality of 
supervision staff. 
6.12. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the role of capital relations in the 
turnaround in performance against schedule in the 1980s. it 
pinpointed the growth of managing contractors as the key reason 
for the turnaround. Managing contractors, by monitoring, passing 
on risk, and emphasising the fixedness of design, served to 
limit, but not eliminate, the opportunities for construction 
contractors to undertake practices which harm performance against 
schedule. A fall in demand and a fall in labour militancy aided 
this process by facilitating an assertion of hierarchical 
relations by managing contractors. 
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This approach by managing contractors was characterised as the 
low trust route to improved performance against schedule, and the 
consequent improvement in performance was seen essentially as a 
step rather than the establishment of a basis for longer term 
improvements in perforamnce. Evidence of the stagnating 
production efficiency was presented in the final section. 
Why managing contractors in the UK have undertaken the low trust 
route rather than the high trust route is an important question. 
Questions concerning the use and establishment of trust are 
difficult to address at the best of times (see Sabel, 1992), but 
in situations where research does not involve a comparison of a 
high trust situation with a low trust situation it becomes 
impenetrable. Some useful points can be made, however. It is 
clear that with the sustained fall in labour militancy in the 
1980s the uncertainties concerning labour could no longer be 
considered a constraint preventing the establishment of trusting 
relations between firms. In a situation of high labour militancy 
there would be a disincentive for firms to enter into trusting 
relations in that firms would be unsure of both themselves and 
other firms performing as per the agreement. In a situation of 
no strong labour militancy no such disincentive exists. /ýk 
A potential constraint on managing contractors adopting the high 
trust route in the UK could be the managerial quality amongst 
both themselves and their subcontractors. For the high trust 
route to be successful, especially in the area of the integration 
of design and construction, there is a requirement for a high 
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level of managerial skill in the organisation of production and 
in the processing and communicating of relevant production 
information. However, given the legacy of contractors' mangement 
emphasis in creating profit outwith the production process, such 
skills connected with the production process are likely to be 
rare. Contractors' mangement staff may be highly skilled in 
their opportunism and contractual knowledge but not in their 
knowledge of production. Relevant here is the observation in the 
unpublished 1982 NEDO report which notes that the (foreign) 
managing contractor at one of the projects expressed criticism 
'at the lack of good managers, planning and scheduling staff 
within UK subcontractors' . Another potential constraint concerns 
the nature of the client-managing contractor relationship. If 
clients were unprepared to enter into longer term high trust 
relations with a managing contractor this clearly will impinge 
on the manging contractor's ability to attempt to undertake the 
high trust route. 
Finally, managing contractors may have been constrained by the 
subcontractors' continued opportunism. If this is a significant 
constraint it may be that the industry will be locked into a 
system of low trust relationships for some time in that the 
competitive tender process may undermine any learning process 
which may lead to behavioural modification (as in the repeated 
Prisoners' Dilemna with voluntary participation). In a situation 
of lower demand, i. e. lower participation, increasing numbers of 
contractors will face the threat of bankruptcy. This threat will 
force them into underbidding at the tender stage which itself 
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begets a whole series of other opportunistic acts if the tender 
is accepted. The tender may be accepted because the 
client/managing contractor has incomplete information. The 
realsiation that opportunistic contractors continue to win 
tenders may negate any behaviour modification arising from lower 
participation. This reflects the argument of J. S. Mill that 
rules of competition are set by the morally least reputable 
participant. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LABOUR RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 1960s AND 1970s 
7.1. Introduction 
The thrust of the argument put forward in this chapter is that 
a question such as 'what percentage of poor performance against 
schedule was due to labour? ' is not appropriate. This is because 
the practices of labour cannot be adequately understood in terms 
of their impact on the economic performance of the industry if 
they are seen as standing sevarately from the commercial arena 
client-contractor relations. A better way to examine the 
relationship between labour and economic performance is to 
examine the dynamics of the interaction between labour-capital 
relations and capital-capital relations. The interconnections 
between the industrial relations arena and the commercial arena 
are stressed throughout this chapter. 
Another key argument of the chapter is that the nature of capital. 
relations was the root cause of poor performance against schedule 
in the 1960s and 1970s. This statement does not contradict the 
argument concerning interconnections put forward in the preceding 
paragraph. To put forward an argument that Y caused X% of the 
poor performance is a distinctly different argument from one 
proposing that Y is a root cause of a system of interconnections 
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which led to schedule delay. The prior argument implicitly 
denies the relevance of systemic interconnections whilst the 
latter explicitly recognises the point and puts forward a further 
argument concerning the root cause of the system of 
interconnections . To say that there existed such a system is not 
to say that it is not possible to tease out these 
interconnections and put forward an argument concerning their 
root cause. 
The assertion that capital relations rather than labour relations 
constituted the root cause of the systemic interconnections 
causing poor performance rests upon three premises. Firstly, the 
detailed evidence on particular manifestations of these 
interconnections point to the primary role of capital relations. 
This is the most useful and compelling evidence, and forms the 
main substance of this chapter. Secondly, the contemporary 
interview evidence in chapter 5 on the opportunistic practices 
of contractors showed that these practices continue their 
existence in a context quite separate from high levels of labour 
militancy. This therefore means that labour militancy cannot be 
seen as a necessary element in the causation of contractors' 
opportunism. Thirdly, the 1970 NEDO survey of contractors 
discussed in chapter 5.3. provides indicative evidence. The 
overwhelming emphasis of contractors in blaming overruns on 
issues pertaining to capital relations (74%) against issues 
pertaining to labour (24%) can be seen to support the argument 
concerning the root cause of the system leading to overruns. 
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In this chapter it will be shown that the material context for 
shopfloor militancy was set by the strategic emphasis of 
contractors upon the commercial arena as a key profit locus, and 
this militancy was used by contractors to reproduce the form of 
client-contractor relations which underlay the severe schedule 
I 
delays of the period. Labour militancy contributed to, but were 
not the root cause of, the systematic reproduction of schedule 
delays in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This chapter consistently argues against drawing a simple causal 
relationship from labour militancy to schedule jelay. This is 
done by focusing on each of the major contours of labour 
militancy and examining its relationship with performance against 
schedule. Therefore, the different sections in the chapter do 
not add new elements to the argument, but serve to provide 
detailed evidence supporting the argument. 
An important characteristic of the labour militancy of the period 
was the nature of workforce and shop steward power, and the form 
of their interest definition. Section 2 shows how the militant 
anti-employer interest definition of 'the cabin' was created in 
the material context of the casual nature of employment, the 
buoyant labour market, and the fact that labour was forced to 
bear the costs of both inefficiencies in the organisation of 
production (a corollary of the contractors' emphasis upon 
extras) and the deliberate practices of contractors (such as 
sitting on the job) which served to slow up the job. 
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Section 3 of the chapter maps out the main form of labour 
militancy in the period and argues that the importance of strikes 
for economic performance lay not only in their direct impact upon 
performance against schedule, but also in the way they were used 
by contractors in their commercial relationship with clients, 
particularly in the way they allowed contractors to pass on blame 
to labour. Contractors would occasionally deliberately 
precipitate disputes, but more generally they would seek to 
benefit from their occurrence by using them as opportunities to 
undertake opportunistic practices and avoid tighter control. 
The main causes of strikes embraced both issues of 'work control' 
and 'economism' (Price, 1980). Therefore, the remaining sections 
in the chapter focus on particular issues in both of these areas. 
Section 4 examines bonus schemes and differentials, and argues 
that the contractors' strategic emphasis upon profit outwith the 
production process meant that they relied upon the bonus scheme 
as their key labour control strategy. However, these two 
strategies lay in contradiction in that the opportunistic 
practices outlined in chapter 5 served to disrupt the flow of 
production necessary for at least the partial 'success' of labour 
control through a bonus scheme. The dynamics were such that the 
subsequent labour militancy was used by contractors to further 
loosen commercial control by clients. 
Section 5 examines three issues of work control - overtime, 
shiftwork, and manning - which can be expected to have an 
important relationship with performance against schedule in that 
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they are the routes used to attempt to catch up an existing 
delay, to accelerate production against schedule. The argument 
that labour militancy in these issues directly prevented attempts 
to catch up delay is shown to offer an inadequate understanding 
of the social processes in that it ignores the contractors' 
incentive in slowing up the job, and contractors' lack of 
managerial skill in the efficient organisation of production. 
Further evidence on other work control issues is presented in 
appendix 2. 
The evidence used in this chapter is based on both primary and 
secondary documentary sources. The bulk of the primary sources 
derive from the OCPCA, the EEF, and the AEU-CS records held at 
the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick. In addition, 
reference is occasionally made to contemporary interviews with 
relevant actors from the period. 
7.2. The Cabin, Shop Stewards and Union Democracy 
The section seeks to establish the nature of power relations 
within worker organisation in the 1960s and 1970s and to 
establish the significance of this in terms of the interest 
definition of the shop stewards and workforce which informed 
their action. The section firstly provides evidence from the 
1960s and then examines attempts in the late 1960s and in the 
1970s to formalise labour relations. It then moves on to examine 
the material context which informed the interest definition of 
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the workforce and the stewards. 
The 1960s 
The report on labour relations at the Llanwern steelworks site 
1960-62 written by the local EEF official (Berry 1963) indicates 
strong shop steward and cabin power (each contractor's workforce 
is known as 'the cabin'), with a severely curtailed role for 
FTOs. In a very detailed description of the site organisation 
of the Constructional Engineering Union (later the AEU-CS) a 
clear picture emerges. The author is very conscious of the 
distinction between FTOs and shop stewards and the cabin. It is 
therefore significant that he describes the 'stranglehold' over 
contractors as having been achieved 'by the CEU stewards and 
rank and file members' (emphasis added) (p. 9). Further, a shop 
steward committee was formed, deliberately separate from the 
official union machinery - 'stewards formed the committee, and 
invited the FTO to attend its fortnightly meetings.... generally 
it would seem that the committee acted as pressure group 
operating against the full-time union official and official 
constitutional policies of the union, and the committee's 
existence tended to prevent his being able to influence the rank 
and file membership' (p. 35). It is apparent also that the shop 
steward committee did not of itself constitute a strong, 
legitimate and separate power base within the worker organisation 
on the site - 'there is no evidence to suggest that the committee 
normally formulated positive and detailed concerted policies or 
plans on specific questions and instructed all stewards to follow 
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such policies'. It is also clear that shop stewards did not 
exist in a bureaucratic relationship (see Hyman, 1979) with the 
cabin - the author calls for shop steward training and complains 
that 'shop stewards are increasingly merely spokesmen for the 
men' (p. 45). 
Similar points emerge from the internal unpublished OCPCA report 
on productivity written in 1967. The report notes that 
'operatives believe that it is their democratic right to hold 
meetings and stop work without penalty, at any time to discuss 
any and every problem they wish whether real or imaginary'. A 
motif of cabin autonomy and independence begins to emerge from 
the evidence - 'the meetings are frequently held without notice 
being given to management' (p. 11). The OCPCA committee is so 
concerned at the uncontrollable nature of the worker organisation 
that it calls for shop stewards to be appointed by the official 
union machinery in order to wrest authority back from the cabin. 
Attempts to Formalise 
In the late 1960s a number of major oil and chemical clients 
established site agreements which set uniform earnings and which 
sought to concentrate the negotiating authority in the hands of 
the FTOs whilst trying to severely restrict the role of the shop 
stewards. 
The coherent picture which emerges of the limited impact of the 
site agreements at Grangemouth, Baglan Bay, Llandarcy and Hull 
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upon the nature of the power structure within worker organisation 
on site is particularly relevant given that these sites can be 
regarded as exceptions in the sense that deliberate and 
consistent attempts to give authority to FTOs were undertaken at 
these sites, unlike at the majority of other sites. The clients 
who set up the site agreements had a clear policy of attempting 
to bolster the official union hierarchy -a letter from the 
secretary on the contractors' group to BP states that 'in the 
opinion of the Policy Committee, unwavering support of the agreed 
procedures and of the full-time trade union officials is our best 
hope of avoiding the -disintegration of authority which is so 
evident on many large sites around the country'. 
The first such agreement was established by a major client, BP, 
at Grangemouth in 1968, and this subsequently applied to BP sites 
in Hull, Llandarcy and Baglan Bay; Shell established a similar 
agreement at Stanlow. The agreements provided for monthly joint 
site multi-contractor and multi-union meetings (stage 3 meetings) 
which would deal with all issues not settled at individual 
contractor level. The site agreements aimed to curtail the 
issues which could be dealt with at the individual contractor 
level. This was aimed at mitigating shop steward power, for shop 
stewards were not allowed to be full members of the stage 3 
meetings. At Grangemouth a concession was given such that three 
shop stewards were able to attend as observers, but were unable 
to speak at the meetings. The notes of these meetings suggest 
that this condition was observed. In interview the secretary of 
the contractors' group confirmed this impression. 
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The agreements explicitly outlawed the recognition of a shop 
steward committee. Although the notes of the stage 3 meetings 
make occasional mention of the existence of a shop stewards 
committee the non-recognition clause was adhered to by 
contractors. Given the argument that shop steward committees did 
not constitute a separate locus of power within worker 
organisation this was perhaps the easiest element to control 
through the agreement. An area shop stewards committee covering 
three major projects in the Grangemouth area existed in the mid- 
1970s. From interviews with two members of the committee it 
emerged that it primarily undertook actions such as coordinating 
donations for other labour movement causes, and for the family 
of workmates who died either on or off site. Indeed, it is not 
clear how different these functions would have been even if the 
contractors had granted them official recognition. 
Whilst the site agreements (none of which applied to power 
station projects) were successful in excluding shop stewards from 
the official and significant negotiating forum, this is not to 
say that this led to a significant reversal of authority. In 
1969 at Grangemouth and at Baglan Bay the contractors conceded 
a paid meeting of stewards with FTOs before the stage 3 meetings, 
thus allowing for the possibility of FTOs to be mandated at the 
meetings. That the locus of power continued to be located in the 
cabins and with the immediately accountable stewards is evidenced 
by occasional lapses by contractors in dealing directly with 
stewards - in 1970 at the stage 3 meeting at Baglan Bay the FTOs 
criticised the contractors for putting safety proposals direct 
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to shop stewards, by-passing the FTOs, and in 1977 at Grangemouth 
the contractors met directly with the shop stewards in order to 
achieve acceptance of a productivity deal. The locus of power 
is amply shown in the 1978 stage 3 discussion of a proposed code 
for wet weather working put forward by contractors with the FTOs 
stating that 'it would be referred to site before further 
discussion' and also in the 1977 negotiations at Grangemouth 
concerning a strike by pipefitters over the union membership of 
the foreman. The notes of these negotiations state that the FTO 
'on arrival at site was told by two shop stewards that if the 
foreman was to join the EETPU the men would return to work.... but 
at a mass meeting it transpired that the two shop stewards had 
not had a mandate, and the meeting voted to continue the strike' 
(emphasis added). The 1970 remit by the Secretary of the Baglan 
Bay contractors' group to the Department of Employment and 
Productivity concerning the operation of the site agreement 
argued that 'there is evidence of a gulf between the attitudes 
of the men and their FTOs, the latter broadly accepting the 
provision of the agreement but being unable to persuade their 
members accordingly'. This report also noted in frustration the 
failure to create a bureaucratic relationship between the shop 
stewards and the cabin :- 'it is significant that the turnover, 
in shop stewards is unusually high, and this may reflect a 
difference in attitude between the stewards who have attended 
seminars [on the site agreement] and the rank and file who have 
not'. 
The direct democracy of spontaneous cabin meetings was in 
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evidence in the early years of the site agreements. In 1970 at 
Grangemouth the contractors complained that the 'shop stewards 
and men are walking off site without approval' in order to hold 
meetings. In 1969 at Baglan Bay the contractors criticised the 
'number of meetings employees had been holding without 
permission. Also in the 1971 national level negotiations the 
contractors, listing problems of compliance with the agreement, 
noted that 'trade union meetings continue to be held during 
working hours'. At Baglan Bay the contractors sought to 
formalise and control the nature of the direct democracy 
practised by the cabins by granting in 1971 a paid half-hour 
meeting of shop stewards to members in the form of a 'report 
back' of the stage 3 discussions. There is no evidence 
concerning the effect of this formalisation and redefinition of 
cabin meetings. In relation to this it is perhaps significant 
that the same contractors at Grangemouth did not follow the 
strategy of formalisation. Direct democracy in the form of site- 
wide mass meetings is also in evidence. At the time of the 1970 
wage negotiations at Grangemouth for the site agreement the FTOs 
informed the contractors that 'meetings have been held off site 
at which FTOs were not present. The men had come forward with 
some strong points of view from these meetings'. In the 1977 
wage negotiations at Grangemouth the FTOs stated that there had 
been a mass meeting followed by a shop steward/FTO meeting. 
Both the clear attempts of the new site agreements to alter the 
nature of power relations within worker organisation and limited 
impact of these attempts explain why resistanFe to the site 
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agreements was mostly confined to speeches in official union 
channels and occasioned relatively little on-site action. The 
AEU-CS witnessed a series of motions to the Executive committee 
and debates at the biennial conference which featured rank and 
file disapproval of site agreements. For instance, a motion from 
South Wales argued for full discussion of site agreements at 
branches 'before our constitutional rights are signed away'. 
Despite the antagonism expressed by delegates to pre-negotiated 
and signed site agreements, on-site resistance to their 
imposition was relatively limited. At Ince Marsh in 1969 there 
was a clear and direct clash between the two conceptions of the 
power structure of worker organisation. At an Executive meeting 
it was reported that 'instead of the members appreciating what 
had been done they had reacted violently at a Site Mass Meeting' . 
The Executive endorsed the Ince Marsh site agreement and 
instructed the local FTO to sign appendix D of the agreement 
which was particularly resented on site. The local FTO refused 
to follow these instructions. The General Secretary then visited 
the site and addressed a mass meeting. The meeting demanded that 
a vote be taken, and although the General Secretary refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the vote the meeting rejected the 
appendix. The unrest on site was such that the Ministry of 
Labour had to summon a meeting of the involved parties in order 
to facilitate a settlement. 
At Grangemouth it was the ASBSBSW who sought to resist the site 
agreements by withdrawing from the procedures in 1969. This led 
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to a mass dismissal of ASBSBSW members and the offer by other 
unions to provide welding labour. Also in 1969 at Grangemouth 
the national level stage 4 minutes report that 'each FTO of the 
5 craft unions had received a letter from their steward giving 
3 months notice to terminate the agreement'. The national 
officials implicitly denied the authority of the stewards to 
withdraw from the site agreement by telling the contractors 'they 
regarded the stewards' letters as serious documents'. 
Other Evidence from the 1970s 
The more limited evidence that exists on the (more common) sites 
without a site agreement indicates continued cabin power. The 
argument that shop steward committees did not constitute a 
separate and legitimate power base in the period is confirmed by 
the nature of the shop steward committees that were officially 
recognised at power stations in the 1970s. 
The constitution of the Littlebrook committee indicates that the 
committee had only a limited role. In particular, the 
circumscribed nature of its authority is revealed by the clause 
that the 'right to strike by any work committee or union will not 
be interfered with'. Power remained with the cabin. Similarly, 
Paling's (1982) discussion of the Dungeness shop steward 
committee indicates the locus of power remaining firmly in the 
cabin - all decisions by the committee had to be endorsed by the 
entire union membership on site. Individual cabins would vote 
and exact numbers for and against counted. Notes of a stage 4 
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(national level) meeting between the EEF and the unions provide 
further support for this point. At Tnverkip power station there 
had been a number of site-wide walk-outs prompted by bomb 
warnings. Contractor management were forced into a de facto 
recognition of the shop steward committee in order to establish 
an agreement on procedures in case of future bomb warnings.. The 
shop stewards and management came to an agreed procedure but 'it 
appeared that the men had different ideas about the acceptability 
of the procedures' . 
Perhaps a more typical site in this period was the Monsanto 
textiles, and uti 1i ties projects at Seal Sane in Tees! ýP, The 
FTOs of the area Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions attempted to maintain authority within the official union 
structure by entering into area-wide negotiations with 
contractors, drawing up the ' Tees i de Understanding' which sought 
to impose uniform conditions within the area. This strategy 
failed to dislocate the independent Dower base and action of the 
Cabin and the immediately accountable Stewards at Sea! Sands in 
1975-77, The circumscribed authority of the FTOs in the monthly 
joint union-contractor meetings is indicated by the minutes which 
state that although stewards would not be in attendance at these 
meetings they 'would be in attendance in the building' during the 
meeting. The frequent adjournments noted in the minutes of these 
meetings attest to the frequent reference back to shop stewards 
by the FTOs, when the minutes of the November 1977 meetings 
state that 'the trade unions stated that the three 
representatives would report back to the other shop stewards and 
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recommend acceptance' it is clear that the phrase 'report back' 
here is being used in a distinctly different manner to that 
utilised by the contractors at Grangemouth. 
The FTOs were aware of their eroding authority - at the June 1977 
meeting they complained that increases in bonus had been conceded 
'without any consultation whatsoever with the FTOs.... in 
response to continuing shopfloor pressure'. The FTOs argued that 
'the contractors had no right to undermine the authority of Trade 
Union Officials by conceding such sums direct to the shopf loor' . 
That the shop stewards' role was dependent upon the ultimate 
authority of the cabins on site is evidenced by the fact that 
in 1976 a decision to work to 'maximum safety' had only been 
taken after a decision of a site-wide mass meeting. The self- 
activity and high level of participation of the workforce is 
clear in the dispute in October 1976 in which a mass of workers 
queuing for chinstraps for their safety helmets led to the 
dismissal of 700 men. 
This consideration of the evidence on worker organisation on site 
indicates that despite attempts at formalising and reversing the 
flow of authority it remains appropriate to characterise the 
period of the 1960s and 1970s as one of cabin power. A new 
General Secretary of the AEU-CS was therefore correct to talk at 
the 1977 biennial conference of a change in the locus of power 
which had yet to be accomplished :- 
'some people in this movement may wish to destroy the 
authority of the Executive Committee and General 
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Secretary. I do not think that is what Conference 
wants. So what we have to do is to restore leadership 
and authority and negotiating ability back where it 
belongs and that is with the leaders of the unions'. 
The importance of establishing the precise nature of worker 
organisation in this period becomes clear when it is realised 
that the interests of the cabin and the shop stewards are such 
that they are likely to inform practices which will impact 
negatively on economic performance. This is in contrast to the 
interests of the national union officials - an argument which 
will be developed in chapter 8. 
Material Context and Interest Definition 
Before examining the material context of cabin militancy it is 
necessary to first address why worker militancy took a 
collective, rather than an individualistic, form - 'whether work 
groups form, and if so how strong the norms governing behaviour 
are, cannot be assumed in advance' (Edwards, 1988: 191). 
Parallels with docks are useful here. Edwards (1988) argues that 
the casualism in the docks did not lead to 'complete anarchy' 
because of two factors - the differentiation of workers by skill 
and type and the organisation of workers into gangs. Both of 
these factors are relevant to the ECI. The differentiation of 
workers by skill and type partly follows the contours of 
demarcation of units of capital, arising from the growth of 
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specialist subcontracting - scaffolders work for scaffolding 
firms, cable-pullers work for cable-pulling firms, laggers work 
for lagging firms. Gang/team work is a central feature of 
production in the ECI. In the same way as loading a cargo 'needs 
a team including workers on the quayside, crane operators, 
slingers and.... men who packed goods in the hold' (Edwards, 
1988: 206), so the laying of pipework in metal frames in the ECI 
requires riggers to load the pipework, crane operators to move 
it, labourers to unload it, and pipe fitters to make the 
preliminary joins. 
The key material context which informed the interest definition 
of the cabin and shop stewards was the casual nature of 
employment in the industry. The 1970 NEDO report conducted a 
survey amongst contractors concerning various aspects of labour 
relations. Eighty six contractors took part in the survey 
covering 'nearly 27,000 operatives engaged in industrial 
construction work generally' (p. 71). 'The survey asked 
contractors to state roughly what proportion of their site 
operatives employed in mechanical and electrical engineering 
construction were regarded as permanent for all practical 
purposes' (p. 76). 37.1% of craftsmen were regarded as permanent 
employees, 30.4% of semi-skilled employees, and 16.8% of 
unskilled employees. The contractors were also asked to give the 
duration of employment of the current craftsmen within the 
company. 21.1% had been employed less than 6 months, 48.2% less 
than a year, and 82.1% less than 5 years (cumulative 
percentages). 
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The casual nature of employment meant that the quicker and the 
harder the cabin worked the sooner they would be without a job. 
Concerning the introduction of a number of completion bonus 
schemes in the North East in the mid-1970s, one delegate at the 
1977 AEU-CS biennial conference stated that 'employers are 
offering completion bonuses in the North East because with the 
shorter contracts and the Employment Protection Act men are on 
notice almost as soon as they are taken on, and the employer 
needs to motivate them'. As such the possibility of cabin and 
shop steward power serving to directly benefit performance 
against schedule through a craft productivist ethos (see Edwards 
and Terry, 1988) is effectively denied by this material context. 
The lack of a productivist ethos is evident from the unpublished 
1967 OCPCA report on productivity :- 'to the work the operative 
is generally indifferent. More operatives work in construction 
for the high financial rewards than for interest in the job. 
Construction work is not made attractive and involves working in 
the worst possible conditions, away from his family and in sub- 
standard lodgings, working long hours, suffering constant labour 
disturbances and under untrained supervision'. 
The thrust of chapter 5 indicated that the key strategy for 
maximising profits by contractors was through an emphasis on 
exploiting the (many) opportunities to extract additional 
payments from the client rather than on increasing the efficiency 
of the production process. This necessarily implies that at no 
point in this period did the workforce experience a concerted 
attempt to increase the rate of exploitation. This expectation 
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is confirmed by the conspicuous absence in the historical sources 
covering the period of systematic complaints of actions most 
commonly associated with attempts to increase the rate of 
exploitation such as speed-ups, tightening of general discipline, 
and tightening of time discipline. Thus, it is no surprise to 
find that at a special 1981 AEU-CS conference the President 
attacked contractors for increased exploitation, not of the 
workforce, but of the clients - 'in a cut-throat industry where 
employers have exploited to the full for many years the market 
forces in order to bleed clients irrespective of whether they are 
private or public sector, it is ironic that we should stand 
accused by this government's Monopolies Commission of learning 
the lesson of employers to the benefit of our members'. 
This lack of an attempt by contractors to increase the rate of 
exploitation should perhaps suggest that the workforce would be 
less likely to define their interests in opposition to managerial 
demands. $yHowever, this would be to ignore that labour was often 
1 
in effect forced to bear the costs of either gross inefficiencies 
(a corollary of the contractors' emphasis on extras) or the 
deliberate practices of contractors (such as sitting on the job) 
which served to slow up the job. There are a number of pertinent 
examples of labour bearing the costs of inefficiencies in project 
organisation. At the Isle of Grain (which later witnessed a 
lengthy and damaging strike by laggers) laggers were hired on the 
client's instructions only to be 'made redundant through lack of 
available work' just three months later (House of Commons Select 
Committee, 1981: 940). In 1971 the AEU-CS Executive discussed a 
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report from an FTO 'that due to some design problems arising a 
number of members were declared redundant'. This directly led 
to a strike. Further, the graphical representation of the 
manning levels on a project provided by the 1976 NEDO report 
shows a succession of four sharp peaks and troughs indicating an 
eccentric overall phasing of recruiting and redundancy by 
, contractors. 
The first Director of the NJC provided a fitting 
illustration of the second way in which labour came to bear 
costs. He spoke thus at the 1983 AEU-CS biennial conference :- 
'there is no point in a client letting a contract to 
a contractor who says he does not have to be 
interested in productivity by, for instance, a cost- 
plus type of contract where it is actually in that 
contractor's interest not to complete the job quickly, 
to overrun and to do all those other things, and then 
at the same time say to the contractor 'But you must 
put in an incentive scheme for the men'. The men will 
be pulling to make the job good and productive but the 
contractor's management will not do anything to ensure 
that they can be productive because that does not meet 
with the contractor's objectives'. 
The unpublished 1967 OCPCA report on productivity recognises that 
the workforce tend to define their interests in opposition to 
management : 'to management and supervision he (the operative) 
is generally antagonistic. Historically and because of the 
present working rules and conditions of work, he is in conflict 
with the 'other side' who (in the operative's opinion) is always 
trying to recover the 'rights' his union and brothers have fought 
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for in the past and is constantly asking him to work in 
unreasonable conditions'. 
Another important element of the material context of the period 
was the buoyant labour market, particularly in the 1970s. A 
buoyant labour market existed not just within the ECI itself - 
the AEU-CS reported its peak membership in 1979 - but also within 
the wider economy. A buoyant labour market will tend to 
facilitate militancy because it will engender a greater sense of 
'confidence' on site. 
These characteristics of the material context, which informed the 
interest definition of the cabin and the shop stewards, will tend 
to create a militant, anti-employer short-term definition of 
interests. In particular, in this context the workforce can be 
expected to aim for a maximisation of earnings during their 
short-term periods of employment (the 'quick penny' in the words 
of the NEDO pamphlet What's Wrong on Site?, 1971), and to 
undertake job controls and job protection to attempt to prolong 
these periods and to reproduce the job's existence on the next 
project. The militancy of the cabin and the stewards in this 
period was therefore informed by both 'economism' and issues of 
'work control' , to follow the terms utilised 
by Price in his 1980 
study of the formalisation on industrial relations in the 
construction industry in the nineteenth century. Whilst Price 
writes of 'the clash between.... work control aspirations.... and 
economism' (p. 135), in the context of the ECI in the 1960s and 
1970s, Hinton's characterisation (of events in the first world 
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war) is more apt :- the 'development of local collective 
bargaining occurred not at the expense of workshop organisation 
and bargaining, but in symbiotic relationship with it' (1973: 79). 
Given that contactors' strategic emphasis lay outside the sphere 
of the production process the cabin and the shop stewards were 
aware that they could formally agree to specific work controls 
being bought out for a 'quick penny', secure in the knowledge 
that their self-activity together with the contractors' 
consistent lack of emphasis on the production process and 
inability to efficiently organise the production process would 
ensure that in reality on site these work controls would remain 
secure. Thus, in 1977 at Grangemouth the shop stewards with 
reference back to a mass meeting agreed to a twelve point 
productivity package in return for a substantial productivity 
payment. Constituent clauses pertaining to welders grinding and 
cleaning their own welds, and to craftsmen undertaking slinging 
and lifting were still far from universally applied even in 1991. 
The power of the cabin and the material context informing their 
interest definition were such that the direct effect of the 
practices of the cabin and the shop stewards was harmful to 
performance against schedule, but the question remains concerning 
its indirect effect. Did the cabin militancy push contractors 
into altering the form of their profit strategy, ultimately 
leading to a beneficial effect on performance? Whilst 
theoretically possible, in the context of the client-contractor 
relations of the period this did not occur. Rather the power and 
practices of the cabin which were dependent upon both a subverted 
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client-contractor hierarchy and poor performance served to 
reproduce and exacerbate both of these elements. Rather than 
pushing contractors into altering their profit strategy cabin 
militancy existed in a symbiotic relationship with the 
inefficiency-creating practices of capital. 
7.3. Strikes, Go-slows, and the Role of Contractors 
This section examines the manifestations of labour militancy in 
strikes and go-slows, firstly examining the pattern of disputes 
and the causes of disputes, and then examining the crucial role 
of contractors in understanding the relationship between labour 
militancy and economic performance. 
Strikes and Go-slows 
The most obvious and direct way in which labour relations can 
impact upon performance against schedule is through the 
withdrawal of labour which directly delays production. Given 
that the ECI does not have a separate classification within the 
Department of Employment's dispute statistics it is not possible 
to give a precise overall picture of the level of disputes in the 
period. The most reliable and informative source is contained 
in the CEGB's submission to the Sizewell 'B' Power Station Public 
Inquiry. This contains the number of stoppages and the 
percentage of hours lost on CEGB construction sites between 1963 
and 1980, and is reproduced below as table 7.1.. The average 
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level of hours lost from 1963-69 was 1.07%, the average level 
from 1970-80 was 3.52%, and the overall average for 1963-80 was 
2.57%. It is to be regretted that the precise definition of a 
strike used by the CEGB in compiling these statistics is not 
given. 
These figures indicate that stoppages per se could only directly 
account for a small proportion of the delays experienced in this 
period. 
TABLE 7.1. Stoppages on CEGB Sites, 1963-80. 
Year No. of 
Stoppages 
Manhours Lost % Manhours 
Lost 
1963 Not Available 164,716 0.73 
1964 88 345,192 0.84 
1965 124 507,944 1.04 
1966 187 517,075 0.94 
1967 215 576,574 1.17 
1968 377 454,748 0.89 
1969 402 784,685 1.89 
1970 429 391,623 1.41 
1971 574 325,776 1.32 
1972 135 1,3000,490 6.19 
1973 216 454,512 2.49 
1974 148 447,799 2.55 
1975 229 635,882 3.37 
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1976 221 1,574,415 7.73 
1977 287 655,176 2.95 
1978 311 1,310,121 5.76 
1979 303 751,768 3.37 
1980 261 322,781 1.58 
This argument is supported by disputes figures from a number of 
sources concerning individual projects. Given the diversity of 
sources it is unlikely that a consistent definition of time lost 
to strikes is being used. As such the figures should be used 
with great circumspection, and regarded as illustrative. Berry's 
(1963) study of Llanwern steelworks found that a total of 328,129 
hours had been lost on the project. Although unable to report 
this as a percentage of total hours, Berry states that this is 
an 'extremely insignificant percentage of the total time 
worked.... probably below the national average'. Portus (in 
Wearne, 1970), of ICI, reports that at the major construction 
works at Wilton 1.5% of hours were lost to strikes in 1965, and 
0.8% in 1966. The 1976 NEDO report included case studies of six 
UK projects and reports percentage time lost for strikes on the 
projects as ranging from 1% to 6%. The unpublished 1983 NEDO 
report on two refinery projects built in 1978-82 states that the 
second of these projects lost 3.5% of hours to strikes. The 1982 
paper by Carr and Williamson (of BP) on the BP Sullom Voe project 
records that in 1979 the mechanical engineering workforce lost 
2.8% of hours, 4.1% in 1980, and 0.4% in 1981. 
Moving the analysis on from the point that the level of hours 
lost to strikes appear to vary from 1% to 6% and therefore cannot 
250 
be held directly responsible for average delays of far greater 
levels in the 1960s and 1970s, it is necessary to question 
whether a strike will delay the schedule by an amount equivalent 
to its total duration. A number of considerations are relevant 
here. The direct impact of a strike upon the schedule delay will 
depend upon the point of the project at which the strike occurs, 
and whether the strike is of direct production workers (e. g. 
welders) or of ancillary workers (e. g. scaffolders). A minute 
from a 1985 project joint council meeting at Heysham 2 power 
station is relevant here. The contractors expressed concern at 
the level of strikes but added that 'the level of hours lost may 
well be made up in the overall progress but would be disastrous 
if still there during commissioning phases, which are essentially 
in-line operations, and every hour lost is irretrievably lost in 
the programme'. The commissioning phases represent a small 
proportion of the total construction schedule, and are 
concentrated towards the end of the project. The quotation also 
raises questions concerning the ability (and willingness) of the 
client and contractors to make up for delays in the overall 
progress. Important considerations here will be the potential 
for and the effect of increasing manning and introducing overtime 
and shiftwork. Each of these will be addressed later in the, 
chapter. 
Further points which should not be overlooked here are how far 
complete withdrawals of labour constituted the main tactic of the 
workforce in this period, and also how far disputes were 
associated with other practices which directly affected the 
251 
project schedules. 
Alternative practices to a withdrawal of labour which can be 
regarded as directly delaying production are 'go-slows' or 
'working to maximum safety' . Overtime and shift embargoes which 
cannot be classified so unambiguously will be examined later in 
this chapter. Conflicting evidence exists on the extent of the 
use of go-slows by the workforce. Berry (1963: 68) argues that 
at the Lianwern steelworks the 'very widespread ' go-slows 'must 
have resulted in the loss of many times the man-hours by 
strikes'. The Commission on Industrial Relations' 1972 study 
of the Alcan smelter project, in a comprehensive description of 
conflict on the site makes only a parenthetical mention of such 
practices :- 'throughout the [3 month] period a pattern developed 
in Peirson and Cleveland Bridge, and to a lesser extent in 
Teeside Bridge of claims which, if not conceded, were quickly 
followed by overtime bans, restrictions on output or stoppages 
of work' (p. 7). In the evidence on the Isle of Grain project to 
the House of Commons Select Committee there is one mention of go- 
slows. The unpublished 1967 OCPCA report on productivity in its 
examination of all the practices which contribute to the poor 
performance of the industry makes no mention of go-slows or 
working to maximum safety. Consideration of these practices is 
conspicuous by its absence in the unpublished 1983 NEDO report 
on two refinery projects, and in the 1986 NEDO report on the 
Sullom Voe project. 
In the minutes of the stage 3 meetings at Grangemouth from 1968 
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to 1981 these practices are mentioned on three occasions. In the 
Baglan Bay stage 3 minutes 1969-72 there is one mention of a 
'general slowdown throughout the site' 'in an endeavour to push 
Power Gas Corporation to take on platers'. Similarly, the Seal 
Sands minutes 1975-77 contain one reference - in October 1976 
after a mass meeting held concerning the bonus level 'the men 
worked to maximum safety and non-cooperation'. Also the minutes 
of the Executive Committee and the Biennial Conference of the 
AEU-CS which were inspected contain one reference - at Didcot 
power station 'as a result of allegations of the members going 
slow and working to rule etc. the employers sacked riggers and 
fitters'. 
From this summary of the available evidence and bearing in mind 
the caveat that go-slows may not have been recorded within the 
minutes of meetings inspected, it is concluded that the Llanwern 
project, where Berry argued the hours lost to go-slows 
outstripped those lost to strikes, was far from common. Go-slows 
were a tactic occasionally deployed by the workers but far less 
commonly than withdrawals of labour. Indeed, this pattern is not 
unexpected in light of the material context of employment. In 
the same way as the casual nature of employment militated against 
the strategic use of sanctions for dockers (see Phillips and 
Whiteside, 1985), so it can be expected that the casual nature 
of the job in the ECI will tend to have the same effect. 
Given the conclusion that strikes were the main manifestation of 
disputes it is useful to examine evidence on the cause of 
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strikes. This is important in assessing how far the labour 
militancy of this period can be characterised as predominantly 
economistic in nature, and how far it was informed by issues 
concerning work control. 
The 1970 NEDO report gives relevant information. In 1965,1967, 
and 1968 the Department of Employment and Productivity conducted 
'three ad-hoc surveys of stoppages due to industrial disputes on 
large industrial construction sites.... The surveys cover 
together the period January 1964 to December 1968. For these 
five years, 718 disputes are recorded.... resulting in about 
483,652 man days lost. Most of the disputes were unofficial.... 
It should be noted that no uniform definition of large sites was 
used in the first two surveys so that there is no absolute 
guarantee that all large mechanical sites were covered. 
Secondly, the information required from the regional industrial 
relations officers was not specified in great detail so that the 
amount and content of information supplied differed from region 
to region .... A further reservation to be made 
is that DEP is not 
informed of all disputes. Moreover, DEP's definition of a 
dispute for statistical purposes excludes stoppages involving 
fewer than ten workers, and those which lost less than one day 
except any in which the aggregate number of working days exceeds 
100. Many minor disputes or occurrences therefore are omitted' 
(p. 105/6). This final point warrants special emphasis given that 
the strike statistics available for some projects in the 1980s 
indicate a high occurrence of half-day or one-day 'fliers'. 
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The report details the cause of strikes as per table 7.2.. 
TABLE 7.2.1970 NEDO Report - Cause of Stoppages 
Issue Percentage 
Wage - Bonus 24 
Wage - Other* 17 
Dismissal 19 
Site Conditions 8 
Working Practices 7 
Sympathy 7 
Demarcation 5 
Redundancy 3 
Other 10 
Total 100 
Note -* including overtime disputes. 
These figures indicate that whilst a large proportion of strikes 
were centred around issues of wages (41%), it would be incorrect 
to see this as the sole important cause of labour militancy. 
Rather, issues concerning work control - dismissal, control of 
overtime, demarcation, working practices, redundancy, and even 
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site conditions and sympathy - also represent a key dimension in 
labour militancy. This indicates the importance of examining 
issues pertaining both to economism and work controls in greater 
detail in order to tease out the nuances of how labour relations 
impacted on economic performance. The following section deals 
with incentive bonus schemes and differentials which primarily 
address economistic issues; the subsequent section deals with 
overtime, shiftwork and manning, which can be interpreted 
primarily as issues of work control (evidence on time-discipline, 
absenteeism, and wet weather working, also issues of work 
control, is presented in appendix 2). 
The Role of Contractors 
This discussion of disputes and their direct and indirect effect 
on economic performance against schedule has so far stressed the 
agency of labour and has examined the industrial relations sphere 
in isolation from the commercial sphere, i. e. from the client- 
contractor relations. It is therefore apposite to note the words 
of the client industrial relations officer at site B :- 'the 
thing about industrial relations being to blame for poor 
performance is a myth perpetuated by management to cloud their 
own inadequacy.... by the nature of the contracting industry 
somebody had to be blamed, and labour was often the easiest to 
blame'. This implies not only that contractors sought to take 
advantage of labour disputes in order to deflect blame or to re- 
negotiate contractual terms, but also that they had an incentive 
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to deliberately create and/or prolong a dispute - in the words 
of the management official from contractor B. a., 'if you wanted 
a dispute, you knew how to have one - all you had to do was lower 
the bonus or sack the steward'. 
Given that contractors at the time of the disputes would 
necessarily seek to deny any blame in relation to their own 
actions this activity is unlikely to be heavily documented in the 
minutes of meetings. One exception is the minutes of the London 
meeting of the BP Contractors' Policy Group in January 1970. BP 
were expressing concern at the laggers' strike at Grangemouth 
being supported by an unofficial strike over the whole of 
Scotland. The chair, from BP, noted the lack of progress in 
negotiations between the Thermal Insulation Contractors' 
Association (TICA) and the GMWU, arguing that this was due to an 
unrealistically low wage offer put forward by TICA. In addition 
the chair 'doubted whether the insulating contractors were 
anxious to resolve the strikes at Grangemouth as they were short 
of men and were also looking for an opportunity to claim a 
revision of their contracts'. 
Although not constituting as direct a piece of evidence of the 
purposeful actions of contractors as the above, the minutes of 
meetings in Grangemouth in 1969 concerning the major 
boilermakers' dispute of that year highlight the contractors' 
concern with the contractual implications of an extended dispute 
:-a contractor 'raised the question of who had made the decision 
not to make tradesmen redundant, arising from the ASBSBSW 
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dispute. No definite answer was given although it was stated 
that this was a decision made by the London Negotiating Committee 
and Policy Group.... [the contractor] asked who would bear the 
loss incurred on any fixed price contracts. It was generally 
agreed that it was up to the individual contractor concerned to 
make representations'. This minute highlights the 
interconnections between the commercial arena and industrial 
relations arena by showing the sort of way in which contractors 
can seek to gain opportunistically in their commercial 
relationship with the client through events in the labour 
relations arena. 
Another illustrative example, this time of the material 
incentives for contractors to undertake such practices as 
creating/prolonging disputes, is provided by documents pertaining 
to a dispute and its surrounding events on a nominated project 
in the early 1980s (see Note 1). Other important related themes 
also emerge, particularly concerning the importance of passing 
on blame to labour. The PJC minutes from the project show a 
progressive increase in the delay on the project with the main 
contractor arguing that the problem was due to severely low 
productivity of pipework from the on-site fabrication shop. In 
particular, the contractor claimed that low productivity was due 
to 'welders deliberately limiting output' in order to increase 
overtime hours and bonus payments. Initially, the FTOs on the 
PJC made pertinent observations concerning the poor organisation 
of the shop and asking why the problem had not been raised before 
'a full-scale crisis', but even they were persuaded by the 
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contractor's argument to hold a mass meeting and call for an 
increase in production. The position deteriorated and the 
contractor threatened to subcontract the pipework fabrication to 
an off-site workshop. The FTOs intimated that if this was to 
occur they would be powerless to prevent a walk-out. At the same 
time it emerged that the production of pipework had been 
undertaken out of sequence such that the delays on the project 
were also due to the inability to erect even that amount which 
had been fabricated. In light of the subsequent events, 
described below, it appears very likely that the contractor's 
intention to sub-contract was aimed at creating a major dispute. 
This much is also implied by a letter from the local FTO to the 
General Secretary of the AEU-CS which poses the question of why 
the contractor was prepared for a major dispute for 'just 4 weeks 
fab shop time' and answers it by stating 'there must be far 
higher stakes', the latter being a clear allusion to commercial 
arrangements with the managing contractor/client. 
The unions called for an independent enquiry under NJC auspices 
to investigate the problem. The contractor's antagonism to NJC 
interference is manifest in a telex sent by the firm to the NJC 
Director :- 
'Despite our religious upholding of the agreement, the 
workforce and the FTOs have not done so. The 
Agreement has failed totally, supporting the NJC 
merely entails the employer in higher costs whilst 
employees lose nothing, extend their employment period 
and create a third body with whom to negotiate. It 
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is critical that the NJC Field Officer address FTOs 
and obtain their commitment to NAECI and transmit that 
idea to the workforce'. 
The NJC decided to hold an enquiry and with local consultation 
appointed a committee comprising FTOs, contractor representatives 
and the NJC Field Officer. This committee found 'no concrete 
evidence that low output is entirely or even mainly the fault of 
the welders. Neither did the committee find any. evidence of an 
organised limitation of productivity in the shop'. The deep- 
rooted failure of management organisation and monitoring is also 
apparent in the report's discussion of productivity levels. The 
report notes that output was consistently below the contractor's 
target figures. However, the 'committee was unsure that the 
target is correct, or if the output had been properly measured. 
In particular, the committee were unsure that all the waiting 
time had been accounted for, and believed that unrecorded waiting 
time may make some contribution to the low productivity levels 
calculated... the committee hoped to see some overall figures of 
shop productivity expressed in man-hours per foot or per ton but 
none existed'. Two confidential reports by the NJC Field 
Officer to the NJC Director confirm this picture. The first 
report stresses the succession of problems from the design stage , 
to the fabrication stage to the construction stage :- 'one is 
left with the impression of an unrealistic programme, poor 
organisation, and the inevitable results'. The second makes 
similar points and stresses that 'labour relations despite a ham- 
handed performance by.... [the contractor] have been reasonably 
good and the FTOs cooperative despite some provocation'. 
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This can clearly be interpreted as an example of a contractor 
seeking to deflect the blame and responsibility for poor 
performance on to the labour force. Despite the investigation 
of the expert committee it appears that this passing on of blame 
was still partly successful in that a later report by the NJC 
Field Officer to the Director notes 'I spoke to the... [client] 
site manager who said that the NAECI is partly responsible for 
his predicament because he cannot call on draconian measures 
such as shiftwork and high incentive payments to buy his way out 
of his diff'iculty'. The report concludes 'it is outrageous that 
the NAECI and the labour force should be blamed for the 
shortcomings of project planning'. 
It is apposite to note the pervasive effect of the systematic use 
of mis-information by the contractor - before the report of the 
expert committee, the FTOs were persuaded by the contractors' 
arguments, and even after the report the client continued to 
concur with the contractor's placing of blame. 
Given this picture of successful systematic misinformation by the 
contractor, and given that this is one of the few cases of an 
independent examination of the causes of a project delay, this 
should serve to alert the reader to the strong possibility that 
other examinations of the industry which did not look critically 
at management definitions may have simply reproduced systematic 
misinformation which sought to deflect blame on to another party, 
in particular labour. This insight is pertinent when considering 
the 1976 NEDO report's analysis of the cause of delays in the 
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projects used as case studies (discussed in chapter 5). 
The report of the expert committee and the implementation of a 
number of its recommendations concerning the organisation of 
production led to an improvement in production levels at the 
fabrication shop but other problems continued, as a confidential 
report by the NJC Field Officer shows :- 'the most incredible 
aspect of this is that all the effort and expense put into 
accelerating fabrication has been negated by the failure equally 
to expand NDT [non-destructive testing], painting and QA 
documentation capacity-'. At this point the contractor announced 
the immediate (one day's notice) laying-off on basic rate only 
of 30 workers, This information was not communicated to the FTO 
until after the lay-offs had taken effect. This was contrary to 
all past practices and expectations, and led to an immediate 
walk-out by pipefitters which lasted for two weeks. A 
confidential report by the NJC Field Officer noted that the 
managing contractor 'was not informed of the lay-off until mid- 
day [on the day of the announcement]...., and was not prepared 
to intervene because of contractual implications' (emphasis 
added). Tellingly the report also notes that 'it is interesting 
to note that the two weeks pipefitters' strike and accompanying 
lay-offs must have been a godsend to.... [the contractor] 
because, as radiographic work could continue, it postponed the 
crunch by that period'. The term 'crunch' alludes to concern 
over the continuing existence of 'material supply difficulties'. 
As such, it is highly likely that this dispute was deliberately 
fomented by the contractor - possibly both as short term and one- 
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off attempt to cut labour costs (through the non-payment of wages 
during the dispute) and as an attempt to force the direct 
involvement of the managing contractor which could later be used 
as a basis for a claim for extra payments. 
This discussion of contractors purposefully provoking and/or 
prolonging disputes and of contractors systematically seeking to 
misinform, pinning blame on labour for poor performance should 
not be interpreted as a form of conspiracy theory in which 
contractors' Machiavellian, behind-the-scenes manipulation can 
serve to explain the majority of strikes. This would both deny 
the agency of labour and credit contractors with a far greater 
ability to control and plan in this instance than they apparently 
possess in other aspects of labour relations and production. 
Rather it has sought to highlight how a simple examination of 
disputes which stresses the agency of labour and the direct 
effect of disputes fails to understand the social meaning of 
disputes within the context of the political economy of the ECI. 
Given the discussion of the material incentives and context of 
contractor action in relation to strikes and given the nature of 
client-contractor relations outlined in chapter 5 it is 
appropriate to argue that contractors in the 1960s and 1970s 
systematically sought to use withdrawals of labour to their 
advantage in contractual arrangements with clients. As part of 
this process it is to be expected that contractors would 
occasionally precipitate a dispute, but it is the wider process 
that is the key to understanding the full implications of strikes 
upon economic performance, implications which are mediated 
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through client-contractor relations. The words of the General 
Secretary of the AEU-CS at a 1981 conference have both resonance 
and profound implications for the relationship between the social 
relations of production and economic performance - he described 
the employers' attitude as 'our contract, our profit, our 
responsibility, but when anything goes wrong it's your fault'. 
A further manifestation of this process of contractors using 
labour problems to their benefit in commercial arrangements with 
clients can be found at the Ethylene plant built at Baglan Bay 
1969-72. The 1976 NEDO report states that 'the contractors were 
reimbursable with no incentive - the client asserted that this 
was not due to the lack of 'biddable' contract packages but 
rather to the conditions existing in the industry at the time, 
i. e. low productivity, poor labour relations etc. ' (p. 46) and 
that 'a few subcontractors who were employed on a schedule of 
rates basis found themselves governed by the slow tempo of the 
job and their position untenable. As a result these contracts 
were subsequently replaced by re-imbursable contracts' (p. 34). 
Further 'in response to poor performance and a failure to meet 
the programme, site management built up the labour force (by over 
100%) in order to meet their commitments. The site having been 
saturated with men, cause and effect became inseparable. Unit 
productivity fell even further .... overloading of site 
facilities 
led to further frustrations.... and a frequency of minor 
disputes' (p. 46). The force of this description is to stress the 
debilitative effects of militant labour upon economic 
264 
performance. However, notes, made by a working party set up at 
the client's behest, of a discussion with the client offers a 
fresh perspective :- 'site managers [of contractors] had failed 
to save BP from themselves. Pressures are brought to bear from 
the client to get the job done quickly which usually resulted in 
the employment of more labour, at no time did site managers warn 
BP that further recruitment could lead to problems'. This 
implies a process in which contractors sought to encourage 
overmanning, a process which would lead to a slackening of 
commercial control. 
A similar dynamic is shown in the evidence on the Isle of Grain 
project. In the evidence to the 1981 House of Commons Select 
Committee by TICA it is argued that lagging contractors come on 
site last and are under great pressure from clients such that 
management 'have been pressed by clients on a number of occasions 
to give way and a reimbursable situation has again developed 
towards the end of a contract' (1981: 700). Such instructions 
from the client to accelerate on a reimbursable basis should not 
be interpreted as a manifestation of client strength, but rather 
of client weakness, perhaps in the face of contractor tactics of 
sitting on the job. 
7.4. Incentive Bonus Schemes and Differentials 
The evidence on immediate causes of strikes highlighted the 
importance of earnings and bonus payments in the labour militancy 
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of the period. Therefore, in order to examine in further detail 
the relationship between militancy and economic performance, and 
in particular the role of capital relations in this, it is 
necessary to analyse the disparity of earnings and widespread use 
of bonus schemes in the period. 
The dominant picture which emerges from the extant literature on 
the ECI is one of militant economism by the labour force in the 
form of leap-frogging bargaining, exploiting the disparity of 
earnings applying to different groups of workers on large sites. 
What's Wrong on Site, the NEDO booklet version of their 1970 
report stresses the problems caused by the workers' search for 
'the quick penny' (1971). Also, Garfit highlights that 'in 
1976.... a year when earnings were meant to be restricted by 
incomes policy, the bonus payments on Teeside rose by 33.3%' 
(1989: 6). 
There is, indeed, plenty of evidence of both the disparity of 
earnings on sites and the consequent leapfrogging bargaining. 
The 1970 NEDO report contains information derived from the 
questionnaire survey of contractors which was undertaken. The 
report states that the research into earnings and hours of work 
covering over 40 large sites showed the existence of great 
disparities of earnings not only between sites but within the 
same sites. 
Berry notes that at Llanwern 'there was still a considerable 
range of bonus earnings as between firms'. The CIR study of the 
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Alcan site states that 'there were big differences in the 
earnings of employees in the same occupations in different 
companies and between categories of skill in different companies' 
(1972: 23). 
This disparity of earnings within and between sites inevitably 
led to conflict - the CIR noted that 'we asked workers what 
comparisons they made when thinking about their earnings, and we 
found most compared their own earnings with earnings of men in 
the same trade in other companies on the site rather than with 
men from their own company on other sites' (1972: 25). However, 
comparisons with other sites were inevitably made. The 1976 NEDO 
report described the BP site agreement at Baglan Bay as follows 
:- 'this agreement could have been an important step forward in 
regulating site relations. However, it failed on this particular 
site largely because it had to operate at the same time and in 
the same region as a power station and men on the ethylene 
project complained of inadequate take-home pay' (p. 21). The 
notes of a 1976 meeting of the Grangemouth contractors' group 
meeting contain a discussion of the higher earnings possible on 
a nearby ICI site, and 'the meeting anticipated the trade unions 
would seek to exploit this'. At a 1974 multi-contractor and 
multi- client meeting concerning the Teeside area the 
representative from Sim-Chem Ltd., a client, noted that in 1973 
the union FTOs 'had proposed a Teeside and Hartlepool area 
agreement.... the object was to avoid leapfrogging between 
competing projects and to restore stability to the area'. 
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However, while there is evidence of disparity of earnings and 
leapfrogging bargaining, a simple emphasis on the economistic 
actions of labour standing independently is inadequate. An 
analysis which embraces the understanding of capital relations 
developed earlier in the thesis suggests a dynamic in which 
contractor inefficiency and attempts to generate extra payments 
give rise to defensive and offensive action by shop stewards and 
the workforce. This in turn is used by contractors to further 
loosen client control over them, and this leads to a further step 
in the lack of strategic emphasis on the production process by 
the contractor which is manifest in the stress on the incentive 
scheme as the main instrument of control and planning. In this 
context, perceiving the contractors' success in bleeding the 
client, the shop stewards and cabin also seek to increase their 
earnings by aggressive militancy vis-a-vis bonus levels. 
Disrupted client-contractor and official union-shop steward 
hierarchical relationship exist in a dynamic symbiosis. 
The Importance of Bonus Schemes 
There is considerable evidence that contractors relied very 
heavily on bonus schemes as the means of control and planning in 
the production process, and that often they were inadequately 
designed and run. The co-existence of these two factors 
inevitably led to considerable problems with regard to the 
control of labour. 
The appendix in the 1970 NEDO report, made up of reports by the 
268 
Department of Employment and Productivity, notes 
'one particular site study sums up much of the 
difficulties associated with bonus payments. Most 
management representatives on this site clearly 
thought that satisfactory output could only be 
achieved if wages were tied to output through bonus 
schemes, whereas most worker representatives thought 
that site bonuses were much too vague and unfair. The 
difference in approach underlined the suspicions and 
complete lack of trust between management and men on 
this site. Despite the many and varied bonus 
schemes introduced, output was low in almost all 
cases. There appeared to be some truth in union 
allegations that management did not have the 
facilities or expertise to devise and administer fair 
bonus schemes' (p. 103). 
Similarly, the study of the Llanwern steelworks' construction 
notes that few firms did not operate a bonus scheme : - 
'about half reported that, by Llanwern standards, they 
achieved a fair rate of productivity from their 
employees. This can be explained by better management 
and supervision. The idea- that some firms operate 
incentive bonus schemes as a 'control' method and 
almost as a substitute for good management and site 
supervision.... cannot be readily be dismissed. This 
is particularly unfortunate for in practice the 
introduction of a bonus incentive scheme calls for a 
very high standard of management indeed if such 
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schemes are to run smoothly. This may well account 
for the serious labour problems experienced by some 
managements.... Some firms appear to consider tonnage 
bonus schemes, with their rough and ready incentives, 
as providing a sort of 'control system' which should 
ensure a satisfactory level of productivity being 
achieved by the men themselves without the firm being 
obliged to introduce and maintain a high and adequate 
level of site management and supervision' (Berry, 
1963: 51-3). 
Contractors' heavy reliance on bonus schemes as a substitute for 
management and supervision is also manifest in the minutes of a 
meeting at Grangemouth in 1977 between some contractors and BP. 
Under the site agreement no bonus schemes were permitted. 
Contractor X was experiencing low productivity and blamed this 
upon the workforce's lack of motivation. To remedy this 
situation the contractor proposed to introduce a bonus scheme. 
Contractor Y, contractor X's managing contractor, recommended 
increasing staff supervision and argued that the current low 
quality of supervision undertaken by charge-hands was 
ineffective. Contractor X 'accepted that there could be some, 
strengthening of supervision but said that their current 
organisation at Grangemouth would be adequate elsewhere'. 
Contractor X ultimately agreed to increase staff supervision 
levels. 
Similarly, in the CEGB evidence to the House of Commons Select 
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Committee it is stated that a common site agreement was not 
proposed for the Isle of Grain because 'the EEF contractors did 
not support the proposal; their traditional method was to operate 
bonus schemes tied to national rates with bonus negotiations at 
the site' (1981: 714). 
The Commission on Industrial Relations study also provides 
evidence on the inadequacy of many bonus schemes :- 'the 
remaining eleven firms operated incentive bonus schemes.... the 
work measurement systems used varied from a complex performance 
index system devised and used by G. N. Haden, to systems where the 
actual measurement of work seemed vague and haphazard' 
(1972: 14). 
Serious inadequacies in the operation of the bonus scheme used 
by contractors in the Teeside district are clear from the minutes 
of a 1974 joint client-contractor meeting concerning the Monsanto 
Seal Sands project: - 'doubts were expressed as to the validity 
of the area bonus scheme'. 
The CEGB also considered bonus schemes to be badly run - 
Marshall, Head of the Industrial Relations Branch of the Project 
Management Department of the CEGB, at the 1983 AEU-CS conference, 
noted that 'most of these national agreements had incentive bonus 
arrangements negotiated by individual contractors and shop 
stewards at site. That is all right, perhaps, as long as the 
schemes are well designed, well administered and viable in their 
own right. But many were badly designed and many were badly- 
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managed and they led to much industrial unrest'. 
There was more than just management ineptitude in the running of 
a bonus scheme (which was related to the lack of emphasis upon 
the production process as a profit locus) underlying the focus 
of strikes around the bonus issue. There existed a fundamental 
tension between contractors' commercial strategy and their labour 
control strategy. Given the emphasis of contractors upon 
generating extra payments outside of the production arena this 
tension resulted in the contractors' commercial strategy serving 
to undermine their labour control strategy. 
This tension can be seen by considering the effects upon bonus 
payments of the particular practices outlined in chapter 5 which 
contractors used in order to generate additional payments from 
the client. If a contractor is deliberately seeking to obtain 
extras on day rates by withholding information on poor quality 
of design the subsequent re-work on day rates will be difficult 
to standardise to include in a bonus scheme because ad-hoc 
adjustment of previous work will be unique in nature and because 
problems of physical access to the work area will arise. Without 
taking these factors on board in the calculation of the bonus the 
level of payment will necessarily fall. Although he refrains 
from discussing contractors deliberately withholding information, 
a similar picture was drawn by Marshall of the CEGB at the 1983 
AEU-CS conference :- 'men trying to strain 8,000 upstanding pipes 
to meet up with stub heads that have been incorrectly placed - 
their earnings will suffer and we will get industrial relations 
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problems. In the past, the first reaction by a traditionally 
trained client project manager has been to scribble that 
situation as a problem of industrial relations. These days we 
do try to research these circumstances'. 
The practice of sitting on the job will have an even more direct 
impact on bonus levels. The essence of sitting on the job is to 
slow production in order to force the client or managing 
contractor to issue instructions to accelerate. Clearly a 
deliberate policy of slowing production by the contractor will 
impact negatively on the bonus paid to the workforce. The NJC 
Director, also at the 1983 conference, makes a similar point :- 
'there is no point in a client letting a contract to 
a contractor who says he does not have to be 
interested in productivity by, for instance, a cost- 
plus type of contract where it is actually in that 
contractor's interest not to complete the job quickly, 
to overrun and to do all those other things and then 
at the same time say to the contractor 'But you must 
put in an incentive scheme for the men'. The men will 
be pulling to do a good and productive job but the 
contractor's management will not do anything to ensure 
that they can be productive because that does not meet 
the contractor's objectives' (also quoted in section 
2 above). 
In a situation where the contractor has deliberately underbid the 
above tendencies are likely to be intensified. Further, the 
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contractor will seek to lower costs by lowering the bonus 
payments. This aspect should not be overstated. Complaints of 
this at AEU-CS executive meetings and biennial conferences are 
noticeable by their absence; the only example from the 
documentary records is being the delegate who spoke at the 1979 
conference :- 'I myself was involved in a dispute at the end of 
last year when we lost sixteen weeks work only because we were 
working for a sub-contractor who, by putting in a price which was 
too low for the work that he was actually doing, tried to make 
us take a cut in our wages, and we were not having it and we lost 
16 weeks'. Although this form seems rare it is another manner 
in which the contractors' commercial strategies could lie in 
contradiction to their labour control strategy. 
Similarly, it can be seen that in a situation in which a managing 
contractor is attempting to mitigate problems in the design stage 
by seeking an acceleration on the construction phase and thus 
pressurising contractors into building up their labour force, 
problems in bonus payments will occur. In this situation 
although an increase in production would occur productivity 
levels would fall because the nature of problems in the design 
stage are likely to prevent. simple, easily-defined and 
standardised runs of work. As such, bonus payments will suffer. 
Contractor C. e. characterised this as 'more men, doing less, 
looking for more' ; the latter phrase referring to a sudden growth 
in the size of the workforce leading to a perception of a 
position of strength amongst the workforce. Just as the bonus 
level drops so the workforce will begin to feel able to demand 
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more. A similar picture is detailed in the study of the Llanwern 
steelworks' construction in which it is reported :- 
'apart from mis-guided pressure at the time of actual 
disputes, many firms considered that the client often 
required excessively rapid build-ups of labour 
which... frequently provoked almost immediate bonus 
scheme disputes because the scheme had to be amended 
with the increase in labour or because the CEU 
erectors realised the potentialities of the situation' 
(Berry, 1963: 16). 
Contractors' commercial strategy meant that bonus payments varied 
and that this variation was unrelated to effort. This lack of 
congruence between payment and effort was further exacerbated 
by the use by contractors of bonus schemes to attract labour in 
periods of labour shortage - as Marshall of the CEGB noted at the 
1983 AEU-CS conference, 'these badly managed schemes were 
manipulated... sometimes by management, sometimes by men. Why? 
Either to purchase peace or to ease recruitment problems'. 
Berry, in his study of the Llanwern works, also notes that the 
'shortage of CEU labour at Llanwern in 1961 was seen as 
significant by contractors .... in some cases this led to raising 
the bonus to attract labour from other contractors on site'. 
Given the inevitable labour force resistance and conflict 
engendered by the variation of bonus levels created by their 
commercial strategy, contractors often resorted to manipulation 
of the bonus levels in order to 'purchase peace', in the words 
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quoted above from the CEGB official. This often overt 
manipulation further undermined the bonus scheme as a crux of a 
labour control strategy for it further showed to the labour force 
how far the payments were dependent on often arbitrary management 
interpretation and definition. This process was manifest at the 
Monsanto Seal Sands site. At a 1974 joint client-contractors 
meeting it was noted that 'in those circumstances the bonus 
scheme tended to be little more than a wage regulator'. At the 
July 1976 stage three meeting there were discussions concerning 
a number of walk-offs in support of demands for a minimum bonus 
level of 93p. The unions blamed low bonus payments on factors 
outside of the labour force's control such as shortage of 
materials and unbalanced teams. The contractors argued the low 
bonus reflected low effort. In October 1976 at a meeting of 
contractors, FTOs and shop stewards, the union side noted that 
the origins of a dispute involved 'management changing its mind 
on the introduction of new norms which had yielded much higher 
earnings. The unions also complained that the bonus assessment 
of a contractor 'was made unilaterally by the foreman. The shop 
stewards should participate in the assessment of bonus'. The 
contractors replied that 'very often, it had to be said, in an 
endeavour to create goodwill the men had been treated more 
generously than output could possibly justify'. At the June 1977 
stage 3 meeting the FTOs stated that 'in response to continuing 
shopfloor pressure and without any consultation whatsoever with 
full-time officials a further 36p had been progressively injected 
into the bonus unrelated to increased production.... it was clear 
that if work continued at the present tempo, which was equivalent 
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to an earned bonus of around 60p, the men would continue to 
receive the 36p injection for nothing'. Putting forward a new 
demand for a minimum bonus of 125p, they stated that 'the 
contractors had demonstrated that the money was available by 
permitting a runaway on this scale and it was obvious to the 
shopfloor that anything they wanted was there for the asking'. 
Although there is no evidence on the form of client-contractor 
relations at Seal Sands it is reasonable, in light of its 
considerable schedule overrun, to assume that some of the 
contractor practices outlined in chapter 5 were undertaken on the 
site. If this was the case, it suggests a dynamic such that the 
strategies which contractors used to generate extras from the 
client undermined bonus schemes as tools of labour control, and 
further that if the practices were successful in generating 
extras this then allowed contractors to be generous in the bonus 
payment levels to buy peace because the money came from the 
client directly, in the form of a 'blank cheque' in the words of 
the 1981 House of Commons Select Committee (p. 45). This then 
creates a qualitatively different picture than the simple one of 
economistic militant labour chasing the 'quick penny'. 
Client Intervention and Contractor Resistance 
The strong links between the commercial arena and the industrial 
relations arena manifest in issues surrounding incentive bonus 
schemes suggest that attempts by clients or managing contractors 
in this period to monitor or control contractors' bonus schemes 
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should be seen as having a dual purpose - of both tightening 
commercial control of the contractor, and of tightening control 
of labour, with the two processes depending on each other. 
As such the CEGB's monitoring of the CDN bonus scheme at the Isle 
of Grain was prompted by more than the industrial relations 
implications of one contractor on site having far higher bonus 
levels than other contractors. This is made clear in the oral 
evidence to the Sizewell B Power Station Public Inquiry by 
Marshall of the CEGB in 1983 :- 
'there has to be an independent monitoring and 
auditing function undertaken of bonus schemes operated 
by contractors for a number of reasons. One because 
we want to do it anyway, so that we are probably 
getting the right production benefit for the monies 
being paid out in bonuses .... the site manager has ... . 
to make sure that at the site end the Board is getting 
value for money through the execution of contracts for 
the various contractors. So it is a complicated 
interweaving of responsibilities and events, in which 
the industrial relations plays a part by activities as 
well as policies' (day 123, p. 37)). 
A similar dual purpose was evident in the actions of ICI, a major 
chemical client, at their Wilton site 1965-66, as described by 
Portus of ICI at a University of Manchester Institute of Science 
and Technology symposium in 1970. In discussing the industrial 
relations problems, in particular the level of strikes, on the 
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site, Portus describes the client's actions as follows: - 
'The first step we took in order to reduce some of the 
chaos was to tell contractors that if they intended to 
operate a bonus scheme that the bonus scheme must be 
related to output.... As time passed, significant 
variation in the bonus payments made by the different 
contractors occurred, although these variations were 
not matched by corresponding variations in output. 
Discussion with the contractors made little progress 
as they generally took refuge in the defence that 
their commercial interests precluded any disclosure of 
costs. They were however induced to estimate 
anonymously a hypothetical job in terms of hours of 
work and when these estimates were compared it was 
found that for equal bonus payments the output 
required ranged between 1 and 4. 
At this point it was agreed that a common approach to 
measurement of output and bonus payments was required' 
(in Wearne, 1970: 31). 
The links between commercial control of the contractor and 
control of labour problems in the operation of bonus schemes were 
also manifest in the presentation from Shell, a major client, at 
a 1977 NEDO meeting; 'prior to the mid-60s our experience of 
bonus schemes was limited to the results of allowing our 
contractors occasionally to resort to devices to get themselves 
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(and us) out of trouble'. The client made a deliberate attempt 
to switch to a more controlled bonus system, requesting a major 
contractor to introduce a rigorous scheme. This scheme 'was 
introduced to all other contractors on that site. By the end of 
1970, all our other sites with site agreements had either 
imported the scheme.... or had developed close imitations of 
their own'. Shell appointed a quantity surveyor 'to act as a 
fully independent audit group' in order to monitor its operation. 
Further, 'monitoring the bonus payment, which is sensitive to 
productivity, enables the client and contractor to identify (and 
deal with) problems arising on the site, probably more quickly 
than otherwise'. Importantly, 'the scheme imposes considerable 
discipline on all concerned with regard to the efficient 
organisation of work as we all know that poor management of the 
project will affect the workers' pay packet' and 'one of the main 
benefits of regular audits is of course that those individual 
employers who might be inclined to tinker with the bonus scheme, 
at site level, in order to buy themselves out of trouble instead 
of confronting the real issues, can be discouraged from doing so, 
by the other employers and the client'. 
There is also evidence of contractors resisting attempts by 
clients to impose uniformity of earnings, preferring a position 
of earnings disparity, a position which directly contributed to 
labour conflict in this period. Contractors resisted for two 
main reasons. Firstly, uniformity across contractors undermined 
contractors' strategy of using the payment system as the central 
tenet of their labour control and production organisation 
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strategy. Secondly, as intimated above, uniformity of earnings 
implies a possibility for greater control of clients over 
contractors. This is because greater client knowledge of 
earnings implies a greater knowledge of contractor operations 
which in turn implies a more substantial basis for clients to 
demand for improved performance. 
For the most part over this period, clients were profoundly 
ignorant of the conditions under which contractors employed their 
workforce. For instance, the CIR study notes that 'methods of 
collecting information on pay were not established until several 
months had passed and the system eventually adopted did not 
produce figures of any great sophistication or reliability. 
Earnings levels, for example, were quoted as an average for each 
company, without any indications of difference in the skill 
composition of the workforce involved' (1972: 26). Even under the 
comprehensive site agreements introduced in the late 1960s the 
clients still lacked precise information on the earnings of the 
employees of the contractors. Despite the attempts to impose 
uniformity of earnings that these site agreements represented, 
the reality on site was often very different from the theory of 
the printed page and sweeping signatures. At Baglan Bay in 1971 
the interim report of the contractors' working party into 
productivity, set up at the client's insistence, noted that 
there were 'anomalies in the interpretation of the agreement 
across the site'. The 1976 NEDO report's discussion of this site 
states that the site agreement 'failed' (p. 21). 
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At Grangemouth in 1978 BP financed the appointment of a full-time 
co-ordinating chair of the contractors' group. The minutes of 
a client-contractor meeting shows that 'his main objective was 
the co-ordination of industrial relations at Grangemouth. The 
standard site agreement during the past three years of incomes 
policy had been under considerable pressure on the Grangemouth 
site and there had been some indications that some contractors 
(and possibly also a client company) had been 'sympathetically' 
responding to claims for payments which were not in strict 
accordance with the agreement'. The intimate links between 
uniformity of earnings, the increase of information about 
contractors available to clients, and the consequent implications 
for greater potential control are underlined in the subsequent 
actions of this BP-financed co-ordinating official and in the 
responses of the contractors. The official and BP clearly came 
to the conclusion that a form of monitoring of the precise 
conditions under which contractors employed labour was required 
in order to accomplish adherence to the site agreement and ensure 
uniformity of earnings. The official wrote to contractors 
seeking weekly returns on absenteeism, sickness, lodging 
allowance, abnormal conditions payments, and inclement weather 
hours. Some weeks later BP also wrote to contractors stating 
'that they must supply to the Resident Engineer any weekly 
returns he requires' and further that contractors 'must allow BP 
access to their wage sheets and other site records of labour 
employed under the site agreement'. In interview, the co- 
ordinating official stated that in response to the audit forms 
concerning hours and earnings which he sent to contractors, half 
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of the contractors refused to complete the forms, arguing that 
such information was 'commercially sensitive'. The contractors 
argued that given a large part of the job was not cost 
reimbursable the client had no right to such information. The 
official countered by saying that the contract they had signed 
with the client involved a clause stating that they were obliged 
to comply with the site agreement. The client legal department 
then added a clause to all existing contracts such that the 
contractors were obliged to complete the weekly audit forms. In 
the words of the official this caused 'a bloody furore', but 
compliance was ultimately achieved. As part of the audit form 
the co-ordinating official also included a section on 
productivity, seeking details on target hours for a piece of work 
against actual hours. The official stated that the contractors 
were able to successfully resist an obligation to complete this 
section of the audit forms. Files consulted at the Modern 
Records Centre confirm that attempts were made to require 
contractors to undertake a 'productivity calculation' in their 
weekly returns, but that ultimately this section was dropped from 
the forms (also discussed in chapter 4.2. ) 
These considerations allow us to understand the resistance on 
other sites of contractors to clients', and occasionally, union 
officials' attempts to impose uniformity of earnings. The CIR 
study notes that the client engaged a consultant to establish 'a 
central service to help contractors maintain uniform standards 
of employment practices.... the activities of GSS [the 
consultant] met with initial resistance from contractors on the 
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site . They were asked to provide detailed earnings information 
and eventually agreed, after discussion in the co-ordination 
committee, only to supply GSS with copies of wage figures given 
to the site industrial relations officer.... At the time of our 
enquiries GSS had not become accepted as a source of advice to 
contractors' (1972: 22). Further, 'when the unions' claim for a 
site agreement was discussed nearly all the contractors were 
against the idea', even though the contractors formally 'deplored 
the disparities in earnings' (1972: 26). Also note that it was 
the contractors who resisted the imposition of a uniform site 
agreement at the Isle of Grain site. Disparity of earnings was 
a key element underlying the major disputes at that site. 
This discussion has shown the role of capital in creating the 
context for labour militancy and has highlighted the dynamics of 
the interactions between the commercial arena and the industrial 
relations arena. Rather than labour militancy, manifest in 
leapfrogging bargaining causing schedule delays, a more complex 
dynamic existed - as is suggested in the wording of the 1971 
interim report of the Baglan Bay contractors' working party into 
productivity (set up at the client's insistence) :- 'the failure 
to meet programme.... has led to anomalies in the interpretation 
of the agreement across the site'. 
It is pertinent to note that the effective delegation by 
contractors of management of the production process to the 
operation of bonus schemes has parallels with Lazonick's analysis 
of the relationship between the social relations of production 
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and economic performance in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century cotton industry. Lazonick similarly notes that managers 
in the cotton industry delegated control of the production 
process in this case to the shopfloor workers .- 'British 
capitalists preferred to leave considerable control over work 
organisation with operatives on the shopfloor rather than invest 
in managerial structures' (Lazonick, 1990: 21). Both of these 
accounts stress the need -to look beyond the surface appearance 
of the coincidence of labour strength/militancy and poor 
performance and to examine the social relationships underpinning 
the surface appearance; in particular the role of management in 
creating or acquiescing in institutions which led to both labour 
strength/militancy and poor performance. 
7.6. Overtime, Shiftwork and Manning 
Having examined the main issues of economism it is now 
appropriate to address issues of work control - namely, overtime, 
shiftwork, and manning. These three topics are being addressed 
within one section because they have central relevance to 
attempts to compensate for previous delays in the project 
schedule. Once it is clear that a project is behind schedule it 
is likely that the client and/or managing contractor will take 
steps to make up for the delay and re-establish the schedule. 
These steps could involve one or more of increasing manning, 
increasing overtime and introducing shiftwork. Although it has 
been established that conf lictual labour relations' manifestation 
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as strikes cannot account for the high level of schedule delay 
in this period it is possible that labour militancy further 
contributed to delays by blocking attempts to accelerate to 
compensate for earlier delays. This section addresses this very 
question. The pertinence of this question is underlined by the 
observation made by the 1976 NEDO report :- 'design changes, when 
they were made on foreign projects seemed to have a less severe 
effect on the programme' (p. 4). 'Delays were rarely made up in 
the U. K. ' (p. 16). 
Overtime 
There is evidence of the occasional use by the workforce of 
overtime embargoes. However, it is clear that overtime was 
rarely used in attempts to accelerate production, and as such the 
opposition to overtime that existed could not be said to have 
exacerbated problems of schedule delay. 
Berry's study of the Llanwern steelworks describes how two f irms 
were subject to a three month overtime ban in support of a demand 
to increase the bonus level. He also states that it was the 
majority opinion of the contractors that 'work to rules', 'go 
slows, and overtime bans were a more important factor at Llanwern 
in enabling stewards and men to obtain unreasonable and 
extortionate concessions than strike action' (p. 71) (also quoted 
in section 3). The CIR study notes that 'throughout the period 
a pattern developed in Peirson and Cleveland Bridge and to a 
lesser extent in Teeside Bridge of claims which, if not conceded, 
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were quickly followed by overtime bans, restrictions on output 
or stoppages of work' (p. 7) (also quoted in section 3 above). 
The minutes of a stage 3 meeting at Baglan Bay in 1971 note that 
'welders at Babcock were refusing to start welds which would 
necessitate work continuing beyond normal working hours' 
Whilst examples of the workforce restricting overtime exist, such 
a tactic appears to have been occasional. Indeed, examples can 
also be found of workforce demands to increase overtime - in 1968 
at Grangemouth at a stage 3 meeting one contractor reported shop 
steward demands to increase overtime, and a month later another 
contractor reported demands for overtime to achieve parity of 
working hours with the supervision. By the mid-70s even the FTOs 
were putting forward demands to increase overtime. This occurred 
at stage 3 meetings in both 1976 and 1977. 
This apparently contradictory evidence can be better understood 
when the control of overtime, rather than levels of overtime per 
se, is considered. 
This consideration feeds into the issue of how far overtime was 
used to increase production in order to compensate for existing 
delays. The 1970 NEDO report argues 'we believe constant 
overtime is not worked to complete programmes on time but arises 
from the necessity to provide acceptable earnings when the basic 
rate is 'out of line' (P-43). In 1966 at national negotiations 
between the EEF and the unions on the Steam Generating Plant 
Erection Agreement the EEF official stated that overtime had to 
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be high 'to attract travelling men'. At a stage 3 meeting at 
Baglan Bay in 1971 an FTO reported that 'shop stewards maintained 
that the process itself (welding) did not necessitate overtime 
and that it was being offered as an incentive to chrome moly 
welders. The FTO understood from the contractor that overtime 
was not an absolute necessity'. The unpublished NEDO report on 
two refinery projects 1978-82 reported in relation to the first 
project that the managing contractor planned to start with a 52 
hour week, rising to 60 hours, despite the likelihood that this 
would prove 'counter-productive'. 'It was never clear whether 
[the managing contractor] really expected to increase output by 
excessive overtime or whether the hours were put forward as an 
(unsatisfactory)* means of raising earnings and attracting 
labour'. At a 1977 NEDO meeting an official from Shell stated 
that in 1968 'we were faced with the usual state of affairs, slow 
progress, high overtime, and overmanning .... The overtime had 
been introduced initially on a controlled basis to attract 
workers but was eventually escalated' . He argued that 
increased 
overtime led to high absenteeism,, resulting in an unbalanced 
workforce which lowered productivity and slowed the rate of 
progress. The 1968 BP-authored document on the proposed site 
agreement at Grangemouth notes. that 'routine overtime is 
frequently worked to augment earnings rather than to increase 
output'. 
This suggests that overtime was rarely used to accelerate 
production partly because of labour's militancy and partly 
because of contractors' attempts to recruit labour in a buoyant 
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labour market. This situation complements contractors' 
commercial strategies in that they are able to put the blame on 
their lack of acceleration of production onto other parties. It 
will be recalled that when contractors sit on the job they will 
seek to blame other parties for lack of progress, forcing clients 
in to giving explicit instructions to accelerate, instructions 
which will form the basis for subsequent claims for additional 
payments. 
Shiftwork 
It appears from the available evidence that in the 1960s and 
1970s shiftworking was occasionally used, but was not widespread. 
The CEGE witnesses at the 1981 House of Commons Select Committee 
stated that 'we have ... to go into shiftworking. There is great 
reluctance at this point in time to get shiftworking operating 
on any major site. There is a bit going on inside the reactors 
at Hartlepool/Heysham, there is some going on at Dungeness and 
there is some going on at Dinorwic within the tunnels' (1981: para 
2194). Of the seven projects in the 1976 report, shiftworking 
is described as operating only at two of the sites. The CIR 
report makes no mention of shiftwork. This is of particular 
interest in that these two reports examined projects which were 
subject to severe delays, and it raises the more general question 
concerning why shiftwork was not extensively used as an 
instrument to catch up schedule delay. 
One possible explanation is that the workforce was able to resist 
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the imposition of shiftworking. The documentary evidence 
contains instances of such resistance. At Llanwern, Berry notes 
that a firm's attempt to introduce a night shift of 30 workers 
in order to meet urgent programme requirements was met by a3 
month embargo by the AEU until a wage increase was conceded 
(1963: 81). At Grangemouth a 1969 stage 3 meeting considered two 
instances of the workforce refusing to allow the introduction 
of a nightshift. At Baglan Bay in 1971, proposals for 'rotating 
shifts to cover 24 hours, 7 days .... to cater for corrective 
engineering etc. ' were put to shop stewards and rejected. At a 
stage 3 meeting later in 1971 nightshift was being used by 2 
contractors, and the unions advised that they wanted this 
terminated when the site rundown began. 
Whilst there is evidence of the limited use of labour force 
resistance to shiftworking, there is no evidence of widespread 
conflict on the issue. The point here is that despite 
considerable and chronic schedule delays contractors only rarely 
pushed for the use of shiftwork as an instrument of acceleration 
of production to catch up delay. A concerted attempt to 
introduce shiftworking had not yet occurred. Further, it is 
relevant to note that proposals for the introduction of shiftwork 
are noticeable by their absence in the recommendations to 
accelerate production of the contractors' working party into 
productivity at Baglan Bay. Also, proposals for shiftwork were 
not a central point of the completion bonus package negotiated 
at Seal Sands in 1977 in order to accelerate production on a 
project subject to considerable delay - in contrast other 
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practices, such as working in the rain, demarcation, and last-in- 
first-out redundancy criteria were all discussed. 
Why were there so few attempts to use shiftwork to accelerate 
production? The analysis presented in chapter 5 of contractors' 
strategy to create profit outside of the production process 
suggests an explanation. The practices of sitting on the job and 
those associated with a commercial bias scenario have clear 
implications in terms of a contractor's reluctance to institute 
measures which will accelerate progress. Also if contractors 
have underbid they will be reluctant to introduce shiftwork with 
the necessity to pay shiftwork premia. It is relevant to note 
here the minutes of a 1974 contractors' negotiating committee 
meeting concerning Grangemouth :- 'it was further noted that two 
contractors objected to the use of two shift working on the 
grounds that the shift working premium would adversely affect 
their contracts'. Further, the lack of managerial emphasis on 
efficiency within the production process which this strategy 
implies also contributes to an explanation. The contractors' 
resistance to undertake double day shift at Drax power station 
in 1981, as detailed in the evidence of Marshall of the CEGB to 
the Sizewell B Public Enquiry' is of particular relevance :- 
'The first round reaction we received from our 
contractors when the implementation or required 
implementation of double day shift was first raised 
with them [was dismissive] .... in the final analysis 
the client has to be hard enough to say, as we did at 
Drax to the boiler contractor, 'You do not start work 
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on this project until you have got the details of this 
requirement absolutely worked out', and one has to 
effect a discipline' (day 123 page 36). 
'one has to understand what it [double day shifts] 
does mean .... in terms of the management expertise 
involved .... a contractor has to move away from what 
I would call his 'traditional programme logic' when he 
moves into the double day shifting area,.... he has to 
look again at the traditional ways in which he 
delivers components to the workplace, because it has 
been double shifted. He has to look again at the way 
those components are what we call 'furnished' before 
they are efected in the workplace. He has to look 
very carefully at the number of working groups which 
he can double day shift because the number of groups 
can only equate to the number of parallel paths on the 
critical path' (day 122, p. 83). 
In as much as shif tworking requires a higher level of managerial 
skills and in as much as contractors placed little emphasis upon 
management organisation of the production process it becomes less 
of a mystery why the period was characterised by so few attempts 
to introduce shiftwork. 
Again there are parallels between the arguments of this chapter 
and those of Lazonick on the cotton industry. Here the parallels 
lie in examining the relationship between the social relations 
of production and economic performance in terms of management's 
lack of effort to transform work arrangements. Lazonick explains 
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that 'Lancashire's cotton businessmen possessed neither the 
incentive nor the ability to undertake the internal re- 
organisation of the industry' (1986: 20). The lack of incentive 
lay in the ready ability to create profit in the production 
process through exploiting the nature of the minder-piecer 
relationship. The lack of ability lay in the strong union 
organisation confronting a highly competitive, and highly 
fragmented organisation of employers. The lack of incentive for 
the ECI employers lay in their strategic emphasis upon creating 
profit outwith the production process. The lack of ability of 
employers in the ECI is more questionable, but employers were 
certainly constrained by labour militancy, and their own 
unwillingness to band together, which itself was related to their 
commercial strategy and their desire to avoid client control. 
An additional constraint was their lack of managerial skill in 
the organisation of production, which, of course, is also related 
to their emphasis on profit outwith the production process. 
Manning 
Turning finally to issues of manning levels, it is a frequent 
observation of studies of individual projects in this period that 
projects suffered from considerable overmanning. The casual 
observer may attribute overmanning to union strength and 
militancy, but in the ECI unions had very little role in 
generating overmanning. Overmanning must be understood in the 
context of the client-contractor relations. There is evidence 
that overmanning occurred mainly in two situations - when the 
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contractor had a reimbursable contract and when the client gave 
instructions to accelerate production. 
The 1986 NEDO report on the 1975-82 Sullom Voe project noted the 
existence of reimbursable contracts, and also noted that the 
initial estimate of peak labour force was 1,100, whilst the 
actual peak was 5,500. The report commented, 'the dangers of 
overmanning had become part of the 'conventional wisdom' of the 
ECI. The problems are those of deploying men efficiently and of 
keeping them supplied with work, information, tools and 
equipment, and of supervision .... Whilst the problems are well 
known it is hard for the client to discipline himself. At Sullom 
Voe this tendency was encouraged by reimbursable contracts' 
(p, 35). 
The specifics of the relationship between reimbursable contracts 
and overmanning are spelled out in the evidence to the Sizewell 
Inquiry by Marshall of the CEGB :- 
'the erection work concerned was being undertaken by 
the contractor concerned under a lump sum arrangement. 
This meant with the benefit of hindsight and 
retrospect that at a stroke of a contractual pen the 
sanction of managing labour effectively was removed 
from the responsibility area of the contractor .... if 
we can just look at the Ince B situation by way of 
example where one particular contractor overmanned his 
work, and as is usual in this industrial relations 
situation the law of diminishing returns applied, and 
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as he over-resourced his work the amount of production 
and job progress was almost inversely proportional to 
the increase in labour resource (day 123, p. 34). 
Evidence of overmanning in situations where the client or the 
managing contractor issued instructions to accelerate is 
plentiful. Given that overtime was used for purposes other than 
for increasing production, and given that shiftwork was resisted 
by both labour and contractors, the only option available to 
contractors whose profit-creating strategy did not entail 
increasing managerial skills in, and efficiency of, the 
production process, was simply to increase manning. The NJC 
Director at the 1983 AEU-CS conference puts this more bluntly :- 
'Ask any project management who knows sod-all about it 
'What are you going to do about being late on 
programme? ' and he will say 'I am going to double the 
workforce'. He will be surprised as hell that the 
work is less with the increased force than it is with 
the proper force. Over-saturation has a terrible 
effect on productivity levels'. 
The evidence also tends to indicate that increasing manning as 
a means to accelerate production was often counter-productive. 
The 1976 NEDO report notes that 'when things start to go wrong 
and the contractors resort to putting more men on the site 
(whether at the client's behest or their own initiative) an 
intolerable stress is placed on the man management on the site' 
In relation to the Baglan Bay site the report states, 
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'evidence from the British Ethylene project, where the manning 
level increased by 100%, was that the attempt proved counter- 
productive .... the direct effect of high manning is that a much 
greater man-management is required from site management whose 
basic expertise is construction engineering' (p. 16). The 
analysis of contractors' profit strategy presented in chapter 5 
also suggests that the increased planning and co-ordination as 
well as 'man-management' required in the production process will 
be difficult for a management team whose emphasis is to generate 
additional payments outside of the production process. With the 
casual nature of employment of even the supervisors, increasing 
the supervisory manning levels had further deleterious effects - 
'this affected the quality of both supervisors and craftsmen 
employed on the site since the supervision ratios were maintained 
only by promoting the more reliable craftsmen, who continued to 
relate more to their workmates than to management' (1976: 41). 
On-site interviews indicate that even in 1991 supervisors 
continue to hold their union card given the possibility that at 
the next project they may be 'back on the tools'. Given that 
explicit instructions to accelerate in effect constitute a de 
facto reimbursable form of contract, contractors have little 
concern of the negative effects of overmanning and indeed have 
an incentive in encouraging it if their percentage management fee 
will increase as their costs (and manning) increase(s). 
This is the context in which to understand the comments made by 
BP Projects officials to the Baglan Bay contractors' working 
party into productivity - 'site managers had failed to save BP 
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from themselves. Pressures are brought to bear from the client 
to get the job done quickly which usually resulted in the 
employment of more labour, at no time did site managers warn BP 
that further recruitment could lead to problems' (also quoted in 
section 4 above). Similarly, it is the context in which to 
understand the observation made by Berry of overmanning at the 
Llanwern works - 'it is a sad comment on management that all too 
often they did but little to resist the client's demands for 
rapid build-ups' (1963: 29). 
The discussion of the Isle of Grain dispute earlier in the 
chapter also noted that often the pressures to catch-up delays 
led to thermal insulation contractors being employed on a 
reimbursable basis. This also led to overmanning, as is 
indicated in the oral evidence to the House of Commons Select 
Committee by the Director of TICA :- 
'our problem .... is arriving late on sites because of 
the programming being already behind by the time we 
get there, and we get the problem that we have to f ace 
the suggestion that more men should go on the site and 
the timescale should be reduced and that creates our 
problem which, of course, makes the management more 
difficult' (1981: 706). 
The unpublished 1967 OCPCA report puts forward two arguments 
on the disadvantages of overmanning. Firstly, 'efficiency 
depends upon operatives being able to see ahead and follow 
through with sequences of repetitive operations but this is 
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reduced and groups of operatives are confined to smaller scope 
and areas'. The second argument has a strong anti-labour slant 
but nevertheless contains a kernel of truth :- 'over-employment 
takes away the fear of unemployment from operatives and as a 
consequence of this the power of the union is increased and major 
unrest follows. The larger the labour force the greater the 
unrest' . This theme is echoed by Berry in his argument 
concerning the Llanwern steelworks that 'panic labour build-ups 
also give the men the impression of an opportune time to press 
demands' (1963: 29). Further consequences of overmanning likely 
to lead to conf lict are suggested in the files on the Baglan Bay 
project. A meeting in 1971 of the client and contractors noted 
that the site 'facilities were 'inadequate for the massive 
workforce', and the interim report of the contractors' working 
party into productivity noted that there were complaints of 'road 
congestion at the start, and the end of the day'. 
The dynamics of the way in which labour conflict derives from 
client-contractor relations and schedule delay and serves to 
reproduce and exacerbate the situation is highlighted by the 
argument put forward to the House of Commons Select Committee by 
the Director of TICA that contracts become reimbursable either, 
'when the men press, usually unofficially, for extra payments 
and the client has forced .... or persuaded [the contractor] 
to give way', or when 'things are going at a pace that the 
contractor is able to maintain and the client has said 'more men, 
more payments''(1981: 705). A picture emerges of a dynamic in 
which design problems and/or contractor tactics create a delay 
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which leads to client instructions to accelerate, which is 
manifest through a simple increase in the labour force and this 
overmanning leads to labour conflict which is used by contractors 
to justify arguments for reimbursable contracts, which in turn 
tend to lead to overmanning. 
This discussion of the important issues of overtime, shiftwork, 
and manning has shown that the extent and significance of 
militancy varied. Militancy vis-a-vis control of overtime 
existed, but this was not significant in terms of schedule 
performance because overtime was rarely used for purposes of 
accelerating production. The conspicuous lack of either 
widespread conflict over, or widespread use of, shiftwork was 
related partly to labour militancy, but more significantly to 
contractors' commercial strategy. Overmanning was widespread in 
the period. Whilst militancy arose from this, it did not create 
it. Vital in its creation were the existence of reimbursable 
contracts, instructions to accelerate, and contractors' lack of 
emphasis upon productive efficiency. A dynamic existed in which 
the labour militancy that existed in these three areas would be 
used to reproduce the form of commercial relations that underlay 
the chronic schedule overruns of the period. Evidence on other 
areas of work control - absenteeism, time discipline and wet 
weather working -exists. Whilst this evidence does not add 
anything new to the argument in an analytical sense it does serve 
to strengthen the empirical basis of the argument. Therefore, 
it is detailed in appen ix 
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7.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided detailed evidence on the connections 
between the commercial arena and the labour relations arena, on 
how the commercial strategy of contractors contradicted their 
labour control strategy, on how this and the strategic emphasis 
of contractors upon the commercial arena as the main profit locus 
set the material context for shopf loor militancy, and on how this 
militancy was used by contractors to reproduce the form of 
client-contractor relations which underlay the severe schedule 
delays of the period. 
Consistently arguing against the simple correlation of labour 
militancy and poor economic performance,, the chapter examined the 
main manifestations of labour militancy and showed how an 
adequate understanding of the relationship between each of these 
forms of labour militancy and economic performance had to embrace 
an analysis of the role of contractors in setting the material 
context for militancy and in seeking to use labour militancy to 
their own advantage in their relationship with clients. 
On a number of occasions parallels between the arguments in this 
chapter and those of Lazonick in his historical study of the UK 
cotton industry were noted. The key common theme was that whilst 
labour militancy/strength could be seen to co-exist with poor 
performance, there was not a simple causal relationship from the 
former to the latter. To understand this relationship an 
analysis of the structure and relations of capital is essential. 
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Further, both Lazonick and this chapter have argued that capital 
relations lay at the root of poor economic performance. Whilst 
for Lazonick the key element in militating against a re- 
organisation of the production process was the fragmentation of 
capital, for this thesis the key element in poor performance was 
the nature of c1 ient -contractor relations. Despite the differing 
details, the commonality is the argument that capital relations 
lay at the root of poor performance. 
Moreover, both accounts have argued that labour 
strength/militancy can only be understood by analysing its 
material context, in which a pivotal role is played again by the 
nature of capital relations and management strategy. For 
Lazonick, the important characteristic is the fragmentation of 
capital and the managerial strategy of the delegation of control 
of the production process. For this study of the ECI, the main 
elements are the commercial strategy of contractors creating 
profit outwith the production process, and the contradiction that 
existed between this and the labour control strategy of the 
operation of bonus schemes. 
The implication is that whilst labour militancy/ strength co- 
existed with poor performance both of these elements can be said 
to have been 'created' by a third element, namely capital 
relations and managerial strategy. This has profound 
implications for the (usually neo-classical) approach to the 
issue of industrial relations and economic performance which 
seeks to statistically correlate variables such as unionisation 
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with economic performance outcomes, in that it raises the problem 
of endogeneity - an issue raised in chapter 2. 
LT -L 
1. An example from the 1980s is used in a discussion of the 1960s 
and 1970s. This is justified by the scarcity of available 
evidence and the argument that the process which the example 
illustrates was more prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 
1980s. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
LABOUR RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANC 
8.1. Introduction 
THE 1980s 
Chapter 4 provided evidence of a substantial relative improvement 
in performance against schedule in the 1980s. Chapters 5 and 6 
argued that capital relations lay at the root of poor performance 
in the 1960s and 1970s and that the main reason for the 
improvement in the 1980s was the rise of managing contractors and 
their ability to cut opportunistic practices. The previous 
chapter showed how the labour militancy of the earlier period, 
existing in a dynamic symbiosis with contractors' practices, 
contributed to delay. 
This chapter shows that the key areas of labour jnilitancy, both 
in forms of economism and of work control, fell in the 1980s. 
It will examine the contours of militancy which vere analysed in 
chapter 7, highlighting the nature of the changes. Therefore, 
the chapter examines the nature of worker organisation, strikes, 
bonus and differentials, overtime, shiftwork and manning. A key 
motif within this is the importance of changes in the industrial 
relations arena for the commercial arena. This matches the 
expectations created by the previous chapter. Given that labour 
militancy was used by contractors to exacerbate and reproduce the 
commercial relationship with clients which underlay poor 
performance, so it can be expected that a fall in militancy will 
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facilitate the managing contractors' strategy of passing on risk 
and cutting opportunism. 
At the same time as mapping out the changes in labour militancy 
and the effect on performance the chapter will focus on the cause 
of the fall in militancy. There are three possible explanations 
for this fall. Firstly, given that a key material context for 
the labour militancy of the 1960s and 1970s was the disruption 
to the flow of production arising from the opportunistic 
practices of contractors and given that managing contractors 
curbed these practices, this should have an important effect on 
militancy. Did militancy fall because of the change in material 
context arising'from the fall in opportunistic practices in the 
1980s? Secondly, chapter 6 provided evidence that there was a 
slump in demand and in employment in the industry, with a 46% 
drop in on-shore ECI employment from 1981 to 1989. Did militancy 
simply fall away as a result of the change in bargaining power 
because of the sudden change in the labour market? Finally, in 
November 1981 a comprehensive national agreement, the National 
Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry (the NAECI) 
came into effect. Was it this that lay at the heart of the fall 
in militancy? 
It is difficult to separate out these strands in that they 
coincided and can often be seen as mutually reinforcing. The 
1970 NEDO report (which effectively constituted the start of the 
protracted negotiating process leading to the 1981 NAECI) 
suggests that the NAECI should be seen as having a role 
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engendering an 'orderly expression of the power structure in the 
industry' (p. 59). This suggests that the NAECI should be seen 
as having a role engendering such a power structure not only in 
the industrial relations arena but also in the commercial arena. 
The importance of the NAECI beyond the industrial relations arena 
is a recurring theme in the chapter. 
Despite the need to be, sensitive to the grouping of these 
elements it is useful to focus on the separate strands, 
particularly to aid the predictive power of analysis - will the 
change in labour militancy continue beyond the low level of 
demand in the industry? One way of separating out the strands 
is to ask how far the 'successful' negotiation and establishment 
of the NAECI in 1981 was dependent on the rise of managing 
contractors and the fall in demand. This can best be addressed 
after consideration of the political and economic origins of the 
NAECI in section 2 of the chapter. 
The main sources of evidence in this chapter are the records held 
at the offices of the National Joint Council pertaining to both 
individual projects, and central, national proceedings and 
negotiations. 
8.2. The NAECI and Its Origins 
The NAECI came into effect in November, 1981 and was signed by 
three employers' associations - NECEA, OCPCA, and TICA - and 
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seven unions - AEU-CS, AEU-ES, ASBSBSW, EETPU, NUSMWHDE, TGWUf 
and the GMWU. Subsequently, a treaty agreement was also signed 
to include the Electrical Contractors' Association and its 
Scottish sister organisation. The agreement applies to all ECI 
work except repair and maintenance, and minor modifications. 
Different institutional and procedural structures apply to 
'nominated' and 'non-nominated' sites. According to the text of 
the NAECI 'the NJC may decide to nominate certain projects. 
Nominated projects have an additional document laying down the 
particulars of site conditions, a supplementary project 
agreement, and they have a multi-contractor/multi-union site 
level body, the Project Joint Council (PJC) charged with 
enforcing the NAECI, and they have an independent auditor to 
check for compliance. The first stage of procedure is the shop 
steward/management meeting, the second is the FTO-manager 
meeting, the third, which only exists for nominated projects, is 
at the PJC level, and the fourth is at the National Joint Council 
(NJC) level. The NJC Disputes Committee 'will come to a decision 
or finding on the issue .... decisions reached by the NJC 
shall be binding on all parties' . The NAECI is a document which 
details at length the exact substantive terms of employment. The 
agreement also set up the NJC, made up of equal numbers of 
contractors' representatives and national FTOs, with an 
independent Chair and a full time Director, to administer the 
agreement. 
The analysis of NAECI's Political and economic origins is best 
addressed not through a descriptive narrative of the various 
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stages of the extended negotiating process of eleven years (1970- 
81), but rather through an examination of the actions and 
interests of the relevant actors - contractors, managing 
contractors, clients, trade unions and the state. 
This analysis is based on a detailed sifting of evidence 
concerning the negotiation process derived from NEDO files, a 
national union official's files, AEU-CS records at the Modern 
Records Centre, and files at the NJC offices. In addition, 
interviews with five key actors were undertaken. 
Contractors 
Given the argument built up over chapter 7 that contractors 
benefited from the mutually-reinforcing capital relations and 
labour relations of the 1960s and 1970s it should be expected 
that contractors and their representative bodies would be 
reluctant participants in the creation of the NAECI, with its 
impact on both the labour relations and commercial arenas. The 
evidence shows that this was precisely the case. 
At a number of points during the eleven years between the 
publication of the 1970 NEDO report's call for a comprehensive 
national agreement and the signing of the agreement there were 
impasses at which negotiations broke down. On no occasion did 
the EEF contractors initiate a return to negotiations. It was 
often the position of the EEF negotiators in protecting the 
interests of particularly the smaller contractors which created 
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such impasses. For instance, in 1978 the EEF sought to resist 
the addition of clauses relating to an audited uniform bonus 
scheme to the agreement. Also the EEF successfully blocked an 
attempt to oblige contractors working on non-nominated sites to 
return audit forms concerning bonus and earnings information. 
Ultimately, it took the threat of a breakaway, Ministerial 
pressure, as well as a change in personnel amongst the EEF 
negotiators to facilitate the EEF contractors' acceptance of the 
NAECI. Following an impasse in 1978 the OCPCA entered into 
informal discussions with some leading large contractors in 
membership of the EEF to form a new employers' association and 
immediately sign a new national agreement with the unions. The 
threat of the loss of a number of leading firms had the effect 
of pushing the EEF back into negotiations. Towards the end of 
the negotiations there was a change in personnel on the EEF team. 
According to interviews with five leading players in the process 
the official replaced was 'always ready and willing to listen to 
the smaller contractors'. The EEF official who took over the 
negotiations stated that he was 'more prepared to ride over the 
immediate wishes of the obstructors'. 
The position of the thermal insulation contractors, as 
represented by TICA, was similar. On the surface, the widespread 
labour militancy of the laggers during the 1960s and 1970s, which 
was at its most visible in the Isle of Grain, should have spurred 
TICA into an active role in creating a comprehensive national 
agreement. Their reluctance to be involved can only be 
understood with reference to how contractors used labour 
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militancy to their advantage in their commercial relationships 
with clients. The minutes of 1979 union-OCPCA-EEF working party 
highlight the reluctance of the thermal insulation contractors 
to be involved :- 
'An employer's representative suggested that 
representatives of both the thermal insulation 
employers and the general unions should be invited to 
a Working Party meeting to acquaint them with their 
plans for the industry in the hopes that attitudes 
might be changed .... It was suggested that a letter 
similar to those sent to the general unions should be 
sent to the Thermal Insulation Contractors' 
Association, but an alternative proposal was that at 
a following meeting .... the unions and the employers 
should raise the matter with the clients whose support 
it could be made a condition of contract that on 
nominated sites thermal insulation work would have to 
be carried out under [the national agreement]'. 
Managinq Contractors 
The interests of managing contractors were more ambiguous than 
those of contractors. Their position 'below' clients implies a 
potential willingness to condone labour militancy in as much as 
it could be used to deter tighter control and tp deflect blame 
for poor performance. On the other hand their position seeking 
to control contractors implies a potential nEýed to seek to 
support the NAECI measures of curbing labour militancy and 
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facilitating greater control of contractors. Another ambiguity 
exists in that, individually, managing contractors seek to offer 
industrial relations expertise as part of their service. This 
is to say that they compete by seeking to offer better industrial 
relations expertise than their competitors. Yet an inevitable 
outcome of the NAECI would be to take industrial relations 
expertise largely out of competition. This ambiguity is 
reflected in the fact that although they are grouped in an 
employers' association, the OCPCA, it is a much looser federation 
than the EEF/NECEA, with the NECEA Director holding Chief 
Executive responsibilities, in clear contrast to the role of the 
OCPCA Director. 
The actions of the OCPCA during the negotiating process reflect 
these contradictory interests. Garfit (1989), a former official 
of the OCPCA, in his account of the negotiations tends to 
overstate the role of the OCPCA. His comments that the lack of 
activity in the negotiations from 1970 to 1976 was largely due 
to Government inaction - 'it is the respective Governments in 
these years which failed to improve matters as much as the 
individual parties' (p. 6) - indicate more an attempt at a post- 
hoc rationalisation than a serious analysis. However, it is also 
apparent that the OCPCA became more active advocates of a 
comprehensive national agreement as the decade wore on. This was 
particularly evident in their attempt in 1978 to form a national 
agreement with the aid of a breakaway rump form the EEF, an 
attempt which sought to breach an impasse in negotiations. Yet 
the OCPCA and its members were also strongly opposed to attempts 
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throughout the 1980s to widen the scope of the NAECI such that 
contractors would have to return productivity information in the 
monthly audit forms which exist on nominated sites. 
clients 
The analysis of the preceding chapters has stressed that clients 
suffered from the system of social relations in the 1960s and 
1970s in terms of schedule overruns. As such it should be 
expected that they would be key advocates of the NAECI as a tool 
of reform, impacting both in the labour relations and commercial 
arenas. Once more the evidence supports the expectations based 
on the preceding analysis. 
Whilst clients came to be key advocates of a national agreement, 
this was not an automatic, immediate process, and indeed it was 
not a process which embraced all clients. The material interests 
of individual clients do not necessarily correspond with those 
that will promote the economic development of the industry as a 
whole. Individual clients are primarily concerned with the 
success of their own projects. It is this short-term definition 
of interests which was often exploited by contractors and the 
labour force on site in the 1960s and 1970s -a client could be 
prepared to 'throw money' at a job in seeking to ensure speedy 
construction. 
The role of the clients in the negotiating process reflected 
these factors in that the clients came to play a pro-active role, 
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but only once the major long term clients i. e. those that needed 
major plants built on a regular basis, had grouped together in 
the Capital Projects Client Group (CPCG) in the mid-1970s. The 
importance of the client role was manifest in 1974 when the 
unions proposed a joint unions-employers' associations meeting 
and the EEF and OCPCA only agreed to attend the meeting after 
they had met with the clients. In 1979 the clients were able to 
insist on vetting the final employers' association proposals 
before they were discussed with the unions. Further, (as noted 
earlier) in 1980 when there was considerable discussion on 
whether the thermal insulation contractors and employees should 
be included in scope of the national agreements, it was noted 
that clients would ultimately be able to insist on it as a term 
of contract. 
The importance of the major long term clients grouping to form 
another national institution, along with national union 
officials, able to act on the long term interests of the economic 
development of the industry is evident in a 1984 letter from a 
non-CPCG-member client to the NJC Director which states that 'the 
national agreement prevents clients from taking measures that, 
albeit costly, would ensure we achieve our objectives .... I agree 
that the procedures and machinery .... are in the best 
interests 
of the industry nationally. However, that does not necessarily 
satisfy local or individual clients' interests'. 
Trade Unions 
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On the position of trade unions, analysis suggests that the 
national officials would be advocates of a comprehensive national 
agreement given that such an agreement concentrated power in 
their hands, and given their perception of the necessity of it 
to end the long term economic development of the industry. 
Further, they were motivated by the traditional labour movement 
value of egalitarianism. Chapter 7.4. indicated the level of 
disparity of earnings that could exist even within a large site. 
There was further disparity between the conditions on the smaller 
sites and the larger ones. Analysis also suggests that the rank 
and f ile members would be unlikely supporters of the NAECI given 
its implicit support for a reversal of authority within union 
government and given their short-term, anti-employer definition 
of interests. Both of these expectations correspond with the 
evidence. 
The national union officials were, in the words of a leading NEDO 
official, 'the key movers' behind the introduction of the NAECI. 
Garfit notes that, 
'the leadership of John Baldwin [General Secretary, 
AEU-CSI and Eric Hammond [General Secretary, EETPU] 
was crucial in achieving the new Agreement. At the 
meeting on 24 November 1976 Baldwin said that 'the 
unions had been waiting for the day when the clients 
became involved'. Following this, his dedication to 
the 'cause' never wavered .... Eric Hammond said 
the only way to restore authority was for all site 
matters to be determined nationally' .... it was a 
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revolutionary doctrine at the time and certainly went 
far beyond what had been recommended in the 1970 
report' (1989: 6). 
In 1976 when the negotiations were at an impasse it was the 
General Secretary of the AEU-CS, John Baldwin, who went, along 
with a NEDO of f icial , to see the Minister of State f or Employment 
in order to seek his assistance in reconvening negotiations. 
Also at the House of Commons Select Committee inquiry John 
Baldwin strongly expressed his advocacy of a comprehensive 
national agreement :- 
'I fully support those efforts to reform the 
industry's industrial relations despite being dismayed 
at the tecent lack of progress caused by 
prevarications between the clients and the employers' 
(1981: 644). 
Evidence on the attitude of the rank and file towards the 
national agreement clearly indicates that in no sense was the 
body of union members actively engaged in a campaign for a 
national agreement. At a negotiating group meeting in 1980 the 
union official for thermal insulation workers stated that he 
believed the proposals would need to be put to a 'national 
delegate conference who he felt would give an emphatic 'no''. 
This echoes the comment made by the boilermakers' national 
official at a 1978 negotiation meeting, as reported by an 
internal EEF note of the meeting, that 'there had never been any 
genuine enthusiasm from union members on site for a .... national 
agreement'. 
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The conflicting approaches towards the agreement of the rank and 
file and the national officials raise the question of how the 
national officials succeeded in securing the acceptance of the 
NAECI. The AEU-CS conference debates on the issue stressed the 
egalitarian aspects of a national agreement, spreading the gains 
made by the union members on the large sites to their colleagues 
on the smaller sites. In a sense the existence of more than one 
'rank and file' tended to blur the conflict between national 
officials and the members (see Gore, 1982 for a discussion of the 
existence of different 'rank and files'). Secondly, the union 
officials used methocis of bureaucratic manipulation. At the 
special AEU-CS 1981 conference called to endorse the NAECI the 
President portrayed the NAECI as an agreement which would 
strengthen the role of shop stewards :- 
'I would first like to dispel the rumours that we are 
here today to sell out or weaken the shop stewards and 
democracy of the union. Nothing could be further from 
the truth .... Here is an opportunity never afforded 
before in the history of our union for members to play 
a more significant part in the most important role of 
their trade union lives, the consultation and drawing 
up of their annual wages and conditions claim'. 
The true significance of the agreement for shop stewards and rank 
and file was that it would dramatically curtail their power and 
place them directly under the authority of the official union 
body. The (mis) representation of the agreement by the leadership 
was important because prior to this conference the union members 
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were unable to discuss the precise content of the agreement - at 
the conference the General Secretary was forced to say, 'I have 
a responsibility to answer the 64 dollar question that has been 
posed to the Executive and myself .... What we have not been in 
a position to do is to report to the membership and to the shop 
stewards the content of a new national agreement. Why? 1. The 
answer he gave to this question was that there was 'no other 
possible date other than today in my diary'. The conference 
passed the acceptance of NAECI with overwhelming support. 
No other union called a decision-making conference let alone put 
the issue to a membership vote. The boilermakers' union called 
a conference to inform the participants of the Executive decision 
to sign the agreement. The plumbing section of the EETPU had a 
consultative meeting for stewards after the national official had 
reported to the Executive and it was decided that the agreement 
should be signed. Seventy stewards were invited to attend but 
only twenty accepted the invitation. Of these twenty, only two 
supported the agreement. Some stewards attended the meeting with 
a mandate to oppose the agreement but were informed that union 
rules precluded the use of such mandates. It is also relevant 
to note that it was a deliberate policy of the national officials 
not to involve union members or shop stewards in the negotiating 
process until a complete package had been settled; a letter form 
an EETPU national official to area officials in 1980 read :- 
I we have made it clear to the employers that we would 
not be prepared to enter into consultations with our 
officials and shop stewards in the industry until such 
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time as we had the shape of the final package. My 
object in limiting the circulation of this document is 
because it is in the embryo stage and we cannot afford 
to have it quoted out of context'. 
In effect, this meant presenting the shop stewards with a fait 
accompli. 
The State 
Given the fragile nature of national institutions within the 
industry able to act upon interests coinciding with longer term 
economic development it was also crucial to the negotiating 
process to have an outside body also advocating the need for a 
national agreement. The state, through the neo-corporatist NEDO 
offices and through the actions of individual Ministers of State, 
was such an outside body. 
The NEDO offices played an important role in securing the 
national agreement. In a 1981 note, admittedly written by the 
NEDO offices, for the Director General of NEDO the negotiations 
are described as an 'EDC-led process' . Garf it also acknowledges 
the importance of the role of the state by blaming government. 
inaction for the lack of progress before 1976, and further notes, 
'it was also significant that Government interests 
continued, notwithstanding the changes of Government 
in 1979. Indeed, the new Secretary for Employment 
took a personal interest and he arranged for Dept. of 
Employment staff to be seconded to the National Joint 
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Council .... He also continued to give personal backing 
to Norman Singleton, the Chairman of the Provisional 
NJC' (1989: 9). 
In interviews, both a senior EEF official and Labour Secretary 
of State spoke of the importance of Ministerial 'pressures' upon 
the EEF to ensure that negotiations restarted, although both 
declined to clarify precisely the form of this 'pressure'. A 
private NEDO note of a conversation with the EEF official in 1979 
states that the official 'welcomed pressure on the EEF from 
Minister and Clients, that's the way to get firms to think 
again' . 
This consideration of the origins of the NAECI shows the central 
importance of the role of union officials, clients and the state. 
In relation to the discussion in the introductory section of the 
chapter it should be noted that managing contractors played an 
increasingly important role in pressing for the agreement as the 
decade wore on. Further, it should be stressed that the actions 
of none of the actors seems to have been significantly affected 
by the fall in demand at the beginning of the 1980s. A proviso 
here is that the confidence of the cabin in resisting the NAECI 
may have been affected by the fall in demand. 
8.3. Union Democracy - National Official Authority and 
Representative Democracy 
Mappinq the Changes 
318 
Whilst the 1960s and 1970s can be characterised as decades of 
cabin power the most appropriate description of union democracy 
in the 1980s is a decade of the assertion of the authority of the 
national official union structure. An explicit purpose of the 
NAECI was to ensure that 'the authority of the official 
leadership of the unions would be strengthened' (NEDO, 1970: 43). 
Thus, when the General Secretary of the AEU-CS stated at the 1977 
conference that 'what we have to do is to restore leadership and 
authority and negotiating ability back where it belongs and that 
is with the leaders of the unions' (also quoted in chapter 7.2. ), 
he was giving an accurate description of motivation of the main 
parties in the negotiating process leading to the NAECI. 
There were a number of ways in which the NAECI facilitated this 
shift in power relations in worker organisation. Most 
importantly it undermined the material basis of cabin power 
through its severe circumscribing of the issues about which 
negotiations could take place on site. Whereas prior to 1981 
shop stewards on large sites were often able to secure 
improvements on issues such as bonus level, abnormal condition 
payments, and the basic rate, perhaps through control over 
overtime and shiftwork availability, the 1981 agreement withdrew 
the legitimacy of site level negotiations on all of these issues. 
The authority to negotiate on these topics was placed solely in 
the hands of the national union officials sitting on the NJC. 
Even the supplementary project agreements which lay out specific 
issues such as the exact hours of work and times of union 
meetings which exist for nominated projects affords no 
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opportunity for a material basis for cabin power as these 
conditions are negotiated by the local FTOs prior to the 
workforce coming on site. The 1981 NAECI states that 'the terms 
of the Supplementary Project Agreement will be negotiated by the 
main contractors and .... the trade union official'(emphasis 
added). A 1981 letter from the NJC Director to contractors on 
Heysham 2 power station site explicitly states that the 
negotiations should be undertaken by FTOs and not stewards. All 
of the shop stewards interviewed on sites stated that the local 
FTO had not sought consultation on supplementary project 
agreement terms even with the local branches. The five local 
FTOs who were interviewed gave the same information. 
Further, the terms of the NAECI and the supplementary project 
agreements militate against FTOs and the shop stewards from 
attending the Project Joint Council meetings with a mandate from 
the cabin. The PJC meetings are held monthly, and usually later 
the same week a 'report back' meeting of FTOs to the rest of the 
shop stewards takes place. In the following week shop stewards 
'report back' to their individual cabins. There is, thus, 
approximately 3 weeks between a cabin meeting and the next PJC 
meeting. Further, the shop stewards who attend the PJC meetings 
do not see an agenda of the PJC until the day of the meeting. 
The timing of meetings and informational flow therefore serve to 
reinforce the authority of FTOs, and preclude negotiation based 
upon cabin mandate. The impact of these factors is highlighted 
by the reported demands in 1984 and 1985 by the union side on 
Heysham 2 power station PJC for a meeting of shop stewards prior 
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to the PJC meeting, and by the repeated rejection by the 
contractors. Of similar significance was the 1990 NJC decision 
to approve a project's supplementary project agreement subject 
to the shop steward/cabin report back meeting occurring after 
the FTO/shop steward report back. 
The reversal of the flow of authority is laid out in its barest 
terms in a 1983 letter from the NJC Director to a contractor on 
the Easington Gas project :- 'your telex states a decision agreed 
at PJC has been overruled at the report back meeting. The 
purpose of the report back meeting is to receive a report on what 
has already been agreed, and is not an extension of the 
negotiating process'. This example also indicates that 
challenges to the reversal of the flow of authority do occur. 
More dramatically, on a number of major projects through the 
decade shop steward committees have been formed in explicit 
defiance of the terms of the NAECI. Whilst there is therefore 
a degree of uncertainty in the nature of the power relations 
between the cabin and the local FTOs at site level the key point 
is that this ebb and flow is played out in a tightly 
circumscribed area. The NAECI denotes the PJC's main function 
as 'to operate and maintain the National Agreement, its 
procedures and the supplementary project agreement'. The role 
of the PJC as the local institution of enforcement of the NAECI 
has become more clearly defined throughout the decade such that 
at site D in 1990 the managing contractor could write to the 
local FTO concerning the shop steward's role on the PJC 'we 
will require a guarantee from the shop steward representatives 
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on the PJC that they will neither advocate or participate in any 
unofficial action and work within procedures in the future'. 
Evidence of the very real reversal of authority in worker 
organisation on large sites can be seen in a number of areas. 
In all of the records of the seven projects which were examined 
in detail a recurring complaint from the union side at PJC 
meetings is that there are too few issues on which 'domestic 
settlement' is possible. The shift in material basis for the key 
role of shop stewards and the cabin in the 1960s and 1970s has 
been such that there i-s evidence of the growing unwillingness of 
workers to become shop stewards, of the growing tendency of 
'spokesmen' to replace accredited shop stewards. This was 
recorded in PJC minutes at three of the four sites visited as a 
cause for concern. This should be interpreted not only as a 
reaction to the lack of power of shop stewards but also as a 
reaction against the tightly defined disciplinary role afforded 
shop stewards by the NAECI. It is noteworthy that two of the 
shop stewards who were interviewed became shop stewards under the 
insistence of the contractor's management. All of the management 
representatives interviewed expressed a preference for accredited 
stewaras over spokesmen. Accreditation can be seen as aiding the 
proc, ess of 'education' concerning the agreement. The importance 
of the role of the union as an institution in legitimising the 
process of socialisation into a disciplinary role is underlined 
in the worcjýs of the client industrial relations official at site 
A who had helped initiate a programme of shop steward training 
following 'a run of disputes' :- 'it is important to have PJC and 
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FTO involvement otherwise the stewards will 
brainwashing'. 
see it as 
The disintegrating worker organisation on site is contrasted with 
increased contractor organisation on site by a 1984 letter from 
a shop steward to the AEU-CS General Secretary concerning Torness 
power station :- 
have never in all my experience seen us so badly 
organised at shopfloor level with the older and more 
experienced men either too frightened or disillusioned 
to take over stewards' duties and the younger element 
too frightened of either victimisation or isolation to 
activate themselves. When you compare this to 
employers whom I have never seen better organised, 
with a site IR coordinator supported by on-site 
representatives of the EEF and pre-PJC meetings of all 
contractor site managers then I have some fears for 
our future'. 
Reinforcing changes to worker organisation which were connected 
with the introduction of the NAECI were changes in internal 
official union structures in the 1980s. The outcome of these 
changes was that the national officials' area of autonomy of 
action, action without reference to the membership, was 
considerably increased. Prior to the full merger with the AEU 
in 1984 the AEU-CS had a national biennial conference at which 
47 delegates attended and debated for a week , setting detailed 
terms for an Executive Council to follow. Also at the conference 
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the Executive had to report on its activities and this had to be 
approved by the conference. The Executive consisted of 8 lay 
members elected every 4 years by members in particular regions. 
The General Secretary and Assistant General Secretary were full 
time officials and were non-voting members of the Executive. 
After the merger, the AEU-CS was able to send 13 delegates to the 
annual national conference of the wider union. The practice so 
far has been for one or two motions to pertain directly to the 
ECI, voted on by representatives most of whom have little 
understanding of the industry. The previous Executive is now 
entitled a 'National Industrial Council' and is in a subservient 
position to the National Executive Council of the wider union. 
The General Secretary of the AEU-CS is the only member of the 
previous Executive to sit on the Executive of the wider union. 
The subservience of the National Industrial Council to the 
National Executive of the wider union as well as the increase in 
the area of autonomy for national union officials was 
demonstrated by the attempts in 1987 by the National Industrial 
Council to dismiss the General Secretary, an attempt which was 
blocked by the National Executive Committee. 
The key national negotiations undertaken by the national 
officials take place without any obligation of reference back to 
the membership or a delegate body of shop stewards. In 1981, 
coinciding with the signing of the NAECI the AEU-CS Executive 
supported the establishment of a multi-union national shop 
stewards' committee. The leadership claimed at the 1981 AEU-CS 
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special conference that this represented a breakthrough in 
democratic processes. However, the actual level of autonomy of 
action of the national officials from this body is underlined in 
the comments made by the union side of the NJC in the midst of 
the 1982 national negotiations to the effect that if the offer 
was not improved the officials would call a meeting of the 
national shop steward committee to reject the offer. Similarly 
the NJC minutes for 1984 report that the unions stated that they 
had reported the offer to an acrimonious meeting with shop 
stewards but that the national officers were prepared to accept 
the offer. The lack of power of this official shop steward and 
FTO body is underlined by reports of 'dwindling attendance' in 
interviews, by national officials, local FTOs and shop stewards. 
The shop steward at contractor A. f. described it as a 'kangaroo 
court', while a shop steward at contractor C. d. described it as 
'a waste of time'. 
This sets the context in which to understand the deep resentment 
at the nature of union government expressed by the twelve workers 
who attended an induction presentation at site D at which the 
author was present as observer. A welder spoke of the present 
'cosy little union-management relationship' and contrasted this 
with the mass meetings held every year at the town hall in 
Grangemouth in the early 1970s in reference to national 
negotiations. The existence of these meetings is confirmed by 
the records on the Grangemouth site held at the Modern Records 
Centre, Warwick. The coordinator of the induction presentation 
confirmed that this was a typical reaction to discussions of 
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NAECI and union government. 
When the impact of unions on economic performance in the 1980s 
is assessed it is important not to make the mistake of making 
simple conclusions from contrasting the effect of cabin power in 
the 1960s and 1970s against the effect of increased authority of 
national officials. This would be to abstract issues of worker 
organisation from the wider social relations of the industry and 
ignore the concept of mutually dependent hierarchies across the 
commercial and labour relations arenas which was introduced in 
the previous chapter. 
The 1970 NEDO report propounded its concept of the national 
agreement as an institution to engender 'the orderly expression 
of the power structure in the industry' (p. 59) by stating that 
a national agreement was required because the authority of the 
official union leadership would be strengthened' and also because 
'it would permit contractors' estimates to be made with greater 
accuracy, so reducing the uncertainty over construction costs 
which undermines present c1 ient -contractor relationships' (p. 43). 
Whist the nature of the symbiotic relationship between the 
commercial and labour relations hierarchies is such that direct 
surface-level connections are unlikely to be easily visible there 
are nevertheless a number of specific examples of official union 
authority being dependent upon a strong willingness by the client 
or managing contractor to pursue a line of action, perhaps 
against opposition from the contractors. In 1987 at a project 
there was widespread shopf loor opposition to the introduction of 
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shif twork to catch up delay. The General Secretary of the AEU-CS 
suggested calling a mass meeting and offered to address the 
meeting, seeking to overturn the opposition. However, he first 
of all demanded a 'concrete assurance of client support' before 
addressing the meeting. Similarly, the union leadership's 
involvement in the negotiating process for the national agreement 
was dependent upon strong client involvement. In the sense that 
the FTO-cabin relationship is dependent upon the stable hierarchy 
of the contractor subordinate to the managing contractor /c 1 ient, 
this points to the important role of the rise of managing 
contractors and their strategy of passing on risk in contributing 
to the change in this aspect of labour relations. 
The role of the recession on union government is more indirect. 
The fall in employment and demand in the industry in the decade 
provided a backdrop both to the ability to impose the NAECI 
successfully, and to the ability of managing contractors to 
'succeed' in their strategy. It can be argued that this backdrop 
was more important in the latter case than the former. The 
importance of the recession on capital relations was stressed in 
the discussion in chapter 6 of the increased 'willingness' of 
smaller contractors to be squeezed when work is scarce. The 
impact of the recession upon the 'successful' imposition of the 
NAECI and the reversal of the flow of authority is likely to have 
been more muted. The state of the external industry labour 
market will not have a direct impact on labour relations on site 
in the sense of directly lowering cabin power. Once employed on 
site the potential for the cabin's power derives from two key 
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elements - the fact that there are considerable costs to the 
client or the contractor of delay - once started, construction 
will not be halted, capital has sunk costs; and the ability of 
the union organisation to prevent replacement labour being 
drafted in a situation where a cabin in dispute has been sacked. 
The characteristic of high sunk costs is a permanent feature of 
large site ECI work, and, with the very rare exception such as 
at the Isle of Grain and the position of the laggers, no such 
replacement was undertaken or attempted. There is, therefore, 
a degree of 'insulation' of the site form the external industry 
labour market. This insulation will not be absolute, however, 
in that the 'confidence' of the cabin is likely to be informed 
by the nature of the external labour market. This discussion of 
the role of the recession on the changes in worker organisation 
suggests that the authority of the official union structure is 
not centrally dependent on a low level of demand. 
This, of course, is not to say that such a structure of power 
relations should be regarded as necessarily permanent. As Hyman 
(1983: 61) has pointed out, unions should not be reified, the 
potential for a reassertion of cabin power continues to exist in 
other elements of the material context. 
Material Context and Interest Definition 
The shift in the locus of power from the cabin to the national 
officials is significant for the purposes of this thesis in that 
the material context informing the interests underlying union 
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action are different. Chapter 7 argued that in the 1960s and 
1970s a material context of the casual nature of employment, of 
the inefficient organisation of production, and of the buoyant 
labour market informed a militant anti-employer, short-term 
definition of interests which embraced both issues of economism 
and work control. 
The first significant difference in the material contexts of the 
two periods was in the nature of the labour market in the 
industry. Chapter 7 provided evidence of the severe slump in 
demand and in employment levels in the industry in the 1980s. 
This meant that there was a corresponding reduction in membership 
levels in the unions which national union officials will perceive 
as a negative development given their bureaucratic 
responsibilities of sustaining the viability of the union 
structure itself. This concern was manifest in the words of the 
General Secretary of the AEU-CS at the 1981 special national 
conference called to endorse the NAECI :- 'if the industry dies, 
the union dies'. 
Further, their position within the permanent union structure (in 
contrast to the casual, short-term site-based position of the 
cabin) allows the national officials to develop strategies of a 
longer term perspective. 
An additional important difference is that the national officials 
are less likely to be militant on issues concerning work control. 
Price (1980) highlights that the greater emphasis on economistic 
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bargaining of union officials is based partly on their position 
away from the concrete issues of control which derive from the 
differentiation between labour and labour power and which forms 
the key material context for the life of the worker eight hours 
a day,, f ive days a week - what Price terms, removing 'all 
decision-making away from the workplace and into the formal and 
neutral procedures' (p. 190). It is also based on the economism 
that is implicit in formalised bargaining and dispute procedures 
- 'it was the business of this new system to translate control 
aspirations into pounds, shillings and pence' (1980: 151). 
Chapter 7 pointed out that in the period of cabin power, issues 
of economism and work control could co-exist through the ultimate 
ability of the cabin at the point of production to resist any 
half-hearted attacks by management on areas of their control, 
regardless of what was stated at the negotiating table. The 
tacit acceptance of this by union officials in the 1960s and 
1970s was absent in the 1980s - what was agreed at the bargaining 
table was to be enforced on site. 
The position of national officials with a strong interest in 
ensuring high employment levels in the industry makes them 
possible 'bearers of industrial -regeneration' (Higgins,, 1987). 
This is because an interest in high employment levels in the 
period can be translated as an interest \in improved economic 
performance of projects against schedule in order to attract the 
siting of marginal capital projects in the UK. Thus,, the General 
Secretary of the AEU-CS wrote in 1981 that 
'unlike the CEGB and the other nationalised industries 
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who have little option but to build their plants in 
the United Kingdom all the industry's other clients 
are predominantly the multi-national oil and chemical 
giants who are 'footloose' in the sense that they can 
select sites from a number of different countries. 
You may be sure that no Texas oil man feels any 
obligation whatsoever to provide work for the British 
construction industry if he can get his plants built 
more quickly and cheaply elsewhere. It is already 
established that on the basis of investment decisions 
already taken the industry is to lose 20% of its jobs 
in the next two years and at least one international 
oil company has said that it will never build in 
Britain again. The only way to reverse this situation 
is to make the industry more efficient and more 
reliable' (NEDO, 1981: ii). 
It is also significant that the client project manager at site 
C stated in interview that at a recent meeting with the NJC, the 
Chair of the unions side had vehemently said that 'we are more 
determined to get this project in on time than you are'. 
Given that contractors act upon an interest in profit rather than 
hitting schedules, and given that clients tend to have an 
interest in securing their own schedule without regard for the 
longer term regeneration of the industry, national union 
officials can be seen to be in a unique position within the 
industry in terms of the interests underlying their practices. 
They are the sole key actors whose structural position serves to 
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define interests with an emphasis of ensuring longer term 
improvements in performance against schedule. 
This is not to say that their practices necessarily had this 
effect in the 1980s. In particular it is relevant to note that 
Streeck's (1987) argument concerning unions as a 'strategic 
contingency' forcing management into organising better economic 
performance does not depend upon unions defining their interests 
as exactly similar to those which promote the competitiveness of 
the industry. Streeck's analysis embraces concerns over the 
differences between apparent and hidden effects, between the 
short-term and long-term effects, needed to stimulate better 
performance. Rather, the force of the above is to pose a key 
question to be examined in this chapter - namely, if and how the 
practices of national officials served to improve performance 
against schedule, both directly and through their impact on 
capital relations. 
8.4. Strikes 
Strike statistics were not centrally and systematically recorded 
by the NJC. However, checking individual project record files 
at the NJC offices it was possible to compile strike statistics 
for most of the nominated projects. There was an average of 0- 9% 
of hours lost to strikes on the 18 projects for which data were 
available. This statistic does not take into account the labour 
force level on the different projects. The project with the 
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highest percentage recorded a loss of 2.5%, whist the lowest 
recorded 0.02%. Given that all of the projects were subject to 
a common form of auditing as prescribed by the NAECI it is likely 
that a common form of calculation was used on all the projects 
to achieve the individual project statistics. 
This average of 0.9% stands in contrast to the average hours lost 
to strikes on CEGB sites in the 1970s (1970-80) of 3.52% (see 
Table 7.1. ). This of course is not a direct comparison of 
equivalents given that the figure for the 1980s covers mainly 
non-power station projects. The two nominated CEGB projects 
completed in the 1980s lost 1.46% and 1.84% of hours to strikes. 
They were the projects with the second and third largest 
percentage of hours lost. 
The average time lost on the non-power station nominated projects 
in the 1980s was 0.81%. It will be recalled that no systematic 
strike statistics existed for non-power station projects in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
The above figures suggest that there has been a substantial fall 
in the level of strikes from the. 1970s to the 1980s in the ECI, 
although the industry continues to be relatively strike-prone. 
Based on the detailed examination of the records of seven 
projects, on the on-site research at four sites, and on the 
examination of the minutes and papers of NJC meetings throughout 
the decade it is appropriate to state that the strike was the 
main form of conflict in this period. The records contain only 
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one discussion of a go-slow or work-to-rule. Chapter 7 provided 
evidence that go-slows were occasionally deployed in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Further, there is no instance of the NJC discussing 
a strike which lasted longer than a 12 day one at Heysham 2. 
This is significant in terms of its impact on progress against 
schedule because a longer strike is more likely to have knock-on 
effects on the work of other contractors and is much harder to 
speedily make up. All but one of the strikes on nominated 
projects were unofficial. This represents only a slight change 
from the previous decades. 
What were the reasons for this fall in the level of strikes? The 
NAECI played an important role in that it promoted a more active 
policing role by the official union structure. Also, it 
increased the flow of information concerning strikes and this had 
an important impact on the meaning of strikE)s in terms of 
political economy. 
There was an increase in the level of activity of the official 
union structure in policing and disciplining unofficial strike 
action. For instance in 1982 a client official at Sellafield 
wrote to the General Secretary of the AEU-CS detailing the level 
of disputes on the project and it was the national union 
official, rather than a contractor representative, who raised the 
issue at an NJC meeting seeking corrective actýon. Similarly, 
in the one instance of a discussion of go-slow the NJC minutes 
show that the General Secretary of the AEU-CS stated that he had 
been advised of a restriction of output at a particular 
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contractor at Drax power station, and that he had arranged for 
an emergency PJC meeting to be called to deal with the matter. 
The increased flow of information surrounding strikes that the 
PJC meetings create serves to undermine a contractor's ability 
to divert the blame for poor progress to the labour force. The 
most obvious manifestation of this came at the project which was 
discussed in chapter 7 when the NJC set up an expert committee 
to examine the contractor's claims that the workforce were 
deliberately limiting production levels. It is highly likely 
that the contractor's ability to use the argument of labour 
militancy to re-negotiate terms was somewhat undermined by the 
findings of the committee that there was no evidence of any 
restriction of output. This is the basis on which to understand 
the report of the project given at a NJC meeting :- '(the client) 
believes a certain major contractor is not supportive of the NJC 
and is prepared to isolate the site from the NJC. That 
contractor, according to (the client) has avoided positive NJC 
involvement in order to enhance their commercial arrangements'. 
Whilst the appointment of an expert committee in this instance 
was an extreme example of the increased flow of information 
surrounding disputes, the forum of PJCs and the lengthy 
discussions surrounding the more protracted strikes also are part 
of this process. 
The role played by the rise of managing contractors and the 
consequent fall in opportunism in causing the fall in the level 
of strikes is also difficult to pin down. Analysis, however, 
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suggests that this is also likely to be important. The 
opportunistic practices of contractors were an important element 
in the material context which informed the labour militancy of 
the 1960s and 1970s. The curbing (not the elimination) of 
opportunistic practices in the 1980s necessarily impacted on the 
material context of militancy in the 1980s. 
A possible way to examine the role of the recession on the fall 
on the strike level is to compare the change in the ECI to the 
change in the rest of the economy. If change in the ECI is 
similar to the economy-wide change the support for the argument 
that the recession had the key impact will be strengthened. 
For the whole economy (and without excluding any major disputes) , 
the average number of days lost per 1,000 employees in 1970-80 
was 12,788. For 1981-89 this f igure is 6,680 (based on 
Employment Gazette, July, 1990: 337). Therefore, in the whole 
economy, strikes levels approximately halved between the two 
periods, whilst the ECI strike statistics indicate a drop of 
around 75% (comparing CEGB 1970-80 average of 3.52% against the 
average of 0.9% for the 18 projects subsequent to 1981). This 
perhaps suggests both the importance of the wider labour market 
as well as the salience of factors above and beyond the 
recession. 
The fall in the level of strikes and use of go-slows in the 1980s 
is such that their direct negative impact on progress against 
schedule had significantly decreased. Chapter 7 argued that the 
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important impact of strikes on performance in the 1960s and 1970s 
was through their use and meaning in client-contractor relations, 
such that conti. actors used laboui militancy as a Justification 
to demand reimbursable contracts, to resist tighter commercial 
control . to def lect blame . and to re-negot i ate contractual terms - 
Tt will be recalled that direct evidence on contractors using 
strikes this way will be dif-ficu-it to find, The words of the 
industrial relations officer of the managing contractor at site 
D that 'a better industrial relations climate means that clients 
are more able to control contractors', suggests that once 
disruptions to Production through labour militancy falls below 
a certain level it becomes more and more difficult for 
contractors to attempt to take advantage of such disruption in 
their commercial relationship with the client or managing 
contractor. In other words, a form of virtuous circle emerges- 
Further, the increased flow of information concerning strikes 
made it more difficult for contractors to use militancy in their 
attempts to avoid commercial control by the client/managing 
contractor. 
This discussion of strikes in the 1980s has indicated that the 
direct negative impact of cabin militancy on performance has 
slanificantly decreased. In the more important arena of its use 
and meanin-g in the sphere of client-contrac. tor relations there 
is good reason to believe that the fall in the 1, evel of strikes 
and the increased flow of information which derive from NAECI 
structures have had the effect of severely limiting the ability 
of contractors to divert blame. for poor progress on to the labour 
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orce. 
8.5. Incentive Bonus Schemes and Differentials 
The point was made in the discussion of incentive bonus schemes 
in chapter 7 that contractors tended to use the bonus scheme as 
the key element in their labour control strategy. However, not 
only did they lack the managerial expertise to run an efficient 
scheme but also their commercial strategy of seeking to generate 
additional payments through the practices outlined in chapter 5 
undermined their labour control strategy. The point was also 
made that attempts by clients to audit and control bonus schemes 
served a dual purpose of tightening control over the contractor 
commercially and in relation to labour management. 
A cornerstone of the NAECI is the condition that, if a bonus 
scheme is to be used, a uniform site-wide audited scheme must be 
run by contractors. The NAECI states that for an incentive 
scheme to be operated a number of requirements must be f ulf illed. 
These requirements are that :- 'Where incentive schemes are 
operated there shall be a common nationally agreed cost factor, 
payment table, which shall be determined by the NJC and shall 
establish the hourly bonus payment'. In addition NAECI has a 
provision such that 'the NJC will have an obligation to 
investigate all instances in which bonus payment levels on 
nominated projects either fall below that associated with a cost 
factor of 1.20 or rise above that associated with a cost factor 
338 
of 0.55' . Crucially these words are 
backed by the provision for 
compulsory independent auditing of the incentive schemes. 
Examination of the monthly audit reports is a major section of 
the agenda of every PJC meeting. 
The NAECI, therefore, sets constraints for the operation of bonus 
schemes, constraints upon contractor behaviour which did not 
generally exist prior to 1981. Further, the imposition of 
uniformity of earnings (apart from small bonus variations) and 
the independent auditing of earnings meant that the immediate 
cause of leapfrogging bargaining was removed. Despite these 
constraints, disputes over bonus continue to be a major 
manifestation of' the (reduced) labour militancy of the 1980s. 
Systematic data on the cause of disputes are rare in the project 
records held at the NJC offices. However, data do exist for 
Heysham 2 nuclear power station, and for Sellafield 
chemical/nuclear reprocessing plant. Here, management compiled 
causes for each dispute and these reports were part of the PJC 
agenda at each meeting. These figures reveal that bonus issues 
continued to be an important cause of strikes in the 1980s. 
This can be understood when it is recalled that chapters 5 and 
6 showed that although opportunism had fallen it was still a 
common practice, and extras still constituted a key prof it locus 
for contractors. Therefore, the material context of militancy 
on bonus issues in the 1960s and 1970s, of a contradiction 
between the commercial strategy of contractors and the labour 
control strategy of contractors, still existed, albeit in a less 
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severe form than in the earlier decades. This meant that bonus 
levels often continued to be unrelated to production levels, and 
therefore continued to form a clear focus for (reduced) cabin 
power. 
Within much more tightly circumscribed limits than existed in the 
previous decades, manipulation of the bonus scheme still occurred 
as did the clash with the contractors' commercial strategy. The 
manager at contractor C. i. stated that the bonus had been kept 
'artificially high for a while' following a series of disputes 
over previous low bonus yields which had been related to 
'problems with material supply and late detailed drawings'. It 
is also relevant to note that this is the contractor whose 
management boasted that 'our backroom boys are exploiting every 
avenue', i. e. this is a contractor whose commercial strategy 
emphasised the generation of additional payments from the client. 
It was this commercial strategy as well as design and delivery 
problems which undermined the strategy of labour control though 
the bonus scheme. 
The project manager at contractor C. f. stated that the stewards 
had come to him and demanded a bonus yield of : E2.20 whilst a 
large crane was on site, this crane having been hired for a 
limited period. The manager stated that he had replied that he 
would give 'favourable norms if things went OK for this period' . 
The manager at contractor C. d. hit a common note when he stated 
that 'walk-outs over bonus still occur. After a testing period 
You find out a norm and you find ways of meeting that norm' . It 
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is also significant that the NJC powers of investigation at the 
lower and upper limits of payment levels have never been invoked, 
because contractors have never breached these limits. 
The more tightly circumscribed nature of this use of the bonus 
scheme is highlighted by the discussion at a PJC meeting at site 
C concerning the bonus payments made by a contractor. The 
auditor's report highlighted irregularities in the calculation 
of the bonus payments. The PJC asked the contractor to explain 
this situation at the following meeting. 
The relevance for economic performance of the NAECI provisions 
on ensuring uniformity of earnings through independent auditing 
stretches wider than simply their impact on labour militancy. 
The auditing provision prevents the use of other payments 'to buy 
peace ' and the use of other payments to increase earnings in the 
short term as part of a labour control strategy. In addition, 
the audit form supplies the client with complete information 
about the amount of money which the contractor uses on labour 
costs, and therefore also allows the client to Pee how much of 
the tender price and extras is retained by the contractor for 
non-labour costs. This increased flow of information available 
to the client implies a greater opportunity for tighter 
commercial control. 
Expressed in these terms it is apparent that it could be in the 
short-term interests of the workforce and contractors on a site 
to seek to avoid the auditing provisions of the NAECI. The 
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auditing provision applies only to nominated projects, and not 
to non-nominated projects. Although the NAECI states nomination 
is decided upon by the NJC, the de facto situation is that the 
client has the power of veto. In this regard it is relevant that 
the client will consult with the contractors hired for the 
project whether nomination should occur. This allows us to 
understand the comments made by the NJC Director at a 1989 NJC 
meeting concerning a large non-nominated project. The minutes 
of the meeting report that the NJC Director stated that 'months 
had been added to the schedule and he suspected that the absence 
of appropriate contact with the NJC may well have occurred 
because both employers and workforce had in their different ways 
been exploiting an inexperienced client'. 
It is not only contractors who are tempted to increase earnings 
in the short term as part of a labour control strategy and as 
part of a process of acceleration, but also clients, as is shown 
in a 1984 letter from a client to the NJC Director concerning two 
projects which had suffered from delays :- 
'The national agreement prevents clients taking 
measures that, albeit may be costly, would ensure we 
achieve our objectives .... I agree that the procedures 
and machinery .... are in the best 
intereits of the 
industry nationally. However, that does not 
necessarily satisfy local or individual clients' 
interests .... Better management would 
improve the 
situation but without incentives and pIrticularly 
without a commitment to the national agrepment, the 
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men's attitudes and hence productivity will not 
improve' (also quoted in part in section 2 above). 
The examination of the effect of the NAECI bonus provisions on 
economic performance must also embrace issues beyond the 
immediate impact on labour militancy. In particular, have the 
NAECI provisions forced management into running better schemes? 
This possibility is suggested by the argument put forward by the 
General Secretary of the AEU-CS at the 1981 national conference 
called to endorse the NAECI that contractors 'are going to be 
trained to manage, and if it is necessary I will train them to 
manage .... If it means a trade unionist has got to educate 
management so be it' . Further, two contractors (A. e. and C. h. ), 
in interview, argued that the 'PJC/NJC limits and regulations on 
bonus schemes forces management to run a better scheme' 
(contractor A. e. ). 
However, against this, the evidence discussed earlier on the 
continuing manipulation of bonus schemes with payment often at 
levels unrelated to production levels, and the evidence in 
chapter 6.11. on a leading contractor's continuing lack of 
precise measuring of work undertaken suggests that there has not 
been a major change. 
It is legitimate to argue that whilst the NAECI provisions on 
bonus schemes have narrowed the scope for manipulation of the 
bonus scheme,; contractors' continued emphasis on extras as a key 
prof it locus and the remaining cabin power have meant that it is 
343 
unlikely that there has been a major improvement in the design 
and operation of bonus schemes. 
The sum of this discussion of changes in incentive bonus schemes 
and differentials in the 1980s is that tighter limits, auditing, 
and the reduction in opportunistic practices have contributed to 
a fall on militancy on the issue. This fall in militancy will 
have impacted positively on performance against schedule both 
directly and indirectly through the increasing inability of 
contractors to blame militancy for delays, thereby evading 
commercial control. Besides this fall in militancy the NAECI 
provisions directly provide the managing contractor with greater 
information on the financial operation of contractors, thereby 
implying greater commercial control. However, it is unlikely 
that the NAECI provisions led to a substantial change in the use 
and quality of design and operation of bonus schemes. 
8.6. Overtime. Shiftwork and Mannin 
Chapter 7 argued that an important reason for the chronic 
schedule delays of the period was the inability of projects to 
make up delays; rather, delays tended to compound themselves. 
The role of labour relations in this was examined in relation to 
overtime, shiftwork and manning and it was argued that the key 
feature of the period was the lack of serious attempt to 
introduce shiftworking to catch up delay. This was related to 
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the commercial strategy of contractors. This section examines 
the role of overtime, shiftwork and manning in the substantial 
relative improvements in the 1980s. 
Overtime 
Overtime in the 1960s and 1970s was rarely used in order to 
catch up delays, rather its primary functions were ones of 
attracting labour in periods of a buoyant labour market and of 
serving to increase earnings as part of a labour control 
strategy. The essential picture of overtime in 1980s is that 
initially it was severely limited such that it was available on 
occasion for contractors to make up delays in 'emergency' 
situations. As the decade wore on and as the labour market 
tightened it once again came to be used as an 'earnings 
regulator', in the words of a national union official at a 1989 
NJC meeting. 
The provisions of the NAECI state that 'the NJC believes that 
regular overtime is not in the Industry's interests .... However, 
there are occasions where the work pattern of a particular 
project may require systematic overtime working which shall be 
allowed .... Any overtime .... shall not normally exceed 30 hours 
in any consecutive 4 week period with not more than 2 Sundays 
worked in each 4. When overtime in excess of these levels js 
anticipated then prior application for approval shall be made to 
the NJC''. What occurred in practice, in the words of the NJC 
Secretary at a 1988 NJC meeting, was that 'PJCs were responsible 
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for co-ordination and control of overtime application unless 
overtime in excess of 30 hours or systematic overtime was 
required'. Overtime approval became a regular item on PJC 
agendas and any overtime to be worked had to be applied for in 
advance to the PJC, In addition the PJC ins. pected the audit 
forms which showed the amount of overtime worked, 
The initial impact of these provisions was a strong curtailment 
in the amount of overtime worked. Whilst in 1981, British 
Nuclear Fuels could say to the NJC that contractors were working 
'more hours than desirable' . the situation had changed such that 
1982 the PiC at the same project could feel able to refusse -a 
contractor's application for overtime hecalislýý there was 
insufficient evid rc , n(-v requirement. or it- A enc e- -0 
fthe e- m en ýf e- ---ý 
gradual -loosening off control occurred. so that 
by on the 
same project the union side of thp PTC 'Pxr)rp.. c;. c; p. cl thp. vip. w that 
BNFL were increasing their overtime requests for allegedly urgent 
work an (I st at ed t-., h, -: 3 
t there wia sa danger of --, iic. h requests 
becomi-na, 'routine'. In 1987 the PJC expressed grave concern 
the overtime growth. and in IqRq tbý- NJC Director stated at an 
NJC meeting that the NiC -h-a-d- 
to '-face that virtually a-1111 ma--jor 
nroiects were now working considerable overtime. ' 
The. curtailment of overtime in the early years of the NAECT had 
a number of effects relevant to economic performance. Firstly, 
it allowed for an easier introduction of shiftwork in the sense 
that it lowered workforces resistance to sh-i-ft--w(--)rk in that 
shiftwork no longer represented an attack on the opportunity for 
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overtime and the ability of workers to regulate their earnings 
and hours through absenteeism and overtime - Further, contractors 
could no longer use the argument of labour force resistance to 
justify the lack of shiftworking, an organisation of production 
which, as chapter 7 showed, contractors were reluctant to 
introduce. Secondly, given that overtime was no longer an 
earnings regulator it was now available to be used for the 
purposes of increasing production in order to catch up delay. 
Reliable evidence for this is difficult to establish in that part 
of the movement towards the use of overtime as an earnings 
regulator was clouded by contractors (and clients) using the 
language of emergency and delayed schedule in order to justify 
their use of overtime. It is, therefore., hard to judge the 
claims of, for instance, the client's presentation at a 1987 PJC 
that the project was 2% behind schedule and that therefore 
weekend overtime was to be started. It does, however, appear 
legitimate to argue that in the context of the curtailment of 
overtime in the earlier years of the NAECI overtime was available 
for catching up delays, and was occasionally used for this 
purpose. Further, the ability of the cabin to enforce an embargo 
on overtime, which was a tactic of the 1970s, was severely 
limited by the reversal in the flow of authority which occurred 
in this period. For instance, the overtime ban imposed on a 1983 
pro3ect was soon ended through a combination of the local FTO 
pressuring the workers and through the threat and ability of the 
contractor to speedily push the issue through the dispute 
procedure to the national level. 
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To understand the relationship between overtime and performance 
against schedule it is also necessary to examine how the use and 
meaning of overtime between the early 1980s and the end of the 
decade changed. The key reason relates to the changes in the 
levels of demand and the labour market in the industry. The 
industrial relations off icer of the client at site B stated that 
systematic overtime was being used because of the need to recruit 
labour against the competition from nearby site D and other 
projects. In 1990 the union side stated at a NJC meeting that 
high overtime was being used to attract labour, with the project 
at St. Fergus working 2 hours more per week than the project at 
Mossmorran. This must be related not only to increases in 
investment in the industry but also to the inability of the 
industry to reproduce the skill levels of the workforce. 
Further, the move towards unrestricted overtime highlights the 
limitations of the power of the national level institutions. A 
contractor official at a 1990 NJC meeting stated that 'the facts 
were that the NJC simply did not have the power to dictate that 
overtime should not exceed a certain level. If applications for 
dispensations were not granted the flow of applications would 
simply dry up' .A greater control of overtime was only possible 
in the earlier part of the decade because of the conjunctural 
opposition of local FTOs to the use of overtime based on high 
unemployment among members. The FTOs on the Easington project 
stressed at a 1983 PJC meeting the need to limit overtime 
because of the very high levels of unemployment. As the level 
of unemployment in the industry fell the local FTOs felt less 
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able to constrain the demands of the workforce and some clients 
to work more and more overtime. 
Such a change in the use and meaning of overtime impacts 
negatively upon performance against schedule. Firstly, overtime 
can no longer be used to catch up schedule delays. More 
importantly, it may endanger the use of (the more effective) 
shiftwork. This has occurred not only due to labour force 
resistance but also due to contractors using the argument of 
labour force resistance as part of a commercial strategy of 
resisting client control. This is established in the discussion 
immediately below of shiftwork in the 1980s. 
Shiftwork 
Shiftwork was rarely used to catch up delays in the 1960s and 
1970s. This was due to the resistance of the cabin and the 
resistance of the contractors. The resistance of the contractors 
was related to both the practices associated with their 
commercial strategy and the low level of managerial skills in 
relation to the organisation of production. 
In the 1980s shiftwork was used extensively. Given that there 
was a considerable improvement in performance against schedule 
it is likely that shiftwork was also used successfully to catch 
up delays. A 1983 paper on double day shifting written by the 
NJC office stated that it had been operated very successfully at 
Drax power station :- 'despite significant delays to the 
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commencement of mechanical and electrical construction, the 
commissioning of the first unit is still on programme for 
completion on the original project dates - an achievement that 
would not have been possible without double day shifting'. 
Shiftwork has also been used extensively to shorten schedule 
lengths. The increasing reliability of the availability of 
shiftwork has allowed clients and managing contractors to build 
it into their schedule planning. British Steel's blast furnace 
pr03ect at Redcar and the ICI Wilton project operated rolling 
24-hour shift systems. These projects had their particular forms 
of shiftwork written into the supplementary project agreements 
negotiated with local FTOs often under strict guidance from the 
national officials, and signed before the arrival of the 
workforce on site. 
The NAECI and the national officials had a key role in not only 
breaking down the resistance of the labour force but also 
breaking down that of contractors. The NAECI provisions state 
that 'all employees are engaged on the basis that they will 
undertake double day shifts or three shift working, rotational 
day shift or night shift working, in accordance with this 
agreement'. The opposition of the workforce and the manner in 
which the NAECI served to channel this opposition away from 
manifesting itself in the form of an embargo on shiftworking is 
described succinctly in the 1983 NJC paper on double day 
shiftworking': - 
I virtually no time has been lost through shif tworking- 
350 
related disputes .... unfortunately this does not 
signify that double day shiftworking is without 
problems as there have been a number of references 
into the dispute procedure. These have been related 
to prescribed shiftworking hours and rotation periods 
but tend to signify a general resistance to the 
concept by the employees concerned'. 
The existence of the NAECI and the altered power relations within 
worker organisation allowed a resistance to shiftwork to be 
channelled through specific grievances about the details of the 
implementation of the shiftwork. 
This lack of an outright embargo from the workforce meant that 
contractors could no longer use the argument of potential labour 
force resistance to justify their own reluctance to undertake 
shif twork. In an action which set an important precedent for the 
decade the NJC and the national union officials played an 
important role in supporting the CEGB at Heysham 2 in its 
determination to make a contractor and the contractor's workforce 
operate on double day shifts. The minutes of a 1982 NJC meeting 
highlight this in that the NJC criticised the contractor for 
'offering to the workforce overtime on Sundays as an alternative 
to double day shiftwork' which had been embargoed by the cabin. 
In an interview with a management official employed by the 
contractor employed at Heysham 2 in 1982, the management official 
stated that the CEGB pushed the managing contractor to push the 
contractor to operate double day shifts. The contractor had 
entered the tender bid without an expectation of working double 
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day shifts and was 'uncomfortable commercially' about being 
pressured into this form of shift operation. The importance of 
the contractor's commercial strategy in their resistance to 
undertake double day shiftworking is also strongly implied by 
Morris and Hough in their description of this instance :- 
'shortly afterwards, [the contractor] introduced double day 
shiftworking .... this met with resistance from the workforce. 
Poor productivity was compounded by an under-estimation of the 
work required to be done and by under-resourcing' (1987: 26/7). 
In effect, this is implying that the contractor underbid. The 
action of the AEU-CS General Secretary in writing to the local 
FTO stressing that whilst the issue was going through procedure 
it was the right of management to introduce shiftwork ensured 
that the contractor could not successfully use the argument of 
labour force resistance to justify failing to introduce the 
shiftwork. 
The change in the use of overtime in the decade and the 
tightening of the labour market has meant, however, that 
contractors are increasingly once more able to use arguments 
concerning labour in order to enhance their commercial 
arrangements with clients. In interviews, two client industrial 
relations officials at site A stated that the managing contractor 
on a sub-project seeking to 'rush the job' insisted that their 
main contractors work extensive weekend overtime. On the main 
pro3ect the contractors argued with the client that because of 
this they were coming under pressure to do away with double day 
shifting (introduced in 1990 in order to catch up delays). The 
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client officials stated that some contractors wanted to cease 
working double day shifts in order to improve their position 
commercially in that they could argue that the continued delay 
against schedule was due to the labour force militancy rather 
than due to any failing of their own. The client believed that 
the schedule of the main project needed double day shiftworking. 
Rather than acquiescing, the client pressured the managing 
contractor on the sub-project to control the use of overtime. 
A similar though less clear-cut scenario was played out on site 
C. This project was planned with the predominant use of double 
day shiftwork on the mechanical and electrical engineering 
section of the project, i. e. on the section of the work covered 
by the NAECI. However, as the labour market in this area of the 
country tightened, the bonus earnings of the workers operating 
under the civil engineering working rule agreement grew 
substantially. This led to the ECI contractors at a PJC meeting 
proposing to relinquish double day shifts 'because of the need 
to match civil earningsI. The union side agreed with this 
proposal. At a subsequent meeting between the NJC, the client 
and the joint chairs of the PJC the only dissent to the proposed 
abandonment came from the national union officials who argued 
that overtime led to absenteeism and low productivity. 
Ultimately, the NJC endorsed the proposed change from shiftwork 
to a working week encompassing 10 hours overtime to give higher 
earnings. That contractors could stand to benefit commercially 
from such a change is indicated by the minutes of a PJC meeting 
in which the contractors' side is reported as stating that, 'if 
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the working pattern was changed without full client support and 
things went wrong, the consequence for contractors would bp 
serious', This is in effect creating a jtistification, has-ed on 
fault outside of the contractors' control, for failure to meet 
a t-ps Tta1 .q c) noteworthy th at it W, 9 the. 
contractors who first raised the proposal to drop shiftwork, 
Manning 
In relation to manning, chapter 7 argued that; given shiftwork 
and overtime were not availlable to catcb up della. y-s, overmanning 
was the inevitable consequence of the inevitable instructions to 
accelerate on the 1960s,: and 1970s combined w-it---'h- the 1 a-(--. k of 
emphasis of contractors on productive efficiency. Tn the 1980s 
overtime was available in the early years and shiftwork was 
availlable throughout. It iis thus to 
be expected that nvp. rmannina 
should correspondingly have been much less prevalent iin t-his 
per i od -13 im -i 
larl v the sh -i -f t -f r om the -1 -9 
70s re i mhu r sab le 
rontracts. to the fixed fee approach and the stintegy of passing 
on risk in the 1980s. as described in chapters 5 and 6- should 
---rmanning, encourage a 
drop in the frequency of ove. 
These. expectations ar e supported by the evi dence in that 0n al 1 
the. sources, on thp 1 c)80c; (-nnsu 1 ted there were on Iv two pi eces of 
evidence inclicat-ing nvprmannina. rrbp. nrn'lpct which had Rpvprp 
f abr-i(-; -gt- -ion -, 
bolp prohl ems, a-, clp. -, rri ed in (-. hant-P. r 7 had =rb 
originally pi anned a peak labour force of 250, whii-I-st in rpal I ty 
the labour force peaked at 350. Secnndlv A at a 1990 
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PJC the contractors stated that the 'project was already 20% over 
the peak workforce projections' and that recruitment continued. 
Given that both of these projects were subject to severe delays 
it is apparent that overmanning continues to be associated with 
poor performance against schedule. 
The fall in overmanning should also be related to the increased 
use of off -site fabrication of large structures, or Pre Assembled 
Units (PAUs), structures which in earlier years would have been 
undertaken on site. Two management officials involved with the 
A5 plant at Hull in the mid-1980s, one from the client and one 
from the managing contractor, stated that the decision to rely 
heavily on PAUs was conditioned upon the fear of a repeat of the 
high level of shopf loor militancy which occurred on the A4 plant 
in the same area in the previous decade. PAUs had the effect of 
substantially reducing the number of workers on site. In the 
words of the managing contractor official, 'the idea was divide 
and rule' . with the strength of the more militant on-site workers 
reduced due to their smaller numbers. Similarly, files at the 
NJC indicate that a named project's heavy use of PAUs had also 
been informed by the desire to avoid shopfloo. T militancy by 
lowering shopfloor numbers. 
The use of PAUs extends beyond these two projects and has been 
informed by other perceived benefits than the avoidance of 
shopf loor militancy. PAUs were used extensively on site A. The 
client project manager argued that their use was experienced by 
355 
simple cost benefits. In addition the use of PAUs implies the 
necessity for a firmer design at an earlier stage. Given that 
there are greater opportunities for contractors to generate 
additional payments in situations where the design is subject to 
change the use of PAUs can be seen to have this additional 
advantage. PAUs, thus, have benefits to clients in both the 
commercial arena and the labour relations arena. The nature of 
this advantage is such that the increased use of PAUs represents 
a sustainable and important improvement in economic performance. 
However, PAUs also serve to cement the division between design 
and construction, a division which needs to be broken down for 
longer term economic development. 
This examination of overtime, shiftwork, and manning has stressed 
the importance of the NAECI and the reversal in the flow of 
authority within worker organisation in allowing for the use of 
effective methods to accelerate production to make up for delays, 
methods which were not used in previous decades. This was 
described in terms of the impact of these factors in both the 
labour relations and commercial arenas. An important theme was 
that as the decade drew to a close and the labour market 
tightened, the ability to ensure control of overtime and 
shiftworking was put under pressure and showed signs of strain. 
This discussion of the causes of change shows not only the 
separate causal significance of the NAECI and the labour market, 
but also the importance of their interaction. For example a key 
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element in the client being able to force the contractor at 
Heysham 2 in 1982 to undertake shif twork was the severe shortage 
of work for the contractor, but the method by which the 
contractor was forced to introduce shiftwork relied heavily on 
the NAECI and the NJC. Evidence on absenteeism, time discipline 
and wet weather working in the 1980s is detailed in appendix 2. 
Whilst the evidence is less conclusive there appears to have been 
some change in absenteeism and wet weather working, though less 
in time discipline. 
8.8. Conclusion - Summary of Changes, Causes and Effects 
The examination in this chapter of the worker organisation and 
those contours of labour relations which were important areas of 
labour militancy in the 1960s and 1970s has shown that there have 
been substantial changes in labour relations practices in the 
1980s, but also that there has been a significant measure of 
continuity. Perhaps the most fundamental change came in the 
nature of worker organisation, with a shift in the locus of 
authority toward the national official union body and away from 
the cabin. The examination of strikes, although based on far 
from adequate data, suggested that while there had been a fall 
in the level of strikes, and the length of strikes fell away, 
relative to other industries the ECI continued to be strike- 
prone. The operation of bonus schemes had not changed 
fundamentall ', although their manipulation in the 1980s was y 
within much tighter limits. The nature of overtime changed in 
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the early part of the decade but at the end of the 1980s it 
appeared to be reverting to its form in the 1970s, i. e. 
widespread in order to attract labour. Shiftwork was used 
extensively in the 1980s, unlike in the previous decades, and 
consequently situations of overmanning were far less common. 
Evidence on time discipline, absenteeism and wet weather working 
(detailed in appendix 2) was less conclusive, although it 
appeared that there had been some change in absenteeism and wet 
weather working, though less in time discipline. 
An analysis of whether these changes can be legitimately 
characterised as representing a 'sea-change' in labour relations 
practices must be based not only on a mapping-out of the extent 
of the changes but also on an understanding of the causes of the 
changes. 
In each of the sections of the chapter attempts were made to 
examine the prime causes of the changes identified in labour 
relations practices. The introduction identified three possible 
explanations for the changes - the curbing of contractors' 
opportunistic practices , the slump in demand in the industry, and 
the introduction of the NAECI in 1981. It was stressed that 
given the elements coincided it would be difficult to identify 
the relative impact of the separate strands. The NAECI played 
a significant direct role in the changes in worker organisation 
and shif tworking, but it was also argued that the context set by 
the recession and the fall in opportunistic practices played 
important facilitative roles in these cases. Further, the 
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independent roles of the NAECI and the managing contractor 
strategy of curbing opportunistic practices are hard to assess 
in that they are interdependent - They are interdependent in the 
sense that the terms, and not only the effects on labour 
relations, of the NAECI contribute to a change in commercial 
relations, the curbing of opportunistic practices. NAECI terms 
which have this impact are the increased flow of information 
concerning strikes, and the increased knowledge of the 
contractors' labour costs that necessarily derive from the 
existence of the NAECI. The supportive interdependence of the 
two elements suggest the changes in labour relations practices 
may outlast the recession. This point is strengthened by the 
argument that the central origins of the NAECI lay separately 
from the rise of managing contractors and the fall in demand. 
The effect of the changes outlined above on economic performance 
have been such that they have contributed to a relative 
improvement in performance against schedule. None of the major 
changes in labour relations outlined in this chapter stem from 
a major push by contractors towards increasing the efficiency of 
production. This tends to confirm the argument developed in 
earlier chapters that there has been no fundamental change in 
productive efficiency in the decade. 
The positive impact of the changes on schedule delay not only 
derive from cutting labour militancy, but also from the way in 
which these changes have tended to prevent contractors from 
deflecting blame on to labour as part of their tactics 
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accompanying practices which slowed Production and generated 
additional payments. Further, as mentioned above, NAECI 
provisions, themselves, have directly facilitated the greater 
commercial control of contractors. 
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CHAPTERNINE 
C ONC LUSI O-N-S 
Introduction 
It is worth recalling the train of argument which underlay the 
definition of the terms of the thesis. At an abstract level it 
was considered that the academic study of industrial relations 
was undergoing crisis and that the most useful 
reconceptualisation of the subject was as a study of the 
political economy of production. The aim of this thesis was to 
contribute towards such a reconceptualisation by engaging with 
the debate concerning the effects of trade unions upon economic 
performance at the micro-level. The mainstream debate focused 
upon trade unions partly for reasons of a directly political 
nature, and it was argued that theoretically a more useful 
approach was to examine the relationship between industrial 
relations (rather than just trade unions) and economic 
performance. To explore issues of causation and process within 
this it was necessary to undertake a detailed processual case 
study of a particular industry. 
The ECI from 1960-90 was chosen because it displayed variation 
in both industrial relations and economic performance, because 
it constituted a crucial case for the thesis that the militancy 
of labour lay at the root of the UK's poor economic performance, 
and because its organisation of production and form of capital 
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relations could be seen as prototypical in the reconst11--uti, --. n 
production in advanced capitalism. 
This conclusion seeks to draw out the implications for 7: 1-iese 
issues from the substantive findings of the research. The second 
section of the chapter reiterates the main substantive findings 
contained within chapters 4 to 8. The third section discusses 
the relevance of these findings for the debates concerning 
research methods. The fourth section examines the implications 
of the findings for the argument that the ECI constitutes a 
prototype for the reconstitution of production in advanced 
capitalism. The chapter ends with a discussion of the relevance 
of the research findings for the argument that labour militancy 
lay at the root of the UK's poor economic performance. 
9.2. Summarv of Main Findinqs 
onomic Performance 
Chapter 4 provided evidence that there had been a marked 
improvement in performance against construction schedule between 
the 1960s and 1970s, and the 1980s. The main sources of the data 
were the NEDO reports of 1970 and 1976 and the NEDO/NJC report 
of 1988. These reports were examined for potential bias which 
would serve to strengthen the expected relationship of 
improvement in economic performance between the two periods. The 
1988 report was shown to be an important source of such bias. 
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Screening of the data for the 1980s was therefore und, ýý-rtaken, 
this served to minimise the systematic bias. Using the screened 
data, analysis showed that the relative improvement in 
performance was such that whilst in the 1960s, 83% of pro3ects 
were sub3ect to delay, in the 1980s, only 15% of pro3ects were, 
and whilst in the 1970s, the mean schedule delay of pro3ects was 
39%. in the 1980s it was reduced to 7%. 
It was stressed that performance against construction schedule 
was not a measure of economic efficiency defined in technical 
terms. A strength of this measure was that it addressed issues 
of non-price competitiveness. It was primarily an extensive 
measure relevant to clients which partly reflected their ability 
to ensure that contractors and their labour forces performed to 
the terms of the tender bids. To clients, overruns were seen as 
costly and as constituting poor economic performance. 
The chapter also noted the lack of data in the industry 
concerning productivity outcomes. There had been an attempt to 
create a data bank of such measures but this had been blocked by 
contractors and managing contractors. This was a clear example 
of data creation as a political process. 
With an understanding of the political-economic meaning of the 
data on performance the task was set to explain why the 1960s and 
1970s were characterised by poor performance against schedule, 
and why the 1980s witnessed a relative improvement in performance 
against schedule. 
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The 19605 and 
The sum of the research and arguments presented in chapters 5 and 
7 is that the root cause of the poor performance in the 1960s and 
1970s lay in the nature of capital relations, in particular the 
'opportunistic' practices of contractors. Chapter 5 demonstrated 
that the interests of contractors differed from those of clients 
and that in the 1960s and the 1970s this manifested itself in 
practices which impacted directly and negatively upon performance 
against schedule. These, practices were discussed by examining 
'extras/on day rates' , 'underbidding' , 'sitting on the job' , and 
'withholding information/commercial bias scenario' . In essence, 
the contractors were able to covertly and deliberately delay 
construction thereby forcing the client into offering extra 
payments in order to attempt to accelerate production. A key 
profit locus of contractors lay in exploiting opportunities to 
generate additional payments. 
Chapter 7 showed that labour militancy was widespread in the 
period and that the locus of power within wor er organisation was 
the cabin. The material context informed a militant, anti- 
employer, short term definition of interests at the cabin level. 
An important element in the material context informing these 
interests was the commercial strategy of the contractors. In 
particular, the use of the bonus scheme as a key method of labour 
control lay in contradiction to the practices of contractors in 
deliberately slowing construction. Contractors would 
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occasionally foment strikes, though more often they would 
strikes as an opportunity to secure financial gain in their 
commercial relationship with clients. The cabin militancy did 
not push management into altering their profit strategy. 
The cabin militancy of the period exacerbated poor performance 
and was used by contractors to continue to evade commercial 
control by clients. It is not useful to attempt to attribute a 
percentage of poor performance to labour militancy; the point is 
that capital relations lay at the root of systemic, symbiotic 
relationship with labour militancy which led to the chronic 
schedule delays of the period. 
The 1980s 
The root cause of the improvement in performance against schedule 
in the 1980s was the rise of managing contractors. Managing 
contractors, by monitoring, passing on risk, and emphasising the 
fixedness of design, served to limit, but not eliminate, the 
opportunities for construction contractors to undertake practices 
which harm performance against schedule. The new national 
agreement (advocated by the official union bodies, clients and 
state agencies and resisted by contractors and the cabin) along 
with the industry recession and the curbing of opportunism led 
to a fall in labour militancy in the 1980s. These factors also 
shaped a significant reversal in the flow of authority within 
worker organisation - cabin power gave way to the assertion of 
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authority of the official union body. The greater control ov--: --r 
labour militancy in effect also facilitated the curbing of 
contractors' opportunism by blocking the previous ability of 
contractors to blame slow building on recalcitrant labour. 
Managing contractors can adopt one of two alternative routes to 
improve performance - the low trust route or the high trust 
route. The low trust route involves an emphasis on curbing 
opportunism, rigidly fixing design, and subcontracting out all 
construction work. The high trust route involves an integration 
of design and construction, the sharing of information and costs 
between these areas, and the undertaking of direct construction 
work. The low trust route implies a 'step' improvement in 
performance, whilst the high trust route implies the basis for 
a longer term improvement. In the UK in the 1980s managing 
contractors took the low trust route, and they were not 
constrained in their choice by issues concerning labour. The 
improvement in economic performance appears to have been 
primarily related to performance against schedule. It should be 
recalled that performance against schedule is not a measure of 
economic efficiency and there is fragmentary evidence that in the 
1980s productive efficiency was largely stagnant. 
9.3. Implications for Research Methods 
Chapter 2 put forward a number of methodological criticisms of 
the existing research on unions and economic performance which 
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stressed the limitations of the production function --ipproach. 
The research findings from the case study approach adopted are 
able to cast further light on a number of points. 
Chapter 2 showed that there was a widespread failure to model for 
management within the extant literature. It was argued that this 
was a crucial failing. Studies which fall to model for 
management and which put forward arguments of causation 
concerning union 'effects' may well be making spurious claims. 
Consider a statistical modelling of the ECI, 1960-90, which 
failed to model for opportunism and the rise of managing 
contractors. Such a modelling would find a clear correlation 
between militancy (perhaps proxied by the level of strikes) and 
schedule overruns. However, such a correlation would be largely 
spurious. Studies which fail to model for management should be 
treated with extreme circumspection. 
Chapter 2 also raised the point that the problem of endogeneity 
may be relevant for studies in the UK which sought to correlate 
militancy with poor performance. The point here is that 'basic 
failures of production organisation [due to lack of management 
sophistication] may lead to lower productivity not only directly, 
but also indirectly through their ef f ects upon union organisation 
and industrial relations' (Batstone, 1986: 41). This is of clear 
relevance to the ECI where contractors' opportunism both lay at 
the root of delays and set a material context for militancy. In 
a sense, both poor performance and militancy in the 1960s and 
1970s were 'created' by a third variable - contractors' 
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opportunism. This strengthens the argument made in chapt: er 
that a detailed understanding of the social relations 
production in the UK suggests that the problem of endogeneity may 
be an important one for studies which find a correlation between 
militancy and poor performance, particularly studies undertaken 
at the industry level. 
The limitations of statistical studies in examining social 
processes was also a theme in the second chapter: - 'it is an in- 
built deficiency of the method of comparative statistics that it 
is ill-suited to the analysis of quality rather than quantity and 
to the exploration of social process' (Nichols, 1986: 97). A 
detailed qualitative analysis of social process was at the heart 
of the approach adopted in this study. It is legitimate to argue 
that the qualitative subtleties of the dynamic symbiosis between 
opportunism and militancy in the 1960s and 1970s would be lost 
to a statistical modelling approach. 
Finally, theoretical problems with the production function 
approach were also examined in chapter 2. The assumption 
implicit in the production function approach that the product 
market is given and determining was shown to be problematic - It 
fails to allow for the point that the analysis of unions and 
economic performance needs to investigate the relationship 
between the spheres of exchange and production. Such a 
relationship has been central to the research presented in this 
study. It was only the focus on this relationship which allowed 
the examination of the impact of labour militancy not 3ust 
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directly on overruns but indirectly through its impact on capital 
relations and the profit strategy of contractors. Militancy in 
the 1960s and 1970s rather than forcing contractors into profit 
strategy based on improving productive efficiency lay in a 
dynamic symbiotic relationship with contractors' opportunism. 
The fall in militancy in the 1980s did not lead to an 
establishment of high-trust relations and a longer term basis of 
development through the integration of design and construction. 
The fall in militancy did, however, facilitate the rise of 
managing contractors whose stress on curbing opportunism led to 
improvements in performance against schedule. The NAECI played 
an important role in the fall in militancy and it also played 
a direct role in the commercial arena. The official trade union 
bodies played a central role in the establishment of the NAECI. 
Here then was a pro-active role of the official union bodies 
which facilitated an improvement in performance against schedule. 
This derived from the unique position of union officials within 
the industry - they were the sole key actors whose structural 
position served to define interests with an emphasis on ensuring 
longer term improvements against schedule. 
9.4. The Orcfanisation of Production in the ECI as Prototypical 
Chapter 3 argued that the organisation of production on the ECI 
could be seen as prototypical in that in the ECI production is 
dislocated, with firms working with other firms on pr03ects, and 
with firms permanently having to reconstitute and redefine 
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themselves, and in that a number of leading commentators ascribe 
exactly these characteristics to the nascent form of production 
in advanced capitalist countries. 
In so far as the ECI constitutes such a prototype, what do the 
research findings imply for the understanding of this 
organisation of production, and what do the findings imply for 
the position of the UK economy under the reconstituted form of 
production? 
The analysis has highlighted the necessity to have a detailed 
understanding of the nature of capital relations. In particular, 
it is not possible to formulate an adequate understanding of the 
nature of capital relations merely upon the basis of a specific 
structure of capital and a specific organisation of production. 
Just because production in the ECI is organised on a project 
basis with firms coming together, and with firms continually 
redefining themselves, it does not follow that these firms 
collaborate, rather than compete, nor that they have high trust 
rather than low trust relations, nor that they share information 
rather than systematically misinform. 
In particular, the study of the ECI has shown how managing 
contractors faced two alternative routes in their approach to 
improving performance against schedule. One route involved an 
emphasis on curbing opportunism, rigidly fixing the design of the 
plant, and subcontracting out all construction work. This was 
termed the low trust route. The high trust route involved an 
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integration of design and construction, the sharing 0 . 1f 
information and costs between these areas, and the undertaking 
of direct construction work. The alternative routes entailed 
qualitatively different forms of capital relations. 
This concept of alternative routes with qualitatively different 
forms of capital relations has important implications for 
Williamson's analysis of the dynamics of capitalist development. 
Williamson's main thesis is that more efficient modes of 
contracting emerge over time, and that changes in the structure 
of capital can be understood in terms of minimising transaction 
costs. It was argued in chapter 3 that an important sense the 
ECI can be seen as a crucial case for the Williamson hypothesis 
in that the organisation of production constitutes a strikingly 
clear example of what Williamson terms the 'fundamental 
transformation'. Williamson argues that this fundamental 
transformation is common to many aspects of production. The 
point here is that the ECI can be seen as entailing the 
fundamental transformation in its purest form. The fundamental 
transformation occurs where a condition of large numbers 
competition obtains at the outset but where a condition of 
bilateral treaty evolves thereafter (1991); a description which 
has clear parallels with the ECI in which the tender process 
evolves into the execution of a contract by one contractor for 
one client/managing contractor. 
At one level his analysis appears persuasive . His analysis of 
changes in the organisational form of production in terms of 
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minimising transaction costs (and therefore not necessarily in 
terms of increasing the technical efficiency of produc-ýion) 
accords with the organisational changes the ECI in the 19,10s in 
which entailed a rise in managing contracting, a fall in 
opportunism, but apparently not a significant improvement in 
productive efficiency. 
However, there are problems in the analysis of high trust 
relations within the Williamson framework. The problem is 
implicitly acknowledged by Williamson who introduced the concept 
of 'atmosphere' in an attempt to analyse trust relations in the 
employer-employee relationship. However, chapter 6 demonstrated 
that this concept lies in contradiction to his assumption of 
opportunism as a fundamental trait of human behaviour. Disabused 
of this concept, the creation of high trust relations is in 
principle feasible; however, the weight of the Williamson 
assumptions makes it almost impossible. The problem for 
Williamson in addressing high trust relations means that the 
framework cannot embrace the argument that the improvement in 
the ECI in the 1980s was essentially limited in nature because 
it was only based on a limitation of opportunistic practices, and 
because the essentially conflictual low trust capital relations 
were left unaltered. 
Williamson's hypothesis that more efficient modes of contracting 
in capitalism emerge over time stands in direct contradiction to 
the analysis of Marx. Marx's hypothesis is that the nature of 
capitalist development is such that a disjuncture appears between 
372 
the social relations of production and the forces of pro, --'Iuc-EI, cn. 
According to Marx this disjuncture hinders the further 
development of productive capacity and serves to give rise to 
revolutionary pressures. Williamson clearly contradlcts this by 
suggesting that further development of productive capacity w1il 
not be hindered because more efficient modes of contracting 
arise. 
Marx's writings on the nature of inter-capital relations have 
received far less current consideration than his writings on the 
nature of capital-labolar relations. This can be largely 
explained by the fact that his analytical prediction of the 
increasing centralisation of capital and the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall coming to hinder further economic development 
has been shown by the subsequent history of capitalist 
development to be flawed. Despite his predictions, capitalist 
economies continue to grow. 
The key point is that whilst the specifics of his prediction have 
been invalidated this does not mean that his more general 
analytical insight concerning crises arising from a disjuncture 
between the relations of production and the forces of production 
can be dismissed. 
Lazonick has argued that the inadequacy of the specifics of 
Marx's prediction arise from his failure to adequately apply his 
own method - he neglected the role of the social relations of 
production and imparted an understanding of the process of 
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capitalist development as a technological imperative 
'Marx argued .... that the development of industria1i 
capitalism results in the concentration and 
centralization of production into a relatively small 
number of enterprises .... Marx simply argued that 'the 
productivity of labour .... depends in turn upon the 
scale of production' and 'therefore the larger capital 
beats the smaller'. 
Thus despite his own emphasis on social relations of 
production, Marx ended up portraying the ongoing 
process of capitalist development as a technological 
imperative' (Lazonick, 1991: 121). 
Lazonick uses this discussion to dismiss Marx's work on inter- 
capital relations. However, this argument serves not to 
undermine Marx's more general insight but to aid an understanding 
of the problems within the specifics of his predictive analysis. 
Consider again the general insight of Marx that disjunctures can 
arise between the social relations of production and the forces 
of production and that such disjunctures impede further economic 
development. It should be noted that the concept of social 
relations of production entails not only capital-labour relations 
but also inter-capital relations. 
Properly understood, this insight has resonance with the finding 
that inter-capital relations in the ECI in the 1960s and 1970s 
were such that performance against schedule was poor and that 
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inter-capital relations in the 1980s were such that improvemeni: s 
in economic performance were necessarily limited in nature. 
Specifically, for instance, the low trust relations militated 
against the integration of design and construction though the use 
of the information feedback loops available within Computer Aided 
Design technology, and through the increased use of orbital 
welding equipment. The substantive findings illustrate the 
concept of the social relations of production impeding further 
economic development. 
It can be countered that this conceptualisation continues to be 
flawed in that Marx's thesis was that a disjuncture would arise 
between the relations of production and forces of production 
which would inevitably find expression in revolutionary upheaval. 
This approach, therefore, would deny the possibility of a high 
trust route within capitalism. 
This counter-argument is flawed, however. The argument that 
according to Marx the disjuncture must find expression in 
revolutionary upheaval rests upon a mis-understanding of Marx's 
approach, a misunderstanding based on Marx's own misapplication 
of his method. As was argued earlier, Marx came to the 
teleological view of the particular form of the disjuncture 
between the relations and the forces of production in capitalism 
through effectively interpreting the process of capitalist 
development as a technological imperative. Once the analysis is 
disabused of this concept of capitalist development as a 
technological imperative it loses the teleological understanding 
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of the inevitability of specific forms of disjuncture leading to 
revolution. 
With the understanding that the analysis does not necessarily 
embrace a teleological vision it becomes possible to view 
capitalist development as being characterised by a number of 
dis3unctures between the relations and forces of productlon, by 
a number of crises, none of which necessarily imply the end of 
capitalist development. 
It is tempting to portray Thatcherism as a response to the onset 
of crisis for the UK, breaking up the rigidified relations of 
production which hindered economic development. Arguably, this 
indeed was a key aim of Thatcherism. The importance of this 
study of the ECI is that it highlights the importance of inter- 
capital relations within the social relations of production. 
This is especially relevant in that Thatcherism concentrated on 
altering capital-labour relations. Putting aside, for the 
moment, considerations of how far capital-labour relations in the 
UK were altered in the 1980s, it is clear that the study of the 
ECI suggests that any attempt to reform the social relations of 
production which failed to address inter-capital relations is 
likely to led to a simple step increase in economic performance 
rather than to the basis for sustained longer term economic 
development. 
A similar argument is put forward by Cutler (1992). Cutler 
argues that there is an increasing emphasis amongst analysts of 
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Britain's economic performance of the need for an in--re-: ise in 
vocational training in the UK, and that this emphasis falls 
understand the importance of capital relations to the country's 
economic performance. In particular, he points to the futility 
of increasing training in light of the research by Williams et 
al. (1990) which highlights the importance of rentier capitalism 
in the UK. Williams et al examine data for 25 'giant' 
manufacturing firms, each with a turnover of at least El billion, 
and present case study evidence on a selection of the firms. The 
case study evidence suggests the importance to these large f irms 
of passing on risk, of profit outwith production, and of treating 
their subsidiaries as little more than financial assets. For 
example, Williams et al. conclude that, 'GEC is becoming a 
rentier capitalist firm whose profits increasingly come from 
short term investment and shareholdings in electrical businesses 
which somebody else manages. GEC's remaining direct 
responsibility for manufacturing is increasingly confined to 
defence contracting where the profitability of development and 
production is guaranteed' (p. 469). There are resonant parallels 
between this argument and the argument of this thesis concerning 
the route of passing on risk adopted by managing contractors in 
the ECI in the 1980s. 
It is also relevant to note that increasingly commentators are 
beginning to re-assess the apparent Thatcher economic miracle of 
the 1980s as constituting a step improvement which did little to 
lay the basis for sustained economic development (e. g. see 
Crafts, 1991; Nolan, 1992; Michie, 1992). 
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In sum, in so far as the ECI can be considered a prototype in 
terms of the organisation of production and capital structure 
then it is clear that the Thatcher experiment aimed exclusively 
at reforming capital-labour relations was fundamentally flawed 
in that it neglected the centrality of the nature of inter- 
capital relations to the performance of the UK economy. Further, 
the evidence from this thesis that there has not been a 
fundamental shift in the nature of capital relations is echoed 
by Imrie and Morris' review of research on vertical capital 
relations in the UK economy (1992). They argue that the research 
shows that 'trans format, ions are concentrated in particular 
sectors' (p. 650). There has been no fundamental shift towards 
'the adoption and implementation of new obligational practices' 
(p. 650). Rather, 'many aspects of the adversarial system seem 
to have remained in place' (p. 645). Indeed, there is evidence 
of a 'new adversarialism' (p. 644) emerging in which the client 
is more able to assert 'a hierarchy of top-down control' (p. 641) . 
The evidence presented in this thesis of managing contractors 
pursuing a strategy of passing on risk exactly matches this 
overall picture. 
9.5. The British Worker Question 
1960s and 1970s 
It was argued in chapter 3 that the ECI was a useful site for a 
case study because it constituted a crucial case for the British 
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worker question, the argument that labour militancy lay : --it the 
root of poor performance on the UK economy in the 1960s : -ind 
1970s. Ostensibly, the ECI represented an archetypal e---. ample of 
the British worker question. 
The central finding of the research, however, was that it was 
contractors' opportunism which was at the root of the chronic 
schedule delays of the period. Labour militancy exacerbated 
delays, but the central significance of militancy was that it was 
used by contractors to reproduce favourable commercial relations 
with clients. Therefore, the British worker question has been 
rejected in a 'crucial' (Mitchell, 1983) case study. This means 
that the wider validity of the British worker argument to be put 
into serious doubt. 
This conclusion accords with the substantive arguments developed 
in chapter 2 concerning the Metcalf hypothesis that powerful 
unions in the 1960s and 1970s impeded productivity levels, 
primarily through restrictive practices. A counter- argument was 
developed to show that job controls constituted a form of social 
organisation of production which matched the short term profit 
criteria, and low production skills of management. As the nature 
of product markets began to change substantially in the 1960s and 
1970s a disjuncture began to appear between this social 
organisation of production and even short term profitability, 
prompting management into attempts at reform. Subsequent piece- 
meal and ill-conceived attempts at reform encountered resistance 
with unions temporarily acting as institutions which rigidified 
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the social organisation of production. This is an argument quit: 19 
distinct from the British worker argument. The case study 
findings, therefore, sit well with it. 
A further point developed in chapter 2 was that any short term 
constraints on the effectiveness of managerial strategy were far 
less relevant to understanding the poor performance of the UK 
economy than the fact that shopfloor relations did not push 
management into altering the nature of its short term approach, 
but rather served to consolidate it. Once more this finds 
support in the research findings on the ECI. The cabin militancy 
of the 1960s and 1970s did not push contractors into altering 
their profit strategy, rather it served to consolidate their 
stress on profit outwith production in that contractors were able 
to use militancy as a tool in their commercial relations with 
clients. 
Further, there is evidence that this specific form of 
consolidation, involving a dynamic between opportunism and 
militancy existed in a number of other important industries in 
the period which suffered poor performance. The specific 
findinqs from the ECI have more qeneral relevance. 
Opportunism and Militancy in Other Industries 
A number of industries can be identified which suggest the 
potential importance of opportunism in understanding their 
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performance and the existence of labour militancy in the 191DOs 
and 1970s - shipbuilding, docks, construction, aerospace, and 
wider engineering. These have been identified by the existence 
of: 
- some form of client-contractor relationshiP, 
- design uncertainty/ lack of client knowledge of production, 
- cost-plus contracts. 
Thus identified, secondary literature was examined in terms of: 
- the potential for significant opportunistic behaviour by 
the contracting agent, 
- the potential that labour militancy could have been 
exacerbated by such a strategy, 
- the potential for a dynamic whereby the contracting agent 
used labour militancy in order to perpetuate a favourable form 
of client-contractor relationship. 
Clearly, evidence concerning opportunism will be extremely 
difficult to locate in that an essential characteristic of it is 
its covert nature. In the ECI it was only through detailed 
archive and interview research that it was possible to provide 
evidence on opportunism. Therefore, a review of secondary 
literature is unlikely to uncover conclusive evidence on the 
existence of opportunism as an important prof it strategy; rather 
the aim is to highlight the potential for the existence of 
opportunism in certain industries. 
Shipbuilding 
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Thomas (1983) shows that the UK shipbuilding industry 
a dramatic relative decline in the postwar period. In 1ý30, the- 
UK produced Just over 50% of additions to the worl, --I's mercla--int 
fleet, in 1950 the UK remained the world leader accounting for 
nearly 40% of world output, but by the mid-1970s the UK's sh--ire 
in world tonnage had dropped to less than 4%. 
The industry's relative decline, and its client-contractor 
relations (shipowner- shipbuilder) make it a relevant industry to 
study. Further, it ostensibly constitutes another archetypal 
case (like the ECI) in which labour militancy caused poor 
performance. In particular, public bodies blamed militant labour 
for the decline of the industry (Geddes, 1966: 29; Booz et al., 
19 73: 6). 
It is certainly true that the shipbuilding industry in the 1960s 
and 1970s was characterised by labour militancy - the Commission 
on Industrial Relations 1971 report into the industry notes :- 
'the number of days lost per 1,000 workers has been running for 
several recent years at something like five times the average of 
the whole economy. In the same period only motor manufacture, 
coal mining and the docks have experienced a higher average 
incidence' (p. 25). 
Other elements - design uncertainty and cost-plus contracts - 
which suggest the potential for opportunism were also present. 
In relation to design uncertainty there is strong evidence that 
the demand of UK shipowners, which provided the bulk of UK 
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shipbuilding work, was of a bespoke nature sub j e.:, t to 
considerable change after the tender from a yard h, --id been 
accepted and even after construction had begun (Thomas, 1983; 
Geddes, 1966: 136; Booz et al., 1973: 133; Reid, 1991: 40,42). 
Evidence on the widespread existenc-e of cost-plus contracts is 
provided by Thomas (1983: 195) and the 1961 Ministry of Transport 
report (p. 47). 
Given that there have been a number of influential studies of the 
decline of the shipbuilding industry, in order to adequately 
present a case for the potential role of opportunism it is useful 
to outline such studies and then to subject them to critical 
analysis. 
The main studies are by Thomas (in the influential Williams et 
al., 1983) and Lorenz and Wilkinson (1986). Both stress the 
importance of the 'demand linkage' (Thomas, p. 179) between the 
builder and owner in this decline. The basic argument of Thomas 
is that the shipyards became locked into meeting the bespoke 
demands of the UK shipowners, whilst the rest of the rising world 
demand was increasingly characterised by a standardised mass 
product. While the builders were locked into this relationship 
the owners had no such ties and increasingly in the 1950s and 
1960s looked abroad for the construction of their ships, leaving 
UK yards increasingly bereft of orders. Thomas unequivocally in 
assigns primary causal significance to this demand-linkage 
(P. 179). This informs his suggestion that the appropriate state 
action to support the industry would have been to push the owners 
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into a more formal relationship with the builders (p. -707, 
)- 
essentially a form of protectionism. 
Although the study represents an improvement on accounts of the 
industry which simply stress the role of militant labour it is 
ultimately inadequate in that it falls to examine the nature of 
the owner-builder relationship; in particular it fails to allow 
for the possibility that this relationship came to be beset by 
opportunism. Thomas views the relationship as harmonious, 
failing to conceptualise potential conflict of interest and how 
this conflict could inform action :- 'the long survival of the 
system [of informal client-customer relations] indicated that it 
worked reasonably well. It gave the shipowners the vessels they 
wanted, and the yards had close links with a major set of 
customers' (p. 195). 
This ignores the salient fact that the system may have given 
'shipowners the vessels they wanted', but these ships arrived 
later than scheduled, cost more than budgeted, and took longer 
to build and cost more than the work done by the emerging foreign 
competition (Geddes, 1966: 29; Ministry of Transport, 1961: 7; Booz 
et al., 1973: 5,102-3). 
This much highlights the central problem with Thomas' account, 
but is there evidence that UK builders acted opportunistically? 
Fragmentary evidence exists pertaining to underbidding, 
misinformation concerning poor design, lack of management 
production skill, lack of productivity data, and existence of a 
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seller's market. 
In relation to underbidding, the Geddes report states that 'one 
builder will shave his price more than another if he is 
particularly keen to get the order either to fill a gap in his 
production programme or because of the prestige the order may win 
him' (p. 27). Underbidding, of course, is unlikely to be 
reported, and mention of it by an important public report 
suggests that it may have been a significant practice. 
Concerning misinformation on design/deliberately building from 
mistaken design, the Geddes report notes suggestively that 
'many owners would prefer to receive more suggestions and more 
expert advice from British shipbuilders than they get' (p. 16-17). 
The report adds that 'the reputation of individual British firms 
will tend to suffer if ... they do not volunteer the suggestions 
for technical improvements [in design and construction] which the 
customer seems to expect' (p. 30). An implication here is that 
UK yards may have tended to take advantage of design faults and 
uncertainty in a way which did not occur in foreign yards. 
One corollary of a prof it strategy which encompasses opportunism 
is a lack of investment in management skill concerning the 
organisation of production. There is evidence of such a lack of 
skill in UK shipbuilding. The Booz et al. report discusses 
'shortage of managerial ability' (p. 6), and 'unsophisticated 
planning' (p. 139). Similarly, Lorenz and Wilkinson stress that 
'management showed a comparative lack of talent and interest in 
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applying systematic planning methods' (1986: 119). Th (--, -: i sa1s ýD 
takes the 'inadequate management' (p. 179) as a given. 
In the ECI the lack of available productivity data was seen as 
part of the contractors' attempts to resist tighter control by 
clients. It is therefore potentially relevant that UK shipyards 
provided no productivity data :- the Commission on Industrial 
Relations report notes that 'comparative statistics on 
productivity in shipbuilding are not generally available' (p. 13), 
and that 'productivity figures hardly exist even in the most 
rudimentary form' (p. 73). 
Opportunism will be more likely in a situation where demand is 
high, in a sense creating a seller's market. Therefore, the 
situation described by Thomas is potentially relevant :- 'for a 
time on the 1950s it could be claimed that Britain's relative 
decline was not obvious. The sellers' market concealed any 
weaknesses and full order books encouraged complacency' (emphasis 
added) (1983: 181). This high demand would allow shipbuilders to 
undertake opportunistic practices and yet remain relatively 
immune from the gradual defection of UK shipowners to foreign 
yards. 
The above evidence suggests that opportunism may have been 
significant. This leads to the consideration of evidence that 
such opportunism may have constituted an important element in the 
material context giving rise to militancy. Again fragmentary and 
suggestive evidence exists. 
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The key material context informing militancy was the 1---: trge-', ,, 
casual nature of the industry. The Commission on Indus t-ri, -il 
Relations noted that 'in the case of one maJor shiprepairing 
company, the size of its manual labour force varied by 50% or 
more over very short periods' (1971: 12). Whilst there is no 
direct link between opportunism and the fluctuating demand, of 
which labour bore the cost through irregular employment, it is 
also clear that opportunism as an inherently short-term strategy 
does not begin to address irregular employment as a problem. 
Moreover, firms on cost-plus contracts are not particularly 
concerned with the ensuing militancy. Lorenz and Wilkinson argue 
that the widespread demarcation rules in the industry can be seen 
as a form of job protectionism responding to the situation in 
which labour was expected to bear the costs of fluctuating demand 
(1986: 128). 
An important point which emerged in the examination of the ECI 
was that there was a contradiction between a profit strategy 
through opportunism and a labour control strategy through 
incentive bonus schemes, and that this contradiction informed 
militancy. There is evidence in shipbuilding of a parallel. 
Bonus schemes were an important element in labour control in 
shipbuilding. The number and standard of supervisors was low 
(CIR, 1971: 76) and bonus schemes were widespread (CIR, 1971: 49). 
Reid notes the contradiction between this and the bespoke nature 
of demand, and our analysis would add the contradiction between 
this and opportunism. Reid argues that 'the most obvious 
symptoms of this double failure to impose either an effective 
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system of supervision or an effective method of incentive paymený: 
were chronic absenteeism and very high levels of labour turnover' 
( 19 91: 45). 
A potential parallel with the ECI also emerges concerning 
shiftworking. In the ECI it was pointed out that despite the 
consistent schedule delays no attempt was made by contractors to 
introduce shiftworking. Evidence was presented which showed that 
contractors resisted the introduction of shiftworking because it 
would demand a higher level of management skills in planning, and 
because it was not in their interests. In this respect it is 
interesting to note that despite the consistent overruns in UK 
shipbuilding there was no attempt to introduce shiftworking in 
the key years of the industry's decline (Ministry of Transport, 
1961: 5; Booz et al., 1973: 8). 
Perhaps the hardest evidence to locate concerns the use of labour 
militancy by contracting agents to perpetuate the beneficial 
nature of the relationship with the client. Fragmentary evidence 
exists here. An important part in this dynamic is that 
contracting agents are able to make the client believe that cost- 
plus contracts are a necessity because of the militancy of 
labour, and that labour militancy is to blame foi7 overruns. The 
Ministry of Transport report notes that there was 'a general 
feeling, as evidenced in the supplementary comments of a number 
of owners, that foreign yards were less prone to delays as a 
result of strike action than United Kingdom yards' (1961: 5), i. e. 
clients believed that militancy underlay overruns. The same 
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report shows UK builders sought to resist tighter commercial 
control by the shipowners. It states that unlike for UK 
builders, for foreign yards 'in almost all cases penalties for 
late delivery were accepted as part of the contract in one form 
or another' (p. 5). It also states. that 'United Kingdom yards 
would quote on a 'cost-plus' basis instead of a fixed price' 
It is likely that the shipbuilders would use arguments 
concerning labour militancy to justify this. It will be recalled 
that because of the very strong demand UK yards, despite the 
looser commercial control by owners, were still able to have 
generally full order books through until the mid-1970s (Thomas, 
1983: 180-81). 
A supplementary point concerns the potential for opportunism by 
subcontractors to the shipbuilders. The use of outside 
subcontracting f irms played an important role in UK shipbuilding 
- the Geddes report estimated that the cost of 'other supplies 
and subcontracts', 'account for upward of a third of a ship' 
(1966: 69). The potential for opportunism by the subcontractors 
is implicit in the comment in the Booz et al. report :- 
'subsequent to contract award overall planning is minimal and 
intercontract relationships are neglected' (1973: 141). The case 
that opportunism could have played a significant role in the 
strategy of subcontractors becomes stronger when it is reallsed 
that some of the very same firms which operate in the ECI also 
operate in shipbuilding (CIR, 1971: 2). 
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Construction 
'Opening delayed as Eurotunnel blames builders 
The Eurotunnel Chief Executive .... said the opening 
date was now in the hands of .... the Anglo-French 
consortium building the tunnel, and accused them of 
deliberately delaying it' (The Guardian, 20.4.93). 
The potential for parallels with opportunism and labour militancy 
in the ECI is clear given that the ECI is part of the wider 
construction industry. , 
However, in order to suggest such 
parallels it is necessary to disaggregate the industry. There 
are two types of building f irm - the speculative builder and the 
contractor. The distinction is that the speculative builder owns 
the building being constructed and then seeks to sell/lease it 
whilst the contracting firm builds for clients who own the 
building. The parallels that exist are confined to the 
contracting sector. Within this, Ball notes the lack of 
integration of design and construction :- 'the fragmentation of 
the building process between different enterprises involved in 
design, surveying, contracting, plant-hire and materials creates 
a minef ield of disputes, delay, avoided responsibility and missed 
opportunities for innovation' (Ball, 1988: 96). 
The industry is also relevant in that its poor performance was 
also subject to the argument that the primary malaise was 
militant labour. Ball (1988) describes the important political 
process by which capital in the industry was able to persuade 
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governments that the root cause of the industry's Lzocr 
performance was the trade unions and the militancy of the labour 
force :- 
'Even Labour governments have essentially seen 
building workers as a 'problem ..... the Wilson 
government of 1964 saw a shortage of skilled building 
labour and the power it gave workers to bid up wages 
as the problem of the building industry .... the 1974-9 
Labour government legitimated LOSC [labour only 
subcontracting] through the introduction of the P714 
tax-certif icate scheme .... when contractors' political 
demands have been against building workers they have 
usually been successful' (p. 74). 
Both Ball and Evans argue strongly that opportunism is key profit 
strategy of contracting firms, and that passing on risk has 
characterised the strategy of firms in the 1980s. Evans states 
that 'under the contracting system difficulties predicting tender 
prices generate pressures to reallse profit by maximising extra 
claims against clients. Improving efficiency is subordinated to 
the aim of avoiding risk and maintaining flexibility of financial 
assets for investment wherever it is most profitable, inside or 
outside construction' (1990: 245). Included here are the familiar 
themes of extras, passing on risk, and stagnating productive 
efficiency as a corollary to the emphasis on profit outwith 
production. Ball stresses underbidding, and avolding penalty 
clauses, and implicitly notes the occurrence of sitting on the 
job :- 
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'contractors prefer to overcommit themselves whenE-ýver 
possible in order to insure against periods 'when no 
new contracts are available. Projects are ex. tended 
beyond contract dates if necessary. Extensions have 
been such an accepted part of. the contracting system 
that penalty costs are rarely incurred .... During 
upturns .... over-commitment is easier, SO long 
construction times and high-priced tender bids result 
rather than more actual building work' (1988: 87-88). 
Whilst the points are appealing given the evidence on the ECI it 
is frustrating that they are not grounded in empirical evidence. 
This criticism, however, cannot be applied to Ball's research 
into the merger activity of leading construction firms. It is 
illuminating that from this detailed research Ball concludes that 
by takeovers, ' contractors try to maintain a portfolio of 
building contracts .... A broad portfolio .... enables greater 
bargaining power with clients .... This advantage, however, has 
no positive effect on productive efficiency and costs. 
(1988: 156). This picture of merger activity in order to enhance 
bargaining power with clients, avoid risks, and without regard 
to productive efficiency sits comfortably with the suggestion 
that opportunism played a significant part in the prof it strategy 
of contracting firms. 
Given that there are grounds for believing that opportunism may 
have been important, is there any evidence that this may have 
exacerbated labour militancy? WhilstO Ball falls to make the 
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argument that client-contractor antagonism may have played 
important role in forming the material context for labour 
militancy, he does hint at contradictions inherent in labour 
control through incentive schemes :- 
'a high proportion of bonus payments has the added 
benefit to the employer of minimising the need to 
supervise the work of the operatives. The site 
location and bespoke nature of building work makes it 
difficult for management to control the intensity of 
work .... Work-study-based incentive schemes partially 
overcome the problem, although often bonuses are 
haphazard or not related to specific tasks but to 
attracting labour to site' (1988: 92). 
Incentive schemes are even more haphazard if the contractors are 
sitting on the job or are undertaking re-work following the 
deliberate tactic of building from a poor design. 
The 1967 Report of a Court of Inquiry into Trade Disputes at the 
Barbican and Horseferry Construction Sites in London provides 
evidence of striking parallels with the ECI. At the Barbican 
site ' continued disagreements over bonus arrangements' were a 
major source of conflict' (P. 11). Underlying these 
'disagreements' was a conflict between the design contractor and 
the construction contractor, with major design changes leading 
to the breakdown of the bonus scheme as the instrument of labour 
control :- 
'In many cases design changes necessitated the taking 
down of work already done .... These factors .... 
had 
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had a serious effect on site morale and in particui-ar 
upon the operation of the bonus scheme by making it 
difficult for operatives to earn reasonable bonuses 
and creating an imbalance between earnings on 
different parts of the site. As a result the firm had 
had to relax bonus targets ad hoc so as to bring 
earnings up to a reasonable level' (p. 25). 
Our analysis suggests that the firm is likely to have exacerbated 
issues concerning poor design by deliberately constructing from 
design plans they knew to be faulty. 
The report also provides strong evidence of the use of labour 
militancy by contractors as a bargaining tool in their 
contractual relations with the client. At the Horseferry site, 
at a client -contractor meeting when the client expressed concern 
with the progress on the project, the contractor's reply was a 
clear attempt to pass on blame to labour - 'the firm claimed in 
reply that this was due to certain individuals who were causing 
the trouble .... and listed a series of 
incidents which they 
claimed had disrupted production on site' (p. 18). 
The contractor's attempt to shift blame on to labour can be 
related to the form of contract in which the contractor was 
'liable to a penalty of E900 for each day by which they exceed 
the completion date, but an extension of time can be granted in 
respect of strikes, lockouts, inclement weather and certain other 
contingencies' 
More notably, the report concluded that the contractor had 
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deliberately fomented an all-out strike for reasons concerning 
their commercial relationship with the client. The contractor 
was facing a loss on the contract and had been unable to use 
arguments concerning labour militancy to revise the terms of the 
contract. They, therefore, deliberately fomented an all-out 
strike by dismissing the shop steward committee, believing that 
an all-out strike would allow them to be released from the 
contract :- 
'There is no doubt that by October, 1966 ... [the 
contractor] would have been glad to be released from 
this contract .... We think it was also very much in 
the minds of the Directors of the Company that if the 
primary purpose of the dismissal of the operatives 
failed, the whole circumstances might provide material 
on which a release from further performance of the 
contract could be sought. It appears to us that by 
adopting the expedient which they did, the Company was 
seeking to create a situation which could be exploited 
to their advantage whichever way events led' (p. 51-2). 
The last sentence expresses very well the idea that contractors 
would use labour militancy in an opportunistic, rather than in 
a Machlave lan, manner. 
A final point from this report worth stressing is that it was 
only through detailed research that evidence on opportunism 
emerged. The ostensible purpose of dismissing the shop stewards, 
as expressed by the Company at the time, was to reform the bonus 
structure and improve productivity (p. 50). It was only through 
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direct questioning of the Directors of the company by the Co,, -: r,. 
of Inquiry that the real motive for their actions emerged. 
Docks 
There is evidence that the economic performance of UK docks has 
been consistently below that of continental ports - 'shipping 
lines observe that generally cargo handling has been slower, 
dearer and less reliable than at Continental ports' (Department 
of Transport, 1986: 6). The industry was also characterised by 
high levels of militancy, (Turnbull et al., 1992: 70). The high 
levels of union power in the industry was seen as 
institutionalised in the National Labour Dock Scheme before its 
abolition in 1989, and the union power and labour militancy was 
seen as underlying the poor performance of the industry (National 
Association of Port Employers, 1988). 
The industry exhibited the characteristics which are necessary 
for opportunism to play an important role. The shipping company- 
port operator relationship can be seen as analogous to the 
client-contractor relationship. Whilst there is no degree of 
uncertainty concerning issues of design, there is a lack of 
knowledge by the client of the production process (cargo 
movement), and once the bilateral exchange has been entered into 
the shipowner is in a Position of great vulnerability, especially 
given the high costs to the shipowner of delayed turnaround. 
Further, dockwork was undertaken on a cost-plus basis. Willman 
notes that, 'these [restrictive labour] practices caused 
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extensions of the time a ship stayed in port .... andt-he cost of 
the entire system was _passed on 
to the merchant or shipowner' 
(emphasis added) (1986: 110). Also, a former official of the 
employers' association stated in discussion that the industry 
'operated on a cost-plus basis' (discussion under terms of 
anonymity). 
Turnbull (with his fellow authors) has recently put forward in 
a book and a series of articles a sensitive account of the 
performance and labour militancy of the industry. In order to 
suggest that opportunism may have played an important role it is 
useful to briefly outline the main arguments developed by 
Turnbull and then subject these to critical analysis. 
Turnbull's analysis of the economic performance of the industry 
has three main facets. Firstly, he argues that there is a 
'conflict of interest' between the port operator and the shipping 
company, the outcome of which is that ports will not be run 
efficiently according to client criteria if the port operators 
run the ports according to a 'commercial model', only focusing 
on immediate demand, failing to invest ahead of future demand. 
This leads directly to the second main facet - state intervention 
is necessary to alter the sub-optimum outcome of this conflict 
of interest. Therefore, in understanding the poor performance 
of the UK industry 'it was not the extent of state intervention 
in the ports that was the problem but its character' (Turnbull 
and Weston, 1992: 386). Lastly, Turnbull and Weston argue that 
labour militancy, in the form of 'restrictive practices' and 
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strikes played a part in the poor performance of the ind, ýistr,., :- 
'the employment arrangements and working practices 
described .... clearly contributed to the relative 
inefficiency of Britain's ports. In particular, many 
of the 'restrictive practices' associated with 
casualism, which dockers defended as 'protective 
practices'.... had a detrimental effect on waiting 
time' (1992: 394). 
To improve the performance of the industry 'greater flexibility 
and improved labour utilization was a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition' (Turnbull, 1991: 31). Therefore, to simply 
concentrate on these aspects allows the strengthening of the 
commercial model, and does nothing to promote the longer term 
economic development of the industry. 
Two criticisms of this understanding of the performance and the 
social relations of the industry can be made. Firstly, whilst 
Turnbull and Weston in particular are concerned to criticise a 
neo-classical analysis of the industry they do not address the 
adequacy of a transaction costs approach. This means that the 
analysis is not sensitive to the potential importance of 
opportunism. It is suggested below that indeed opportunism may 
have been prevalent. Secondly, while the studies are sensitive 
to the origins of 'restrictive practices' ' in terqis of a reaction 
to casualism in the industry the analysis in effect treats these 
practices as standing separately from the commerqial strategy of 
the employers. They fall to see how these practices and an 
opportunistic and short-term approach to profit creation by 
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employers could potentially become meshed in a symbiotic 
relationship. Vital here 1 icuous absence of anv 's the consp' 
consideration of the importance of cost-plus contracts. In a 
book of 270 pages focusing on the industry there is only one 
(indirect) mention of the existence of cost-plus contracts 
(Turnbull et al., 1992: 98). 
There is evidence which suggests that opportunism may well have 
been prevalent. A former chairman of the recently privatised 
British Transport Docks Board has described the structure of the 
industry in the following terms :- 
'there is an excessive fraqmentation in cargo 
handling, unco-ordinated transport to and from the 
port, a multitude of clearing and forwarding agencies 
and, within all this, the inertia of long-established 
customs .... all concerned are able to ý)ass the buck' 
(emphasis added) (quoted in Turnbull et al. , 1992: 36). 
Here, 'excessive fragmentation' refers to a complex network of 
contracting relationships; 'pass the buck' refers to a strategy 
centred on passing on risk and the ability to deflect blame on 
to another party; and 'the inertial of long-established customs' 
can be seen as referring to stagnating efficiency. 
Opportunism will be more likely to be important in periods of 
high demand. Although the following description of the product 
market refers to its impact on the power of labour, its relevance 
for contractor power should not be overlooked :- 
'The product and labour markets of the postwar period 
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further reinforced the dockers' power. The post-war 
boom and the consequent expansion of world trade 
witnessed a 124 per cent increase in the tonnage 
passing through Britain's ports .... 1947-65' (Turnbull 
et al., 1992: 216). 
In these circumstances, given that workers could use the shipping 
company's weakness (once the bilateral exchange had been entered 
into) in terms of 'bargaining counters' (Willman, 1986: 110) then 
so could the port operators. Indeed given that the UK port 
employers have been characterised by Turnbull as following the 
short-termist commercial. model then this much can be expected. 
If creating profit through opportunism rather than through 
increasing productive efficiency was important to port employers 
then a lack of managerial skill in the organisation of the 
production process can be expected. This expectation is clearly 
met :- 
'employers abdicated considerable control over the 
organisation of work to their foreman a4d dockers 
themselves. Thus there was very little technological 
or managerial structuring of the immediate work 
processi (Turnbull et al., 1992: 40). 
What of the link between opportunism and labour militancy'ý The 
key element informing the militancy of the dockerp was the casual 
nature of employment. Casualism was a result of the fragmented 
structure of contracting relationships in the industry :- 'the 
organisation of the industry was therefore not only complex and 
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fragmented, 
leading to complex patterns of pricing and port 
charges, 
but it also led directly to fragmented forms of 
employment' 
(Turnbull et al 1992 : 42 Fragmentation in the 
Organisation of 
the industry will be more likely in low-trust 
relationships characterised 
by opportunism. 
In the ECI militancy was often related to bonus issues. it is, 
therefore, relevant to note that bonus issues were a key 
immediate cause for unrest in the docks industry (Turnbull et 
al., 1992: 22). 
An important way in which port employers could be seen as using 
labour relations to their benefit was suggested by a former 
official of the employers' association when he stated, in 
discussion, that the 'employers hid behind a monopoly union' in 
their relations with the shipping companies, arguing that the 
port operators could deflect demands from shipping companies for 
improved performance by blaming labour militancy. The image of 
'hiding' is similar to Turnbull et al. 's metaphor of the NDLS as 
a 'shield' :- 'in short, supposedly inadequate disciplinary 
procedures were more often a shield for managerial incompetence 
than a proscription of managerial prerogatives' (1992: 81) - Port- 
employers benefitting from a cost-plus relationship with their 
clients had little incentive to address issues of labour control 
when labour militancy reinforced the nature of the relationship 
WIth the client. This does not suggest a level of Machiavellian 
strategy by port-employers - indeed the short-termism 
and 
ý4ill'ngness to accede to labour demands might derive 
form the 
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shipping companies - 'the employer would frequentl-,, - come 
strong pressure from the shipowner to settle any disputes -quickly 
and get the ship turned round' (Turnbull et al. , 1992 : 43 This 
is strongly reminiscent of Berry's (1983) description of the 
relationships at the construction of the Llanwern steelworks 
(reported in chapter 7). The point is that the port operators 
benefitted from a perpetuation of labour militancy and cost-plus 
contracting with shipping companies. 
This all begs the question that if the port operators benef itted 
from the system of relationships which was in part 
institutionalised in the NDLS why did they press for the 
abolition of the NDLS? Two points are relevant here. The port 
employers' association, NAPE. only came to lobby militantly for 
its abolition in the mid-1980s (Turnbull et al., 1992: 88). 
Secondly, this timing can be related to the fall in prof its that 
port employers experienced in the early-1980s (Turnbull et 
al., 1992: 31) and the fact that 'non-Scheme ports captured an 
increasing proportion of Britain's trade' (Turnbull et al., 
1992: 68). With the slump in demand in the 1980s and the 
competition from non-Scheme ports, profitability through 
opportunism 'shielded' by the NDLS became less and less viable. 
Aerospace 
The UK aerospace industry has been beset by chronic schedule and 
budget overruns on projects (Plowden Report, 1966: 22; Pugh, 1986; 
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National Audit Office, 1986: 20). An examination of the 
11mit-7--d 
secondary literature suggests that opportunism by contractors and 
subcontractors may have played an important role in ýhis. 
The client-contractor relationship clearly exists in the 
industry, with the government as the main client (Plowden, 
1966: 15). The Plowden Report indicates the prevalence of cost- 
plus contracts :- 'virtually all military development work is 
paid for on the basis of full cost plus a profit element' (p. 81 ). 
The National Audit Of f ice (1986: 2-3 ) and Pugh ( 1986) indicate the 
high level of design uncertainty and poor level of project 
definition. 
There are also suggestions of opportunistic practices. The 
National Audit Office report notes that the contractors were 
'over-optimistic' (1986: 1). This can be interpreted as evidence 
of systematic underbidding. Opportunism is also suggested by the 
National Audit Office comments that 'deficiencies in their 
[contractors'] cost plans and management arrangements weakened 
cost control, and cost-plus contracts gave no incentive to 
produce realistic estimates or contain costs' (1986: 1); and that 
'contractors' optimism as to the feasibility of projects had not 
always been matched by their willingness to agree firm prices for 
their development' (1986: 17). Further, the report suggests that 
lack of information militated against the competitive process 
leading to the withering-away of opportunism over the longer term 
:- there was 'little evidence of systematic monitoring of past 
performance or the realism of cost estimates to provide a more 
403 
reliable basis f or f uture estimates' (p. 15 ). Jones (1985) notes 
the weak commercial control exercised by the UK state as a client 
compared to the control exercised by USA federal state :- 
'despite its greater involvement in the structure of the industry 
the different state agencies lack the administrative resources 
for the kind of detailed scrutiny and regulation of contractors' 
affairs that is possessed by the US Department of Defense' 
(p. 231-2). Given that the state did not create an effective 
monitoring system opportunism can be anticipated. That client- 
contractor relations were not high-trust in nature is indicated 
by the Minority Report within the Plowden Report which indicates 
that 'relations between contractor and customer have become 
soured' (p. 99). The recommendation of the Plowden Report that 
the government should purchase a financial share in airframe 
companies, i. e. a recommendation of vertical integration, is of 
course a classic response to the existence of opportunism. 
In aerospace the poor performance has never been directly 
attributed to union power (although the 1986 National Audit 
Office lists 'the effects of industrial disputes' in a list of 
'other factors which have contributed to time and cost problems' 
(1986: 18)). Extensive job controls did, however, exist in the 
industry (Jones, 1985). Interestingly, Jones argues that the 
form of client-contractor relations led to the 'hoarding' of 
labour by contractors (p. 233). This is in contrast to the 
discussions of opportunism in other sectors of the economy where 
it was associated with the casualisation of labour. Jones 
clearly believes that the shopfloor strength of labour derived 
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from the nature of the capital relations in the industry, : -ýnd 
that the shopfloor controls were only part of the story of the 
poor performance in the industry - 'the broader economic 
performance of an industry may be reduced by the workers' 
organised controls over employment and work practices. This 
question has been left deliberately open here. What the 
preceding analysis has tried to suggest is that the British 
institutions of shop floor bargaining and craft style union 
tactics may not be the only relevant source of those controls, 
(emphasis added) (p. 251). Given this insight it is frustrating 
that Jones fails to analyse client-contractor relations in terms 
of the potential for opportunism. Evidence suggests it may have 
been prevalent. 
Wider Engineerin 
As well as aerospace it is possible that opportunism may have 
been important in other sectors of engineering. Client- 
contractor relations can be seen to exist in a number of sectors 
with the contractor more commonly known as the supplier. 
Relevant here are engineering firms which acted as suppliers to 
car manufacturers, to aerospace firms, to engineering 
construction firms, to shipbuilding firms, as well as weapons 
manufacturers supplying the army. Design uncertainty is clearly 
a factor in the latter four sectors. 
The question of how prevalent cost-plus contracts were in these 
client-contractor relations in the 1960s and 1970s is of 
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considerable importance. Tolliday notes the importance of cost- 
plus contracts in car manufacturing in wartime for the abili-ýy 
of management to pass on wage rises ( 1985: 112 ). Similarly, Piore 
and Sabel, albeit with reference to the USA, stress the 
importance of cost-plus contracts in wartime in the shaping of 
management- labour relations (1984: 101). Unfortunately, there is 
no clear evidence on how widespread cost-plus contracts were. 
By and large the studies of the emergence of 3ob controls on 
engineering have neglected to analyse the form of customer- 
supplier relations. They have focused upon the shopfloor almost 
as an autonomous area, in effect stressing the agency of labour 
to the neglect of the understanding of the material context for 
this action. This focus can be related to the perception of the 
autonomy of industrial relations in advanced countries in the 
post-war period. As chapter 1 argued this was most plainly 
stated by Dunlop's model of the 'industrial relations system'. 
Many writers who would not share some of the more conservative 
implications of Dunlop's particular model did however implicitly 
share the view of the labour process as a semi-autonomous social 
area. 
One important exception to this tendency is the study by Scullion 
and Edwards (1988). In the factory which is the focus of the 
study, 'Premier Metals' from 1955 to 1980, they found extensive 
and strong shopfloor job controls. They then pose the vital 
question - why did management tolerate these craft controls? The 
essence of their answer can be found in a 1958 quotation from the 
406 
managing director of the firm :- 
'Labour relations have not been too satisfactory 
bad practices in the past were condoned by management 
and which are now claimed as custom and practice by 
the trade unions. These practices were the inevitable 
outcome of our costing formula which was virtually a 
'cost-plus' basis. In other words, the higher the 
labour costs the more profit was made and a bigger 
return to overheads' (emphasis added) (1988: 130). 
The existence of cost-plus contracts alongside craft controls on 
the shopfloor lead the authors to put forward the perceptive 
argument that 'critics and defenders of the shopf loor record have 
tended to treat it as separate from other parts of companies' 
activities. They need to be examined together. ' (1988: 148). 
This gets at one of the criticisms of Turnbull's examination of 
the docks industry - the failure to look at the commercial 
strategy and labour relations together. The existence of cost- 
plus contracts in periods of high demand suggests that militancy 
and opportunism could exist in a symbiotic relationship. An 
apparent unity of interest of the workforce and the supplier is 
clouded by the contradictions in the role of the bonus scheme, 
and the readiness of management to pass on product market 
volatility on to the labour force in the form of redundancies. 
Further, as gradual changes in the nature of client-contractor 
relations occur management attempts to undertake piece-meal 
reform of labour relations and production. But such piece-meal 
attempts merely exacerbate labour militancy. This is the 
scenario painted by Scullion and Edwards at Premier Metals when 
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they describe profitability problems leading to manaqemen-- 
attacks on 3ob controls which in turn led to union resistance and 
intensification in the climate of distrust (p. 134-6). There is 
a case that such a scenario existed in the wider engineering 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This review of the secondary literature on shipbuilding, docks, 
construction, aerospace and wider engineering suggests the 
dynamic of opportunism, poor performance and militancy identified 
in the ECI may have more widespread significance. It is not put 
forward as a general model, however. It is put forward an 
important specific form of the widespread phenomenon of shopfloor 
relations consolidating the managerial strategy of the 1960s and 
1970s. 
1980s and Beyond 
A corollary of Metcalf's argument that powerful unions underlay 
the poor performance in the 1960s and 1970s is that the 
'productivity miracle' of the 1980S was primarily caused by 
changes in industrial relations, in particular the 'fear factor' 
of impending unemployment mobilising workers into accepting 
greater flexibility and into working harder (1989: 19). 
This argument is contradicted by the evidence of the ECI where 
the root cause of the improvement in performance against schedule 
lay in the rise of managing contractors, rather than in 
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substantial industrial relations change. Whilst Metcalf is 
ambivalent about how far the 1980s' improvements in productivity 
growth are sustainable, this study suggests that the 1980s 
witnessed a step improvement rather than the establishment of a 
basis for longer term economic development. 
Metcalf's entire focus is upon the constraints which unions 
impose upon the effectiveness of management strategy, with the 
guiding concept that, once unconstrained, management will choose 
an optimum path of economic development. But in the ECI, free 
from constraints of high labour militancy underlain by cabin 
power (which militate in f avour of low trust relations), managing 
contactors in the 1980s adopted a low trust route, implying a 
step improvement. 
There is strong indirect evidence that the productivity 
improvements in the wider economy also represented a step, rather 
than a fundamental shift in productive strategy towards up-market 
restructuring. Firstly, the UK labour force has not become a 
highly skilled labour force in the 1980s, as should be expected. 
As Evans, Ewing and Nolan (1992) note, where flexibility has 
increased it has predominantly not led to a multiskilled 
workforce. Secondly, there is no evidence of an emerging 
sophisticated HRM strategy in the large and growing non-union 
sector. The WIRS 3 data (Millward et al., 1992) clearly shows 
that the institutions associated with a sophisticated HRM 
approach - company councils, quality circles, prof it-related pay 
- are not prominent in the non-union sector. If up-market 
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restructuring had occurred it would be expected that f irms would 
undertake an HRM approach to enlist the necessary commitment. 
Thirdly, 'multinational companies .... have come to see Britain 
not as a base for highly skilled, high value-added production but 
as an ideal location in which to carry out labour-intensive 
assembly and sub-assembly work' (Nolan, 1989: 113). Again 
systematic evidence here is difficult to obtain but Nolan makes 
a strong argument that in the paradigmatic case of motor 
vehicles, the above argument is correct. 
The Thatcher reform approach which suggested that management 
unconstrained would make optimum decisions looks to be 
misconceived. 
9.6. Conclusion 
This thesis began by arguing that industrial relations as a field 
of study was undergoing a transformation, and that the more 
useful development would be a transformation into the study of 
the political economy of production. 
The crisis in the study of industrial relations was related to 
the disintegration of the existence of industrial relations as 
distinct social area. Such a disintegration was evident within 
the ECI. A simple focus, within the traditional definition of 
industrial relations, upon matters pertaining to Job regulation 
would have given only a partial understanding of the meaning and 
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origins of labour militancy. A fuller understanding was only 
possible through a wider focus on the Political economy off 
production, through an analysis not only of the context of labour 
militancy set by capital relations but also of how labour 
militancy interacted with capital relations. 
An alternative form of development was the transformation of 
industrial relations into the study of human resource management. 
Implicit within the HRM approach is the guiding concept that the 
nature of employee relations is a key determinant of economic 
performance such that long term strategies towards employees, 
fostering loyalty and cooperation, should form an important part 
of the wider business strategies of firms. This mistakes A 
particular form of relationship between industrial relations and 
economic performance as THE form. That the relationship between 
industrial relations and economic performance is a more complex 
one than implied by the HRM approach has been amply demonstrated 
in this study of the ECI. Indeed, it has been argued that 
opportunistic contractors have used labour militancy as a tool 
in their relationship with clients in other important sectors of 
the UK economy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Not only clients but labour have had to bear the costs of the 
system of relationships that have existed in the ECI. If this 
study within the framework of the political economy of production 
has shown that labour should not have to bear the blame as well 
as the costs then it has served a useful purpose. 
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APPENDIX-l 
ECONOMI-C-PERFORMANCE DATA - ASSUMPTIONS AND SCREENING 
This appendix sets out in detail the precise assumptions behind 
the presentation of the results of the statistical analysis of 
the economic performance data that was set out in chapter four 
As chapter four outlined, there are three secondary sources for 
the economic performance data - the 1970 NEDO report, the 1976 
NEDO report, and the 1988 NEDO/NJC report. The three sections 
of this appendix deal with each of the sources respectively. 
Each section begins with a reproduction of the relevant sections 
from the tables in the reports, and proceeds to detail the 
particular manner in which this thesis has interpreted the data. 
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1. Data___ for__t__he 1_96_0_s_- the 197_0_NED(--) Report 
TABLE A. l. Power Station Performance_(Source: NEDO, 1_970ý 
Power 
Station 
Delay in Completion 
(months) 
Original 
Constr. 
Ist 
set 
2nd 
set 
3rd 
set 
4th 
set 
5th 
set 
Schedule 
(months) 
1 25 17 9 8* 9 88 
2 3 6 6 60 
3 24 24 29 35 69 
4 24 24 60 
5 5 14 3 - 72 
6 - - - 5 4 35 
7 14 17 8 8 79 
8 29 27 26 27 77 
9 18 6 5 6 78 
10 6 6 3 15 67 
11 7 7 4 3 67 
12 7 3 2 2 83 
13 16 86 
Notes 1. * Based on first synchronising date: resynchronised 
2 years later following accident. 
Source: NEDO, 1970: 125. 
Table A. 1. above gives 'details of excess costs and building 
programme delays at a selection of power stations recently 
completed in GB or still under construction' (NEDO, 1970: 125). 
In the table information is given for delays in completion for 
each set of a power station, whilst the original construction 
schedule is given for the entire project. In order to calculate 
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a schedule delay statistic (i. e. overrun as percentage ot 
original schedule) for each project, for each project the aver--: 1ge 
delay was calculated for each set, and then this average was 
expressed as a percentage of the original construction schedule. 
For instance, for power station 1 the schedule delay was 
calculated by taking an average of 25,17,9,8, and 9 (=13.6), 
and expressing this as a percentage of 88 (15.45%). 
TABLE A. 2. Oil Gasification Plant Performance (Source: NEDO 
1970) 
Duration of Construction 
(months) 
Type of Project Planned Actual Delay 
Refinery Expansion 18 24 6 
Refinery Expansion 18 19 1 
Refinery Expansion 20 25 5 
New Refinery 25 34 9 
New Refinery 21 21.5 0.5 
New Refinery 24.5 24.5 
Oil and Chemical Plant 21 29 8 
Oil and Chemical Plant 12 19 7 
Oil and Chemical Plant 23 23 - 
Oil and Chemical Plant 24 23 -1 
Oil and Chemical Plant 18 19.75 1.75 
Oil and Chemical Plant 27 27 
Oil and Chemical Plant 20 25 5 
Elec. Generating Plant 16 23 7 
Elec. Generating Plant 28-30 30-31 2-1 
Elec. Generating Plant 20 28 8 
Source: NEDO, 1970: 126. 
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Table A. 2. above gives data on 'some ma3or oil and c, -iemic--il T-, 'L7, nt 
T projects constructed in recent years' (NEDO, 1970: 126). In the 
table information is given on sixteen pro3ects in the form of 
planned construction, actual construction and delay. To 
calculate a construction schedule delay statistic for each 
pro3ect, for each project the delay was expressed as -a percentage 
of the original construction schedule. For the fifteenth plant 
in the table the planned schedule is assumed to be 29 months, and 
the delay to be 1.5 months. 
TABLE A. 3. Oil Gasification Plant Performance (Source: NED 
1970) 
Plant Delay in Commissioning 
(months) 
14 
2 2 
3 
4 13 
5 0.5 
6 8 
7 23 
Source: NEDO, 1970: 126. 
Table A. 3. above gives data on 'some major oil gasification 
plants constructed since 1961' (NEDO, 1970: 126). Information is 
given on seven projects in the form of delay in commissioning the 
last unit of the plant for each project. Original construction 
schedules are not given for each project, but the information is 
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given that 'the construction period for these plants usuall-y 
covered a period of two to three years' - From that it is assumed 
that those projects with a delay of longer that 10 months had an 
actual construction period of 36 months, whilst those projects 
with a delay of less than 10 months had an actual construction 
period of 24 months. Enough information now exists to calculate 
schedule delay statistics for each project, e. g. for the first 
plant actual length is assumed to be 36 months, the delay is 
given at 14 months; therefore the construction schedule delay is 
63.6% (=14/(36-14) as a percentage). The seventh project is 
excluded from the statistical analysis. The arbitrary assumption 
concerning actual construction periods means that its schedule 
delay is calculated as 176.9%, far higher than any other schedule 
figure in this period. It should be noted that excluding this 
obviously severely overrun project, effectively treating it as 
an outlier, will serve to weaken the expected relationship 
between time and economic performance. 
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Dat__a___fo_r the 1970s- the 1976 N_EDO--_Re_port 
TABLE A. 4. Performance of 7 Case Study--- Projects Source-: 
--N-EDO, -L 
1976 ) 
Pr03ects Overrun on 
Planned 
Project 
Time 
(1) 
Actual 
Construction 
Time 
(months) 
Actual 
Construction 
Time 
(months) 
Ethylene 68 51 41 
Distillers 41 48 39 
Refinery 1 33 32 27 
Refinery 2 0 37 25 
Methanol Plant 0 28 21 
Power Station 64 87 69 
Power Station 18 73 59 
Source: NEDO, 1976: 10. 
Notes 1. 'For purposes of comparison, project time on power 
stations is measured to synchronisation of the first- 
unit' (NEDO, 1976: 10). 
2. 'Construction time is measured from start of civil 
engineering to completion of construction' (NEDO, 
19 76: 10 ). 
Table A. 4 above gives data on seven projects in terms of actual 
construction time, actual project time, and overrun on planned 
pr03ect time expressed as a percentage. The problem here is that 
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schedule delay is based on the whole project (i. e. . 
4,. -- r, --, mthes -L art 
of design to the plant coming on stream), and not 3ust on the 
construction phase, the latter being the basis for the 
calculation elsewhere in this thesis. The assumption is made 
that the construction schedule delay was equal to the project 
schedule delay (both expressed as percentages). This assumption 
is extremely likely to make the observed construction schedule 
delay lower than the actual construction schedule delay. 
Therefore the assumption will work in the opposite direction than 
the expected direction of the relationship between economic 
performance and time. The observed construction schedule will 
very likely be lower than the actual construction schedule delay 
because, as table A. 5. below indicates, construction schedule 
delays tend to be longer than overall pro3ect schedule delays. 
TABLE A. 5. Performance of 16 Questionnaire Projects (Source: 
NEDO, 1976) 
Design Procurement Construction Overall 
Project 
Percentage 36 28 42 21 
Lateness 
Source: NEDO, 1976: 23. 
Note 1. 'Overall project refers to time from planned start of 
process design to date planned for bringing plant on 
stream' (NEDO, 1976: 23). 
Table A. 5. gives data on sixteen UK projects, with data supplied 
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by clients concerning 'their most recent pro3ects' (NEDO, 
19 76: 23 In the tab!, -- average construction schedule delay is 
given for the whole sixteen nrnýprts not fnr 11 ndividtial 
nrojects. The cumulative average is 42%. It is a weakness that 
this data cannot be broken down by individual pro3ects because 
this prevents the calculation of a number of relevant statistics 
- otmrrPntage. of projects delayed, and schedule delay for orn-lects 
excluding power stations. The inability to separate out the 
power station projects are spel 1 ed out in morp dpta 11 in chantpr 
4, The sum of that discussion was that the exclusion of power 
station projects for other time periods did not substantially 
alter the overall level of schedule delay. 
The key NEDO official responsible for writing the 197-6 NEDO 
report stated that there was no overlap of projects between, 
tables A. 4. and A. 5. above, nor between the projects covered in 
the 1970 report and in the 1976 report. 
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3. Data forthe 1980s - the 198_8___N_EDO/N_JC_Rep=: 
TABLE A. 6. Performance in the 1980s (Source: NEDO/NJC, 19-38) 
Pro3ect Year Performance 
Complete 
Grangemouth Ethanol Plant 1982 One Month 
- BP ahead of 
Schedule 
Easington Gas Terminal - BP 1983 On 
Schedule 
Killingholme Ref 1 nery 1983 5 Months 
Expansion - Lindsey Oil behind 
Schedule 
Culham Joint European 1983 On 
Taurus Nuclear Fusion Schedule 
Reseach Project 
Dalry Vitamin C Production 1983 On 
Plant - Hoffman La Roche Schedule 
Sellafield Site Ion 1984 To Client's 
Exchange Effluent Plant - Satisfaction 
BNFL 
Billingham Nitric Acid 1984 10 Mths Faster 
Plant - ICI Than Previous 
Comparable 
Project 
Pembroke Visbreaker - 1984 3 Months ahead 
Texaco of Schedule 
Barry Silicone Plant 1984 To Client's 
Satisfaction 
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Mossmorran Gas 1984 To Client's 
Shell/Exxon Chemical Satisfaction 
Shell Haven Kero Mode 1984 On Schedule 
Project - Shell 
Sellafield Fuel Handling 1985 To Client's 
Plant - BNFL Satisfaction 
Port Talbot Hot Strip Mill 1985 On Schedule 
- BSC 
Morecambe Bay Barrow Gas 1985 To Client's 
Terminal - British Gas Satisfaction 
Pembroke Continuous 1985 4 Months ahead 
Catalyst Regeneration - of Schedule 
Texaco 
Fife Ethylene Plant Esso 1985 5 Months ahead 
of Schedule 
Stanlow Platformer 3 1985 Ahead of 
Shell Schedule 
Drax B Coal Fired Power 1986 7 Months ahead 
Station - CEGB of Schedule 
Redcar Blast Furnace - BSC 1986 Substantially 
on Schedule 
Easington. Rough Onshore 1986 To Client's 
Storage Facility Satisfaction 
Killingholme Refinery 1987 1 Week behind 
MTBE/TAME Project - Lindsey Schedule 
Oil 
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St. Fergus Fulmar Gas 1987 3 Months 
-ahead Terminal - Shell/Esso of Schedule 
Stanlow Lube Oil Pro3ect 1987 On Schedule 
Shell 
Liverpool Edible Oils Plant 1987 To Client's 
- Bibby Satisfaction 
Immingham Chemical Plant - 1987 Successfully 
Norsk Hydro Completed 
Wilton Power Station Coal 1987 To Client's 
Firing Project Satisfaction 
Heysham 2 Power Station - 1988 On Schedule 
CEGB 
Dimlington Gas Terminal - 1988 On Schedule 
BP 
Shell Cat Cracker 2 Shell 1988 To Client's 
Satisfaction 
Workington PET Plant 1988 On Schedule 
Eastman Kodak 
Washington Car Assembly 1988 On Schedule 
Plant - Nissan 
Severnside Ammonia Plant - 1988 To Client's 
ICI Satisfaction 
Source: NEDO/NJC, 1988. 
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As indicated in chapter four, this data from the 19ý'32) NEL, i--)I', IJC 
report was systematically screened by examining NEL, O f iles 
concerning the compilation of the 1988 report, by sending a 
questionnaire to clients, and by an examination of pro3ect files 
held at the NJC. In this screening process five of the thirty 
two pro3ects were excluded because they were non-nominated 
projects, and therefore likely to have been included to serve the 
purpose of improving the overall picture. A further pro3ect has 
been excluded because a substantial part of its construction 
sch, edule took place prior to the introduction of 1981 national 
agreement. 
To preserve anonymity there is no correspondence between the 
ordering of the screened data a-nd the order of projects in the 
1988 NEDO/NJC report. 
Table A. 7. below gives the scre-ened data. 
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TABLE A. 7. Schedule Delay in__- the 1980s 
_- 
The Scree-ned 
_Data 
Project Planned 
Construction 
Schedule (months) 
Construction 
Overrun (months) 
A 12 2 
B 18 5 
C 24 0 
D 14 0 
E 23 -2 
F 22 -4 
G 30 0 
H 23 -4 
1 51 -5 
J 90 -1 
K 4 0 
L 24 18 
M 11.5 1.5 
N 21 0 
0 24 1.5 
P 75 0 
28 0 
R 22 4- 
S 22 0 
T 22 2 
U 67 14 
V 30 0 
w 27 12 
x 38 -3 
y 24 6 
z 37 0 
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APPENDIX 
-2 
ABSENTEEISM,, TIME 
--- 
DISCIPLINE-, AND WET WEATHER WORKING 
Chapter 7 showed that the labour militancy of the 1960s and 1970s 
embraced issues of both economism and work control. The central 
argument advanced was that whilst miltancy directly exacerbated 
delay, its main significance was that it was used by contractors 
to perpetuate the form of commercial relationships with clients 
which underlay schedule delays. Given that this is the first 
time such an argument concerning labour relations and commercial 
relations has been advanced in academic literature it is 
necessary to substantiate it with detailed evidence. To this 
end, this appendix details the evidence concerning three issues 
of work control - absenteeism, time discipline and wet weather 
working - firstly, in the 1960s and 1970s, and then in the 1980s. 
The section does not add anything new in analytical sense but 
serves to strengthen the empirical basis of the argument. 
The issues are particularly worthy of examination in a discussion 
of labour relations and economic performance given that in the 
survey of contractors undertaken by the 1970 NEDO working party 
10% of contractors put down 'unexpectedly low labour 
productivity' as their first-ranked reason for schedule delay. 
The three issues can be seen as potentially important causes of 
'unexpectedly low labour productivity' (survey discussed in 
chapter 5). 
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1960s-an_d 1970s 
Absenteeism 
In relation to absenteeism in this period, there iis tentat-ive. 
eviclence. that absenteeism tended to be high and that this ---i- was 
often related to the availability of overtime. The 1970 NEDO 
report included as an appendix a case study of a pro. 'i ec t 
researched by the Department of Employment and Product ivity. The 
appendix reports that 'despite the fact that contractors had kept 
the site open for weekend and overtime workii-ng the response was 
very poor. Absenteeism. ... was abnormally high' (p. 104). At the 
1970 wage negotiations at Grangemouth the contractors quoted 
levels of 's-ick absenteeism' between 12.9% and 15.3%' . The 1976 
NEDO report stated that absenteeism on the seven UK projects 
studied ranged from 8% to 15% (p-20). The 1986 NEDO report on 
the Sullom Voe project also noted the existence of high overtime 
and absenteeism. Marshall of the CEGB, in his evidence to the 
Sizewell inquiry, noted that high a-bsenteeism existed with '-ýhe 
reason being that men were able to absent themselves for one dav, 
during the basic working week and make up the earnings potentia-1 
and more at the weekend through the app 1i cat i on of nrp. m i um A-- J; -- - Am - 
payment sf or overt -ime' 
(day 80,, p. 75)ý The 1969 BP document 
detailing notes on the proposed site agreement states that 
lovertime worked at premium rate is often accompan-Jecl by a 
corresponding loss of time at basic rates because of 
absenteeism'. Portus of ! CI (in Wearne, 1970) described the 
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situation at the Wilton site in the mid-60s as, 'a curious 
correlation between overtime and absenteeism was observed, in 
that if the overtime was 25% then the absenteeism was 25%. 
Furthermore it was found that at this level an average attendance 
time of only 40 hours per week per man was being achieved' 
(1970: 31/2 ). At a 1977 NEDO meeting a representative from Shell 
stated that in the mid-60s on Shell sites 'increasing overtime 
led to high absenteeism, the imbalance thereby created in the 
workforce reduced productivity, sending progress spiralling 
downwards'. The high level of absenteeism can be legitimately 
interpreted as a means of the workforce autonomously regulating 
their hours and earnings outwith management control. 
It should be noted from the above that there is a tendency to 
describe levels of absenteeism as 'high' rather than to give 
specific statisics. The paucity of reliable statisical evidence 
on levels of absenteeim is of itself important. The extent of 
contractors' lack of emphasis upon the production process as a 
prof it locus is highlighted by the apparent lack of knowledgs by 
contractors of their own absenteeism levels. The 1986 NEDO 
report on the 1975-82 Sullom Voe project notes that, 
'attention was first turned to this subject in 1978 
when BP asked their contractors to account for their 
absentee levels. Their immediate response was that it 
was within acceptable bounds. Upon further scrutiny, 
however, it was found that absentee levels (including 
certified sickness, absence with and without 
permission and compassionate leave) were at around 16- 
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18% .... It had been app_, 3rent that nn-nnp ln 
fact 
measured the leve o-f 
- 
ahsenteei -, m in anv__. s]yqtema-t 
ma-nn-er. Real is in g thi c; . -R-P esta blished a co. no-M. on 
method of measurement to be appl i ed by a11 contractors 
a IR af1 rs t ster) to understandina thtý R17. P C) fh 
problem and toward taking 
reducing lost time. BP complained that c. ont-ra(-. t-nr. c, -' 
management were. apat ic on the creneral question of het 
absenteeism- The root C; ý 11 -S P wa-s however not 
determined, it could for example have been to 
the question of whet-her or nnt their (Sir) Was 
incentive in the (-ontract' (p. 5-6/7 ) (Pm7phasi s added) . I-I-I-- -- -- -- -- I 
It should be recalled that Sullom Voe was character-ised by the 
use of reimbursable contracts. The point concer-jing the lack of 
knowledge of contractors is echoed iin the evic-lence of Marsha -1-1 
of the. CEGB to the Sizewell Inquiry 'absenteeism statistics 
have often been. very. dif f licult to obtain 
from contractors' (day 
80: para 75). 
The sum of this is to suggest that whilst. it is evident that high 
absenteeism was endemic in thi -, op. ri od and that -ýt 
had a negative. 
effect on progress, this occurred a part'milar material 
context set by contrac-tors' ii-, e of overtime. and further th' 
ab-senteeii-sm went largely unchallenged by contractors- This 
interpretation finds support in the discussion of absenteeism by 
the unpublished 1967 OCPCA report on productivity in which the 
report '-recommends the genera 1 a-dont-ion of (wri tten control 
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procedures' , thus implying that such control procedures were not 
in general usage. This lack of challenge by contractors must be 
understood in the context of their strategic qmphasis on the 
commercial arena as their key profit locus. 
Time 
___Disc 
ipl ine 
Examining time discipline in this period it is appropriate to 
quote the description put forward by the unpublished 1982 NEDO 
report on two refinery projects to the effect that the second 
project 'suffered from the chronic UK difficulty of enforcing 
timekeeping around mealbreaks'. The contractors' working party 
into productivity at Baglan Bay examined the tim(p losses at each 
part of the day and stated that 22 minutes were lost at the start 
of the day due to clocking, changing, washing and collecting 
tools, 25 minutes at the tea break due to work slowing and 
walking, 37 minutes at the meal break for the same reasons, 10 
minutes due to toilet vists, and another 22 minutes at the end 
of the day. This aggregates to a total of two hours lost 
(including the actual paid 10 minute tea break). Whilst, there 
is no evidence on how these statisics were compiled they are 
suggestive of the levels of potential time loss. 
The 1976 NEDO report reports the results of activity samplings 
taken on six UK sites. These results are shown in table A. 8.. 
The active period, that period defined as 'the daily period 
during which under normal circumstances construction should be 
observable .... 
(excluding) all official breaks such as lunch and 
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tea breaks, washing peri ods wa I ki ncr ti me etc- const 1 tuted n 
average 87.40A of the paid day (p. 24). Further, within this 
-active period an average 
35.8% of time was spent 'not on plot', 
which was a 'residual category calculated by deducting the 
observp. c-l number of men on ea-ch round of observations from the 
potentially observable force. providp(I P. ar. h clay hy the. labour 
contractor' (p ý 26 The n-port continues ''not I --- on plot' 
mpasures time away from the pint for whatever reasons. but- thprtm 
is a ctrnna presumpt 1 on that some of thi q absence 
illegitimate' (P. 28). 
TABLE A. 8.1970 NPT)O Rpnnrt Act i vity Sampl i na I; iirvp. ys, - 
Pt=rcentacfe nf ArtivP Ppriod Spent nn Fach ACtivit 
hy the Potentially Observa-ble Labour Force 
Stes 
Act J vi ty, UK! UK2 UK3 UK4 UK 5 UK6 
Construction Work 17 44 3 -8 27 25 31 
Movem nt -1 -1 
11 -15 16 -3 
Miscellaneous 20 27 
I---- 
26 24 27 32 
Not on Plot 52 18 21 33 35 20 
--Jl 
Labour resistance to the discipline of the clock and their self- 
activity in seeking control of their own time played a major part 
in this. At a stage 3 meeting at Baglan Bay in 1971 it was 
reported that there had been sympathy action over the dismissal 
of three men for clocking out at noon on Friday. The contractor 
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concerned agreed to re-instate the men but refused to reimburse 
wages - The FTOs stated that 
'the men were arguing that there is 
a right to clock out'. Determined unilateral action by the 
workforce in taking an afternoon as well as a morning tea break 
was recounted by a delegate at the 1967 AEU-CS conference :- 
'we to take the afternoon tea break on the 
job i was working on. We were penalised in working 40 
hours a week, by losing the tea break and the men were 
suspended for the rest of the day for taking the 
break. There was a meeting of the ! ads and 87 voted 
in favnur of takinq, thp break. 'Rr, Baldwin read the 
riot act, and said that we would get no support from 
anybody, This happened a few times in a few days. in 
e end the lads said 'we w-J-111 have. -a tea 
break the 
afternoon, If the executive council don't support us 
we can't help it We wi 11 not gi ve away tb is 
condition'. We. took that decision and because of 
that the whole of the labour foice was discharged'. 
in the Baglan Bay December 1969 stage 3 minutes it was noted that 
there were to be no facilities to purchase tea, and that 
contractors would lissup. men with flasks which they fill 
themselves beforp arriving'- In the Sentpmher 1971 notes of the 
meetings of contractors' working party into productivity it i -- I --- - --- -- ý 1- is 
stated that 'the site managers referred to the minutes of early 
1970 on the subject of tea -flasks and our attempts to get this 
into operation' . there was a compromi se 'to put it back into the 
changehuts which is actually taking place now' . Tn an interview 
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with the Baglan Bay bollermakers' union FTO it was stated that 
'the lads didn't like flasks. The longest lasting flask was 
approximately 36 hours, and because of the. massive cost of 
replacement the contractors gave up. There was no need to 
organise this resistance, it was spontaneous'. 
It is likely that such instances of overt conflict and resistance 
were the exception. There is good reason to believe that the 
form of de facto deterioration, as described in the minutes of 
a 1969 contractors' meeting concerning the Grangemouth site, was 
more common :- 
'the meeting agreed that a most disappointing 
situation had been reached by the site agents. When 
the agreement was negotiated it was not intended that 
the morning break would be a breakfast break, merely 
a tea one. It was also agreed that such a break would 
be taken in the work area, and a stage 4 meeting 
confirmed that suitable and adequate cover should be 
provided for this purpose. The meeting agreed to 
write to the ETU FTO detailing this and to formally 
state that there was no obligation on part of the 
contractors to supply food faciities during the tea 
break' . 
The previous analysis of contractors' practices in this period 
has indicated that such a situation may have developed without 
any form of challenge by contractors, particularly under a 
reimbursable contract. In this regard it is significant that it 
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was only after the client initiat-ed an invest-igation I nto 
product-1vitv -at 
Baglan Bay. that the level. -, of non-prodi ---ictive. time. 
were recognised as a problem Cnntra-rts at Baglan Bay were. 
mainly reimbursable in nature- 
Wet Weather Wqrkjng 
There is evidence that on occasions the amount of time lost to 
inclement weather conditions could be considerable. At the 1970 
wage negotiations at Grangemouth the contractors stated that 'the 
men seem not to merit working in slightly immoderate weather. 
The vital issue is whether it is raining or not .... (the 
contractors) are constantly bedevilled with this question'. At 
a 1977 stage 3 meeting at Seal Sands the contractors stated that 
4.5% of hours had been lost to 'wet time' 'since the commencement 
of the proiý-(-t-' - The unpublished NEDO report on the two refinery 
projects reported that 3% of hours were lost for inclement 
weather for the second proJect. In relation to their activity 
sampling of site work the 1976 NEDO report stated that 'it was 
noticeable to the observers that there is a lower propensity to 
work during damp weather on UK sites than on those overseas' 
(p. 28). These figures should be taken as suggestive -rat-her than 
precise -indicators. 
There 
iis evidence 
that the self -activity. of 11abour 
is an 
important factor, but to fully understand its; man-ifestati on in 
this, a-rea it liss necessary 
to 1place it in the context of capital 
relations. 
433 
The level of resistance to working in the rain is indicated by 
the statement by the General Secretary of the AEU-CS at a 1968 
stage 4 national meeting with regard to the BP site agreemnet :- 
'he could not accept that his members should work in the rain, 
even though issued with protective clothing, and indicated he 
would take strong action if he found a continuance of this 
attitude being adopted by contractors, which was against his 
trade union's national policy'. The refusal to work in the rain 
still appeared to be strong in Grangemouth in the mid-70s 
according to the minutes of a 1976 stage 3 meeting, in which the 
FTO stated :- 
'the work required the use of a winch which had rain 
water running onto it. The winch operator was offered 
protective clothing but there was a clear 
understanding that in normal circumstances 
riggers/erectors would not be required to work in the 
rain. This was recorded in the stage 4 ipinutes of 
8/11/68. The men, therefore, asked for alternative 
work which would not involve a winch driver doing work 
in the rain but this was refused and although the man 
remained available for work, the Employer withdrew the 
productivity allowance as a discipinary measure 
The Contractors replied that they were well aware of 
the official policy of the AUEW (Constr. Sect. ) 
regarding work in the rain. In this case however, the 
winch driver had been prepared to put on protective 
clothing to operate the winch for some ten minutes 
only so that work could proceed'. 
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There is evidence that AEU-CS resistance to working in the rain 
was stronaer than in other unions. At 'Raal -an 
Bay the 197n rponrt- 
by the Secretary to the contractors' group to the Department of 
Employment and Productivity regarding the effectiveness of the 
site aareement stated that .- 
'most contractors said that the. productivity allowance 
was effective in inducing men to work in marginal 
conditions and recorded a modest improvement in this 
fiý-. ld, with only one excention. This improvement did 
not include the CEU whose attitude to working in 
marginal condition, continued to be generally 
intransigent, Some progress has, however, been 
achieved in that the CEET-J -have on occasions unloaded- 
lorries in damp weather'. 
As well as there being a difference of practices amongst unions 
there is also evidence of a lack of unif ormi ty among contractors. 
At a 196-9 -national staap 
4 mp. ptina nn Granapmouth there were 
discussions surrounding the dismissal of 49 ARTI-CS riggers. The 
FTO stated that ' it was aga iin. st 
his union's, pol J cy to work in the 
rain, unless it was work of an emergency character .... he said 
the problem regarding rain only seemed to occur with Mathew 
Hall' . The notes of a 1978 contractors' meeting regarding 
Grangemouth show a discussion of a5 week strike :- 'Laiings said 
that the strong -support given to the strike might 
indicate that 
there was something in the men's allegations regarding the wet 
weather practices of other contractors. ThRrP was strona, 
pressure from the client for the monitoring of inclement weather 
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practices'. An example of the sort of covert agreement between 
the cabin and individual contr, 91"tOrs which lay behind this 
conflict is given in the minutes of a stage 3 meeting held a 
month later - the contractors stated that 'the labour force. .2, 
were insisting that iff some men were out working on dry jobs the 
remainder in the cabins should be paid the full site rate, it 
had also been alleged that previously men were required to remain 
20-30 minutes in local shelter and then were allowed to return 
to the cabin on full rate. The site. agreement specif ically 
precluded this'. 
The 1967 unpublished OCPCA report on productivity argues that in 
regard to time lost to poor weather 'managements do not pay 
enough attention to alternative. employment' . This a useful 
insight. The effect on progress of the cabin refusing to work 
in the rain would be mitigated if contractors planned ahead such 
that alternative productive work under cover existed. Given the 
evidence elsewhere on the contractors' lack of emphasis on 
production planning it is appropriate to argue that alternative 
productive work would rarely be available. 
Finally, it is also appropriate to argue, as with the issue of 
time discipline, that in situations of reimbursable contracts, 
or situations of instructions to accelerate - situations which 
were common, and deliberately made common by contractors; in the 
Period - contractors, would have little incentive to challenge the 
autonomous regulation of the cabin with regard to wet weather 
working practices. 
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The discussion of absenteeism, time discipline and wet weather 
working undertaken by this section has shown that the self- 
activity of labour in the arena of work control directly 
contributed to low labour productivity. The self-actlivity of 
labour occurred in a material context set by the contractors' 
emphas iis upon the commerc -ig- 
I arena as the main prof it locus, - 
Further, the very practices of labour wh-i(--. h-- contractors allowed 
in the material context of reimbursable contracts and 
instructions to accelerate were used by contractors to 3ustify 
the reproduction of this form of contractual relationship. 
A^^^ -- 
The picture of labour relations and economic performance in the 
1980s which emerged in chapter 8 was that-- the f all ii n 
opportunism, the recession, and the NAECI played important roles 
litancy, The fall in milita in cutting the levels of mi ncy meant 
that 'blaming l1abour' was no 
longer available to contractors as 
a tool in their commercial relations with clients. Further, the 
NAECI had direct commercial implications. The evidence on 
absenteeism, time discipline, and wet weather working confirms 
this picture. 
Absenteeism 
The high levels of absenteeism in the 1960s and 1970s were noted 
above. This was related to the existence of reimbursable 
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contracts, and the systematic and widespread use of overtime. 
The picture was one of workers using ahsentee-ism to regulate. 
their hours and earnings whillst contractors had 11-ittile incentive 
or ability to manage the absenteeism problem. 
Tt is difficult to give a definitive picture of absenteeism in 
the 1980s, in that there was no rentral rý-cnrdinq of ah. gpntpp' 
levels, for p-ro-Jects, and post-joh rpnorts bv P, TCR also failed to 
report on levels. The one instance where a project's high lpvpll 
of absenteelism was discussed by the NiC was that of project A in 
1991. The client t with NiC members and described the 'high' me 
levels of absenteeism on the project - between 6.5% and 7.5% in 
1990 and 1991. This instance stands in contrast to the 1970s 
nrojects with absenteeism between 8% and 18% which were discussed 
above. Tt appears that the chronic absenteeism of the pi. evious 
decades had been ameliorated. 
This improvement can be explained by the fall in overtime in the 
early part of the decade, the absence of reimbursable contracts 
in the 1980s and the increased information flow which stems from 
the NAECI auditing provisions- Contractors, arp rtzaiiired to A--- - 
report monthly lPvpls of ahsentý-Pj-, m on andit fnrmq which are 
subject to PJC, NJC and client inspection. Whereas in the 1970s 
it was, common for neither the contractor nor the client to have 
any knowledge of absenteeism levels, in the 1980s the NAECI 
ensures the existence of such information. 
An important echo of the previous decades, however, was that it 
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was the client at site A, and not the contractors, who was 
concerned with high absenteeism. The client (and contractor lack 
of) concern is intimated in a 1991 letter from the client to the 
NJC Director which states, 'we shall be of course be discussing 
these statistics [on absenteeism] with the Contractors Group' 
This tends to confirm the picture of the contractors' continued 
lack of focus upon productive efficiency. 
Time Discipline 
It was argued above that, considerable production time was lost 
at the beginning and end of the work day and at tea and meal 
breaks. This was related not only to labour militancy in the 
sphere of work control but also to contractor non-enforcement in 
the context of reimbursable contracts and instructions to 
accelerate. 
Given evidence in chapters 5 and 6 that contractors largely 
continue to stress the generation of additional payments, it can 
be expected that a substantial change is unlikely to have 
occurred. The evidence does not paint a clear picture but can 
tentatively be interpreted as supporting this expectation. 
Whilst the introduction of electronic card swiping instead of 
mechanical card pushing on 2 projects in 1987 as well as at site 
in 1991 imply a greater enforcement of time discipline, 
especially as the clocking also applied to the meal break, there 
are other pieces of evidence which tend to contradict this. The 
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PJC minutes of a site on which there has been continuous 
construction for the decade reveal a slackening of enforcement. 
In 1983 at a contractors' group meeting 6 of the 14 contractors 
stated that their workforces took their tea at the immediate 
place of work, but in 1987 the client stated that at the 
beginning of the decade tea breaks were taken 'in very close 
proximity to the place of work' but that increasingly this was 
no longer the case. 
Further, at site C the f irst contractors on site had not operated 
the new NAECI provisions on 'bell to bell' working concerning the 
changing into work clothes after clocking out. One contractor 
attempted enforcement of the provisions, which led to labour 
force resistance in the form of unilateral changing of work 
clothes before clocking out. At this point the other contractors 
had still not attempted enforcement. The client then pressured 
the contractors to enforce in unison. The interpretation of the 
client's industrial relations officer was that 'without client 
intervention, lef t to contractorss, bell to bell would have 
withered and died'. 
A similar theme of the client pressuring the contractors to 
enforce. ti-me discli-pilline, w-i--- th the corollary that witho"t client 
pressure enforcement of time discipline was manifest on 
s-ite A. The Dii-rector-level client official responsible for the 
completion of the construction project had visited the site and 
had been so 'appalled' at the lack of work activity some ten to- 
fifteen minutes after the lunch break period that he called an 
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immediate meeting of site managers to cr-it-ic. -ise them 
for allowing 
this situation and to demand an improvement, 131 ml 1 arl y; the 
industrial relations officer of the managing contractor on site 
D noted that 'a constant bollocking of construction management 
was needed regarding the morning and lunch breaks', 
Before. bell to bell provisions introduced in 1 990 th -e NAECT 
had 
no role in aiding the tightening of time discipline, in 1982 
there were two references from contractors to the national level, 
stage. 4, of the disputes procedure seeking a reduction in 
'walking time'. Similarly, the union side pursued a reference 
to stage 4 in 1983 against the introduction of mechanical 
clocking on one site. The panel supported the union case . 
The panel rejected these attempts to tighten time discipline 
because of the explicit understanding between the contractors and 
the union that the NJAECI would not be used to underm-i-ne existing 
custom and practice in certain areas, which emerged primarily to 
be demarcation and time discipline. This limitation on the scope 
of the NAECI should be seen as flowing from the limits on the 
autonomy of the national union officials. Given the, at best, 
lack of enthusiasm of their members for the NAECI, there were 
1-im-its beyond which they could not go despite the reversal in the 
flow of authority -and 
the growth of representative democracy, 
The 1990 NAECT bell to bell provisions emerged from the 
contractors' reaction to the union demands for -a cut 
in the 
working week from 39 to 38 hours, with the tightening of time 
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discipline seen as a compensatory device. As such it would be 
difficult to interpret an attempt to enforce it as a sign of an 
increasing emphasis among contractors on the efficient 
organisation of production. At sites B and D it was being 
tightly enforced from the start. of the projects. Its 
introduction at site A was described above - At site A the client 
had made the decision that there would be no attempt to enforce 
the provisions given that strong labour resistance would be 
expected, as the labour force had already been well established 
on site under the old conditions. The labour force was still 
relatively small and newl on site C when bell to bell had been 
introduced and it had engendered resistance as described earlier. 
Three mass meetings were called on the subject and there was a 
unanimous vote that if anyone was dismissed over this there would 
be a site-wide walk-out. In addition this spurred the formation 
of a shop steward committee on the site. 
The lack of resistance at sites B and D can be related to the 
fact that in both instances the client or managing contractor 
took into account the operation of bell to bell working in the 
design of the site lay-out, in the design of the project itself. 
On being asked whether the NAECI provisions had affected 
decisions concerning design and lay-out, the industrial relations 
manager of the client at site stated that 'it certainly 
concentrated our minds on the issue'. Here, there is another 
strand in the relationship between the labour relations and 
commercial arenas such that institutions of labour relations 
inform the realisation of the economic improvements through the 
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integration of design and construction. It will be recalled from 
chapter 6 that the form of low trust conflictual capital 
relations militated against such an integration. 
An example of the lack of the integration of design and 
construction and the problems that this can cause for the 
management of time discipline was evident at Heysham 2 power 
station. The post-job report prepared by the PJC notes that 'a 
considerable amount of unrest occurred when it was decided that 
clocking stations .... must be moved to the 4.5 metre level .... 
The unrest was not created by the move itself, but by an 
inability to move men in large numbers to and from the work areas 
without frustration'. This was in part due to 'insufficient 
hoist capacity to cater for the large numbers involved'. 
Wet Weather Workin 
Above it was indicated that in the 1960s and 1970s significant 
time could be lost due to 'inclement weather conditions'. This 
was related to cabin militancy in the context of reimbursable 
contracts, and the failure of contractors to plan alternative 
work under- cover. 
The problems with evidence which were discussed under absenteeism 
also apply here. Despite the lack of systematýc data on time 
lost to the weather conditions, there is evidence on one case, 
namely, the PJC post-job report on the St. Fergus project which 
describes 0.8% of hours lost to the weather as 'substantial'. 
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This indicates that there has been a drop in the hours lost 
because this level in the 1960s and 1970s would have been 
regarded as modest, At St. Fergus the NAECI played an important 
role in limiting and channellina the cabin militancy -- 'fnur 
cases were. taken to stage four regarding inclement weather, and 
evolved around whether the workforce or the management decided 
when they cab-ined up in event of inclement weather. It was 
extremely difficult to get this message (i. e. management 
prerogative) across to the workforce'. The NAECI explicitly. 
grants managerial prerogative on this issue and states that 
workers must work in týe rain in protective clothing. The 
auditing provision is also important in that the client or 
managing contractor has knowledge of levels of time lost. The 
problem of getting across the message of managerial prerogative 
is intensified when the contractor is unw-J-111-ing to use the NAECI 
Provisions, and allows a position where in light rain, 50% 
continue to work, 50% stay, in the cabin; and all the workforce 
are paid the full bonus. This was the case for contractor D. a. . 
Conclusion 
This appendix has provided additional evidence on important areas 
of work control, The evidence conf irms the arguments of chapters 
7 and 8 that in the 1960s and 1970s the high levels of labour . -I 
militancy had to be understood in relation to the emphasis of 
contractors on profit outwith production. The fall in militancy 
in the 1980s in effect facilitated the curbing of contractors' 
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opportunism by blocking the previous ability of contractors to 
blame slow building on recalcitrant labour. 
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